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coding for analysis of the pilot data, and confirmed that the final selection of attributes 
seemed reasonable, but has had no further involvement in the project since the end of the 
piloting stage. 
 
I conducted about 50 / 60 of the interviews during the piloting stage. Dr Anil Gumber 
conducted the remainder because he is bilingual, and could therefore interview ethnic 
minorities. The piloting stage involved respondents ranking attributes, having the opportunity 
to suggest others, and then filling in a questionnaire. After piloting I analyzed the data using 
STATA. I then organized the printing and mailing out of flyers for enclosure in the publication 
Kidney Life (20,000 flyers). When responses came back (with clerical support) I ensured that 
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we sent out questionnaires to the patient, carer, donor, and healthcare worker respondents. 
In addition to this I organized a separate mailing to live donors and relatives of deceased 
donors via the British Organ Donor Society (BODY). The mailing to healthcare workers was 
organized by Nicholas West (transplant co-coordinator) and Dr Robert Higgins from the 
University Hospital in Coventry. Dr Anil Gumber arranged for questionnaires to be translated 
into 5 other languages for non-English speaking respondents. To ensure we had a large 
enough sample of respondents from ethnic minority groups, he also visited hospitals to obtain 
responses from ethnic minorities. Dr Domenico Moro was involved in early analysis of the 
data using STATA v. 7, but all the analysis in chapters 5, 6, and 8 was conducted by me 
using STATA 9.2 (which allows for the calculation of confidence intervals using the delta 
method). Professor Ala Szczepura assisted by arranging meetings to help manage the 
project, and being a constant source of encouragement and support and proof reading final 
chapters. 
 
With respect to the analysis in Chapter 5 of the thesis which I conducted and wrote up, Dr 
Higgins looked through a draft and made some small changes and small additions to the text. 
He also suggested other key references for inclusion in the associated paper that has been 
submitted to BMC Nephrology, and he is assisting me with final revisions (due back by 31st 
May 2012) prior to publication. Professor Leech gave me feedback on the econometric 
notation used. The authorship of the associated paper will be: Mr Michael D. Clark, Dr Anil K. 
Gumber, Professor Dennis Leech, Dr Domenico Moro, Professor Ala K. Szczepura, Mr 
Nicholas West, and Dr Robert M. Higgins. Much of the material in Chapter 6 of the thesis has 
already been published in the journal Diversity in Health, and the authorship for that paper 
was the same as for the paper submitted to BMC Nephrology. I analyzed the data and wrote 
the chapter, and published paper. Some minor changes were suggested by co-authors and 
peer reviewers, which I took on board. 
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In relation to the data analysis in Chapter 7, I had support from Dr Domenico Moro who 
familiarized me with how to conduct Mixed Logit and LCM, and also programming using 
GLAMMs in STATA.  Although, I found learning how to conduct Mixed Logit straightforward, I 
did not fully grasp how to conduct Latent Class Modelling using GLAMMs the first time 
around. Therefore the LCM data analysis was conducted by me and him, under the direction 
of Dr Moro. That said I will shortly have to use LCM again to analyze data for my new renal 
dialysis DCE. I am therefore confident that having worked on LCM once again alongside Dr 
Moro, I will reach the point at which in future I could conduct such LCM analysis unaided. 
When it came to the written analysis contained in Chapter 7 I decided which econometric 
models to include, interpreted results, and wrote the chapter. A couple of helpful comments 
were made when I presented an early draft of analysis in Chapter 7 at the Health Economics 
Study Group in Bangor last year, which I took on board. Moreover, Professor Szczepura 
proof read the final chapter. 
 
It was my idea to include both Eq-5d and VAS in the patient renal transplant questionnaire 
(see Appendix E) because I wanted to explore possible links between quality of life and DCE 
preferences. I also had the idea of exploring whether there might be a link between the 
perspective patients adopted when answering the questionnaire (i.e. altruistic or otherwise) 
and preferences (Chapter 8). I conducted all the data analysis for Chapter 8, and wrote the 
chapter. The material in that chapter was also proof read by Professor Szczepura.  Also, 
Michael Alexander provided clerical assistance. 
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Introduction to the thesis. 
Chapter 1 of the thesis is divided into 5 sections. Section A begins by defining a 
Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE), and outlines the key stages involved in 
conducting a DCE. Sections B and C outline theories underpinning DCE analysis. 
Section B outlines the characteristics theory of demand, whilst section C, explains 
random utility theory (RUT), compensating variation (CV), marginal willingness to 
pay (MWTP), and willingness to pay (WTP) analysis. Section D of the thesis 
provides a review of the DCE literature. Section E outlines the research questions 
addressed in the thesis including calculating WTP and hypothetical bias; the 
description of the cost attribute; preference heterogeneity; and altruism. 
Chapter 2 shows how DCEs can be used to calculate WTP, using a DCE relating to 
Deep Vein Thrombosis (DVT). The regression results are used to show how MWTP 
can be calculated, and to construct value functions to predict the probability of 
uptake for service options, also welfare changes are calculated using a CV formula. 
Chapter 3 uses data from a DCE applied to Menstrual disorder and Gynaecology 
patients. It evaluates an experimental method I developed to establish whether 
respondents might fail to factor in the monetary attribute into their DCE decision 
making, leading to hypothetical bias. All the DCE questionnaires for this data 
analysis had a monetary descriptor described as ‘cost to you.’ Using interaction 
dummy variables I then established whether estimated WTP differed between 
respondents who claimed not to take the monetary attribute into account in their 
decision making, and others who said they did or sometimes took it into account.  
Chapter 4 applies essentially the same DCE design but only analyses data from 
Gynaecology patients. The scenarios are the same as those used for the DCE in 
chapter 3, except that there are 3 different descriptors for the monetary attribute. I 
tested for statistically significant differences in MWTP between DCE questionnaires 
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using each of the descriptors of the monetary attribute. I also repeated the test 
conducted in chapter 3 (for statistically significant differences in MWTP according to 
whether respondents took the monetary attribute into account). 
Chapters 4-8 all use data obtained from a DCE relating to preferences for different 
allocation criteria for allocating kidneys for transplantation. Chapters 5 and 6 look at 
preference heterogeneity which is observable using interaction dummy variables 
(the issue of unobserved preference heterogeneity is considered in chapter 7). 
Chapter 5 establishes how marginal rates of substitution (MRS) differ between 
different respondent groups including renal patients, healthcare professionals, live 
donors / relatives of deceased donors, carers, and ethnic minority versus non-ethnic 
minority patients. Chapter 6 establishes how MRS differs between non-white ethnic 
minority patients versus other patients; South Asian patients versus other patients; 
and according to respondent gender. Chapter 7 of the thesis compares results from 
models which do not cater for unobserved preference heterogeneity, with results 
from models which do. Initially 2 basic models which do not cater for preference 
heterogeneity at all (because they do not include dummy variables) are applied 
including random effects logit and conditional logit. Then models catering for 
unobserved preference heterogeneity including Mixed Logit and a Latent Class 
Model (LCM) are used. Finally there is an analysis involving the application of 
conditional logit with interaction dummy variables. Chapter 8 of the thesis explores 
how preferences might differ according to how altruistic respondents are. It 
establishes how respondent preferences differ according to respondent self-
disclosed perspective when answering DCEs. In other words whether they claimed 
to answer the DCE in terms of what would be best for me; what would be best for 
me and others; or what is best for others. 
Finally chapter 9 involves a discussion of the findings emerging from the thesis, and 
draws conclusions about the merits of material contained in it.   
1 
 
Chapter 1: Explaining the nature of Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs), and their 
foundations in economic theory, a review of DCE literature in health, and setting out 
the key issues examined in the thesis. 
 
Introduction. 
 
In section A of this chapter I begin by defining a DCE and then explaining the key stages 
involved in conducting one. In sections B and C the theoretical foundations of DCE analysis 
are explained. In section B the characteristics theory of demand is outlined, and details 
provided of how the theory can be used to allow for the assumption that chacteristics of 
goods or services can be valued in utility terms separately as with DCEs. In section C other 
theories underpinning DCE analysis are explained including random utility theory (RUT), 
Compensating Variation (CV), Marginal Willingness to Pay (MWTP) and Willingness to Pay 
(WTP). 
 
Section D of this chapter outlines the key findings of 2 previously published reviews of the 
healthcare DCE literature relating to the period 1990-2008. I then updated these reviews by 
adding in the details of a further 96 papers published between 2009-2011. In section E of the 
chapter having conducted this literature review in section D, I then go on to outline 4 key 
methodological issues that the thesis will address in subsequent chapters. 
 
A.1. What is a DCE? 
 
Discrete choice experiments (DCEs) like Conjoint Analysis involves the application of a stated 
preference technique in order to establish respondent’s valuation of attributes / characteristics 
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of a good or service or health state. However, unlike some Conjoint Analyses which are 
incompatible with random utility theory, DCEs are underpinned at a theoretical level by both 
Lancaster’s characteristics theory of demand, and random utility theory (RUT) (see sections B 
and C of this chapter).  DCEs therefore involve an attempt to value key defined attributes / 
characteristics of a good service, or health state, in a manner which is compatible with RUT.  
 
A.1.1. key stages involved in conducting a DCE. 
 
A number of key stages are associated with conducting a rigorous DCE.  
 
1) Identifying a DCE application: Inevitably before embarking upon a DCE the suitability of 
a particular application has to be assessed. This should be an application in which underlying 
utility can in theory be separable (i.e.  it should be possible to apply DCEs in order to 
establish how utility might be related to the levels of attributes /characteristics of a good, 
service, or health state, etc). Note although more basic DCE designs assume complete 
separability of utility, more elaborate designs are also possible in which potential interactions 
between attributes (i.e. whereby the utility value of levels of a given attribute is related to the 
levels of another or other attributes included a DCE) are explored. DCEs have been applied 
to a wide range of health related applications (for further details see sections D3 and D7.1.), 
and have involved the presentation of a wide range of summary outcome measures (see 
section D7.2).  
 
2) Identifying DCE attributes and levels:  A variety of strategies can be undertaken to 
identify suitable attributes to include in a DCE design (Coast and Horrocks 2007). Very often 
the first step involves conducting literature searches using appropriate databases and then 
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reviewing any literature obtained to establish whether it sheds some light upon what the 
attributes and levels might be. Sometimes expert opinion might be consulted. For example if 
it’s a DCE for a health application, the advice of healthcare professionals who understand the 
issues surrounding the proposed application might be consulted in order to help inform an 
initial selection of attributes and levels for the DCE perhaps through interviews. Interviews or 
focus groups can also be conducted with individuals from the respondent group(s) who will 
ultimately be asked to complete a DCE in order to establish which attributes and levels might 
be valued by those who complete a DCE. Sometimes as (Coast and Horrocks 2007) point out 
patient surveys have been used to inform attribute and level selection. On other occasions  
suggestions have emanated from expert reviews (Hall, Kenny et al. 2002), or from the 
findings of clinical trials (Bryan, Buxton et al. 1998); (Ryan and Hughes 1997)). 
 
3) Piloting the DCE: Although some DCEs have been undertaken without undertaking a pilot 
DCE first, the benefits of initial piloting and analysis of pilot data econometrically are 
considerable (a pilot DCE will need to be designed appropriately like a final DCE – see (4) 
below).  More to the point if thorough qualitative analysis is not conducted to develop the 
attributes and levels then “lack of evidence of rigour casts doubts on the thoroughness of this 
work and thus the value of resulting DCMs” (Coast and Horrocks 2007). Personally, 
whenever I now embark upon a DCE, I ensure that I include a thorough pilot analysis, to 
obtain a mixture of both qualitative and quantitative information. Qualitative information can 
be obtained via either one-to-one interviews (Coast and Horrocks 2007), or via group 
discussions in focus groups / citizens juries.  If one-to-one interviews are conducted during 
piloting of questionnaires, then ‘think-aloud’ exercises can be used (Ryan, Watson et al. 
2009) to establish what meaning respondents attach to information contained in questionnaire 
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preambles; to the experimental pilot questionnaires attributes and levels; and also to other 
questions which might need to be posed relating to respondent characteristics, etc.  
 
If a DCE involves the inclusion of a monetary attribute then particular attention needs to be 
paid to its appropriate description (in the interests of incentive compatibility). Moreover, 
piloting is needed to establish appropriate levels for the monetary attribute. The choice of 
monetary descriptor may be more straightforward, and the task of establishing appropriate 
levels for the monetary attribute simpler, if a DCE is applied in a context in which respondents 
currently have to pay for the healthcare provision in question. However, in many cases DCEs 
are applied to place a monetary valuation (using Willingness to Pay analysis [WTP] or 
Willingness to Accept  [WTA] analysis) upon a good service or form of healthcare provision 
which is currently free at the point of use (or would be if it were to be made available). In 
these circumstances particular attention needs to be paid to ensure that the descriptor for the 
monetary attribute is as ‘incentive compatible’ as possible (i.e. the monetary attribute is 
phrased in such a manner that respondents are most likely to divulge their true trade-off 
between money and the other attributes, thereby providing an accurate indication of WTP or 
WTA). Also there is a need to ensure that an appropriate range is specified for the levels of 
the monetary attribute. This is because the range specified for the monetary attribute may 
affect estimated WTP or WTA. Moreover, if the range specified for the monetary attribute is 
not appropriate this can result in the monetary attribute appearing to be insignificant in 
econometric results (when in reality respondents would have valued changes in the monetary 
attributes, had changes been expressed over a more appropriate monetary range).   
 
Unfortunately there is no definitive ‘correct’ method which can be applied to establish an 
appropriate range for the monetary attribute.  However, the use of mainstream WTP 
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techniques including open-ended WTP / WTA analysis, or perhaps more appropriately using 
a series of payment cards to establish the ceiling level for the range for WTP / WTA, are 
approaches which are sometimes adopted.    
 
During piloting it is also possible to extract information from respondents about whether they 
consider the range of attributes and levels included in the pilot DCE is appropriate, and also 
to invite respondents to suggest other possible attributes (or modifications to existing 
attributes) or changes to attribute levels. Respondents can also be invited (if they are filling in 
a pilot DCE questionnaire) to identify attributes currently specified in the pilot questionnaire, 
which they consider should either be excluded or amended for the purposes of the final DCE 
design. It is also possible to include attribute ranking exercises during piloting. These involve 
asking pilot respondents to rank the attributes already included in a DCE (plus others they 
suggest or other pilot respondents have suggested) in order of importance to them.   
 
Whilst attribute ranking exercises might be of some value, one limitation of the approach is 
that respondents valuation  of attributes might be a function of how much they value the 
stated levels for attributes (so that if specified attribute levels were changed their rankings 
might). Nonetheless, as long as the potential limitations of ranking exercises are recognised, 
information from attribute ranking exercises might provide an additional valuable source of 
information. Alternatively, other more qualitative iterative approaches can be adopted (Coast 
and Horrocks 2007)) in the interests of identifying and correctly phrasing DCE attributes and 
levels. 
 
If enough respondents complete a pilot DCE questionnaire then the data can be analysed 
using an appropriate econometric technique. An analysis of the pilot data can provide 
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information about whether attributes (and sometimes levels of attributes) prove significant.  
Also if the pilot DCE questionnaire is framed to gather information about possible interaction 
effects between attributes, then it is possible to establish whether these interaction terms are 
significant in a pilot design, before catering for interactions (or perhaps the lack of 
interactions) in the final DCE design. 
 
The quantitative information from analysis of pilot DCE data can be used alongside qualitative 
information, and perhaps quantitative information from pilot attribute ranking exercises to 
inform the specification of appropriate attributes and levels for inclusion in the final DCE 
analysis. In short conducting a rigorous pilot DCE analysis is essential in order to ensure that 
the final DCE design incorporates the most appropriate DCE attributes and levels. Moreover, 
the pilot exercise can be used to ensure interactions between attributes are appropriately 
catered for in the final DCE design. Also, qualitative feedback can help to ensure that 
attributes and levels are explained in a straightforward manner to DCE respondents. The pilot 
exercise can also be used to ensure that the range of additional socio-economic and other 
respondent information requested when a DCE is finally applied is appropriate, and that 
questions are framed in a manner which respondents can understand.  
 
4) Designing a DCE: Careful attention is required in DCE design.  If the design is for a pilot 
DCE, then the quality of information feeding into the DCE design (about attributes and levels 
for inclusion in the design) will not generally be as refined as for a final DCE. Nonetheless, 
even for pilot DCEs, it is usually possible to obtain information from the literature and from 
interviews with a small number of healthcare professionals in order to inform attributes and 
level selection for the pilot questionnaire. 
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If a pilot DCE has already been applied then the findings from quantitative analysis of pilot 
DCE data, and attribute ranking exercises (if they are conducted) alongside findings from 
qualitative analysis including interviews (sometimes involving ‘think-aloud exercises) or focus 
groups (or other sources of information noted in 1 above) can be used to help inform the final 
selection of attributes and levels for the final DCE design. Researchers should also seek any 
information they can obtain during piloting, about whether respondents’ valuation of attributes 
and levels overlap in utility space, and therefore whether two, or three way interactions ought 
to be incorporated in DCE designs.  
 
One key consideration in the design of a DCE is to work out how many options respondents 
should be allowed to choose from per scenario.  
  
A forced choice of one of two options may be useful if only 2 options are necessary and you 
want to avoid respondents having a ‘don’t know’ option because they may be tempted to tick 
that box in preference to carefully choosing between the other 2 options (i.e. in cases for 
which the difference in utility between the 2 options is not that great and careful thought is 
required). However a forced choice approach has the disadvantage that respondents can 
only register their true ‘indifference’ between 2 options by not answering the question at all, 
rather than ticking a ‘would not choose either’ option. Therefore, even if there are only 2 
options to choose between, some DCEs designs allow respondents to register a third ‘don’t 
want to choose’ type of response.  
 
In some contexts of course it may be applicable for respondents to face a choice between 
more than 2 options (which requires the use of multinomial models for data analysis 
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purposes, rather than binary dependent models which can be used if respondents only 
choose between 2 options).  
 
DCE designs can be tailored to provide for the presentation of different numbers of options 
i.e. 2, 3 or more to options. Therefore, working out how many options respondents should 
face and how these ought to be presented is an important aspect of the DCE design, and an 
issue that needs to be addressed ideally during the pilot stage of DCE design.  
 
For both pilot and final DCEs, if the number of attributes and levels is very small then it may 
be possible to apply a full factorial DCE design (i.e. use a design template which 
encompasses the full possible range of each attribute’s levels). In contrast fractional factorial 
designs attempt to infer utility from a sub-set of scenarios which are comprehensive enough 
to enable utility to be inferred from a more limited range of choice scenarios that are 
presented to respondents.  Most DCEs deploy fractional factorial designs because they 
involve specifying multiple attributes with multiple levels. As such, they would require the 
presentation of too many attributes and levels to respondents if a full, rather than fractional, 
factorial design was deployed.  
 
By definition full factorial designs simply involve presenting respondents with all the attributes 
and all the different combination of attribute levels that may potentially arise, given the 
number of attribute and levels included in the design. So applying such designs is usually 
impractical unless the number of attributes and levels are both very low. If a fractional 
factorial design is applied then different approaches can be used to create an appropriate 
design (see section D.4).  The standard approach for linear models is to adopt an orthogonal 
design (in which variations of attributes and alternatives are uncorrelated in all choice sets) 
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and then integrate them into choice designs (Amaya-Amaya M, Gerard et al. 2008). The 
approaches adopted usually involve the use of fractional factorial designs from catalogues or 
from the internet, or use of software packages (such as SPEED, SPSS, SAS, or other 
packages). Other approaches involve the use of “foldover” or “foldover with random pairing” 
type designs (see section D.4 for further details), or adopt statistically efficient designs (once 
again see section D.4 for further details), and the computer package SAS can be used to 
generate a D-optimal design. 
 
D-optimal designs are allowed to deviate a little from orthogonal designs because they permit 
some limited correlations between attributes. This is in the interest of allowing ‘efficient’ 
estimation using smaller sample sizes. The package SAS (which uses a D-optimal approach) 
like some other packages is amenable to generating design templates for DCEs in which 
choice options are ‘labelled.’ Labelled choice DCEs are applicable if the choice between 
different options is not just a function of differences in attributes, but also of mode of choice.  
An example of this is the DCE I am currently undertaking (mentioned above), relating to 
healthcare professional, carer and patient preferences for different types of kidney dialysis. 
With kidney dialysis, some attributes of dialysis must assume certain attribute levels 
conditional upon the mode of dialysis adopted. For example with peritoneal dialysis, a small 
operation to the stomach is required (so that patients are dialysed via the stomach), whereas 
with haemodialysis blood is usually obtained and replaced via a fistula to the arm or neck. 
Therefore in such circumstances, in which the characteristics or attributes of provision are 
determined by mode of delivery, the nature of choice can only be appropriately presented 
using a labelled choice DCE approach. With labelled choice DCEs it is possible to value 
individual characteristics / attributes alongside a label which is also valued in utility terms 
(which may relate to mode of delivery, brand, name of supplier, etc). 
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5) Analysing DCE data:  DCEs by definition must be compatible with random utility theory 
(RUT). This means that the data need to be analysed using an econometric model which is 
compatible with RUT. If only two choices (with no opt-out) are presented to a respondent (and 
preferences are not heterogeneous), then either Random Effects Logit or Random Effects 
Probit are probably the most appropriate models to adopt to analyse the DCE data 
econometrically.  
 
If respondents are presented with more than 2 options, or 2 options plus an opt-out then the 
data can be analysed using a multinomial model such as multinomial logit (MNL). It should be 
noted that as discussed in section D.5 of this chapter, the MNL model can be applied if 3 
main simplifying assumptions hold. MNL models are applicable if the following can 
reasonably be assumed: 
 
(i) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). 
(ii) Error terms are independently and identically distributed (IID) across observations. 
(iii) No taste heterogeneity. 
 
However, as discussed in section D.5, other models can be adopted if it is thought that any of 
these assumptions do not hold. For example, there are models which relax the IIA 
assumptions by allowing for more flexible error distributions i.e.  Nested Logit and multinomial 
probit models. There are also heteroskedatic models which relax the IID assumption. 
Furthermore, there are models which cater for preference heterogeneity such as Mixed Logit 
(MXL) and Latent Class Models (LCM). 
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6) Presentation of DCE results: In section D of this chapter, I provide an overview and 
review of the DCE literature in the health field. In section D.7.1, I indicate the range of 
previous DCE health applications, and in section D7.2. I show how the output of DCEs has 
been presented in these analyses. When conducting DCEs it is logical to present results in 
terms of one or more key outcome measures. 
 
These might involve expressing the value of attributes in terms of per willingness to pay unit; 
per time unit (perhaps waiting time); per risk unit; in terms of a monetary welfare measure; in 
terms of a utility score; in terms of odds ratios; or in terms of probability scores; or other 
summary outcome measures as outlined in section D.7.2.  
 
The choice of appropriate key outcome measure(s) will depend upon the nature of the DCE 
application, and also the range of attributes specified in the DCE. The outcome measure(s) 
used should be tailored to the actual research question that needs to be addressed. So for 
example measures such as per WTP unit or a monetary welfare measure may be particularly 
appropriate outcome measures to include in a DCE analysis if researchers want to conduct a 
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA).  
 
A measure such as ‘per time unit’ (which could be framed as waiting time) might be 
particularly appropriate in contexts where healthcare is free at the point of use (which might 
render summary outcome measures such as Willingness to Pay [WTP] subject to hypothetical 
bias). Because it has been argued that state funded healthcare systems often ration through 
the use of queues, a summary outcome measure such as willingness to wait (assuming a 
DCE includes an attribute relating to waiting time) may be more appropriate in such contexts. 
Summary outcome measures relating to risk units might be particularly appropriate if DCEs 
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are applied in contexts such as screening, diagnosis, or medical decision making, when the 
decisions to be addressed relates to how much respondents value increasing or reduced 
levels of risk. Utility scores can be used as summary outcome measures, but they may have 
the disadvantage that respondents may not be able to comprehend the value of the particular 
utility scores presented. Odds ratios may be useful if the information is required in relation to, 
for example, adoption rates of drugs or interventions. Equally, presenting results in terms of 
probability scores may be of value if DCEs are applied in contexts in which establishing 
relative probabilities is the main issue that a DCE needs to address. 
 
When writing up DCE results it is good practice to provide a comprehensive account of the 
key stages that researchers have followed (i.e. steps 1-6 above). Moreover, when conducting 
DCEs it is common practice to incorporate some validity checks (see section D.6 of this 
chapter). Details of any validity checks undertaken, as well as of qualitative methods used to 
enhance DCE process and results, should be included when presenting DCE study results. 
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B. The theoretical underpinnings of Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs) – The 
Characteristics Theory of Demand).   
 
B1. The characteristics theory of demand. 
 
(Lancaster 1966) provided a thorough characteristics theory of demand based on a critique of 
conventional consumer theory. He argues that “those properties that make a diamond quite 
obviously something different from a loaf of bread have been omitted from the theory” so that 
“the only property which the theory can build on is the property shared by all goods, which is 
simply that they are goods.” (Lancaster 1966) In other words he is saying that with 
conventional demand theory, demand is for goods or services, but that the theory makes no 
reference to their inherent characteristics.  His ‘new approach’ therefore relates utility and 
demand to inherent characteristics. This is why this theory can provide the theoretical 
foundations for the use of DCEs, because DCEs relate utility to the inherent characteristics of 
goods or services.  
 
Lancaster argued that conventional theory does not adequately deal with differences in 
goods, so it is ill equipped to deal with newly emerging differentiated goods, or by implication 
newly emerging services. One of the advantages of applying Discrete Choice Experiments is 
that you can value differentiated goods and services in terms of their differences in 
characteristics, and thereby relate differences in utility directly to differences in characteristics 
(referred to as the ‘attributes’ of a DCE). 
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B1.1.The characteristics theory of demand, and predicting demand. 
 
With conventional theory, shifts in demand are often interpreted as changes in taste, a notion 
dismissed by Lancaster as ‘non-operational’ as “there is no way of predicting the relationship 
between preference before and after the change.” (Lancaster 1966)1 With Lancaster’s 
framework though, since it is characteristics which are valued, goods or services which 
provide different configurations of characteristics (i.e. newly emerging goods), can be valued 
in terms of the value of their new inherent characteristics. Moreover, Discrete Choice 
Experiments (and Conjoint Analysis more generally) have been used by market researchers 
precisely for this purpose. Even within the narrow context of healthcare, DCEs have been 
used to predict demand for healthcare services or newly emerging healthcare services 
(Szeinbach, Mason et al. 1990); (Chakraborty, Ettenson et al. 1994); (Stensrud, Sylvestre et 
al. 1997); (Gates, McDaniel et al. 2000); (Payne and Elliott 2005). 
 
B1.2.Substitution effects. 
 
Lancaster’s framework places the emphasis upon how much consumers value characteristics 
(the ‘demand side’), but with the ‘supply side’ having an impact upon prices and what is 
provided to the market primarily as a result of the efficiency ‘substitution effect’. This effect 
arises because consumers may change good collections as a result of compensated relative 
price changes, to obtain the same characteristics collection in a more efficient manner. There 
is also a private ‘substitution effect’, almost akin to the substitution effect with conventional 
demand theory (although operating at the level of characteristics rather than goods).  
 
                                                 
1 My italics. 
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B1.3. Consumption activities. 
 
Lancaster  believes that consumption is an activity in which “goods, singly or in combination” 
(Lancaster 1966) are inputs into consumption activity, but that the desired output is a 
collection of characteristics. Services or goods provide the basis of “different joint outputs” 
(i.e. different bundles of characteristics). Therefore consumption activities generate joint 
outputs. Valuation of characteristics means “characteristics possessed by a good or 
combination of goods are the same for all consumers and, given units of measurement, are in 
the same quantities, so that the personal element in consumer choice arises in the choice 
between collections of characteristics only, not in the allocation of characteristics to goods.” 
(Lancaster 1966) 
 
B 1.4. Lancaster’s theory of demand and utility? 
 
The key elements of his theory are as follows: 
 
1) Relating goods to consumption activities. 
 
Goods or collections of goods are regarded as consumption activities to which a scalar (here 
k) defining a level of activity can be ascribed. The good in itself does not provide utility; it is 
the characteristics goods possess that confer utility. Lancaster allows for the fact that “Goods 
from different intrinsic commodity groups can be regarded as intrinsically unrelated, goods 
from the same commodity groups as intrinsically related.” (Lancaster 1966) 
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To simplify, goods are said to be consumed in linear activity, and objectively so that: 
 
xj = Σ ajk yk        (equation 1) 
            k 
 
yk:  The level of consumption activity k 
xj:  The jth commodity. 
ajk:   Determined by the intrinsic properties of goods themselves and possibly societies’ 
technological knowledge. 
 
Equation (1) therefore relates commodities to available goods. Equivalently, in matrix notation 
we have: 
 
x = Ay         (equation 2) 
 
 
y: Goods 
x:  The commodity 
A: The matrix relating the commodity to ‘y’ goods. 
 
2) Relationship between activities and fixed vectors of characteristics. 
 
Lancaster claims (and presumably for simplification) that consumption activities generate a 
fixed vector of characteristics (again via a linear relationship): 
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zi = Σ bikyk        (equation 3) 
            k 
 
zi:  Is the amount of the ith characteristic. 
bik: Relates goods consumed in a given activity (yk’s) via the bik’s to the given 
characteristics zi’s (B in matrix notation below), and in a sense indicates the sum of 
characteristic ‘i’, a good yk is able to generate (coefficients bik are objectively determined) for 
some units of zi. 
 
Equivalently in matrix notation we have: 
 
z = By         (equation 4) 
 
3) Individuals have an ordinal utility function in characteristics space. 
 
The function is U (z), and it is assumed to possess the convexity properties of a standard 
utility function. 
 
B1.5. Key assumptions of the model. 
 
In this model the z vectors define the direct ingredients of preferences i.e. characteristics (and 
thus welfare), which are related to the ‘y’ commodity goods; whilst the ‘x’ vector relates the x 
goods to the y commodity goods (i.e. the collections of goods to those available). Thus the 
vector x representing a consumer’s relationship with the rest of the economy is not direct and 
one-to-one, as in the conventional model, but indirect, via the activity vector y - i.e. contingent 
upon the nature of the commodity goods (which of course can be regarded as different 
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bundles of characteristics). In effect, this means that different bundles of characteristics 
impact on demand for goods (the x’s), contingent upon the bundles of characteristics intrinsic 
to the y goods. 
 
In contrast to conventional consumer theory the “simple question asked (in principle) in the 
traditional analysis – does a particular consumer prefer collection x1 or collection x2 – no 
longer has a direct answer, although the question, does he prefer characteristics collection z1 
or z2, does have such an answer.” (Lancaster 1966). This therefore can imply a model of the 
following form: 
 
Maximise U (z)    Subject to px ≤ k 
  
 
With   z = By; x = Ay  and z, x ≥ 0. 
 
(equation 5) 
 
Thus the maximand relates characteristics to utility (defined in C space – characteristics 
space), with a budget constraint based on the price of goods (in G-space), and a 
transformation relating the z characteristics (C-space) to the x goods (G-space), via B (which 
defines the consumption technology). Whilst the relationship between those x goods 
demanded, and the characteristics bundles available is determined by x = Ay. 
 
To maintain this transformation from C to G-space, Lancaster claims it is necessary to 
assume that convex sets in G-space transform into convex sets in C-space, but points out 
that the inverse transformation between C-space and G-space may not exist (i.e. goods with 
a certain mapping of characteristics may not exist). Also non-negativity constraints are 
necessary. 
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For the most part it is assumed that either characteristics exceed the number of goods, or 
goods exceed the number of characteristics. Thus the utility function and the budget 
constraint must therefore be related in the same space. Either the utility function can be put in 
G-space [U(x)] 2, or the budget constraint can be expressed in C-space and related to U(z)3. 
With characteristics exceeding the number of goods (so that Bx = z contains more equations 
than variables xi) we cannot find a goods vector giving rise to the arbitrarily specified 
characteristics vector z, thus maximise U(z) can be replaced by maximise U(x) and it will 
remain convex. 
 
With goods exceeding the number of characteristics (the norm Lancaster claims in advanced 
societies), then the consumption technology has fewer equations than variables, thus for 
every characteristics vector there is more than one goods vector. Thus for every point in C-
space the consumer can choose between different good vectors, implying a pure efficiency 
choice (i.e. delivering least cost bundles of characteristics through the choice of goods). 
Therefore for every characteristics vector, the consumer chooses the most efficient 
combination of goods to achieve an efficient bundle of characteristics (i.e. consumers are on 
the efficiency frontier). 
 
B1.6. The efficiency frontier. 
 
The efficiency choice is the solution to a canonical linear program: 
 
                                                 
2 We can write U(z) = U (Bx) = u(x) to have a new utility function in terms of goods, but properties of u(x) 
depend on B(x). 
3 Again implies a more complex budget constraint than the conventional model. 
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Minimise: px    Subject to: Bx = z*; x ≥ 0 
 
         (equation 6) 
 
In other words expenditure is minimized to achieve a given level of characteristics (z) given 
goods x. By varying z*, the consumer given a constraint px = k can determine a 
characteristics frontier comprising all z such that the value of the above program is just equal 
to k (the level of consumption activity). Therefore there is a determinate goods vector 
associated with each point on the efficiency frontier. It is assumed that the consumption 
technology is objective, and the characteristics frontier is objective and is the same for all 
consumers facing the same budget constraint. There is also though in addition to the 
efficiency choice, a private choice i.e. a choice of which point on the efficiency frontier is 
preferred by a given consumer.  
 
The characteristics frontier expands or contracts linearly (according to shifts in income), 
proportionately to an increase or decrease in income, so it has the same shape for all 
consumers who face the same prices. To demonstrate this simply and diagrammatically you 
can assume a situation in which there are 2 characteristics and 4 consumption activities. The 
horizontal and vertical axis respectively relate to 2 different characteristics z1 and z2. The 
equations below relate to the activities-characteristics portion of the consumption technology: 
 
z1 = b11y1 + b12y2 + b13y3 + b14y4     (equation 7) 
z2 = b21y1 + b22y2 +b23y3 + b24y4     (equation 8) 
 
If there was only activity 1 then all goods purchased must be on ray 1 which is defined by b11 / 
b21. Equivalently if there was only activity 2 the ray would be defined as b12 / b22; if there was 
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only activity 3 it would be defined by b13 / b23; and with only activity 4 it would be defined by 
b14/b24. There is a point on each of those rays at which given prevailing prices and income it is 
not possible to get further out from the origin (because of the income constraint). By joining 
up those points on the rays with straight lines between each ray and its nearest adjacent ray, 
you define the efficiency frontier.4  
 
 
 
Figure 1 depicts the efficiency frontier, and then shows how it changes in response to a price 
change. We begin with an efficiency frontier defined by the lines between E1, E2, E3, and E4. 
Each of these points indicates the most (of combinations of characteristics z1 and z2) that with 
prevailing prices, can be obtained along a given ray for a given income. The effect of a price 
increase therefore in relation to one given good (i.e. good 2, along ray 2) is that for a given 
income, you can obtain less of good 2. This implies a shift inwards towards the origin along 
                                                 
4 This of course assumes that they are on a ray which is either as far out or further out than a chord between the 
adjacent rays (in characteristics space). 
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Figure 1: The efficiency frontier. 
E’’2 
E’2 
E’’’2 
 
 
2 
22 
 
ray 2. If this was sufficient to take you to E’’2 then with an efficiency substitution effect5 this 
would take you inside the cord between E1 and E3, so E2’’ would no longer be on the efficiency 
frontier. Other bundles of characteristics provide more cost-effective means of generating 
characteristics, and good 2 would no longer be demanded (leading to an efficiency 
substitution effect). However if prices do not rise as much, and instead cause a movement 
along the ray to a point such as E’2 then the efficiency frontier just shifts inwards such that its 
now defined by the points E1, E’2, E3, and E4. This is likely to result in a decline in demand for 
good 2 due to a private substitution effect (i.e. the fact that for some consumers their 
indifference curves are such that as the efficiency frontier shifts to E’ they substitute towards 
other goods, as with conventional consumer theory). In contrast as you might expect a price 
decrease for good 2 implies that you can obtain more of good 2 for a given income and thus 
the efficiency frontier would shift out i.e. from E1, E2, E3, and E4 to E1, E’’’2, E3, and E4.  
Thus the analysis assumes that there is an efficiency substitution effect (switching effect) 
whereby if price changes are large enough there is a complete change from one activity to 
another. If you had similar but differentiated products (and a one to one relationship between 
goods and activities) then the efficiency substitution effect results in a complete shift from 
consumption of one good to another. If that is not the case and all goods are used in all 
activities, the efficiency substitution effect results in less consumption of a good whose price 
rises, but not complete disappearance from the market (i.e. like use of eggs in cakes).6  
Overall effects are reinforced by private substitution effects whereby consumers respond to 
changes in the shape of the efficiency frontier (resulting in some substitution of one good 
[characteristics bundle] for another). 
 
                                                 
5 The efficiency substitution effect implies that consumers may change goods collections as a result of 
compensated relative price changes to obtain the same characteristics collection in a more efficient manner. 
6 A further requirement for the efficiency substitution effect is that the number of activities exceed the number of 
characteristics (otherwise switching of activities will not occur) 
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B.1.7. Conclusions (characteristics theory of demand). 
 
Lancaster’s characteristics theory of demand was the first serious theoretical attempt to 
construct a theory of demand which makes reference to both characteristics and goods 
space. It remains probably the most cited theory relating to the characteristics theory of 
demand. It is also often cited as providing the theoretical foundations for the use of Discrete 
Choice Experiments and some forms of conjoint analysis (CA). Moreover, the characteristics 
theory of demand also provides the theoretical underpinnings for analysis of revealed 
preference data, using hedonic pricing approaches.  
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C. Random Utility Theory (RUT), Compensating Variation (CV), Marginal Willingness to 
Pay (MWTP), and Willingness to Pay (WTP)  
 
C.1 Random Utility Theory [RUT] 
 
Lancaster’s characteristics theory of demand provides the theoretical foundations for adopting 
an approach, which permits separable utility, and the related assumption that utility is related 
to characteristics (attributes) of goods and services.  
 
Random Utility Theory [RUT] (McConnell 1995); (Mc Fadden 1999); (Louviere, Hensher et al. 
2000) complements the characteristics theory of demand by providing a theoretical 
justification for the econometric estimation of demand. RUT models are useful because they 
provide for the assumption of deterministic utility maximizing behaviour and allow it to co-exist 
with apparent randomness across individuals which actual data exhibits. RUT assumes that 
consumers select the most attractive (utility maximising) options subject to constraints like 
time, and money. 
 
RUT models assume that a respondent’s preferences can be described by a utility function, 
and that respondents select an alternative conferring the greatest utility (Horowitz 1985); 
(Verbeek 2000). Therefore the utility of an alternative is represented by the sum of two 
components: a deterministic component accounting for the systematic effects of observed 
factors influencing choice, and a random component (hence the term ‘random utility), 
accounting for the impact of unobserved factors (Horowitz 1985); (Louviere, Hensher et al. 
2000). Therefore with the random utility framework, utility of each alternative is a linear 
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function of observed characteristics plus an additive unobservable error term (Verbeek), and 
thus using RUT utility (Louviere, Hensher et al. 2000) can be expressed as: 
 
Ui = Vi + εi        (equation 9) 
 
Here Ui is the latent measure of utility associated with option i, whilst Vi is the observable / 
systematic / explainable component of utility, and εi is the unobservable / unexplained 
component of utility. Given this underlying utility function, researchers want to model the 
probability that a randomly chosen consumer will select option i. This can be expressed  
(Louviere, Hensher et al. 2000) as: 
 
P (i \ A) = P [(Vi + εi) >…>(Vj + εi)>….> (Vj + εi)] for all j in A.  (equation 10) 
 
Here P (i \ A) is the probability that a consumer chooses action i from the set of all possible 
actions. These assumptions can then be used to underpin an econometric model which 
assumes that the effects of interest Vi are a function of observables (i.e. defined attributes in 
a choice experiment). Therefore Vi can be defined (Louviere, Hensher et al. 2000) as a linear 
function of observable parameters as: 
 
Vi = + ∑k βk Xki        (equation 11) 
 
 
Here β is a K-element vector of parameters and X is an i by k vector, corresponding to 
observables describing actions that can be chosen. It is assumed that attributes will be 
selected for a choice experiment which correspond to the K-element vector of observable 
parameters affecting utility, and that respondents maximize their utility subject to constraints 
like time, and money (price).  
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Often, for DCEs (Louviere, Hensher et al. 2000) an econometric model will be assumed with 
the following underlying utility function: 
 
Ui = + ∑k βk Xki + μi + εi      (equation 12) 
 
 
Such a model allows the error term in the regression to be decomposed to allow for multiple 
pairwise choice responses from each respondent (through the inclusion of μi) as well as other 
unobservable error terms (εi). Such a model can be estimated using a suitable random effects 
model. 
 
C.2. Including a monetary attribute in a Random Utility Model.  
 
If a price coefficient is included in the model, then it can be interpreted as the marginal utility 
of income so long as there is a binding budget constraint. Moreover, welfare measures can 
be derived based upon the concept of consumer surplus (Mcconnell 1995); (Mc Fadden 
1974), which are equivalent to willingness to pay (WTP). In the McConnell paper consumer 
surplus (C) is expressed as: 
 
C = ∫  ∏i (P) dP.       (equation 13) 
         0 
 
Here ∏i (P) is the demand curve indicating the probability of choosing alternative i, at price P, 
whilst dP indicates the change in price. The model assumes that C is the maximum amount 
an observer would expect to collect from an individual, and thus C is equivalent to WTP. 
McConnell argues that the consumer surplus measure obtained via calculation of WTP, can 
be used to establish Compensating Variation (CV), for a given price for alternative i.  
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CV is of course equivalent to the net revenue of a planner who has to compensate a 
consumer for a price change after it occurs, to return a consumer to her original utility level u0.  
It would be negative if the planner would have to pay the consumer a positive level of 
compensation, because the price change makes her worse off  (Mas-Colell, Whinston et al. 
1995).  
 
WTP measures, so long as they are unbiased and derived using a model consistent with 
RUT, are compatible with utility maximisation. However, for this to be the case an assumption 
of linearity with respect to the budget constraint is required. Typically, within health 
economics, estimates of WTP derived using DCEs take the form of estimates of Marginal 
Willingness To Pay (MWTP). These are usually obtained using the following formula (Lancsar 
and Savage 2004)): 
 
MWTP1 = (∂IUF / ∂X1)  / (∂IUF / ∂P) = β1 / - βp    (equation 14) 
 
 
Here IUF is the indirect utility function estimated using a DCE, and P is price, whilst X1 
indicates attribute 1 from the vector X. In effect therefore MWTP for a given change in 
attribute X1 is normalized into monetary terms, by taking the impact upon indirect utility for the 
model overall as a result of a change in attribute X1, and dividing through by the impact in 
indirect utility for a given change in price (usually defined in terms of 1 unit of a currency: £1, 
$1, or €1, etc). For attribute X1 it is equivalent to the coefficient on X1 (which is β1) divided by 
the coefficient on the monetary attribute which is price (which is βp). Improvements with 
respect to a change in X1 should be associated with positive values of WTP, whilst 
undesirable changes in X1 should be associated with negative values of WTP for a given 
change in X1.  
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Alternatively if you want to assess a change in WTP arising from a change in all attribute 
levels of a product or service the following formula can be used (and commonly is) to quantify 
WTP: 
 
WTP = ∑ (βk / -βp) . (ΔXk)      (equation 15) 
              k 
 
Here the subscript k represents the attributes describing the product or program. This method 
involves the unweighted summation of the product of MWTP multiplied by the change in 
levels across attributes. However, Lancsar & Savage assert that using this formulation is 
appropriate “only if the alternative is chosen with certainty.” (Lancsar and Savage 2004), 
which will be the case (Ryan 2004) for ‘state of the world’ models.  
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D.  A systematic review of the literature relating to Discrete Choice Experiments 
(DCEs) in healthcare. 
 
D.1. Introduction. 
 
The most comprehensive reviews of DCEs published to date are (Ryan and Gerard 2003); 
and (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012). In this chapter, some of the results of these earlier 
reviews (covering 1990 up to the end of 2008) are indicated. I also update and build upon 
them, by reviewing DCEs in health covering the period 2009 - 2011.  
 
Both the previous reviews had inclusion criteria which sought to identify health related, 
discrete choice experiment studies written in the English language. The earlier review (Ryan 
and Gerard 2003) used the following sources to obtain potentially relevant literature: 
MEDLINE; EMBASE; HEALTHSTAR; Social Science Citation Index; PsychLIT; Econlit; and 
the Health Management Information Consortium database. The search terms used included 
'conjoint’, 'conjoint analysis', ‘conjoint measurement', 'conjoint studies', 'conjoint choice 
experiments', 'part-worth utilities', ‘functional measurement', 'paired comparisons', ‘pairwise 
choices', 'discrete choice experiments' and 'stated preference.' The more recent review (de 
Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012), applied the same search terms, using Medline to identify 
studies, but involved what the authors describe as "a narrower search of databases" which 
was not fully described in the paper. I contacted the lead author (E-mail communication with 
Dr de-Bekker-Grob) and discovered that the only database used for the review was PUBMED
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/ MEDLINE. The authors (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012) did point out in their paper that 
they "have since re-run a broader search for another purpose which revealed other studies 
but the broad findings of this review do not change"; so it would appear that narrowing the 
search to studies cited only in PUBMED / MEDLINE did not significantly impact upon the 
conclusions of their review. 
 
The first review (Ryan and Gerard 2003) covered papers published over the period 1990-
2000, whilst the latter focused on papers published between 2001 and 2008. The 2003 review 
involved literature searches for the period 1990-2000 and generated 919 potential references. 
However, the pool of potential studies was reduced to 328 once abstracts for conjoint 
analysis studies not grounded in random utility theory (RUT), revealed preference studies, 
and studies not written in English or without health economics applications were removed. 
After a second round of more careful abstract reading, a further 199 abstracts were removed 
from the review by the authors on the grounds that they were not original empirical studies.  
 
Therefore 129 full papers were obtained, out of which 95 studies were rejected for a variety of 
other reasons. Thus, the first review covering the period 1990-2000 only identified 34 studies 
which met its inclusion criteria.  
 
The second review was conducted by de-Bekker-Grob (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012)), 
in collaboration with both authors of the original review, and therefore represented an 
updating and continuation of the earlier review (Ryan and Gerard 2003). The more limited 
literature searches in this second review generated 682 possible references for the period 
2001-2008, and after reading abstracts or full articles, the authors concluded that 121 
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references relating to 114 original studies met their inclusion criteria. The authors also noted 
that the number of applications of discrete choice experiments in healthcare had risen from a 
mean of 3 per year in 1990-2000 to a mean of 14 per year during 2001-2008. 
 
D.2. Methods. 
 
The present review builds upon these two earlier reviews. It focuses on the literature for the 3 
year period of 2009 —2011, identified using the same search terms. Like the authors of the 
most recent review (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012), I restricted the searches to PUBMED 
/ MEDLINE. I conducted the initial searches in September 2011,and updated these in March 
2012 to ensure that all 2011 papers were identified and included in  the review. Thus, the 
review covered a full 3 year period from the 1st January 2009 – 31st December 2011. The 
searches conducted in September 2011 generated 218 citations and searches in March 2012 
identified a further 50 references. After examining abstracts or papers for these references, 
96 studies were identified which met the inclusion criteria for review i.e. they related to 
Discrete Choice Experiments compatible with Random Utility Theory (RUT) and had been 
published in English speaking journals.  Articles reporting Adaptive Conjoint Analysis 
methodology were excluded, since Esther de Bekker-Grob had informed me by e-mail that 
these had been excluded from their review (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012). 
 
D.3. Overview of DCE applications. 
 
Over the period 2009 – 2011 the number of papers relating to health related discrete choice 
experiments studies fulfilling the inclusion criteria was 98. However, these papers only related 
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to 96 7 distinct studies, as 2 papers (Guimaraes, Marra et al. 2010; Boonen, Donkers et al. 
2011) replicated analyses in other papers published during this period, so were removed. 
Therefore, the mean number of studies per year in this period has risen to 32. 
 
The most recent review (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012) subdivided the papers reviewed 
by study objective (some papers appeared under 2 or more categories if they had multiple 
objectives). For the current review, I also sub-divided papers into the same broad categories.  
In table 1, a summary is provided of descriptors for papers included in the 3 reviews. In 
addition, in the 2001 to 2008 review papers were classified into a number of broad categories 
(see (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012)). Below, I indicate the number of papers for 2009 — 
2011 falling into these same broad categories compared with 2001 to 2008 figures: 
 
A. Patient or consumer experience factors - 40 studies for 2001 to 2008; 16 studies for 2009 
to 2011: (Albada and Triemstra 2009; Boonen LHHM, Schut FT et al. 2009; Brown, 
Finkelstein et al. 2009; Clark MD, Gumber AK et al. 2009; Davison, Kromm et al. 2010; 
Deverill, Lancsar et al. 2010; Kiiskinen, Suominen-Taipale et al. 2010; Nieboer, Koolman et 
al. 2010; van der Pol and McKenzie 2010; van der Pol, Shiell et al. 2010; Darba, Restovic et 
al. 2011; Mentzakis, Stefanowska et al. 2011; Pereira, Mulligan et al. 2011; Potoglou, Burge 
et al. 2011; Waltzman, Scholz et al. 2011; Yi, Ryan et al. 2011).  
B. Valuing health outcomes  - 8 studies for 2001 to 2008; 13 studies for 2009 to 2011: 
(Bederman S, Mahomed NN et al. 2009; Goto, Takahashi et al. 2009; Johnson, Hauber et al. 
2009; Ratcliffe, Brazier et al. 2009; Skjoldborg, Lauridsen et al. 2009; van Til, Stiggelbout et 
al. 2009; Witt, Scott et al. 2009; Koopmanschap, Stolk et al. 2010; Lancsar, Wildman et al. 
                                                 
7 It is sometimes difficult to know whether analyses should be classed as separate studies or not. In the end we 
decided to treat the two analyses by van Helvourt-Postulart et al (2009) as 2 separate studies, because they related 
to 2 different areas of study. One of them focused itself with application of hierarchical information integration to 
DCEs; whilst the other was a comparison of DCEs and “barriers and facilitators in implementation research”.   
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2011; Mentzakis, Ryan et al. 2011; Poulos, Yang et al. 2011; Ratcliffe, Couzner et al. 2011; 
Vroomen and Zweifel 2011). 
C. Investigating trade-offs between health outcomes and patient or consumer experience 
factors  - 38 studies for 2001 to 2008; 51 studies for 2009 – 2011: (Bunge EM, de Bekker 
Grob EW et al. 2009; Chan, Sahota et al. 2009; de Bekker-Grob, Essink-Bot et al. 2009; 
Eberth, Watson et al. 2009; Green and Gerard 2009; Guimaraes, Marra et al. 2009; Hauber, 
Mohamed et al. 2009; Howard and Salkeld 2009; Kruijshaar, Essink-Bot et al. 2009; 
Muhlbacher, Rudolph et al. 2009; Ozdemir, Johnson et al. 2009; Pavlova, Hendrix et al. 2009; 
Regier, Friedman et al. 2009; Scalone, Mantovani et al. 2009; Tinelli, Ryan et al. 2009; 
Bijlenga, Bonsel et al. 2010; de Bekker-Grob, Hofman et al. 2010; Essers, Dirksen et al. 
2010; Essers, van Helvoort-Postulart et al. 2010; Hauber, Mohamed et al. 2010; Hol, de 
Bekker-Grob et al. 2010; Johnson, Ozdemir et al. 2010; Nayaradou, Berchi et al. 2010; 
Scuffham, Whitty et al. 2010; Torbica and Fattore 2010; van Dam, Hol et al. 2010; Wittink, 
Cary et al. 2010; Ahmed and Fincham 2011; Bogelund, Vilsboll et al. 2011; Brown, Pashos et 
al. 2011; Damen, de Bekker-Grob et al. 2011; Faggioli, Scalone et al. 2011; Goto, Takahashi 
et al. 2011; Hauber, Gonzalez et al. 2011; Lagarde, Smith Paintain et al. 2011; Laver 2011; 
Lloyd, Hodgkins et al. 2011; Lloyd, Nafees et al. 2011; Marti 2011; Mohamed, Epstein et al. 
2011; Muhlbacher and Nubling 2011; Musters, de Bekker-Grob et al. 2011; Oteng, Marra et 
al. 2011; Scalone, Watson et al. 2011; Schwappach, Mulders et al. 2011; Scotland, 
McNamee et al. 2011; Sweeting, Whitty et al. 2011; Swinburn, Lloyd et al. 2011; Thrumurthy, 
Morris et al. 2011; van Empel, Dancet et al. 2011; Van Houtven, Johnson et al. 2011;  Hong, 
Liu et al. 2011). 
D. Estimating utility weights within the QALY framework - 2 studies for 2001 to 2008; 2 
studies for 2009 – 2011: (Stolk, Oppe et al. 2010; Lancsar, Wildman et al. 2011). 
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E. Job-choices  - 6 studies for 2001 to 2008; 4 studies for 2009 to 2011: (Blaauw, Erasmus et 
al. 2010; Grindrod, Marra et al. 2010; Gunther, Kurstein et al. 2010; Kolstad 2011).  
F. Developing priority setting frameworks - 6 studies for 2001 to 2008; 7 studies for 2009 – 
2011: (Albada and Triemstra 2009; Clark MD, Gumber AK et al. 2009; Green and Gerard 
2009; Davison, Kromm et al. 2010; Koopmanschap, Stolk et al. 2010; Youngkong, Baltussen 
et al. 2010; Watson, Carnon et al. 2011). 
G. Health professional's preferences for treatment or screening options for patients  - 17 
studies for 2001 to 2008; 9 studies for 2009 – 2011: (van Helvoort-Postulart, Dellaert et al. 
2009; van Helvoort-Postulart, van der Weijden et al. 2009; Bhatt, Currie et al. 2010; Tsung-
Tai C 2010; Wyatt, Batley et al. 2010; Faggioli, Scalone et al. 2011; Lagarde, Smith Paintain 
et al. 2011; van Empel, Dancet et al. 2011; Benjamin, Cotte et al. 2012). 
H. Other  - 4 studies for 2001 to 2008; 5 studies for 2009 to 2011: (Ratcliffe, Brazier et al. 
2009; Tsung-Tai C 2010; Faggioli, Scalone et al. 2011; Fegert, Slawik et al. 2011; Whitty, 
Scuffham et al. 2011).  
 
Each paper was read carefully and key data extracted in a systematic manner. This is 
presented in the following sections. 
 
D.3.1. Number of DCE analyses per year. 
 
de Bekker-Grob et al (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012) noted that the number of 
applications of discrete choice experiments in healthcare rose from a mean of 3 per year 
(1990 — 2000), to a mean of 14 per year (2001 - 2008). Our review for 2009 —2011 obtained 
papers (meeting the inclusion criteria) relating to 96 different healthcare related discrete 
35 
 
choice experiments studies. Overall 29 of these papers were published in 2009; 27 in 2010; 
and 40 in 2011. The average number of papers per year therefore rose to 32 (2009 — 2011) 
which is a very marked increase compared to the earlier periods. 
 
D.3.2. DCE studies country of origin. 
 
In the 2001 – 2008 review it was noted that the UK remained the major user of DCEs. 
However, the UK’s dominance has been eroded considerably in these years. Table I shows 
that the proportion of studies emanating from the UK has continued to fall, from 20 / 34 (59%) 
in 1990-2000, to 55 / 114 (48%) in 2001 – 2008, to a low of 20 / 96 (21%) during 2009 – 
2011. Moreover, the number of studies emanating from Australia has also fallen 
proportionately from 7 / 34 (18%) in 1990 – 2000, to 13 / 114 (11%) in 2001 – 2008, to 7 (7%) 
in 2009 – 2011.  
 
Comparing 1990 – 2000 with 2001 – 2008, the proportion of studies coming from Canada 
rose slightly (1 / 34 (3%) in 1990 – 2000 to 6 / 114 (5%) in 2001 – 2008), as did the number of 
studies from other countries such as Denmark (rose from 0 to 5 / 114 (4%) in 2001 – 2008); 
the Netherlands (rose from 0 to 5 / 114 (4%) in 2001 – 2008); Germany (rose from 0 to 3 / 
114 (3%) in 2001 – 2008), and ‘Other’ countries (rose from 0 to 13 / 114 (11%) in 2001 – 
2008). 
 
However, comparing 2001-2008 with the most recent 2009 – 2011 period, it is clear that an 
increasing proportion of studies now originate in places such as the USA (14 / 114 (12%) in 
2001-2008 up to 16 / 96 (17%) in 2009 – 2011); Canada (6 / 114 (5%) in 2001 – 2008 up to 9 
/ 96 (9%) in 2009 – 2011); Denmark (5 / 114 (4%) in 2008 – 2011 up to 6 / 96 (6%) in 2009 – 
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2011); the Netherlands (5 / 114 (4%) in 2001 – 2008 up to 18 / 96 (19%) in 2009 – 2011); 
Germany (3 / 114 (3%) in 2001 – 2008 up to 6 / 96 (6%) in 2009 – 2011). There is also an 
increase in studies coming from ‘Other’ countries (13 / 114 (11%) in 2001 – 2008 up to 19 / 
96 (20%) in 2009 – 2011) which reflects an increasing trend towards applying DCEs in an 
increasing range of different countries including high, middle and low income countries. 
 
D.3.3 The number of attributes included in DCE studies.  
 
Examining the number of attributes included in studies shown in table 1, it is clear that the 
trend towards fewer studies with only 2 – 3 attributes has continued. In 1990 – 2000 5 / 34 
(15%) studies fell in this category, 15 / 114 (13%) during 2001 – 2008, and the figure with 2 – 
3 attributes fell to 10 / 96 (10%) in 2009 – 2011. The proportion of studies with 4 -5 attributes 
rose from 10 / 34 (29%) in 1990 – 2000 to 50 / 114 (44%) in 2001 – 2008, but it fell back 
again to 29 / 96 (30%) in 2009 – 2011. 
 
Closer examination indicates that the trend away from DCE studies with either 2 – 3 attributes 
(down from 13% to 10% between 2001 – 2008 and 2009 - 2011), or 4 to 5 attributes (down 
from 44% to 30% between 2001 – 2008 and 2009 - 2011), is partly attributable to a trend 
towards more DCEs with between 6 and 9 attributes. For example the proportion of studies 
with 6 attributes was stable at 9 / 34 (26%) in 1990 – 2000 and 30 / 114 (26%) in 2001 – 
2008, but has risen marginally to 28 / 96 (29%) in 2009 – 2011.  Moreover the proportion of 
studies with 7 – 9 attributes rose from 4 / 34 (12%) in 1990 – 2000, to 15 / 114 (13%) in 2001 
– 2008, and then to 22 / 96 (23%) in 2009 – 2011.  
 
37 
 
The proportion of studies with 10 attributes has remained at 2% during both 2001 – 2008 (2 / 
114) and 2009 – 2011 (2 / 96), falling from 2 / 34 (6%) in 1990 – 2000. The proportion of 
studies with more than 10 attributes fell from 4 / 34 (12%) in 1990 – 2008 to 2 / 114 (2%) in 
2001 – 2008, but rose again slightly to 5 / 96 (5%) in 2009 – 2011. 
 
D.3.4. Domains of DCE attributes. 
 
The proportion of DCE studies including a monetary measure remained fairly constant over 
the period. In 1990 – 2010, it was 19 / 34 (56%), in 2009 – 2011, 61 / 114 (54%) and in 2009 
– 2011 53 / 96 (55%). The proportion of DCE studies including a measure of risk rose in the 
most recent period, from 12 / 34 (35%) in 1990 – 2000 and 35 / 114 (31%) in 2001 – 2008, to 
62 / 96 (65%) in 2009 – 2011 (the high figure for 2009 - 2011 may in part be due to a 
somewhat broad interpretation of what might be construed as an attribute relating to risk).  
 
Finally, the proportion of studies with a health status domain showed a similar pattern, with 19 
/ 34 (56%) in 1990 – 2000, 61 / 114 (54%) during 2001 – 2008, and rising to 70 / 96 (73%) in 
2009 – 2011. At the same time, the proportion of studies with attributes relating to other 
domains, increased from 3 / 34 (9%) in 1990 – 2000 to 17 / 114 (15%) in 2001 – 2008, and 
then to 39 / 96 (41%) for 2009 – 2011.  
 
D.3.5. The number of questions posed by DCEs. 
 
Between the 2001 – 2009 review and the 2009 – 2011 period, there has been a clear trend 
away from having 8 or fewer choices towards having 9 – 16 choices per DCE, as shown in 
table 1.  The proportion of DCE studies posing 8 or less choices was 13 / 34 (38%) in 1990 - 
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2000, rising marginally to 45 / 114 (39%) in 2001 – 2008, and then falling back to 22 / 96 
(23%) in 2009 – 2011. In contrast the proportion of studies with 9 – 16 choices was 18 / 34 
(53%) in 1990 – 2000, fell to 43 / 114 (38%) during 2001 – 2008, and then rose to 53 / 96 
(55%) during 2009 – 2011. The proportion of studies with more than 16 choices rose initially 
and then stabilized. It was 2 / 34 (6%) in 1990 – 2008, then 21 / 114 (18%) in 2001 – 2008, 
and 18 / 96 (19%) in 2009 – 2011.  At the other end of the spectrum, the proportion of studies 
which did not report the number of choices that respondents had to face has remained 
relatively low; 1 / 34 (3%) in 1990 – 2000, 5 / 114 (4%) in 2001 – 2008, and rising marginally 
again to 5 / 96 (5%) in 2009 – 2011.  
 
D.3.6. DCE survey administration. 
 
In terms of ‘Administration of the survey’, table 1 indicates that there appears to be a trend 
since 1990 away from self-completed questionnaires. The proportion of self-completed 
questionnaires was 27 / 34 (79%) in 1990 – 2000, falling to 76 / 114 (67%) in 2001 – 2008, 
and then falling further to 58 / 96 (60%) in 2009 – 2011. The proportion of interviewer 
administered DCEs was 3 / 34 (9%) in 1990 – 2000, rose to 22 / 114 (19%) in 2001 – 2008, 
but then fell back marginally to 16 / 96 (17%) in 2009 – 2011.  
 
Overall, there has been a general trend towards DCEs involving a computerized review over 
the last twenty years. During 1990 – 2000 3 / 34 (9%) of respondents answered DCEs which 
involved computerized review, in 2001 – 2008 the proportion increased to 13 / 114 (11%) and 
then rose sharply to 25 (26%) during 2009 – 2011. The proportion of DCEs not reporting 
details about survey administration was low, but rose slightly from 1 / 34 (3%) in 1990 – 2000, 
to 9 / 114 (8%) in 2001 – 2008, but then fell back again to 2 / 96 (2%) during 2009 – 2011. 
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Table I. Background information on DCE studies. 
Item Category Baseline: 1990 
– 2000 
Period: 
2001 – 2008 
Period: 
2009 – 2011 
   N  = 34 N = 114 N = 96 
Country of 
origin 
UK 20 (59%) 55 (48%) 20 (21%) 
 USA 7 (21%) 14 (12%) 16 (17%) 
 Australia 6 (18%) 13 (11%) 7 (7%) 
 Canada 1 (3%) 6 (5%) 9 (9%) 
 Denmark 0 (0%) 5 (4%) 6 (6%) 
 Netherlands 0 (0%) 5 (4%) 18 (19%) 
 Germany 0 (0%) 3 (3%) 6 (6%) 
 Other 0 (0%) 13 (11%) 19 (20%) 
Number of 
attributes 
2 – 3 5 (15%) 15 (13%) 10 (10%) 
 4 – 5 10 (29%) 50 (44%) 29 (30%) 
 6 9 (26%) 30 (26%) 28 (29%) 
 7 – 9 4 (12%) 15 (13%) 22 (23%) 
 10 2 (6%) 2 (2%) 2 (2%) 
 >10 4 (12%) 2 (2%) 5 (5%) 
Attributes 
covered 
Monetary 
measure 
19 (56%) 61 (54%) 53 (55%) 
 Time 25 (74%) 58 (51%) 71 (74%) 
 Risk 12 (35%) 35 (31%) 62 (65%) 
 Health Status 
domain 
19 (56%) 62 (54%)  70 (73%) 
 Health care 28 (82%) 79 (69%) 75 (78%) 
 Other 3 (9%) 17 (15%) 39 (41%) 
Number of 
choices per 
respondent 
8 or less 13 (38%) 45 (39%) 22 (23%) 
 9 – 16 choices 18 (53%) 43 (38%) 53 (55%) 
 More than 16 
choices 
2 (6%) 21 (18%) 18 (19%) 
 Not clearly 
reported 
1 (3%) 5 (4%) 5 (5%) 
Administration 
of survey 
Self-completed 
questionnaire 
27 (79%) 76 (67%) 58 (60%) 
 Interviewer 
administered 
3 (9%) 22 (19%) 16 (17%) 
 Computerised 
review 
3 (9%) 13 (11%) 25 (26%) 
 Not reported 1 (3%) 9 (8%) 2 (2%) 
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D.4. DCE Experimental design and choice set construction. 
 
After selecting appropriate attributes and levels, the DCE must adopt a suitable design. Full 
factorial designs can be deployed which present respondents with scenarios reflecting all the 
possible attributes and levels which might be included in a DCE. However, such designs may 
be too large for respondents to complete, which is why smaller fractional factorial designs are 
usually preferred.  
 
The standard approach for linear models is to adopt an orthogonal design (these have the 
property that variations of attributes and alternatives are uncorrelated in all choice sets i.e. 
they are statistically independent of each other) and then integrate them into choice designs 
(Amaya-Amaya M, Gerard et al. 2008).  Truly orthogonal designs also exhibit ‘level balance’ 
(de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012) i.e. the levels of attributes each appear with equal 
frequency. As de-Bekker Grob et al (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012)) point out orthogonal 
designs can be sourced from certain design catalogues (Hahn and Shapiro 1966), some 
software packages (e.g. SPEED (Bradley 1991) or SPSS) or from websites (e.g. (Sloane 
2009)). In the case of binary choice DCEs the profiles generated from orthogonal designs can 
be the choices (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012). 
 
In some instances choice sets have been created from orthogonal arrays, and two main 
methods (Louviere, Hensher et al. 2000)) can be used (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012). 
One of these involves pairing choices with their ‘foldover’ which may refer to the mirror image 
of the original design (such that for example 16 profiles might be paired with their foldover, 
thereby generating 16 choices – for further details see footnote 2, in (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan 
et al. 2012). Alternatively the approach of ‘foldover with random pairing’ may be deployed (so 
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that the 16 profiles might be randomly paired with their foldover). As (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan 
et al. 2012) point out some designs are readily available which use these methods (Burgess 
and Street 2003), (Burgess and Street 2005); (Street and Burgess 2004); (Street and Burgess 
2007a); (Street, Burgess et al. 2005), (Street, Burgess et al. 2008)) as well as help from 
experts (Street and Burgess 2007b).  
 
More recently, as de-Bekker Grob et al (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012) point out, 
statistically efficient designs have been developed (Burgess and Street 2003), (Burgess and 
Street 2005); (Street, Burgess et al. 2005); and (Zwerina, Huber J et al. 2005). Numerous 
measures of statistical efficiency can be deployed but the most common is the D-efficient 
criterion. With D – optimal designs the determinant of the covariance matrix is minimised (de 
Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012). D-optimal designs deviate a little from orthogonal designs 
because they permit some limited correlations between attributes. This is in the interest of 
allowing ‘efficient’ estimation using smaller sample sizes (Amaya-Amaya M, Gerard et al. 
2008). The computer package SAS, which is increasingly applied in order to produce DCE 
design templates, includes a D-optimal design algorithm.    
 
When deriving efficient designs it is commonly assumed that the parameters are zero (de 
Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012). However as Amaya-Amaya, Gerard, and Ryan (Amaya-
Amaya M, Gerard et al. 2008) point out deriving efficient designs may involve making prior 
assumptions about parameter estimates (this approach is exemplified by the work of Sandor 
and Wedel, (Sandor and Wedel 2001), (Sandor and Wedel 2002), and (Sandor and Wedel 
2005)) and then generating a D-optimal design (the package SAS can be used to generate D-
optimal designs). Prior assumptions about parameters may be informed by analysing pilot 
DCE questionnaire data econometrically, and then incorporating prior estimates of 
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parameters in order to increase statistical efficiency into designs generated using packages 
such as SAS or Ngene (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012).  
 
D.4.1. Design type. 
 
Table II provides an overview of changes in the design type adopted by researchers.  This 
shows that the proportion of studies involving full factorial DCE designs fell from 4 / 34 (12%) 
in 1990 – 2000 to 0% in 2001 to 2008, and then rose again marginally to 4 / 96 (4%) during 
2009 – 2011. In the period 1990 – 2000, 25 / 34 (74%) of studies were fractional factorial 
studies, a figure which rose to 114 / 114 100% in 2001 – 2008, but then fell back to 86% in 
2009 – 2011. Overall, 5 / 34 (15%) of authors did not clearly report their ‘Design type’ in 1990 
– 2000, a figure which fell to 0% in 2001 – 2008, but then rose again to 9 / 96 (9%) during 
2009 – 2011. 
 
Overall in 1990 – 2000 25 / 34 (74%) of DCE studies involved a ‘main effects’ design, and this 
proportion rose to 100 / 114 (89%) during 2001 – 2008, although the figure fell back to 68 / 96 
(70%) in 2009 – 2011. So, as with the baseline review and 2001 – 2008 review, ‘main effects’ 
designs remain the dominant type of design in published DCE studies. In 1990 – 2000, 2 / 34 
(6%) of study designs catered for interaction effects; this figure fell slightly to 6 / 114 (5%) in 
2001 – 2008, before rising again to 11 (11%) in 2009 – 2011.  I anticipate a continued trend 
towards increasing use of designs which cater for interactions, given that there is increased 
awareness of the need for designs to cater for interactions between attributes, where 
interaction effects might exist. In 1990 – 2000 it was suggested that for 4 / 34 (12%) of 
studies a design plan was not applicable, this figure fell back to 0% in 2001 – 2008, before 
rising very slightly to 1 / 96 (1%) in 2009 – 2011. However, the proportion of studies for which 
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design type was not clearly reported was 3 / 34 (9%) in 1990 – 2000, 0% in 2001 – 2008, and 
16 / 96 (17%) in 2009 – 2011.   
 
D.4.2. Use of software packages to design DCEs. 
 
The use of a software package to design DCEs has fallen slightly.  Overall 19 / 34 (56%) of 
designs were said to involve use of a software package in 1990 – 2000, falling slightly to 59 / 
114 (52%) in 2001 – 2008, and then falling again to 44 / 96 (46%) in 2009 – 2011. There 
seems to have been a general trend away from using the package SPEED over the period, 
probably because it has become increasingly dated in nature, and new packages have 
become available.  In 1990 – 2000 13 / 34 (38%) of studies involved the use of SPEED; this 
proportion fell to 22 / 114 (19%) in 2001 – 2008, and 6 / 96 (6%) in 2009 – 2011. Use of 
SPSS varied; in 1990 – 2000 2 / 34 (6%) of studies used SPSS, rising to 14 / 114 (12%) in 
2001 – 2008, before falling back to 7 / 96 (7%) in 2009 – 2011.  
 
The package SAS (which provides D-optimal designs) has become increasingly popular over 
the period. Recorded use rose from 0% in 1990 – 2000, to 14 / 114 (12%) in 2001 – 2008, 
and then to 18 / 96 (19%) in 2009 – 2011. Sawtooth was less popular, remaining relatively 
constant; 2 / 34 (6%) of authors in 1990 – 2000, 5 / 114 (4%) in 2001 – 2008, and 5 / 96 (5%) 
in 2009 – 2011. The use of ‘Other’ software was also low; 2 (6%) in 1990 – 2000, 0% in 2001 
– 2008, and rising again to 7 / 96 (7%) in 2009 – 2011. A few papers included ‘No further 
details’ relating to ‘Design Source’; 0% cases in 1990 – 2000, 4 / 114 (4%) in 2001 – 2008, 
and 2 / 96 (2%) in 2009 – 2010. 
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D.4.3. Use of design catalogues, websites, and expert advice to design DCE 
questionnaires. 
 
Design catalogues were used in a small number of studies although this has risen in recent 
years; 2 / 34 (6%) of studies in 1990 – 2000, 6 / 114 (5%) in 2001 – 2008, rising to 15 / 96 
(16%) in 2009 – 2011. Although websites were not used to source DCE designs in 1990 – 
2000, they accounted for 3 / 114 (3%) of studies in 2001 – 2008, rising slightly to 4 / 96 (4%) 
in 2009 – 2011. Finally, use of expert advice to underpin study design varied. It accounted for 
4 / 34 (12%) of cases in 1990 – 2000, down to 4 / 114 (4%) in 2001 – 2008, before rising 
again to 6 / 96 (6%) in 2009 – 2011. Unfortunately, the ‘Design Source’ was not clearly 
reported in a significant proportion of studies. It accounted for 9 / 34 (26%) of studies in 1990 
– 2000, rising to 42 / 114 (37%) of cases in 2001 – 2008, before falling back to 26 / 96 (27%) 
in 2009 – 2011. 
 
D.4.4. Methods used to create choice sets. 
 
In 1990 – 2000, 3 / 34 (9%) of designs involved Orthogonal arrays with single profiles (i.e. 
binary choices), the figure rose to 12 / 114 (11%) in 2001 – 2008, but falling to 2 / 96 (2%) in 
2009 – 2011. Use of orthogonal arrays with random pairing was more common but has fallen 
over time; in 1990 – 2000 18 / 34 (53%) of analyses , falling to 19 / 114 (17%) in 2001 – 2008, 
and then falling again to 11 / 96 (11%) in 2009 – 2011. 
 
Studies involving orthogonal arrays with pairing with a constant comparator constituted about 
one in five designs at first (6 / 34 (18%) in 1990 – 2010 and 23 / 114 (20%) in 2001 – 2008) 
before falling to 3 / 96 (3%) in 2009 – 2011 (during a period when this approach became 
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more open to criticism). In 1990 – 2000 no studies involved orthogonal arrays with foldover 
random pairing, the figure remained low, 1 / 114 (1%) in 2001 – 2008 and 1 / 96 (1%) in 2009 
– 2011. In 1990 – 2000, none of the studies reviewed involved orthogonal arrays with 
foldover, but this figure rose to 11 / 114 (10%) in 2001 – 2008, and rose further to 20 / 96 
(21%) in 2009 – 2011. Similarly, there has been a general trend towards D- efficient designs, 
rising from 0% in 1990 – 2000 to 14 / 114 (12%) in 2001 – 2008, and 18 / 114 (19%) in 2009 
– 2011. Finally, in 1990 – 2000 4 / 34 (12%) of studies were classified as ‘Other 
(pragmatically chosen)’, falling to 2 / 114 (2%) in 2001 – 2008, before rising to 6 / 96 (6%) in 
2009 – 2011. The proportion of studies which did not clearly report the methods that they 
used to create choice sets has risen over the last two decades, from 3 / 34 (9%) in 1990 – 
2000. to 32 / 114 (28%) in 2001 – 2008, and 30 / 96 (31%) in 2009 – 2011.  
 
Table II. Background information on DCE studies. 
Item Category Baseline: 1990 
– 2000 
Period: 
2001 – 2008 
Period: 
2009 – 2011 
   N  = 34 N = 114 N = 96 
Design type Full factorial 4 (12%) 0 (0%) 4 (4%) 
 Fractional 
factorial 
25 (74%) 114 (100%) 83 (86%) 
 Not clearly 
reported 
5 (15%) 0 (0%) 9 (9%) 
Design plan Main effects 
only 
25 (74%) 100 (89%) 68 (71%) 
 Main effects, 2 
or more way 
interactions 
2 (6%) 6 (5%) 11 (11%) 
 Not applicable 4 (12%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 
 Not clearly 
reported 
3 (9%) 8 (7%) 16 (17%) 
 Software 
package 
19 (56%) 59 (52%) 44 (46%) 
Design 
Source 
SPEED 13 (38%) 22 (19%) 6 (6%) 
 SPSS 2 (6%) 14 (12%) 7 (7%) 
 SAS 0 (0%) 14 (12%) 18 (19%) 
 SAWTOOTH 2 (6%) 5 (4%) 5 (5%) 
 Other 2 (6%) 0 (0%) 7 (7%) 
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Table II (contd). Background information on DCE studies. 
 No further 
details 
0 (0%) 4 (4%) 2 (2%) 
 Catalogue 2 (6%) 6 (5%) 15 (16%) 
 Website 0 (0%) 3 (3%) 4 (4%) 
 Expert 4 (12%) 4 (4%) 6 (6%) 
 Not clearly 
reported 
9 (26%) 42 (37%) 26 (27%) 
Method to 
create choice 
sets 
Orthogonal 
arrays: Single 
profiles (i.e. 
binary choices) 
3 (9%) 12 (11%) 2 (2%) 
 Orthogonal 
arrays: 
Random 
pairing 
18 (53%) 19 (17%) 11 (11%) 
 Orthogonal 
arrays: Pairing 
with constant 
comparator  
6 (18%) 23 (20%) 3 (3%) 
 Orthogonal 
arrays: 
Foldover – 
random pairing 
0 (0%) 1 (1%) 1 (1%) 
 Orthogonal 
arrays: 
Foldover  
0 (0%) 11 (10%) 20 (21%) 
 D – efficiency 
(SAS) 
0 (0%) 14 (12%) 18 (19%) 
 Other 
(pragmatically 
chosen) 
4 (12%) 2 (2%) 6 (6%) 
 Not clearly 
reported 
3 (9%) 32 (28%) 30 (31%) 
 Other N / A N / A 14 (15%) 
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D.5. Estimation procedures. 
 
D.5.1. The importance of Random Utility Theory (RUT). 
 
A good overview of the cases for using different types of econometric methods in order to 
analyse DCE data is provided by de-Bekker Grob et al (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012). 
The authors begin by pointing out that DCE choices need to be modelled within the 
framework of Random Utility Theory (RUT) (McFadden 1974) In this utility framework the 
latent utility of alternative i in choice set Cn (for individual n) can be decomposed into two 
parts V(Xin,β), a systematic component which can be explained as a function of changes in 
attribute levels, and εin which relates to unmeasured variation in preferences, and in this 
framework the utility of alternative i for individual n is given by: 
 
Uin =  V(Xin,β) + εin 
         (equation 16) 
 
RUT models as de-Bekker Grob et al (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012) point out, assume 
individual n chooses alternative i if that alternative maximises utility among all alternatives 
within the choice set Cn. 
 
D.5.2. Binary Probit and Logit and Multinomial Logit (MNL). 
 
As de-Bekker Grob et al (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012) point out, when DCEs present 
binary / forced choices (you select from one of two options) then binary probit or logit models 
can be used, however once more than 3 options are presented then multinomial logit (MNL) 
48 
 
becomes what they describe as the “workhorse for data analysis.” However as de-Bekker 
Grob et al (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012) also point out, MNL requires 3 assumptions: 
 
(i) Independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) 
(ii) The error terms are independent and identically distributed (IID) across observations 
(iii) There is no taste heterogeneity (i.e. preferences are homogeneous across respondents). 
 
The authors suggest that “Such assumptions may be restrictive in describing human 
behaviour, questioning the validity of policy conclusions.”  
 
D.5.3. Other models which allow the assumptions of MNL to be relaxed. 
 
Other models (see figure 2 in (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012)) can be used for 
applications which do not conform to the 3 underlying assumptions of MNL as follows: 
 
(i) Models which relax the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption (IIA): 
Such models involve more flexible error distributions and include models such as Nested 
Logit and multinomial Probit.  
 
(ii) Models which relax the independent and identically distributed (IID) assumption: 
Such as heteroscedastic models, i.e. heteroscedastic logit which allows for flexible as 
opposed to a fixed variance. 
 
(iii) Models which allow for taste heterogeneity: These include Mixed Logit and Latent 
class models (LCM) which allows for taste variation. Mixed Logit (also known as random 
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parameters logit) avoids potential estimation bias from unobserved preference heterogeneity 
in discrete choice models by estimating a distribution of preferences across patients for each 
preference parameter (Hauber, Gonzalez et al. 2011). With LCM parameter heterogeneity 
across individuals is modelled with a discrete distribution over a set of classes, and 
individuals are sorted into a set of classes (Mentzakis, Ryan et al. 2011) 
 
D.5.4. Use of Probit, Random Effects Probit, Logit, and Random Effects Logit. 
 
As previously reported, early DCE studies i.e. 1990 – 2000 (Ryan and Gerard 2003) seemed 
to focus upon applying either binary choice or ‘forced choice’ DCEs. So, for example in 1990 
– 2000, 6 / 34 studies (18%) were Probit; this figure fell to 8 / 114 (7%) in 2001 – 2008, and 
fell further to 2 / 96 (2%) in 2009 – 2011. Similarly, in 1990 – 2000 18 / 34 studies (53%) were 
Random Effects Probit, falling to 47 / 114 (41%) in 2001 – 2008, and then further to 14 / 96 
(15%) in 2009 – 2011. The number of Logit studies was 1 / 34 (3%) in 1990 – 2000, rising to 
13 / 114 (11%) in 2001 – 2008, and falling to 4 / 96 (4%) in 2009 – 2011. The number of 
Random Effects Logit studies was similarly small; 1 / 34 (3%) in 1990 – 2000, 6 / 114 (5%) in 
2001 – 2008, and 9 / 96 (9%) in 2009 – 2011. 
 
D5.5. Use of Multinomial Logit (MNL). 
 
It would appear that the decline in the use of Logit, and Probit and Random Effects Probit 
reported above has been offset by an increased use of MNL studies, which have the 
advantage that they can cater for more than 2 response options. During 1990 – 2000, 6 / 34 
(18%) used Multinomial Logit (MNL), rising to 25 / 114 (22%) during 2001 – 2008, and 
increasing further during 2009 – 2011 to 43 / 96 (45%).  
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D.5.6 Use of Nested Logit (NL). 
 
During the period 2001 – 2008 (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012) a small shift towards use 
of Nested Logit (a technique which relaxes the IIA assumption) was observed. It involved 5 / 
114 (4%) during the period 2001 – 2008, up from 0% in 1990 – 2000. For the period 2009 – 
2011, the figure remained low at 3 / 96 (3%) studies. 
 
D.5.7. Models applicable when there is preference heterogeneity. 
 
During 1990 – 2000, only 1 / 34 studies used Mixed logit, by 2001 – 2008, 6 / 114 studies 
(5%) used Mixed Logit. All of the Mixed Logit studies for the period 2001 – 2008 found 
evidence of some preference heterogeneity. During the period 2009 -2011, there was again a 
clear trend towards increased use of Mixed Logit; 17 / 96 studies (18%) utilised the technique, 
and in all cases there was evidence to suggest at least some preference heterogeneity. Also 
one study (Johnson, Ozdemir et al. 2010) used a Mixed Logit Hierarchical Bayesian model 
(MLHB), an extension of Mixed Logit modelling. This is an interesting development because 
with the MLHB approach (Johnson, Ozdemir et al. 2010) Mixed Logit population parameters 
are first estimated to indicate the distribution of tastes across the sample. These population 
parameters then serve as priors in a Bayesian update using information obtained from each 
individual’s pattern of choices, and the mean of the Bayesian posterior of a parameter can be 
interpreted as a classical estimator (Johnson, Ozdemir et al. 2010). Another study used what 
they described as a Bayesian like approach which was similar to mixed logit (Wittink, Cary et 
al. 2010). 
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During the early period (1990 – 2000) no study used the latent class model (LCM). Later 
studies using LCM were few, but all provided evidence of preference heterogeneity. During 
the period 2001 – 2008 1 / 114 studies (1%) used LCM, and it also found preference 
heterogeneity. During 2009 – 2011, 3 / 96 (3%) of studies used LCM, and all 3 again 
identified evidence of preference heterogeneity. 
 
A few studies used ‘Other’ estimation procedures. In 1990 – 2000 this was 1 / 34 (3%) of 
studies, the figure rose slightly to 4 / 114 (4%) in 2001 – 2008 and then rose again to 13 / 96 
(14%) in 2009 – 2011. Reporting of the estimation procedure used has improved over time. 
Overall 2 / 34 (6%) of respondents did not clearly report the estimation procedure used in 
1990 – 2000, the figure fell to 4 / 114 (4%) in 2001 – 2008, and then fell again to 1 / 96 (1%) 
in 2009 – 2011.   
 
Table III. Estimation procedures 
Item Category Baseline: 1990 
– 2000 
Period: 
2001 – 2008 
Period: 
2009 – 2011 
  N = 34 N=114 N = 96 
Estimation 
procedure 
Probit 6 (18%) 8 (7%) 2 (2%) 
 Random 
Effects Probit 
18 (53%) 47 (41%) 14 (15%) 
 Logit  1 (3%) 13 (11%) 4 (4%)  
 Random 
Effects Logit 
1 (3%) 6 (5%) 9 (9%) 
 MNL 6 (18%) 25 (22%) 43 (45%) 
 Nested Logit 0 (0%) 5 (4%) 3 (3%) 
 Mixed Logit 1 (3%) 6 (5%) 17 (18%) 
 Latent class 
(LCM) 
0 (0%) 1 (1%) 3 (3%) 
 Other 1 (3%) 4 (4%) 13 (14%) 
 Not clearly 
reported 
2 (6%) 4 (4%) 1 (1%) 
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D.6.  Validity. 
 
D.6.1. Validity checks. 
 
Table IV first begins by assessing whether Validity tests are applied. Tests of external validity 
are particularly valuable, if they can be applied because stated preferences from DCEs can 
then be compared with revealed preferences. However, DCEs are often applied in order to 
provide information in contexts in which revealed preference information is not available. 
Therefore, given the lack of revealed preference information, there is often little scope to 
conduct tests of external validity (particularly if DCEs are applied in the context of stated 
funded healthcare provision). This is presumably why table IV show that in 1990 – 2000 none 
of the studies contained a test for external validity. The figure rose to 1 / 114 (1%) in 2001 – 
2008 due to a paper by Mark and Swait (Mark and Swait 2003) which compared doctors’ 
prescribing decisions in relation to prescriptions for alcoholism with the preferences they 
expressed in a DCE. Given that the preference information obtained via DCEs and revealed 
preference data were similar the results proved reassuring. For the most recent time period 
(2009 – 2011), unfortunately there are no papers which compared DCE preferences with 
revealed preferences (the strict definition of external validity I used).  
 
In terms of tests for internal theoretical validity, most studies included these. Overall 22 / 34 
(65%) of studies in 1990 – 2000 included such a test, with the figure falling to 64 / 114 (56%) 
in 2001 – 2008, and then rising again to 69 / 96 (72%) in 2009 – 2011. Such tests involve an 
assessment of whether coefficients appear to move in line with prior expectations, and papers 
reported that they were generally met. 
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Tests for non-satiation were less frequently reported and the frequency has fallen. For the 
period 1990 – 2000, 14 / 34 (44%) of studies contained such a test, the figure rose slightly to 
56 / 114 (49%) in 2001 – 2008, before falling again to 14 / 96 (15%) in 2009 – 2011. The 
decline in the use of such tests probably reflects concerns that they tend to be passed, so 
that they are a relatively weak test of validity. If tests of transitivity could readily be applied 
using DCEs, the information yielded might be more useful. However, they cannot always be 
readily applied, which is presumably why over the period 1990 – 2000 only 3 / 34 (9%) of 
studies contained a transitivity test, in 2001 – 2008, 5 / 114 (4%) of studies such a test, and 
during 2009 – 2011 no studies contained a transitivity test. Tests relating to Sen’s extraction 
and contraction properties were rarely reported. During 1990 – 2000 none of the studies 
contained a test relating to Sen’s extraction and contraction properties, the figure rose to 2 / 
114 (2%) during 2001 – 2008, before falling back to 1 / 96 (1%) in 2009 – 2011.  
 
Use of a test for internal compensatory decision making was much more frequent.  In 1990 – 
2000, 12 / 34 (35%) of studies involved such a test , the figure for 2001 – 2008 was 36 / 114 
(32%), but in 2009 – 2011 it fell to only 14 / 96 (15%). 
 
D.6.2. Use of qualitative methods to enhance DCE process and results. 
 
Table IV also contains information on the use of qualitative methods to enhance DCE process 
and results. In 1990 – 2000 6 / 34 (18%) of studies used qualitative methods to inform 
attribute selection, the figure rose to 79 / 114 (69%) in 2001 – 2008, before falling back to 36 / 
96 (38%) in 2009 – 2011. A similar trend is apparent in relation to the use of qualitative 
methods to inform attribute level selection the figure was 6 / 34 (18%) in 1990 – 2000, it rose 
to 38 / 114 (33%) in 2001 – 2008, before falling back to 25 / 96 (26%) in 2009 – 2011. 
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The use of a pre-testing questionnaire fell consistently over the period it was 16 / 34 (47%) in 
1990 – 2000, it fell to 36 / 114 (32%) in 2001 – 2008, and then to 23 / 114 (24%) in 2009 – 
2011. The use of de-briefing choices to help strengthen understanding rose from 0 in 1990 – 
2000 to 5 / 114 (4%) in 2001 – 2008, it then fell down to 2 / 96 (2%) during 2009 – 2011.  
 
Table IV. Validity 
Item Category Baseline 1990-
2000 
Period: 
2001 – 2008 
Period: 
2009 – 2011 
  N = 34 N = 114 N = 96 
Validity tests External 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 0 (0%) 
 Internal: 
Theoretical 
22 (65%) 64 (56%)  69 (72%) 
 Internal: Non-
satiation 
15 (44%) 56 (49%) 14 (15%) 
 Internal: 
Transitivity 
3 (9%) 5 (4%) 0 (0%) 
 Internal: Sen’s 
expansion and 
contraction 
0 (0%) 2 (2%) 1 (1%) 
 Internal: 
Compensatory 
decision making 
12 (35%) 36 (32%) 14 (15%) 
Use of 
qualitative 
methods to 
enhance 
DCE process 
& results 
Increasing face 
validity: Attribute 
selection 
6 (18%) 79 (69%) 36 (38%) 
 Increasing face 
validity: Level 
selection 
6 (18%) 38 (33%) 25 (26%) 
 Increasing face 
validity: Pre-
testing 
questionnaire 
16 (47%) 36 (32%) 23 (24%) 
 Increasing face 
validity: 
Strengthen 
understanding 
responses – 
Debriefing 
choices 
0 (0%) 5 (4%) 2 (2%) 
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D.7. Areas of application and outcome measures. 
 
D. 7.1. Areas of application. 
 
Table V presents details of the areas of application for DCE studies represented in the 3 
reviews. This shows the main study objectives and topic areas covered by DCEs published 
over the last two decades. As indicated by de-Bekker Grob et al (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 
2012), although DCEs had been originally introduced into health economics primarily in order 
to value patient experience (Ryan 1999) there was clear evidence that the applications of 
DCEs had broadened out considerably by the time de-Bekker Grob (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et 
al. 2012) wrote their review covering the period 2001 - 2008.  Moreover, this trend continued 
into 2008 – 2011. 
 
Table V shows that in 1990 – 2000, 12 / 34 studies (35%) had a main study objective which 
involved valuing experience factors, in 2001 – 2008, 40 / 114 studies (again 35% of the 
sample) had the same main study objective, however during 2009 – 2011 the figure fell to 13 
/ 96 (14%). The fall in the proportion of studies primarily involving the valuation of experience 
factors (in 2009 – 2011) is illustrative of the trend away from the use of DCEs just in order to 
value patient experience.  
 
Throughout all 3 periods, approximately one in ten studies have had the main objective of 
valuing health outcomes. In 1990 – 2000, this figure was 3 / 34 studies (9%), during 2001 – 
2008 it was 8 / 114 (7%), and in 2009 – 2011 the figure rose a little to 11 / 96 (11%). 
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In contrast, the proportion of DCE studies looking at trade-offs between health outcomes and 
experience factors has risen steadily.  In 1990 – 2000, 3 / 34 studies (9%) had this as a main 
study objective of, during 2001 – 2008, the figure was 38 / 118 (33%), rising further to 48 / 96 
(50%) in 2009 – 2011. This reflects a shift from looking at patient experience factors in 
isolation (down from 35% in 2001 – 2008 to 14% in 2009 – 2011) towards looking at trade-
offs between health outcomes and experience factors (up from 33% in 2001 – 2008 to 50% in 
2009 - 2011). 
 
In 1990 – 2000, no studies main study objective was looking at utility weights within a QALY 
framework. During 2001 – 2008, 2 / 114 (2%) of studies had this as the main objective. These 
2 studies used DCEs as an alternative to Standard Gamble (SG) and time-trade off (TTO) to 
estimate utility weights within a QALY framework (Ryan, Netten et al. 2006); and (Burr, 
Kilonzo et al. 2007). More recently there has been some further work in this area. In 2009 – 
2011, 2 / 96 studies (2%) had this as their main objective reflecting continued interest in this 
research agenda. One of these studies (Lancsar, Wildman et al. 2011) looked at deriving 
distributional weights for QALYs using DCEs, whilst the other (Stolk, Oppe et al. 2010) used 
DCEs to quantify EQ-5D health states. 
 
A small percentage of DCEs have the objective of evaluating job choices. In 1990 – 2000, this 
figure was 2 / 34 studies (6%), during 2001 – 2008 it was 5 / 114 (4%), again similarly in 2009 
– 2011 the figure was 4 / 96 (4%). Whilst this is not a major application of DCEs, the 
technique can be used to help ascertain preferences for different health related jobs, thereby 
helping to inform human resource policies. During 2009 – 2011 the applications included 
attracting nurses to rural areas in Kenya, South Africa, and Thailand (Blaauw, Erasmus et al. 
2010); and also attracting health workers to rural jobs in Tanzania (Kolstad 2011). Further 
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studies included establishing pharmacists’ and student pharmacists’ preferences for patient 
centred care in Canada (Grindrod, Marra et al. 2010), and establishing young physicians’ 
preferences for choice of practice establishment in Germany (Gunther, Kurstein et al. 2010). 
 
A number of studies have used DCEs in the context of developing priority setting frameworks. 
In 1990 – 2000, these represented 2 / 34 studies (6%), during 2001 – 2008, 6 / 114 (5%) of 
studies had the same objective. The figure rose marginally to 7 / 96 (7%) in 2009 – 2011. 
Applications in 2009 – 2011 included establishing Dutch patients’ priorities for ambulatory 
hospital care centres (Albada and Triemstra 2009); establishing UK patients’ priority criteria 
for kidney transplant allocation (Clark MD, Gumber AK et al. 2009); establishing Canadian 
patients’ and healthcare professionals’ preferences for priority criteria for kidney allocation 
and end of life care for patients with chronic kidney disease (Davison SN, Kromm SK et al. 
2010); establishing Dutch healthcare professionals’ priorities for reimbursing different 
healthcare interventions (Koopmanschap, Stolk et al. 2010); a UK general public survey of 
preferences for resource allocations relating to health technology appraisal (Green and 
Gerard 2009); establishing UK general public priorities for resource use (Watson, Carnon et 
al. 2011); and establishing priority setting criteria for HIV / Aids interventions in Thailand 
(Youngkong, Baltussen et al. 2010).  
 
Finally, 1 / 34 studies (3%) in 1990 – 2000 had a main study objective of looking at health 
professionals’ preferences, 17 / 114 (15%) of studies during 2001 – 2008 had this objective, 
and the figure fell to 7 / 96 (7%) in 2009 – 2011 
 
So in summary the main change in areas of application between 2001 – 2008 and 2009 – 
2011 has been a shift away from using DCEs to value experience factors (down from 35% to 
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14%) towards using DCEs to look at trade-offs between health outcomes and experience 
factors (up from 33% to 50%). This suggests that DCEs are still utilized to look at experience 
factors, but are now more often used to see how experience factors trade-off against health 
outcomes. This could be taken to be a reassuring finding, in that the way in which DCEs are 
applied now means they increasingly provide information not just about patient experience, 
but also about health outcomes. There have been small increases in the proportion of studies 
with a primary study objective such as valuing health outcomes (7% in 2001 – 2008, rising to 
11% in 2009 – 2011) or developing priority setting frameworks (5% in 2001 – 2008, rising to 
7% in 2009 – 2011). Such increases have been offset by a decrease in studies which look 
primarily at health professionals’ preferences (15% in 2001 – 2008 falling to 7% in 2009 – 
2011). Moreover, the proportion of studies for some areas of application has remained largely 
unchanged between this review and the last; for example, looking at utility weights within a 
QALY framework (2% in 2001 – 2008 and in 2009 – 2011) and evaluating job choices (4% in 
2001 – 2008 and in 2009 – 2011. 
 
D.7.2. Outcome measures. 
 
Table V also provides an analysis of the main outputs presented in papers. In the past DCEs 
often expressed outputs in terms of the primary outcome measure of ‘Per WTP unit’ or ‘Per 
time unit’.  In 1990 – 2000, 10 / 34 studies (29%) used the ‘Per WTP unit’ outcome measure, 
increasing to 44 / 114 studies (39%) in 2001 – 2008, but in 2009 – 2011 the figure was only 
16 / 96 (17%). The use of per unit of time as an outcome measure has also declined over the 
period. During 1990 – 2000 10 / 34 (29%) of papers used this outcome measure, in 2001 – 
2008 the figure was 23 / 114 (20%), and it has now fallen back further to 3 / 96 (3%) in 2009 – 
2011.  
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The proportion of DCEs using ‘Per risk unit’ as a main outcome unit is low, and this has 
fluctuated a little over the period. Between 1990 – 2000, 3 / 34 studies (9%) used this as their 
main outcome measure, during 2001 – 2008 the figure was 2 / 114 (2%), and in 2009 – 2011 
the figure was 5 / 96 (5%).  
 
Interestingly, only a minority of studies use monetary welfare measures as the main measure 
and this proportion has fallen a little in proportionate terms over the period. During 1990 – 
2000, 5 / 34 studies (15%) involved a money welfare measure, during 2001 – 2008 the figure 
was 14 / 114 (12%), and during 2009 – 2011 the figure was 10 / 96 (10%). 
 
The use of utility scores as the main outcome measure is more common and this has 
fluctuated over the period. In 1990 – 2000 8 / 34 (24%) of studies had utility score as the main 
outcome measure. The figure was 20 / 114 (18%) during 2001 – 2008, rising to  29 / 96 (30%) 
during 2009 – 2011.  
 
There is also evidence that the use of an ‘Odds ratio’ has fluctuated. In 1990 – 2000 only 1 / 
34 papers (3%) used odds ratios as the main outcome measure. By 2001 – 2008 the 
percentage had more than quadrupled to 9 / 114 (13%), it then fell back slightly to 6 / 96 (6%) 
in 2009 – 2011. Likewise the use of ‘Probability scores’ has fluctuated. These were the main 
outcome measure for 1 / 34 studies (3%) in 1990 – 2000. The figure increased to 15 / 114 
(13%) in 2001, before declining to 4 / 96 (4%) during 2009 – 2011. 
 
Finally, table V presents information on ‘Other’ outcome measures used. For the periods 
1990 – 2000, and 2001 – 2009, the review authors did not use an ‘Other’ category for the 
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main outcome measure used. However, for this review I categorized a substantive number of 
studies 23 / 96 (24%) in the ‘Other’ category. Sometimes, this was because a study adopted 
‘Other’ summary outcome measures. For example, some studies used an outcome measure 
relating to the ‘relative importance’ of attributes (Bederman S, Mahomed NN et al. 2009; van 
Helvoort-Postulart, van der Weijden et al. 2009; Grindrod, Marra et al. 2010; Johnson, 
Ozdemir et al. 2010; Brown, Pashos et al. 2011; Hauber, Gonzalez et al. 2011; Mohamed, 
Epstein et al. 2011; Muhlbacher and Nubling 2011). Other studies used an outcome measure 
which was a variation upon this i.e. MRS with respect to the most important attribute (Hauber, 
Mohamed et al. 2009), or the importance weight of a utility scale - IWQOL – Lite(Hauber, 
Mohamed et al. 2010). Other outcome measures utilized included choice shares (Boonen 
LHHM, Schut FT et al. 2009); odds ratio of WTP (Lloyd, Nafees et al. 2011); Willingness to 
Accept – WTA (Mentzakis, Ryan et al. 2011) or distribution weights for QALYs (Lancsar, 
Wildman et al. 2011).  
 
I also classed a number of studies under the ‘Other’ category because they had more than 
one primary outcome measure, so that they could not reasonably just be subsumed under 
just one of the other outcome measures. Examples of these included the use of willingness to 
pay and willingness to wait (Chan, Sahota et al. 2009); ranks as well as utility scores (de 
Bekker-Grob, Essink-Bot et al. 2009); MRS as well as WTP (Deverill, Lancsar et al. 2010); 
incremental WTP and incremental utility (Essers, van Helvoort-Postulart et al. 2010); WTP 
and predicted choice probabilities for vaccines (Poulos, Yang et al. 2011); comparison of 
DCE choices and explicit choices (Thrumurthy, Morris et al. 2011); comparison of time trade 
off scores (TTO) vs DCE scores (Ratcliffe, Brazier et al. 2009); comparison of Best-worst 
scaling DCE versus Standard Gamble (SG) and TTO (Ratcliffe, Couzner et al. 2011); and 
comparison of Visual Analogue Scale (VAS), TTO, and DCE (Stolk, Oppe et al. 2010). 
61 
 
 
So in summary the main finding emerging from the 2009 -2011 review in relation to summary 
outcome measures is that the use of ‘Per unit WTP’ as the main outcome measure is 
declining (down from 39% in 2009 – 2011 to 17% in 2009 – 2011). There has also been a 
small decline in the percentage of studies with a summary measure which is a monetary 
welfare measure (down slightly from 12% in 2009 – 2011 to 10% in 2009 – 2011). Moreover, 
the use of ‘Per unit of time’ as the main outcome measure has also declined, but more 
steeply (down from 20% in 2009 – 2011 to 3% in 2009 – 2011).  
 
In relation to the use of other summary outcome measures there does not appear to be a 
consistent trend so much as evidence of fluctuation. For example, use of ‘Per risk unit’ 
(accounted for 9% of studies in 1990 – 2000, 2% in 2001 – 2008, and 5% in 2009 – 2011); 
use of ‘utility scores’ (accounted for 24% of studies in 1990 – 2000, 18% in 2001 – 2008, and 
30% in 2009 – 2011); use of ‘odds ratios’ (accounted for 3% of studies in 1990 – 2000, 13% 
in 2001 – 2008, and 6% in 2009 – 2011); and probability scores (accounted for 3% of studies 
in 1990 – 2000, 13% in 2001 – 2008, and 4% in 2009 – 2011).The other trend worthy of note 
is that, in contrast to previous review periods when no studies were categorised as using 
‘Other’ outcome measures, for 2009 – 2011 I categorized 23 / 96 (24%) in this category.  This 
was partly driven by a substantial proportion of studies utilising a mixture of outcome 
measures. 
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Table V. Output of DCEs. 
 No. 
 
Per 
WTP 
unit 
Per 
time 
unit 
Per 
risk 
unit 
Mone
tary 
welfa
re 
meas
ure 
Utility 
score 
Odds 
ratio 
Probab
ility 
score 
Other 
Main study – 
objective – 
Baseline: 1990 – 
2000 
         
(A) Valuing 
experience 
factors 
12 
(35%) 
3 4  1 3 1   
(B) Valuing 
health outcomes  
3 
(9%) 
1    1    
(C) Trade-offs 
health outcomes 
& experience 
factors 
14 
(41%) 
4 6 3 4 1  1  
(D) Utility 
weights within 
QALY 
framework 
0 
(0%) 
        
(E) Job-choices 2 
(6%) 
2        
(F) Developing 
priority setting 
frameworks 
2 
(6%) 
    2    
(G) Health 
professional’s 
preferences 
1 
(3%) 
    1    
(H) Other 0 
(0%) 
        
Total 34 
(100
%) 
10 
(29%) 
10 
(29%) 
3 
(9%) 
5 
(15%) 
8 
(24%) 
1  
(3%) 
1  
(3%) 
0 
(0%) 
          
Main study – 
objective – 
2001– 2008 
         
(A) Valuing 
experience 
factors 
40 
(35%) 
17 12  4 6  1  
(B) Valuing 
health outcomes  
8 
(7%) 
 1       
(C) Trade-offs 
health outcomes 
& experience 
factors 
38 
(33%) 
20 6 1 10 3 4 7  
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Table V (contd). Output of DCEs. 
(D) Utility 
weights within 
QALY 
framework 
2 
(2%) 
    2    
(E) Job-choices 5 
(4%) 
3      1  
(F) Developing 
priority setting 
frameworks 
6 
(5%) 
1  1  2 2 2  
(G) Health 
professional’s 
preferences 
17 
(15%) 
2 4   7 3 4  
(H) Other 4 
(4%) 
1        
Total 114 
(100
%) 
44 
(39%) 
23 
(20%) 
2 
(2%) 
14 
(12%) 
20 
(18%) 
9 
(8%) 
15 
(13%) 
0 
(0%) 
          
Main study – 
objective – 
2009– 2011 
         
(A) Valuing 
experience 
factors 
13 
(14%) 
3   3 4  1 2 
(B) Valuing 
health outcomes  
11 
(11%) 
1  1 1 3   5 
(C) Trade-offs 
health outcomes 
& experience 
factors 
48 
(50%) 
11 1 2 6 11 3 2 12 
(D) Utility 
weights within 
QALY 
framework 
2 
(2%) 
       2 
(E) Job-choices 4  
(4%) 
1    1 1  1 
(F) Developing 
priority setting 
frameworks 
7 
(7%) 
 1   4 1 1  
(G) Health 
professional’s 
preferences 
7 
(7%) 
 1 1  4   1 
(H) Other 4 
(4%) 
  1  2 1   
Total  16 
(17%) 
3 
(3%) 
5 
(5%) 
10 
(10%) 
29 
(30%) 
6 
(6%) 
4 
(4%) 
23 
(24%) 
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D.8. Main findings of the literature review. 
 
Ryan and Gerard (Ryan and Gerard 2003) identified 34 studies for the 1990 – 2000, implying 
a mean of just over 3 papers per year. The more recent review (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 
2012) identified 114 DCEs relating to the period 2001 - 2008. This was equivalent to a mean 
of 14 studies per year. For the period 2009 – 2011 my review sourced 96 DCE studies, 
implying an average of 32 per year during this period. I also found that 40 / 96 of these 
studies were published in 2011, which suggests there is an ongoing trend towards increasing 
use of DCEs in health which shows no signs of abating. There has also been a shift away 
from UK dominance in terms of DCE publications. During 1990 – 2000, 59% of studies came 
from the UK, this figure fell to 48% in 2001 - 2008, and then to 21% in 2009 – 2011. Although 
the UK just remains the largest source of DCE studies (thanks to Scotland being part of the 
UK), it came close to being overtaken by the Netherlands and the USA which accounted for 
19% and 17% of DCE studies respectively during 2009 – 2011. Moreover, the range of 
countries producing DCE studies has widened further when comparing 2001 – 2008 
publications with those in 2009 – 2011.  
 
de-Bekker Grob et al (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012) noted a wide range of policy 
applications for which DCEs were applied during 2001 – 2008. Our findings suggest this 
remains the case during the period 2009 – 2011. Moreover, de Bekker Grob et al (de Bekker-
Grob, Ryan et al. 2012) also noted that the valuation of patient experience continued “to be 
the focus of the majority of studies” and found that 35% of studies had this as the main study 
objective. In contrast, during 2009 – 2011 I found a marked decline to 14% in the proportion 
of studies that had patient experience as the main study objective. However, most DCEs 
continued to include attributes relating to patients’ experiences, but it was just that more of 
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these looked at trade-offs between health outcomes and experience factors. Such studies 
accounted for 33% of studies in 2008 – 2011, rising to 50% in 2009 – 2011.   
 
When comparing my findings with those for the 2001 – 2008 period (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et 
al. 2012), I identified that the proportion of studies with a main study objective relating to 
health outcomes had grown a little from 7% in 2001 – 2008 to 11%. Also, the proportion of 
studies relating to priority setting grew very slightly from 5% in 2001 – 2008 to 7% in 2009 -
2011. But, the proportion of studies mainly relating to health professionals’ preferences fell 
from 15% to 7%. Whilst the proportion of studies with main study objectives relating to Utility 
weights within a QALY framework (2%), job choices (4%). and ‘Other’ applications did not 
change between 2001 – 2008 and 2009 – 2011. 
 
The 2001 - 2008 review (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012) reported that “Willingness to Pay 
continued to be a commonly used output from DCEs” for the period 2001 – 2008. However, 
the present review found evidence that the proportion of studies using either ‘Per WTP unit’ 
(39% in 2001 – 2008, and 17% in 2009 – 2011) or a ‘Monetary welfare measure’ (12% in 
2001 – 2008, and 10% in 2009 – 2011) as the primary outcome has fallen as a percentage of 
overall DCE use. At the same time, given that the number of DCEs per year had increased 
from 14 to 32 per year between the two time periods, this does not mean the average number 
of papers per year with either a ‘Per WTP unit’ or ‘Monetary welfare measure’ as the main 
outcome measure has declined. Rather, they simply account for a smaller proportion of the 
growing annual number of published DCEs. Of course, the use of DCEs to elicit WTP 
estimates is encouraged by those who posit that WTP estimates might be of use to inform the 
benefits side of a Cost-Benefit Analysis (McIntosh 2006). However, numerous concerns have 
been raised in relation to the use of DCEs to elicit WTP. These include fear that respondents 
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might base their valuations more upon what they perceive something might cost or should 
cost, rather than registering a response which relates to the maximum amount they would be 
willing to pay (Ratcliffe 2000); (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012). Indeed in a test for 
consistency in willingness to pay experiments (Ryan and San Miguel 2000) which posited that 
if commodity A is preferred to B, then individuals WTP for A should exceed B, 30% of 
respondents failed the consistency test. This result was thought to be partly attributable to 
respondents registering cost-based responses. If respondents are responding in this way, 
then it is a cause for concern because it means that estimates of WTP obtained from 
respondents may fail to accurately include consumer surplus, which estimated WTP should 
accurately encompass if it is to be of used for the purposes of conducting Cost-Benefit 
Analyses.  
 
Other concerns have been raised about whether estimates of WTP obtained via DCEs may 
be sensitive to the range specified for the monetary attribute or the presence or absence of 
payment per se (Skjoldborg and Gyrd-Hansen 2003). In a subsequent analysis the authors 
found evidence that respondents might be more influenced by the presence or absence of a 
non-zero cost than the level of cost indicated by the monetary attribute (Gyrd-Hansen and 
Skjoldborg 2008)). Other evidence suggests that the way attributes are “framed” in a DCE 
questionnaire (i.e. number of polyps found versus number of polyps missed etc) may impact 
upon estimated WTP (Howard and Salkeld 2009). Also there is reason to suppose that the 
way monetary attributes are described (see section E1.2) may affect how changes in the 
monetary attribute are valued.  
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There are also strong reasons to suppose that there might be problems with hypothetical bias 
when DCEs are used to estimate WTP in contexts where healthcare is free at the point of use 
(see section E1.1 of this chapter). Also, WTP estimates are likely to vary across different 
respondent groups. When Cost-Benefit Analysis is deployed the relevant perspective to use 
to inform resource allocation decisions is that of the general public. However, most DCE 
studies in health relate to patient preferences. This means that patient DCEs which generate 
WTP estimates may not be of use for the purposes of Cost-Benefit Analysis.   
 
Another issue arises because when estimating MWTP, it is commonly assumed that marginal 
utility of money is constant and the cost function is therefore assumed to be continuous and 
linear. However, there is reason to think that the cost gradient may not be continuous and 
linear, as is commonly supposed when estimating WTP using DCEs (Johnson, Mohamed et 
al. 2011). Moreover, alternative specifications for estimating cost generate different estimates 
of WTP and respondents may deploy heuristics which involve recoding costs into categories 
such as low, medium, and high, thereby undermining the validity of WTP estimates (Johnson, 
Mohamed et al. 2011). It therefore has been argued that ‘cheap talk’ or graphic 
representations of attribute cost levels in questionnaire preambles may improve response 
validity (Johnson, Mohamed et al. 2011). Indeed some evidence (Ozdemir, Johnson et al. 
2009), has indicated that the cost function for a ‘cheap talk’ subsample of DCE respondents, 
appears to be linear whereas the cost function for the main sample of respondents not 
engaged in ‘cheap talk’ is not. 
 
It could be that these wide ranging concerns, which raise question marks about the 
methodological robustness of establishing WTP using DCEs, have made people more wary of 
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conducting WTP analysis using DCEs both in general, and also particularly in contexts in 
which healthcare is free at the point of use (where estimates of WTP may be more 
susceptible to hypothetical bias). It is also conceivable that, as more papers have been 
published which raise methodological concerns about WTP analysis (also see section E1.1  
of this chapter), both peer reviewers and the editorial staff of journals have become more 
discriminating when it comes to evaluating whether a DCE which uses WTP analysis is 
worthy of publication.  
 
The authors of the 2001 – 2008 review (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012) suggested that 
their findings indicated that a “fewer number of attributes are used in current DCEs”. 
However, my review for 2009 – 2011 uncovered a more complex pattern in relation to trends 
in the numbers of attributes included in studies. The percentage of studies with only 2 – 3 
attributes has declined from 15% during 2001 – 2008, to 13% in 2001 – 2008, and again to 
10% in 2009 – 2011.  However, the percentage of studies with 4 -5 attributes has fluctuated 
(29% in 1990 – 2000, 44% in 2001 – 2008, and 30% in 2009 – 2011). There was also a small 
increase in the percentage of studies with 6 attributes (26% in both 1990 – 2000, and 2001 – 
2008, but up to 29% in 2009 – 2011), and a substantial increase in the proportion of studies 
with 7 – 9 attributes (12% in 1990 – 2000, 13% in 2001 – 2008, but up to 23% in 2009 – 
2011). The percentage of studies with 10 attributes was 6% in 1990, and has remained at 2% 
for both 2001 – 2008 and 2009 – 2011. At the same time, the percentage of studies with more 
than 10 attributes fell from 12% in 1990 – 2000 to 2% in 2001 – 2008 and has risen to 5% in 
2009 – 2011. Thus, if anything the trend between 2001 – 2008, and 2009 – 2011 has been 
towards including more attributes rather than fewer in DCEs. Moreover there has also been 
an interest in developing approaches to cater for the inclusion of increased numbers of 
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attributes within DCE designs (van Helvoort-Postulart, Dellaert et al. 2009); Witt, Scott et al. 
2009). 
 
Bringing together my findings and those of earlier reviews, there is obviously a long 
established pattern of DCEs typically covering a range of possible attribute domains (both in 
1990 – 2000, 2001 – 2008, and 2009 - 2011) with a substantive proportion of DCEs focusing 
on a monetary measure, time, risk, health status, and health care related domains. Moreover, 
increasing numbers of studies are related to ‘other’ or several domains, (9% in 1990 – 2000, 
15% in 2001 – 2008, and 41% in 2009 – 2011). There has also been a marked fall in the 
proportion of DCEs presenting 8 or fewer DCE choices (38% in 1990 – 2000, 39% in 2001 – 
2008, but down to 23% in 2009 – 2011). This trend has been offset by a recent increase in 
the percentage of studies presenting 9 – 16 choices (53% in 1990 – 2000, 38% in 2001 – 
2008, up to 55% in 2009 – 2011) whilst the proportion of studies with more than 16 choices 
has not changed much since 2001 – 2008 (6% in 1990 – 2000, 18% in 2001 – 2008, and 19% 
in 2009 – 2011). 
 
In terms of questionnaire administration, the shift away from self-administration of DCEs (79% 
in 1990 – 2000, 67% in 2001 – 2008, and 60% in 2009 – 2011) has arisen largely due to an 
increase in the percentage of DCEs administered via a computer (9% in 1990 – 2000, 11% in 
2001 – 2008, and 26% in 2009 – 2011). Increasing respondent access to computers and e-
mail means this trend is likely to continue. These developments might be particularly helpful if 
there is a need to represent some attributes such as risk in a pictorial form as an aid to 
comprehension. It may also reduce the cost of accessing respondents and administering 
DCEs in some cases. 
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The trend towards the increased use of ‘efficient’ DCE designs noted by de-Bekker Grob (de 
Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012) has continued. In 1990 – 2000, D-efficient designs were not 
used. During 2001 – 2008, 11% of studies used D-efficient designs, a figure which has further 
risen to 19% in 2009 - 2011. Although there has been an increase in the percentage of 
studies catering for interactions (6% in 1990 – 2000, 5% in 2001 – 2008, and 11% in 2009 – 
2011), main effects designs remain the dominant form of design. However, as the authors of 
the 2001 – 2008 review (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012) have argued, future work still 
needs to increasingly explore the inclusion of interactions terms in the design and analysis of 
DCEs, and more exploration is needed to assess the impact of including prior knowledge of 
parameters (perhaps from DCE pilot studies) within final ‘efficient’ DCE designs. 
 
Interestingly, there has been a shift away from using estimation procedures such as Probit, 
and Random effects Probit. This is in part due to the fact that a lower proportion of DCEs 
involve the presentation of binary choices. The use of Multinomial Logit (MNL) models has 
correspondingly increased, so that they account for 45% of studies in 2009 – 2011 (up from 
18% in 1990 – 2000, and 22% in 2001 – 2009). For the first time, in 2001 – 2008, 3% of 
studies applied Nested Logit, during 2009 – 2011 the figure was 4%.  
 
The interest in applying models which cater for preference heterogeneity has increased (see 
also section E1.3). In 1990 – 2000, Mixed Logit studies accounted for 3% of studies, 5% in 
2001 – 2008, but 18% in 2009 – 2011. There were no latent class model DCE studies in 1990 
– 2000, but these accounted for 1% of studies in 2001 – 2008, and 3% in 2009 – 2011. I 
anticipate that the trend towards the increased use of models that cater for preference 
heterogeneity will continue. These should be applied when preferences are not homogenous 
and, when they have been applied, they have usually indicated that preferences are 
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heterogeneous (suggesting that their use is appropriate). There have also been some notable 
developments in this area including the use of Mixed Logit Hierarchical Bayesian models 
(Johnson, Qian et al. 2010) and adoption of Bayesian like approaches similar to mixed logit 
(Wittink, Cary et al. 2010).  
 
Whilst validity checks are still often applied and the use of some validity checks has increased 
since 2001 – 2008 (i.e. internal theoretical validity checks) there appears to have been a 
decline in the use of most tests during 2009 – 2011. This includes tests of non-satiation, 
transitivity, Sen’s expansion and contraction properties, and tests of compensatory decision 
making. We might have anticipated a decline in the use of such validity checks, because the 
usefulness of the results they yielded has increasingly been called into question (Lancsar and 
Louviere 2006); (Miguel, Ryan et al. 2005) (Ryan and Watson 2009)). However, one finding I 
was unprepared for and I regard as a cause for concern, is the decline in recent years in the 
percentage of studies using qualitative methods to enhance DCE process and results 
compared with 2001 – 2008. This is apparent in terms of all 4 measures specified in the 2001 
– 2008 review. These include the use of qualitative methods to inform attribute selection; use 
of qualitative methods to inform level selection; use of pilot pre-testing questionnaires; and 
the use of qualitative methods to strengthen understanding of responses (including de-
briefing choices). I suspect this trend may in part be attributable to the fact that an increasing 
proportion of studies are emanating from countries with a limited track record of DCE 
research. This may mean that those conducting them are less aware of the importance of 
qualitative methods to enhance DCE process and results.   
 
In conclusion the use of DCEs in healthcare continues to grow, and the range of applications 
is growing, in an expanding range of countries. There is increasing evidence that more 
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sophisticated approaches to both DCE designs and analysis of data are improving the quality 
of final analyses. That said, recent evidence indicating that some qualitative approaches to 
improving DCE design validity are being neglected is a major cause for concern. 
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E.1. Areas of research addressed in this thesis. 
 
Inevitably, when writing a thesis in an area as wide ranging as the application of DCEs within 
health, it is essential to home in on one or more key issues. For this thesis, I decided to 
pursue the following four main issues (E.1.1 – E.1.4): 
 
E.1. Calculating Willingness to Pay using a monetary attribute and Hypothetical bias. 
 
Any divergence between participants’ stated preferences and how they would respond in a 
real life scenario can be defined as hypothetical bias (Champ and Bishop 2001). Hypothetical 
bias therefore relates to the difference between actual behaviour and hypothetical statements 
of value (Little and Berrens 2004; Mozumder and Berrens 2007). It implies that the 
hypothetical nature of the preference elicitation has biased responses (Guzman and Kolstad 
2007). 
 
DCEs are a stated preference technique, and a form of contingent valuation (CV). It has been 
suggested that because DCEs closely mirror actual consumer purchasing situations, they 
may be less prone to one of the primary drawbacks of contingent valuation, namely 
hypothetical bias (Lusk and Schroeder 2004). DCEs may be less susceptible to various 
sources of bias than other forms of WTP analysis. For example ‘Yea saying’ (Brown, Champ 
et al. 1996) which involves an over readiness to agree to a given suggested WTP. This 
occurs when respondents face a stark ‘all or nothing’ choice. However, DCEs require a 
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hypothetical trade off between levels of attributes. As this does not involve all or nothing 
choices, it makes ‘Yea saying’ less likely (Hanley, Wright et al. 1998). Moreover, obtaining a 
‘warm glow’ (Sen 1977); Andreoni 1990) from expressing a high WTP is more likely using 
open-ended or closed-ended WTP analysis, than with DCEs. This is because with DCEs 
respondents make multiple trades between conflicting attributes, with conflicting price 
differentials. This ensures respondents focus more on what they are trading for what, rather 
than obtaining ‘warm glow.’ Finally, embedding arises when respondents’ valuations of a 
programme are insensitive to changes in the size of benefits (Kahneman and Knetsch 1992). 
A similar concept (scope insensitivity) refers to findings that WTP values are not sensitive to 
differences in the number of units (Olsen, Donaldson et al. 2004). Both these phenomena 
should be less of a problem with DCEs, as respondents continually relate differences in 
attributes (i.e. the scope of benefits) to the scope of price differentials. Therefore tests of 
scope are integral to DCE design (Adamowicz 1995; Hanley, Wright et al. 1998).  
 
However, despite the fact that for the aforementioned reasons we might expect DCEs to be 
less susceptible to hypothetical bias than other forms of CV, concerns remain that WTP 
estimates generated using DCEs might still be subject to some hypothetical bias. WTP 
estimates may be more subject to hypothetical bias if DCEs are applied to estimate WTP for 
healthcare provision which is free at the point of use. Indeed respondents may interpret cost 
as something that can be ignored as they in reality don’t directly face a real cost (Ratcliffe 
2000). If this happens and some respondents ignore the monetary attribute when they 
complete a DCE, it would mean the utility value of currency unit will be lower, and therefore 
estimates of MWTP would be correspondingly higher. They may also base their monetary 
valuation upon what they consider something might cost (so called ‘cost-based’ responses) 
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rather than what they are willing to pay (Ratcliffe 2000). This is of concern because ‘cost-
based’ responses may fail to incorporate the element of consumer surplus that estimates of 
Willingness to Pay should encompass. 
 
Other evidence suggests (Gyrd-Hansen and Skjoldborg 2008) that respondents might be 
more influenced by the presence or otherwise of a non-zero cost than the actual cost implied 
by a monetary attribute. This may be attributable to a lexicographic aversion to the “concept 
of paying” (Gyrd-Hansen and Skjoldborg 2008). Logically we might expect this to be a more 
pronounced influence upon hypothetical choices when respondents are used to receiving 
something ‘free at the point of use.’ This is because respondents are more likely to have a 
lexicographic aversion to the “concept of paying” if they are asked to express their WTP for 
something which they are accustomed to receiving ‘free at the point of use.’ If in contrast they 
faced a real situation in which they either had to pay for something which is currently free at 
the point of use in order to access it, their responses might differ from those expressed in a 
DCE (which would indicate the presence of hypothetical bias). 
 
Alternatively it has been suggested that  respondents may deploy heuristics which involve 
recoding costs into categories such as low, medium, and high (Johnson, Mohamed et al. 
2011) which means that the marginal utility of money cannot be assumed to be constant. This 
explains some empirical evidence which suggests that the cost gradient may not be 
continuous and linear, as is commonly supposed when estimating WTP using DCEs 
(Johnson, Mohamed et al. 2011). However, it is unclear that such behaviour necessarily 
provides evidence of hypothetical bias. It would only be indicative of hypothetical bias if 
respondents applied such heuristics as a result of the hypothetical nature of DCE choices. 
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However, if respondents would respond in a similar way in contexts in which they actually 
paid for something, then it would not be hypothetical bias. 
 
It has been argued that incorporating ‘cheap talk’ or graphic representations of attribute cost 
levels in questionnaire preambles, may improve the validity of responses (Johnson, 
Mohamed et al. 2011). There is evidence that cheap talk may alter cost function responses. 
Indeed it has been shown (Ozdemir, Johnson et al. 2009) that the cost function for a cheap 
talk subsample appeared to be linear whereas the cost function for the main sample of 
respondents not engaged in ‘cheap talk’ was not. Those engaged in ‘cheap talk’ in effect 
thought through their responses in greater depth before making a final choice. Therefore their 
‘cheap talk’ responses could be more akin to those they might have registered had they 
regularly made such choices in a non-hypothetical situation. So it could well be that when 
respondents face hypothetical DCE questions, because they lack experience of making 
choices, the trade-offs they express are less valid. However, if they are forced to engage in 
‘cheap talk’ this hypothetical bias (arising because responses to a hypothetical question may 
be less thought through) might be avoided. 
 
The suggestion that hypothetical bias might arise when responses are less thought through, 
fits with evidence that estimates of WTP may be affected by the number of choices that 
respondents face (Bech, Kjaer et al. 2011)). This may be indicative of the fact that 
respondents engage in a learning process whilst completing a DCE questionnaire such that 
latter responses more accurately reflect preferences than earlier ones. 
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There is also evidence that the way in which hypothetical questions are framed can affect 
WTP results (Howard and Salkeld 2009). When assessing the costs and benefits of screening 
for colorectal cancer, the framing of attributes was manipulated to be positive (the number of 
cancers or polyps found), or negative (the number of cancers of polyps missed). Moreover, 
there was evidence that the way hypothetical questions were framed had a statistically 
significant impact upon estimates of WTP. 
 
In chapter 2 of the thesis I demonstrate that if it can be assumed that WTP can be accurately 
elicited using DCEs, the information obtained might be of policy making utility. I applied DCEs 
in order to address the issue of whether healthcare for patients with suspected Deep Vein 
Thrombosis (DVT) ought to be provided via hospital outpatients departments or via 
community based provision. I then calculated estimated marginal willingness to pay (MWTP), 
and also estimated Willingness to Pay using the Compensating Variation approach. I then 
considered the health policy implications of findings. This chapter therefore provides an 
example of some of the potential that WTP analysis undertaken using DCEs might have to 
shed light upon health policy issues (if it can be assumed it is not subject to bias, which is the 
heroic assumption that underpins that analysis).  
 
In chapter 3 of the thesis I address one possible source of hypothetical bias. I apply DCEs to 
the UK National Health Service to female patients who currently do not have to pay for the 
NHS healthcare they receive. Clearly in this sort of context if respondents face a monetary 
attribute, a proportion of respondents may choose to ignore it because in reality they know 
that they would not have to pay (i.e. because of hypothetical bias). I therefore posed a 
question after the DCE questions to establish whether respondents factored in the monetary 
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attribute into their decision-making or not. I then used interaction dummy variables to 
establish whether WTP varied comparing respondent groups according to how they had 
replied to this question. This analysis was conducted largely upon a sample of respondents 
who had menstrual disorders. However, I also included in our sample some DCE respondents 
with other miscellaneous Gynaecological problems who like the Menstrual disorder patients, 
faced a monetary attribute entitled ‘Cost to you.’  
 
A similar analysis is conducted in chapter 4 on a different sample of respondents, (women 
with miscellaneous gynaecological problems) who this time (unlike the analysis in chapter 3) 
face the same DCE but with 3 possible different descriptors of the monetary attribute (Cost to 
you; Amount Lost; or Willingness to Pay) rather than just ‘Cost to you’ (as with respondents to 
the DCE whose responses are analyzed in chapter 3). Given that one of these descriptors 
refers to ‘Cost’ it might be thought that the descriptor ‘Cost to you’ might encourage cost 
based responses, in a manner that the descriptor ‘Willingness to Pay’ might not. So in chapter 
4, I examined whether there is a statistically significant difference in estimated Marginal 
Willingness to Pay (MWTP), comparing estimates of MWTP obtained from questionnaires 
with each of the 3 monetary descriptors. 
 
E.2. Description of the cost attribute. 
 
Respondents might be concerned that expressing WTP could represent some precursor to an 
attempt to introduce charging (Ratcliffe 2000). This is why when applying DCEs it is not 
uncommon to change the description of WTP attributes. In chapter 4, I therefore provide 
79 
 
details of a wide range of different monetary descriptors which have been used for health 
related DCEs. Taking care to describe a monetary attribute appropriately is important 
because it may improve the incentive compatibility of the DCE questionnaire (de Trenqualye 
1995). However, it remains unclear how the use of different descriptors affects estimated 
WTP (Ratcliffe 2000), which is why we investigated this issue in the later part of the analysis 
described in chapter 4 
 
Chapter 4, conducts a similar analysis to that conducted in chapter 3 but this time purely upon 
a sample of patients with miscellaneous Gynaecological problems (i.e. respondents who had 
replied to the questionnaire which was targeted at those with ‘Menstrual disorders’ [the main 
body of the patient sample used for the analysis in chapter 3] are excluded from the sample 
used for data analysis in chapter 4).  I established using a question in a DCE questionnaire 
whether respondents claimed to have taken the monetary attribute into account when 
registering choices in the DCE, I then established how WTP varied according to respondents 
answer to the question about whether or not they take the monetary attribute into account.  
 
Having addressed this initial ‘hypothetical bias’ issue, I then compared estimated WTP 
according to which descriptor for the monetary attribute respondents faced (this time in 
contrast to the analysis in chapter 3 respondents faced one of three possible different 
descriptors for the monetary attribute (Cost to you; Amount Lost; or Willingness to Pay). Of 
course the description of all the other attributes and levels in the DCE questionnaire was kept 
the same. I wanted to establish whether the description of the monetary attribute might affect 
estimated WTP.  
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The choice of 3 descriptors for the monetary attribute was informed by feedback from 
interviews, obtained when the DCE questionnaire was being piloted. We chose the 3 
descriptors which pilot respondents seemed to feel to be the most appropriate 3 options (Cost 
to you; Amount Lost; or Willingness to Pay). However, I deliberately steered away from 
allowing comparison of descriptors for the monetary attribute which might affect who pays. 
This is because logically you might expect that respondents might respond differently to an 
attribute which affects who pays i.e. cost to taxpayers, or cost to the NHS vs. out of pocket 
cost to the respondent (Bryan and Dolan 2004). What is less clear however is whether 
changes to the description of the monetary attribute which don’t affect who pays, might affect 
estimates of WTP. This is an important issue because when healthcare is ‘free at the point of 
use’ it has  become common place to use alternative descriptors for the monetary attribute to 
‘Willingness to Pay’ in order to improve the incentive compatibility of the DCE. However, it is 
unclear whether and how this might affect estimates of WTP. Moreover, as indicated in 
section E.1.1, it is possible that a descriptor which refers to costs such as the descriptor ‘cost 
to you’ might encourage cost based responses. If this is the case we might expect estimates 
of WTP obtained using the ‘cost to you’ descriptor to be lower than those obtained using the 
‘Willingness to Pay’ descriptor. The analysis in chapter 4 therefore considers whether or not 
this is the case. 
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E.3. Preference heterogeneity. 
 
In recent years new techniques such as Mixed Logit and Latent Class Models (LCM) have 
been increasingly used in order to analyse DCE data econometrically (see section D5.7 of 
this chapter), in order to assess the extent to which respondent preferences are 
heterogeneous and identify unobserved preference heterogeneity.  Before the development 
of these techniques more basic techniques tended to be deployed relating to observable 
preference heterogeneity, in order to establish whether preferences varied between pre-
defined respondent groups including running separate econometric models for different 
response groups, and also using interaction dummy variables to establish whether 
preferences for a given attribute differed in a statistically significant manner between the base 
sample and a sub-group of respondents which formed an interaction dummy variable group, 
or between alternative interaction dummy variable groups. 
  
My review of the literature for 2009-2011 revealed that basic techniques including separate 
regression models for different respondent groups were used (Essers, Dirksen et al. 2010; 
Faggioli, Scalone et al. 2011; Guimaraes, Marra et al. 2009; Lloyd, Nafees et al. 2011;  
Pereira, Mulligan et al. 2011;  Scalone, Mantovani et al. 2009; Thrumurthy, Morris et al. 2011;  
Tinelli, Ryan et al. 2009; Torbica and Fattore 2010;  van Dam, Hol et al. 2010; van Til, 
Stiggelbout et al. 2009). Also interaction dummy variables were used (Boonen LHHM, Schut 
FT et al. 2009; Clark MD, Gumber AK et al. 2009; de Bekker-Grob, Essink-Bot et al. 2009;  
Koopmanschap, Stolk et al. 2010;  Lagarde, Smith Paintain et al. 2011;  Musters, de Bekker-
Grob et al. 2011;  Nayaradou, Berchi et al. 2010;  Nieboer, Koolman et al. 2010;  
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Schwappach, Mulders et al. 2011;  Vroomen and Zweifel 2011; Wyatt, Batley et al. 2010), 
and LR tests were used to test for restrictions i.e. separate groups vs. full sample (Johnson, 
Hauber et al. 2009) had been used.  Running separate models for different sub-groups of 
respondents can allow you to establish whether attributes appear to be valued differently by 
different respondent groups. In particular you can see whether the range of statistically 
significant variables differs between samples. You can also establish (for all statistically 
significant variables) whether there appear to be differences in the point estimates for 
attribute coefficients between sub-groups. If you want to establish whether any differences in 
the valuation of individual attributes is statistically significantly different however, then use of 
interaction dummy variables is indicated. For example (Clark MD, Gumber AK et al. 2009) if 
you wanted to establish whether there are statistically significant differences in preferences 
between one sub-group of the sample and the rest of the sample (in this case between non-
white ethnic minority patient vs. the rest of the sample; or South Asian patients vs. the rest of 
the sample; or female vs. male patients) you can use interaction dummy variables. . Here Yij 
is the binary dependent variable, from individuals i = 1…m, for observations j = 1…ni. The 
number of observations ni varies because the i individuals do not all complete every pairwise 
choice (a minority of respondents don’t answer all choices). The term μi is the random effects 
error term (which allows for multiple responses from i respondents), and εij is the standard 
Probit error term for individuals i for j observations. In equation 17, D is a dummy variable and 
is equal to 1 if the respondent is in the subgroup, otherwise it is equal to 0.  
Yij = β0+β1waitij+β2tissueij+β3dependentij+ β4ageij+β5disease1ij+β6disease2ij+β7ill1ij+ 
β8ill2ij+β9Dij+β10Dij waitij+β11Dijtissueij+β12Dij dependentij+β13Dij ageij+β14Dij disease1ij+β15Dij 
disease2ij+ β16Dijill1ij+β17Dijill2ij+µi+ εij 
        (Equation 17) 
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It follows that if any beta β10 to β17 is statistically significant (at a given significance level) then 
we have evidence to suggest that preferences for a given attribute differ (comparing the 
preferences for a defined sub-group of respondents with the rest of the sample) at a defined 
significance level within the sub-group. Moreover, if you also run the analysis for the entire 
sample (without using dummy variables), as well as a model with interaction dummy 
variables, it is possible to use likelihood ratio (LR) tests to establish whether the interaction 
dummy variables are jointly significant (Clark MD, Gumber AK et al. 2009).  
 
Alternatively if you are running separate econometric models for different sub-groups of 
respondents, you could use an LR test to establish whether there is a jointly significant 
difference in preferences comparing defined sub-groups of respondents and a pooled 
dataset, whereby all the sub-groups are pooled together (Johnson, Hauber et al. 2009). 
Unfortunately this approach (unlike that deployed by (Clark MD, Gumber AK et al. 2009) has 
the limitation that you cannot establish whether preference for particular attributes vary in a 
statistically significant manner between sub-groups (which is why an interaction dummy 
variable approach might be preferred). 
 
In addition more sophisticated econometric modelling including Mixed Logit (Blaauw, 
Erasmus et al. 2010; de Bekker-Grob, Hofman et al. 2010; Eberth, Watson et al. 2009; Goto, 
Takahashi et al. 2011; Hauber, Mohamed et al. 2009); Howard and Salkeld 2009; Johnson, 
Ozdemir et al. 2010; Mohamed, Epstein et al. 2011; Oteng, Marra et al. 2011; Ozdemir, 
Johnson et al. 2009; Potoglou, Burge et al. 2011; Regier, Friedman et al. 2009; Scalone, 
Watson et al. 2011; Scuffham, Whitty et al. 2010; Sweeting, Whitty et al. 2011; van Helvoort-
Postulart, Dellaert et al. 2009; van Helvoort-Postulart, van der Weijden et al. 2009; Whitty, 
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Scuffham et al. 2011; and Wittink, Cary et al. 2010)  and LCM (Grindrod, Marra et al. 2010; 
Mentzakis, Ryan et al. 2011; Mentzakis, Stefanowska et al. 2011) has also been applied to 
analyse DCE data.  
 
Mixed logit and Latent Class Models (LCM) both cater for unobserved preference 
heterogeneity. A good exposition of the statistical methodology underpinning both Mixed Logit 
and the LCM technique is provided in the discussion paper and published paper produced by 
Hole (Hole 2007; Hole 2008). So readers with an interest in the underlying statistical 
methodology are referred to that work. The Mixed Logit model has continuously distributed 
coefficients, whereas a latent class model has coefficients which follow a discrete distribution 
(Hole 2007). With the Mixed Logit approach information on preference heterogeneity is 
obtained by treating the coefficients as random rather than fixed parameters (Eberth, Watson 
et al. 2009). Using this approach standard deviation of coefficients can be calculated. If the 
standard deviation for a given attribute is statistically significant then this provides evidence of 
preference heterogeneity for that attribute (Eberth, Watson et al. 2009). 
 
In contrast with Latent Class Models (LCM), econometric results differ for different discrete 
latent classes. The optimum number of latent classes can be determined by increasing the 
number of latent classes, until criteria such as the Bayesian Information criterion, or Akaike 
Information criterion, suggest the number of classes is optimal.  With LCM respondents have 
a defined probability of being in a particular latent class. Each latent class is characterized by 
coefficients (and confidence intervals around coefficients) for each of the attributes. These 
coefficients and confidence intervals are specific to that latent class. The crucial defining 
characteristic of the LCM technique is that the continuous distribution of heterogeneity is 
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approximated by a number of finite ‘points of support,’ which can be understood as sorting 
individuals into discrete classes (Greene 2007). However, ‘which class contains any particular 
individual, whether known or not to that individual is unknown to the analyst’ (Greene 2007). 
 
In this thesis I experiment with applying interaction dummy variables to establish whether 
preferences vary between respondent groups. In chapter 3 interaction dummy variables are 
used to establish whether preferences and WTP differs between respondents who either 
claim they do or ‘sometimes’ consider the monetary attribute when making choices vs. those 
who say they don’t consider the monetary attribute when making choices. In chapter 4 
interaction dummy variables are again used to test the same hypothesis, and then 
additionally to establish how preferences might differ according to which monetary descriptor 
is used in a questionnaire The analysis in chapter 4 (in contrast to that in chapter 3) analysed 
DCE data from DCEs that used 3 different descriptors for WTP (Amount lost, Cost to you, and 
Willingness to Pay), not just 1 descriptor (‘Cost to you’ as in chapter 3). 
 
In chapter 5 I again use interaction dummy variables to compare preferences for allocating 
renal transplants between different stakeholder groups including patients, healthcare 
professionals, carers, and donors / relatives of deceased donors and ethnic minority vs non-
ethnic minority patients. In chapter 6, I explore diversity issues within the patient sample of 
renal transplant DCE respondents in more depth using interaction dummy variables.  I assess 
whether preferences differ between the non-white patients vs. other patients; South Asian 
patients vs. other patients; and female vs. male patients.  
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In chapter 7, I apply both Mixed Logit and LCM to the same renal transplant DCE dataset, in 
order to assess whether these methods, or a more basic model (i.e. Conditional Logit with 
interaction dummy variables) yield the most useful results. In this chapter I consider whether 
just applying Mixed Logit or LCM analysis (without first developing a hypothesis to test about 
how preferences might differ) is sufficient to provide important information about preference 
heterogeneity. Results obtained using Mixed Logit and LCM are then compared with the 
results obtained from a Conditional Logit model with interaction dummy variables for ethnic 
minority patients. The interaction dummy variables are specified to test a key hypothesis that 
preferences for allocating kidneys differ between ethnic minority and non-ethnic minority 
patients. In chapter 8 I apply interaction dummy variables to compare responses between 
respondents who claim that they only considered others when expressing DCE choices (self 
reported ‘altruistic’ responders) vs. responders who report that their own self interest either 
partially or wholly influenced their preferences. 
 
E.4. Altruism. 
 
The DCEs that have been deployed in healthcare (which I reviewed in section D) tend to 
assume that respondents will primarily adopt a neo-classical self interested perspective when 
answering a DCE.  However, much of the DCE analysis reported in this thesis (chapters 5, 6, 
7, and 8) is applied in a context in which altruistic motivations may be of considerable 
importance. Indeed altruistic concerns for the welfare of others are widely cited as the main 
motivation for organ donation (Gill and Lowes 2008); (Patel, Chadha et al. 2011); (Siminoff, 
Mercer et al. 2007)). This is why I considered that assessing the possible impact of ‘altruistic 
motivations’ was very important for this thesis. Moreover, given the fact that organs are 
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usually freely donated, it would not be surprising if renal patients who responded to our DCE 
survey expressed preferences impacted by altruistic motivations, rather than just wanting 
organs to be allocated in a manner which is primarily to their personal advantage. So we 
anticipated that altruistic motivations would play a role in determining the preferences of some 
patient respondents, who answered our DCE questionnaire. 
 
The concept of the ‘caring externality’ (Culyer 1976) allows for the possibility that the utility 
that an individual derives from healthcare, may not solely derive from treatment / healthcare 
obtained by a given individual. Rather instead it allows for the possibility that altruistic 
concerns (about the health status of others) might enter into individuals’ utility functions. The 
existence of ‘caring externalities’ has also been used as an important justification for the NHS 
and welfare state more generally (Culyer 1980), and could be used to help explain 
preferences for organ allocation. The ‘Caring externality’ embraces a conception of altruism 
whereby individuals choose on the basis of their own preferences but their preferences 
include benevolent ones, such that utility is derived from the amount of utility enjoyed by 
others (Dowie 1985). 
  
Whilst some economic analysis has suggested that individuals might not exhibit ‘pure 
altruism’ and individuals are generally self-seeking (Wildman and Hollingsworth 2009) other 
analyses seem to suggest that in healthcare caring externalities exist (Jacobsson, 
Carstensen et al. 2005). The authors (Jacobsson, Carstensen et al. 2005) suggest that caring 
externalities may be more pronounced if the ill health suffered by others is more severe. 
Indeed the authors conducted a WTP analysis (using mainstream WTP analysis not DCEs) 
whereby some respondents valued ‘internal preferences’ (i.e. health benefits to themselves), 
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whilst others valued ‘caring externalities’ in WTP terms (i.e. their WTP for health benefits for 
another unrelated individual). The authors found evidence that respondents generally valued 
‘caring externalities’ positively. They also found that “Differences between caring externalities 
and internal preferences were large, and caring externalities were consistently smaller than 
internal preferences.” (Jacobsson, Carstensen et al. 2005). Moreover, as respondents valued 
more severe states of ill health experienced by others, they found that “the increase in caring 
was higher regarding others than oneself.” (Jacobsson, Carstensen et al. 2005). The fact that 
‘caring externalities’ and therefore altruistic preferences might be more important in relation to 
states of severe ill health (like that experienced by many patients on dialysis) suggests that 
altruistic preferences / caring externalities may play an important role in relation to 
preferences for renal transplantation.  
 
So establishing whether or not respondents are basing their DCE responses about 
preferences for prioritizing people for renal transplants either entirely or partially upon 
altruistic motivations, is pertinent in relation to this research. Therefore in chapter 8 of the 
thesis, preferences were analyzed to ascertain whether they differed between respondents 
who answered a question about the perspective they adopted differently. Respondents could 
indicate that they expressed DCE choices on an entirely altruistic basis i.e. they could tick a 
box to indicate they only considered what was best only for others. Alternatively, they could 
tick a box to indicate they considered what was best for them and others. Or they could tick a 
box to indicate they only considered what was best for them. I tried to establish whether 
preferences were affected by the motives that respondents claimed affected their decision 
making. Interaction dummy variables were therefore used to ascertain whether preferences 
differed between groups. 
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Chapter 2: Balancing patient preferences and clinical needs: Community 
versus hospital based care for patients with suspected DVT 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
In chapter 1 of the thesis, it was explained that there are a number of methodological 
problems associated with eliciting Willingness to Pay using DCEs. In this chapter such 
concerns are put on one side. This is in order that I can present an analysis which 
demonstrates how I used a DCE questionnaire (which contained a monetary attribute) to 
establish patients’ preferences and willingness to pay (WTP) for different service models 
for suspected deep vein thrombosis (DVT). 
 
Although the published analysis relating to this study (Clark, Gumber et al. 2009) simply 
presented estimates of Marginal Willingness to Pay (MWTP), in this chapter I also present 
information upon different service model uptake rates (using Value functions), and 
Willingness to Pay analysis using the Compensating Valuation formula. 
 
The aim of this chapter therefore is to give a flavour of how Willingness to Pay estimates 
using DCEs could potentially be used to help inform decisions about which service model 
might best cater for patients’ needs.  
 
Issues concerning the reliability of WTP estimates, which have already been considered in 
chapter 1 of this thesis, are not explored in this chapter. Moreover, issues relating to the 
validity of obtaining estimates of WTP using DCEs are explored further in chapters 3, and 
4, and the final PhD ‘Discussion’ chapter. 
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2. Background 
 
Deep vein thrombosis (DVT) imposes a considerable burden on the healthcare system 
(Michota 2005). Its prevalence tends to increase in ageing populations, making it an 
increasing health problem. There is good evidence on optimum means of diagnosing DVT 
from systematic reviews and randomised controlled trials which compare different 
approaches (Goodacre, Sampson et al. 2006; Nijkeuter, Ginsberg et al. 2006). There is 
also a considerable body of evidence on its treatment.  
 
In severe cases of DVT hospitalisation is necessary (Wichers, Di Nisio et al. 2005).Based 
upon a review of 17 studies, Douketis concluded that four criteria can be used to identify 
patients with DVT who may require hospitalisation (Douketis 2005). They included the 
presence of massive DVT, symptomatic pulmonary embolism, high risk of bleeding with 
anticoagulation, and other serious co-morbidities. It follows that for less serious cases of 
DVT or suspected DVT, outpatient or community based treatment should be sufficient. 
Indeed some estimates for the UK (Pout, Wimperis et al. 1999), suggest that around 40% 
of patients have ‘non-complex’ DVT which can be managed without a hospitalisation. 
 
However, it is unclear whether diagnosis, and ongoing monitoring and anticoagulation 
therapy, should be provided via hospital outpatients departments or in the community. 
This study attempts to assess which of these two models might be most appropriate. 
Crucially, it also asks which characteristics or attributes of provision patients value most, 
and by how much. It follows therefore that an ultimate decision about the form of provision 
to be adopted may relate most to how well each of the models of provision can be tailored 
to meet patient preferences.  
 
Evidence on patient preferences in relation to DVT service provision is sparse. There is 
some limited evidence (based on a sample of 41 patients) comparing patient preferences 
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for outpatient and inpatient care. Findings suggest that outpatient provision is preferred by 
a ratio of around 3:1 (Rodger, Gagne-Rodger et al. 2003). However, a limitation of this 
work, apart from the small sample size, is the lack of evidence on which characteristics of 
the two models of provision respondents like or dislike. The findings may therefore have 
been affected by differences in the perceived quality of these as provided, rather than 
necessarily the actual model of provision.  
 
We have used discrete choice experiments (DCEs), a variant of conjoint analysis which is 
compatible with random utility theory (RUT), to consider the extent to which provision 
might fulfil patient preferences and how much patients with suspected DVT may value 
particular improvements in service provision. DCEs are of importance for decision making 
in contexts in which resources are scarce (Ryan and Gerard 2003),(Jones, Berney et al. 
2004) and are recognised as a means of informing priority setting (Farrar, Ryan et al. 
2000; Jan, Mooney et al. 2000; Morgan, Shackley et al. 2000; Schwappach 2003; 
Baltussen, Stolk et al. 2006). DCE methods are not used by the National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE). NICE primarily uses evidence from cost–utility 
analyses which relate health outcomes (measured by quality adjusted life years [QALYs]) 
to costs. Using this approach, candidates for health expenditure can be ranked in terms of 
cost per QALY. This means that NICE is able to differentiate between interventions with 
‘acceptable’ costs per QALY, and those deemed prohibitively expensive (i.e. using 
willingness to pay (WTP) per QALY). In contrast DCEs can assess the value of attributes 
for non-health benefits as well as attributes relating to health benefits (for example 
continuity of care, and avoiding hospital visits), as well those impacting upon health 
outcomes. WTP estimates can be used to inform the benefits side of a cost–benefit 
analysis (McIntosh 2006), and a strong case has been made (Ryan 2004) for NICE to 
consider using DCEs, but to date it has not probably because QALYs provide a standard 
measure allowing for assessment of efficiency across all those clinical areas for which 
cost-per QALY data is available  
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It has been argued that evidence on preferences is particularly important in relation to the 
assessment of diagnostic interventions (Sassi, McDaid et al. 2005) , and DCEs may 
significantly strengthen the existing evidence-base. In this chapter amongst other things 
we consider how much patients may value changes in the speed of DVT diagnosis. 
Quicker imaging may reduce the amount of unnecessary anticoagulation in patients who 
are found not to have a DVT. Prompt imaging also reduces patient anxiety. Patients may 
also place a value upon other aspects e.g. access, continuity of care, and fewer hospital 
visits, that will improve the quality of their healthcare experience. There is little research 
evidence on patients’ valuations of such factors, or their willingness to trade off factors 
affecting clinical outcomes i.e. speed of diagnosis, for improvements in service provision. 
Crucially most clinical papers report on efficacy, based on studies in centres of clinical 
excellence. However, local factors e.g. how promptly a diagnosis is made, will influence 
actual service effectiveness. Through the application of DCEs, we are able to establish 
the extent to which patients would be willing to pay to avoid delays in diagnosis, and for 
other defined improvements in service delivery. The analysis addresses these issues. 
 
The diagnostic pathway was not the focus of the research. Our focus was whether 
provision for suspected DVT ought to be provided via hospital outpatients departments or 
in the community. If it was via the community, the primary care trust (PCT) could negotiate 
‘fast-tracked’ diagnosis for suspected DVT. Therefore an attribute was included to 
establish how much respondents valued this. The diagnostic pathway faced by 
respondents varied across the three Leicester hospitals. In all cases patients had an initial 
clinical examination, followed by D-dimer, and then either venography, or ultrasound. The 
latter primarily determined whether anticoagulation therapy should continue (patients 
would generally be put on anticoagulation if a DVT was suspected, until such a diagnosis 
could be largely discounted). In the pre-amble to the questionnaire, we told respondents 
that a decision on whether anticoagulation ought to continue would be taken using 
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ultrasound or venogram diagnosis. Speed of imaging diagnosis was therefore presented 
in terms of how quickly you had either your venogram or ultrasound. We said that about 
66% of patients with suspected DVT do not have one (the figure for Leicester), and that 
unnecessary anticoagulation therapy could end, after an ultrasound or venogram 
diagnosis was established. This was a simplification because different diagnostic 
techniques are associated with different sensitivity and specificity. However, eliciting 
valuations about differing diagnostic accuracy would exceed the cognitive capabilities of 
many respondents so we could not probe this. 
 
3. Materials and methods 
 
3.1. Discrete choice experiments (DCEs) 
 
As the literature review in section D of Chapter 1 showed, DCEs have become 
increasingly used within health economics. They allow patients’ preferences to be elicited. 
Also using a series of suitably constructed scenarios it is possible to obtain information on 
preferences. It is also possible to conduct analysis of Marginal Willingness to Pay, Uptake 
rates, and calculate compensating variation (CV), a monetary measure of welfare change, 
if a monetary attribute is included in the DCE questionnaire. Patients value attributes and 
attributes define the important characteristics (Lancaster 1971) of healthcare provision 
which may change. By including an attribute for ‘loss of income’ it is also possible to 
estimate how much respondents might be willing to pay for defined changes in attributes 
(McIntosh, Donaldson et al. 1999). The key stages involved in conducting a DCE are as 
follows. 
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3.2. Identifying choice dimensions 
 
It is important to select attributes that might be affected by the choice of providing a DVT 
service in the community or in a hospital outpatient department. To select appropriate 
attributes we conducted literature searches using MEDLINE to obtain relevant literature. 
We also interviewed clinicians to identify key attributes, especially those delineating the 
two models. Our final selection of choice dimensions included: 
(a) number of patient visits to hospital;  
(b) hours of available DVT nursing provision; 
(c) speed of imaging diagnosis;  
(d) continuity of nursing staff provision;  
(e) income loss (respondents were asked to assume that “DVT provision may or may not 
involve you experiencing some loss of income, perhaps because of some time spent away 
from work”) 
 
Table 1: Details of attributes and levels. 
Attribute Lower limit level Upper limit 
level 
Intermediate 
levels 
Reason for limits 
Number of visits 
to hospital 
0 visits 12 visits 4 and 8 visits The minimum number of visits 
with community provision is 0. 
The upper limit of 12 (the limit 
commonly experienced by 
patients for the number of 
hospital visits). 
Hours of 
available DVT 
nursing provision 
5 hours 14 hours 
30 minutes 
9 hours and 30 
minutes 
5 hours was the minimum at 
one hospital, and 14 hours 30 
minutes was the maximum at 
one of the hospitals 
Speed of 
imaging 
diagnosis 
24 hours 5 days 3 days 24 hours is usually the 
minimum wait. But 5 days is 
the maximum wait that 
patients experience. 
Continuity of 
nursing staff 
provision 
Much continuity Some 
continuity 
Lack of 
continuity 
This was a discrete variable 
and details of the differences 
were explained1 
Income loss £0 £250 £50 and £150 This range seemed to perform 
well in the pilot exercise. 
 
                                                          
1 Respondents were told that much continuity involved having the same nurse for all INR (blood) testing and 
counseling; some continuity was having mainly the same nurse throughout the INR testing and counseling; 
lack of continuity was having different nurses throughout for INR testing and counseling. 
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This was the first DCE I conducted (under the oversight of Emma McIntosh, University of 
Oxford), and we did not use mainstream Willingness to Pay analysis first in order to 
establish a suitable range for the monetary attribute. Instead we just tried to set what we 
both considered to be a plausible range for the monetary attribute.  
 
When we discovered that the monetary attribute was highly significant in an initial pilot 
analysis of the questionnaire (using the range for monetary loss specified above) we 
concluded that the range for the monetary attribute was reasonable. If, however, I were to 
repeat this research again I would use mainstream Willingness to Pay analysis first, in 
order to ensure that the range specified for the monetary attribute was acceptable to most 
respondents. Community based patients may need to attend hospital only once (for 
imaging) and in rare cases, in which clinical diagnosis in the home is able to exclude the 
possibility of a DVT, may not need to attend at all. However, hospital based patients will 
need to attend more often. The hours of available DVT nursing provision are affected by 
hours prevailing in hospital DVT clinics or times when community DVT nurses are 
available. Speed of imaging typically varies across hospitals. Thus it will be affected by 
which hospital patients attend for outpatient care, or which hospital they are referred to for 
imaging as community based patients. 
 
Continuity of hospital based or community based nursing provision is affected by the 
degree to which either form of provision can provide the same nursing staff. The extent to 
which patients value monetary loss may also vary across the two models. 
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3.3. Selection of levels for attributes 
 
Final levels were selected for attributes to reflect rational upper and lower limits, and also 
sensible intermediate levels. The values selected both did not appear inappropriate and 
were actionable (see Table 1). 
 
3.4. Questionnaire design: creating a DCE questionnaire  
 
The number of scenarios that respondents need to value using DCEs is related to the 
number of attributes and levels assigned to each attribute (Ryan and Hughes 1997). Here 
the total was equivalent to 432. Thus a fractional factorial design was used (i.e. one which 
assumes that by obtaining information about people’s responses to limited numbers of 
choices, the value placed on other choices can be inferred). These were generated by the 
computer package SPEED. When pairing off choices, it is also good practice to minimize 
what is known as overlap (trying to avoid pairing attributes in such a way that the levels for 
attributes are the same for a given attribute for both choice A and B) (Huber and Zwerina 
1996) and. Emma McIntosh and I pragmatically tried to pair attributes off in such a way as 
to avoid overlap as much as possible. It is also good practice to avoid excesses of level 
imbalance (i.e. the frequency of some attribute levels appearing more often in the choices 
presented to respondents than other attributes) and under the direction of Dr Mcintosh, I 
therefore allowed some of the choices sets generated by the SPEED design template to 
appear more than once (to offset level imbalance in the original SPEED design), which is 
why we ended up with 15 pairwise choices. Reducing overlap and level imbalance should 
help to improve the statistical efficiency of findings (i.e. the ability of the DCE to generate 
information about preferences from as little response information as possible). If we could 
have specified 4 levels for each attribute we would have been able to generate an 
orthogonal design template using SPEED which did not exhibit level imbalance. However, 
although our pilot work indicated having 4 levels for most attributes seemed appropriate, 
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when it came to continuity of care, the 3 levels for continuity of care that we presented 
seemed more appropriate to respondents. Given we knew we would have some 
imbalance, we also decided to set the 3 levels for hours of available nursing provision in 
line with what was available via the 3 different sources of existing provision in Leicester. 
 
Scenarios can be presented in the form of pairwise choices. We used a main effects 
design, thereby excluding interactions between preferences for attributes. A fixed 
comparator was not used; instead we had 15 pairwise choices. Moreover, we conducted 
the recommended “simple checks” of the correlation matrix of attribute levels and 
frequency checks, in order to ensure the absence of collinearity (Ryan and Gerard 2003). 
Following advice on best practice we also included a Consistency / dominance test (Ryan 
and Gerard 2003) in which respondents faced an option which for which logically we 
would always expect them to prefer one option to the other (i.e. if they behaved in a utility 
maximising manner).   
 
3.5 Questionnaire piloting and refinement 
 
A pilot questionnaire was administered on 30 patients. Responses were evaluated, and all 
but one attribute was found to be significant at the 5% level, with the other significant at 
the 6% level. This was a most reassuring result implying that only minor changes to the 
presentation had to be made. Therefore the questionnaire still had 15 pairwise choices, 
and the same attributes and levels. 
 
3.6. Obtaining responses from patients 
 
All respondents had, or previously had, a suspected DVT and attended one of the three 
Leicester hospitals. The questionnaire was mainly given out in hospital waiting rooms to 
patients with suspected DVT. However in order to reach some former diagnosed patients 
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(rather than just suspected DVT patients) a small sub-sample was distributed by post to 
patients who had previously presented with a suspected DVT in Leicester. We obtained 
256/394 adequately completed responses (a usable response rate of ca. 65% overall). 
 
3.7. Model applied 
 
Results were generated using econometric analysis. We used Random Effects Probit. The 
Random effects modelling corrects the error term in the regression analysis to allow for 
multiple responses from respondents. Variables are defined in Table 2. The model can be 
expressed as: 
 
Y = α0 + α1Difcont1 + α2Difcont2 + α3Difvisit+ α4Difhours + α5Difspeed + α6Difinc + µ + ξ 
 
Here Y is the binary dependent variable, µ is the random effects error term (which allows 
for multiple responses from each respondent) and ξ is the other Probit error term. The 
constant term (α0) if significant might potentially indicate the present of some variables 
omitted from the DCE design which influence choice. 
 
Table 2. Description of variables 
Attribute name Description 
Difcont1 A difference between much continuity and some continuity in DVT 
nursing 
Difcont2 A difference between some continuity and lack of continuity in DVT 
nursing 
Difvisit The number of times people would have to attend hospital – 1 extra 
visit 
 
Difhours Hours during which routine dedicated DVT provision is available – 1 
extra day 
Difspeed Speed of imaging diagnosis – 1 extra day’s wait.  
 
Difinc Income loss - £1 of income loss 
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3.8. Calculating willingness to pay (WTP) 
 
To estimate WTP, coefficients from the regression model are used. They indicate utility 
associated with changes in attributes. The coefficient upon income loss (α6) indicates the 
utility of losing £1. To establish WTP for a change in one of the non-monetary attributes 
(associated with α1, α2, α3, α4, α5), you need to take the coefficient you want to express in 
WTP terms, and divide it by α6 (we divide by -α6, because what is relevant is the utility 
value of a pound, not a pound lost, which is what the coefficient indicates). By dividing 
each of the non-monetary coefficients by − α6, we normalize the value of the coefficients 
(α1, α2, α3, α4, α5) in WTP terms2. It is also then possible to put 95% confidence intervals 
around WTP estimates using the Delta method (Wooldridge 2002), which can be 
executed using the non-linear confidence interval command in Stata v. 9.2. This approach 
to calculating WTP is applicable for ‘state of the world models’ whereby one alternative 
will be selected with certainty (Ryan 2004). 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. Profile of respondents. 
 
4.1.1. Transport and distance to hospital. 
 
234 / 256 respondents indicated distance travelled, averaging 7.5miles. Overall 19% were 
within 3.5 miles; 48% within 5miles; 78% within 10 miles; and 21% travelled more than 10 
miles. 
                                                          
2 Note the coefficients in Table 3 follow a convention of rounding coefficients up or down (as appropriate) 
to 3 decimal places. However, for the purposes of deriving the actual value of willingness to pay values, we 
used the actual coefficients generated by the regression analysis package STATA. These are expressed to 7 
decimal places, and by using these more precise point estimates, we can establish point estimates of 
willingness to pay for each of the non-monetary attributes, which are rounded up or down (as appropriate) 
to the nearest 1 pence 
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4.1.2. Respondents’ gender and age. 
 
241/256 respondents indicated their gender, 116/241 (ca. 48%) were male and 125/241 
(ca. 52%) female. Overall 227/256 respondents indicated their age, and the average age 
was 58.5 years. 
 
4.1.3. Respondents’ ethnicity. 
 
Overall 246/256 respondents indicated their ethnicity, 232/246 described themselves as 
white (ca. 94%); 5 as ‘white and other’ (ca. 2%); 3 as Black Caribbean (ca. 1%); 5 as 
Indian (ca. 2%); and 1 said ‘Other’ (ca. 0.5%). 
 
4.1.4. Respondents’ household income. 
 
Overall 238/256 respondents indicated their gross household income band, 43/238 (ca. 
18%) reported it was less than £5000; 69/238 (ca. 29%) indicated an income of £5000–
11,999; 50/238 (ca. 21%) an income of £12,000–19,999; 37/238 (16%) an income of 
£20,000–29,999; 26/238 (ca. 11%) an income of £30,000–44,999; 7/238 (ca. 3%) an 
income of £45,000–59,999; and 6/238 (ca. 3%) indicated an income of £60,000+. 
 
  
120 
 
4.1.5. Consistency checks. 
 
The aforementioned consistency check indicated that ca. 13% of respondents appeared 
to be ‘inconsistent’ responders. Although the level of ‘inconsistency’ was high, the 
reported data analysis was conducted upon the full data set.  
 
4.2. Econometric results. 
 
The attributes are described in Table 2, and the results are presented in Table 3. All the 
coefficients on attributes are significant at the 5% significance level (and 5 out of 
6 are significant at the 1% level). Coefficients are also of the expected sign. The 
coefficient on having ‘much continuity’ of DVT nursing care (same nurse for INR (blood 
testing) and counselling throughout) rather than just ‘some continuity’ (mainly same nurse 
throughout INR testing and counselling) is positive. Likewise, the coefficient on ‘some’ 
rather than a ‘lack of continuity’ (different nurses throughout for INR testing and 
counselling) is also positive. The Marginal Willingness to Pay (MWTP) findings imply a 
positive utility premium associated with greater continuity of care of £179.32 for having 
much not some continuity, and £56.88 for having some not a lack of continuity. The 
coefficient on an extra visit to hospital is negative, suggesting utility is adversely affected 
by an extra visit, and respondents would pay £17.12 to avoid this. The coefficient on an 
extra hour of dedicated nurse provision is positive, respondents value increased 
availability of provision at £4.82 per hour. The coefficient on speed of imaging diagnosis is 
negative (having to wait an extra day for an imaging diagnosis negatively impacts on 
utility) and respondents would pay £115.73 to avoid this. Finally, as expected the 
coefficient on income loss is negative implying income loss causes disutility.  
 
It is difficult to definitively interpret the significant constant term in the regression analysis. 
The fact it is significant could mean that choices are influenced by other factors apart from 
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attributes specified. Another possibility is that this DCE design caters for main effects but 
not interaction effects. If in reality there are interaction effects between particular attributes 
which have not been catered for in the design, the constant term could be picking this up. 
If I was conducting this analysis again (especially if the constant proved significant in the 
pilot analysis) I would use qualitative analysis to explore whether the valuation of certain 
attributes and their levels might interact with the valuation of others. Interaction effects, 
which imply that a respondent’s valuation of one attribute is impacted by the levels of 
another attribute, may become apparent in ‘think-aloud’ exercises during piloting. If such 
effects became apparent, I would cater for interaction effects within the design (probably 
using a D-efficient design template in SAS). 
 
Table 3. Regression results. 
 
Attribute Coefficient Confidence 
interval (CI) 2 
 
 
coefficient 
Marginal 
Willingness to 
Pay (MWTP) 
CI around Willingness 
To Pay3 
 
Dif_cont1 .400** (.311 / .488) £179.32 (£123.34 / £235.31) 
Dif_cont2 .127** (.058 / .195) £56.88 (£25.68 / £88.08) 
Difvisit -.038** (-.031 / -.046) -£17.12 (-£13.17 / -£21.07) 
Difhours .011* (.002 /.020) £4.82 (£0.65 / £8.99 ) 
Difspeed -.258** (-.239 / .277) -£115.73 (-£96.53 / -£134.93 ) 
Difinc -.002** (-.002 /-.003)   
Constant .082** (.021 / .142)   
Mc 
Faddens R2: 
0.263  % of actual 
values predicted 
by the model: 
50.79% 
* denotes significant at the 5% level; ** denotes significant at the 1% level. 
2 95% Confidence interval for coefficient; 3 95% Confidence interval, using the Delta 
method. 
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4.3. Interpretation of results using Marginal Willingness to Pay (MWTP) to estimate 
Willingness to Pay. 
 
If we can assume a ‘state of the world’ model then options can be compared using 
estimates of MWTP. If the alternative that the NHS provided with certainty was Model A (a 
home community based service requiring one visit to hospital; which was available for 9 h 
30min a day; providing a diagnosis in 24 h; and providing much continuity of nursing 
provision) then these estimates of willingness to pay suggest that patients  would be 
willing to pay £264.87. Alternatively, if the NHS provision available with certainty was 
Model B (a hospital outpatient service involving eight visits to hospital; available for 5 h; 
providing a diagnosis in 24 h; and providing much continuity of nursing provision), it would 
be valued at £123.34. Thus, patients value a community based service more.  
 
However, if the choice was between Model B (described above)  vs. Model C (a home 
community based service requiring one visit to hospital, available for 14 h 30min; 
providing a diagnosis in 24 h; but providing a lack of continuity of care). Model B would be 
valued at £123.34, and Model C would be valued at an average of £52.77.  
 
Therefore these WTP results suggest that if the only 2 options available were Model A 
(home community based service) vs. Model B (hospital outpatient service), then 
community based provision (Model A) would be preferred to hospital outpatient based 
provision (Model B), because it is associated with a higher WTP of £264.87 rather than 
£123.34. However if Model A was not available and the choice was instead between 
Model B and C, then the hospital based service (Model B) would be preferred to the home 
community based service (Model C), because its associated with a WTP of £123.34, 
rather than £52.77  Therefore estimates of WTP can be seen to be related to how both 
community or hospital based provision performs in terms of the characteristics of provision 
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it is associated with, rather than necessarily to the community/hospital based provision 
distinction per se. 
 
4.4. Value functions and uptake rates.  
 
If we are trying to assess the relative desirability of different models of DVT provision, one 
way of doing this is to calculate the uptake rates for different models of provision (Ryan, 
Watson et al. 2008)  
 
If we assume initially there are 2 options: 
 
 Option 1 (Model D):  A community based option which involves 1 visit to hospital; 
9.5 hours of service availability; 24 hour diagnosis; and much continuity of care; 
income loss = £50 
 
 Option 2: (Model E) A community based option which involves 1 visit to hospital, 
14.5 hours of service delivery, 24 hour diagnosis, and some continuity of care; 
income loss = £50 
 
Then the following value functions apply: 
 
V Option 1 = (-0.038 x 1) + (0.011 x 9.5) + (-.258 x 1) + (0.400 + 0.127) + (-0.002 x 50) = 
0.2355 
 
VOption 2  = (-0.038 x 1) + (0.011 x 14.5) + (-.258 x 1) + (0.400) + (-0.002 x 50) = 0.1635 
 
VNo provision = 0 
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Having calculated the value functions the probability of uptake for the 3 options can be 
calculated: 
 
Pr (Option 1: Model D) = e0.2355 / e0.1635 + e0.2355 +e0 =  0.367551582 
 
Pr (Option 2: Model E) =  e0.1635 / e0.1635 + e0.2355 +e0 =  0.342018103 
 
Pr (No provision) = e0 / e0.1635 + e0.2355 +e0 = 0.290430315 
 
An additional option (Option 3) can then be introduced: 
 
 Option 3 (Model F): A hospital outpatient based option which involves 4 visits to 
hospital, 14.5 hours of available service provision, 24 hours diagnosis, and much 
continuity of care; income loss = £0 
 
The indirect utility of this option can then be calculated: 
 
VOption 3  = (-0.038 x 4) + (0.011 x 14.5) + (-.258 x 1) + (0.400 + 0.127) + (-0.002 x 0) = 
0.2765 
 
With the 3 options plus the no provision option then the probability of uptake changes to 
the following: 
 
Pr (Option 1:Model D) = e0.2355 / e0.1635 + e0.2355 +e0.2765+e0 =  0.265776586 
 
Pr (Option 2:Model E) =  e0.1635 / e0.1635 + e0.2355 +e0.2765+e0 =  0.247313325 
 
Pr (Option 3: Model F) = e0.2765 / e0.1635 + e0.2355 +e0.2765+e0 =  0.276899896 
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Pr (No provision) = e0 / e0.1635 + e0.2355 +e0.2765+e0 =  0.21001019 
 
Therefore the introduction of the third option (Model F: hospital based) has altered uptake 
rates, and the third option (Model F) a hospital based option seems to be preferred by a 
higher proportion of respondents to the 2 other community based options (Models D, and 
E) probably because in contrast to the other options it does not entail an ‘income loss’). If 
however we assume that the price of Model F increased (so there was an income loss of 
£50 not £0) then the value function for that option with a price increase would become: 
 
VOption 3(with price increase)  = (-0.038 x 4) + (0.011 x 14.5) + (-.258 x 1) + (0.400 + 0.127) + (-
0.002 x 50) = 0.1765 
 
Consequently the uptake rates for the 3 options would change and would become: 
 
Pr (Option 1:Model D) = e0.2355 / e0.1635 + e0.2355 +e0.1765+e0 =  0.272969 
 
Pr (Option 2:Model E) =  e0.1635 / e0.1635 + e0.2355 +e0.1765+e0 =  0.254007 
 
Pr (Option 3: Model F with price increase) = e0.1765 / e0.1635 + e0.2355 +e0.1765+e0 =  0.25733 
 
Pr (No provision) = e0 / e0.1635 + e0.2355 +e0.1765+e0 =  0.215694 
 
Therefore option 3 in the event of a price increase (income loss increases from £0 to £50) 
is no longer the most popular option, because option 1 is now associated with a higher 
uptake rate. So a community based option (option D) is then the preferred option rather 
than the hospital based option (option F). 
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Therefore in the same way in which the WTP analysis using MWTP figures indicated that 
the choice between community and outpatient based hospital provision was dependent 
upon the attribute levels of community or outpatient based hospital based provision, 
analysis using Value functions together with uptake rates can result in the same 
conclusion being reached. 
 
Using ‘uptake rates’ presented in this way also has the advantage that the impact of 
changes in the availability of different service models, or changes in the price of service 
models (as proxied here by the income loss attribute) can be established upon 
respondents relative valuation of different models of provision. Analysis of this kind would 
be particularly useful to health policy makers if they were able to offer service users 
different models of provision, and they wanted to establish how much demand there might 
be for each of the different models of provision, before making them available to patients. 
 
4.5. Compensating Variation (CV). 
 
For the purposes of WTP analysis, if we want or need to move away from the assumption 
of a ‘state of the world’ model and assume that decision makers can choose from more 
than 2 alternatives we can assess welfare changes in terms of ‘compensating variation’ 
(CV).  
 
The formula for CV is: 
                         
CV =  1 / -βCost[ ln∑ exp(V1j) - ln ∑ exp(V0j) ]      
 
You can also calculate the welfare associated with the introduction of Option 3 (prior to its 
price increase) as follows: 
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CV = 1 / 0.002 [ ln(e0.2355 + e0.1635 +e0.2765+e0) – ln (e0.2355 + e0.1635 +e0) 
      = (500) [ln (4.761673689) – ln (3.443166736)] 
      = (500) [1.560599264 – 1.236391611] 
      = £162.1038265 
      = £162.10 
 
Therefore the introduction of Option 3 can clearly be seen to have increased welfare (i.e. it 
is associated with a CV of £162.10).  
 
If in contrast option 3 was introduced at a higher price (£50 income loss not £0) then the 
welfare gain associated with its introduction would be lower: 
 
CV = 1 / 0.002 [ ln(e0.2355 + e0.1635 +e0.1765+e0) – ln (e0.2355 + e0.1635 +e0) 
      = (500) [ln (4.636201163) – ln (3.443166736)] 
      = (500) [1.533895316 – 1.236391611] 
      = £148.7518525 
      = £148.75 
 
Using the CV method if you assumed that you started with 3 options, and wanted to 
identify the welfare loss associated with an increase in ‘income loss’ from £0 to £50 it 
could be calculated as follows: 
 
CV = 1 / 0.002 [ ln(e0.2355 + e0.1635 +e0.1765+e0) – ln (e0.2355 + e0.1635 +e0.2765+e0) 
      = (500) [ln (4.636201163) – ln (4.761673689)] 
      = (500) [1.533895316 –1.560599264] 
      = -£13.35 
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This result unsurprisingly is equivalent to the difference between £162.10 and £148.75 
(£162.10 and £148.75= £13.35). Note the average respondents welfare loss is less than 
the £50 rise in the cost of the option 3 because not everyone bears the price increase (just 
those who still demand option 3) and also because as the price of option 3 increases, 
people substitute away from that option. 
 
Crucially the information from the uptake rates (like the WTP analysis using MWTP 
figures) suggests that whether community or hospital based provision is the most 
preferred option is contingent upon the attribute levels of community or hospital based 
provision. Moreover, the information presented here from the CV welfare measure does 
not overturn this conclusion.  
 
5. Discussion 
 
All the analyses presented (including MWTP, Value functions and associated uptake 
rates, and Compensating Variation) serve to illustrate that patients’ valuation of 
community or hospital based DVT function is inextricably related to the extent to which the 
different types of provision deliver a bundle of DVT service attributes that patients value. 
Our findings cannot simply be used to support the view that either community or hospital 
based DVT provision is inevitably better. This means that our findings need to be 
considered alongside a range of clinical considerations when deciding what type of DVT 
provision ought to be delivered.  
 
Recent advancements in drug treatment both for prophylaxis and treatment of DVT 
(Ageno and Turpie 2005; Cohen, Hirst et al. 2005; Gutt, Oniu et al. 2005; Petersen 2005; 
Stannard, Lopez-Ben et al. 2006) may serve to increase the trend away from inpatient 
based treatment of DVT / suspected DVT. This makes consideration of whether care 
should be provided in hospital outpatient departments or the community an important 
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issue. In terms of heparin treatment, the findings of a Cochrane review of evidence in this 
area concluded that home treatment is no more susceptible to complications than hospital 
treatment. This led the reviewers to tentatively conclude that the limited evidence 
available indicates that home management is cost effective and (they suggested) likely to 
be preferred by patients (Schraibman, Milne et al. 2007).   
 
Evidence from a well-designed Canadian economic evaluation (O'Brien, Levine et al. 
1999) also supports the view that home based treatment with low molecular weight 
heparin is less expensive than inpatient treatment. Moreover, clinical outcomes and 
patient quality of life were not compromised. A more recent Spanish study (Montes, 
Gonzalez et al. 2005) comparing community with inpatient provision reaches the bolder 
conclusion that even for patients with “serious conditions” DVT management can be safely 
undertaken in the home and on a cost-saving basis via a home care unit.  
 
A variety of approaches (in addition to the discrete choice experiment approach used in 
this study) could be adopted in order to elicit preference information. These include patient 
satisfaction surveys (Cohen, Forbes et al. 1996; Castle, Brown et al. 2005). However a 
limitation of this approach is the somewhat nebulous concept of ‘patient satisfaction’ 
(Williams 1994). Citizens’ juries have also been used to obtain information on preferences 
(Mossialos and King 1999; Mooney and Blackwell 2004). Protagonists of citizens’ juries 
suggest they allow for debate and reflection such that the preferences are better informed 
(Dolan, Cookson et al. 1999). However, opponents of this approach argue that empirical 
evidence indicates that juries are “chiefly concerned with non-rational persuasion, and 
because of this they are morally and democratically irrelevant.” (Price 2000). By 
implication, therefore, far from helping to form more rounded preferences citizens’ juries 
could serve to pervert them. Focus groups have also been used to obtain information on 
preferences (Bowie, Richardson et al. 1995; Bradley, Sweeney et al. 1999; Shaffer, Yebei 
et al. 2006). However, there is uncertainty about the optimal size of groups, or indeed 
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whether there is an optimal size, and what factors should determine this (Tang and Davis 
1995). Focus groups may also be subject to the sort of criticisms made against citizens’ 
juries (Price 2000), especially if the ‘framing’ of questions posed can sway the parameters 
of the debate. 
 
Patient preferences are clearly important when considering new service models (Ryan, 
Scott et al. 2001; Jones, Berney et al. 2004) Although there is some information on patient 
preferences (Rodger, Gagne-Rodger et al. 2003), there remains a paucity of information 
on preferences for different models of healthcare provision. This analysis helps to bridge 
this gap, using DCEs to place monetary valuations upon characteristics of provision. Our 
analysis illustrates that both factors affecting health outcomes (e.g. speed of imaging 
diagnosis) and also factors which mainly affect the nature of the ‘process’ of care (e.g. 
continuity of care; hours of available provision; and the number of times patients have to 
go to hospital) are of importance to DVT patients. Moreover, respondents have clearly 
demonstrated a willingness to trade between differences in these attributes.  
 
One of the implications of these findings is that studies which currently seek to establish 
whether patients prefer hospital outpatient care or community home based care (by simply 
comparing the two models) may miss a crucial point. Our DCE results, interpreted using a 
variety of approaches including estimates of Willingness to Pay (WTP) using marginal 
willingness to pay figures (MWTP), uptake rates, and compensating variation (CV), 
suggest that patient preferences for one model or the other are intimately related to the 
extent to which either model performs in terms of attributes that are considered important 
by the patient. Therefore, applying a mainstream WTP analysis which does not value the 
different attributes of hospital or community based provision would miss this crucial point, 
which the present study helps to draw attention to. Thus, patients’ valuations may be 
related more to the degree to which prompt diagnosis or continuity of care can be 
provided by a model, rather than to whether or not the DVT service is provided in a 
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hospital or the community.  It should be noted that in Leicester it was not common practice 
to use delayed repeat ultrasound scanning, so it made sense to include speed of 
diagnosis. However, delayed repeat ultrasound is standard practice in many protocols 
(Goodacre, Sampson et al. 2006) and is particularly relevant for below the knee DVT. The 
findings therefore, in relation to respondent valuation of quicker diagnosis, cannot be 
generalized to patients who are, or ought to be given, delayed repeat ultrasound on 
clinical grounds. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The implications of MWTP figures are unclear, if accurate they would suggest that 
patients do value certain attributes highly. For example, they value each 24 hour reduction 
in diagnostic delay at £115.73. This could be taken to imply it would be worth the UK NHS 
investing up to £115.73 for each 24 hour reduction in diagnostic delay. However, 
respondents had been told that 66% of patients in actual fact do not have a DVT, and 
unnecessary anticoagulation could be avoided as a result of quicker diagnosis. Therefore, 
in contexts in which more patients do actually have a DVT, valuation of quicker diagnosis 
may be lower. Also, to the extent that the diagnosis may be less than definitive, estimated 
WTP for this attribute may also be overstated. 
 
The NHS operates within budget constraints, and whilst speeding up diagnosis may be 
cost-beneficial, other interventions may be more cost-beneficial and more of a priority. 
However, because our WTP findings are derived from a patient sample of respondents 
(rather than a general public one) strictly speaking they should not be used to inform the 
benefits side of a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA). This is because, ideally, CBA requires that 
a societal (general public) perspective should be adopted. It should be noted that one 
problem with applying this DCE to a general public sample of respondents might have 
been that the general public lack experience of the issues surrounding DVT service 
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provision. Therefore, their valuation of attributes may be less well informed than 
valuations obtained from DVT patients.  
 
However, patients may place a higher valuation upon improvements in attributes of DVT 
service provision, than a member of the general public would, because they would benefit 
from improvements. So estimates of MWTP and WTP generated using this DCE data are 
likely to be higher than they would have been had they been obtained from a general 
public sample. 
 
Moreover, even if speeding up diagnosis was cost-beneficial some radiology departments 
may have problems recruiting radiologists, so fast-tracking DVT patients may not be 
possible.  
 
However, if there is scope to provide ‘fast-track’ diagnosis for suspected DVT at low cost, 
and staff are available, this ‘fast-tracking’ diagnosis for DVT may represent a highly cost-
beneficial improvement in service provision. It is clear that in relative terms, the provision 
of a quicker diagnosis is valued far more (£115.73) by patients than reducing the number 
of required visits to hospital (valued at £17.12 per visit averted). This indicates that ‘fast-
tracking’ diagnosis may be more important to patients than the context in which they 
receive a service for suspected DVT. 
 
Our findings (from WTP analysis utilising MWTP figures, uptake rates, and the CV welfare 
measure) highlight the fact that the extent to which a service model performs in terms of 
meeting patients’ preferences for defined characteristics of provision may be more 
important than the actual model of care adopted. Therefore I would argue that there is a 
need to move away from a sterile debate which compares one model with another, and 
instead to ask how well different models perform in routine service settings in terms of 
defined attributes. 
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Also because of the high valuation that patients appear to place upon reducing waiting 
time for diagnostic results (£115.73 per day) it may well be that the issue requiring most 
consideration is whether or not fast-tracked diagnosis can be made available for patients 
with suspected DVT. Moreover, if service quality in a routine setting is significantly worse 
than that observed in trials conducted in centres of excellence, there will be a divergence 
between reported efficacy and actual effectiveness. If this divergence affects attributes 
such as speed of diagnosis (valued at £115.73 per day delay avoided) then our analysis 
demonstrates that such differences may impose a large economic burden upon patients. 
 
A former UK Health secretary Alan Milburn once argued that we needed to move away 
from a ‘one size suits all’ health service by facilitating patient choice. The analysis 
contained within this chapter illustrates the usefulness of DCE results in assisting health 
policy makers better facilitate patient choice. Firstly, the MWTP figures can help to give 
policy makers a feel for how much patients might value defined improvements in provision 
(e.g. speeding up diagnosis, improving the continuity of provision, reducing visits to 
hospital by providing services in the community rather than hospital, etc). MWTP figures 
also help policy makers see which attributes of service provision patients value most. 
They can then concentrate their efforts upon making improvements to those 
characteristics for which the ratio of benefits to costs is highest. 
 
Secondly, if policy makers wish to offer a variety of service models to patients, then 
surveying patient preferences using DCEs can help predict likely uptake rates for the 
alternative models. Policy makers could thereby ensure that service providers are 
appropriately resourced to meet the demand for different models of care they might wish 
to provide. Thirdly, welfare measures including the CV measure can be used to assess 
whether expanding choice (by offering different models of provision) is associated with 
sufficiently large improvements in patient welfare (as measured by CV) to justify the 
expenditure associated with improving DVT provision. 
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Finally, the pilot analysis for this DCE was conducted over ten years ago, and DCE 
methods have moved on considerably since I undertook this work. If I were to undertake 
this study again I would undertake a thorough mainstream WTP analysis during piloting to 
establish an appropriate range for the monetary attribute. I would also aim to have an 
equal number of levels for all attributes if possible (in the interests of achieving level 
balance), and would therefore not resort to using some profiles twice from the design 
template in an attempt to help restore level balance. During piloting, I would fully explore 
(using qualitative interviews and ‘think aloud’ exercises) whether attributes might interact 
with each other in order to generate a design which catered for any interactions that might 
exist. I would also ensure that the DCE took on board all the developments in diagnosis of 
DVT which might have arisen in the last decade. In addition, I would also use ‘cheap talk’ 
in order to encourage respondents to factor in differences in the monetary attribute into 
their decision making, as this might considerably improve the reliability of estimated WTP. 
Furthermore, I would also take great care to ensure that the descriptor for the monetary 
attribute was as incentive compatible as possible in the interests of minimizing 
hypothetical bias. Finally, I would try to include a general public sample as well as a 
patient sample so that the WTP results could be used for the purposes of conducting a 
Societal Cost-Benefit Analysis. 
 
In conclusion, I recognize that the reliability of the findings of the MWTP analysis, uptake 
analysis, and analysis of Compensating Variation (CV) contained in this chapter is 
compromised a little because of the aforementioned concerns. Nonetheless, the analysis 
in the chapter still helps to give a flavour of the potential that findings from MWTP 
analysis, uptake analysis, and welfare analysis (involving compensating variation) might 
have to inform policy if well conducted and not subject to bias. 
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Chapter 3: Discrete choice experiments and willingness to pay analysis (WTP). An 
approach to assess the possible impact of hypothetical bias upon estimated WTP. 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
In this Chapter, the focus is upon exploring the impact of hypothetical bias on estimates of 
WTP obtained using DCEs when healthcare is free at the point of use.  The DCE was one 
used to compare a ‘One-Stop’ outpatient model for women with menstrual disorders or other 
gynaecological problems with a new integrated care pathway service model. 
 
In Chapter 1 (section E1.1) it was pointed out that one key concern about eliciting estimates 
of WTP has always been that estimates obtained using contingent valuation methods might 
be subject to hypothetical bias. It was pointed out that hypothetical bias refers to the 
difference between actual behaviour and hypothetical statements of value (Little and Berrens 
2004; Mozumder and Berrens 2007). This form of bias therefore implies that the hypothetical 
nature of the preference elicitation has biased responses (Guzman and Kolstad 2007). 
However, it was further pointed out that there is reason to suppose that using DCEs to elicit 
WTP might make estimates less susceptible to some sources of hypothetical bias than using 
other forms of WTP analysis, including bias arising because of ‘Yea saying’, ‘warm glow’, 
embedding, and scope insensitivity (for further details see section E1.1). 
 
In Chapter 2, I demonstrated how estimates of Marginal Willingness to Pay (MWTP), and 
estimates of Compensating Variation might be useful in informing health policy. Moreover, it 
can further be pointed out that if DCEs can be accurately applied to generate estimates of the 
general public’s Willingness to Pay (WTP) for health interventions, then these WTP estimates 
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could be used to inform the benefits side of a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) (McIntosh, 
Donaldson et al. 1999).  
 
CBA might be preferred to Cost-Utility Analysis (CUA) to evaluate healthcare interventions if 
the interventions generate both process and health outcomes. This is because conventional 
CUA is ill equipped to value benefits which do not impact upon health outcomes. In contrast 
DCE studies can be designed to establish how much respondents value both health and 
process outcomes. If the information yielded about WTP obtained through DCEs is accurate, 
then this data could be used to derive welfare estimates (McIntosh and Ryan 2002). 
However, a number of theoretical and practical implementation issues remain surrounding the 
application of CBA (McIntosh and Ryan 2002; McIntosh 2006; Borghi 2007). Crucially if DCEs 
are to be used to calculate WTP and welfare estimates for CBA, then estimates of WTP must 
be accurate. 
 
2. Background. 
 
It was pointed out in Chapter 1 (section E1.1) that concerns that WTP estimates obtained 
using DCEs might be subject to hypothetical bias remain. DCEs have been equally applied 
when healthcare is free at the point of use (Propper 1994; Ryan and Hughes 1997; Bryan, 
Buxton et al. 1998; van der Pol and Cairns 1998; San Miguel, Ryan et al. 2000; Hall, Kenny 
et al. 2002; Taylor and Armour 2002; Weston and Fitzgerald 2004; Lloyd, McIntosh et al. 
2005; Ryan, Diack et al. 2005) and when payment enters into decision making (Szeinbach, 
Mason et al. 1990; Stensrud, Sylvestre et al. 1997; Jan, Mooney et al. 2000; Telser and 
Zweifel 2002; Roux, Ubach et al. 2004; Hanson, McPake et al. 2005; van der Berg, Al et al. 
2005).  Therefore, not only might there be general problems with the robustness of using 
estimates of WTP using DCEs (Ratcliffe 2000; Ryan and Gerard 2003), but the WTP 
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estimates might also be more subject to hypothetical bias if DCEs are applied in a context in 
which healthcare provision is currently free at the point of use. For example, a respondent 
who does place a value on defined improvements may act strategically to conceal this 
(strategic bias). This is likely to be a particular problem with mainstream contingent valuation 
(CV) studies, although the potential for respondents to act strategically when answering DCE 
questions is not as great as in CV. Furthermore, respondents may have difficulty valuing 
health in monetary terms, and consider that some things are “not commensurable with 
monetary valuation.” (Clark, Burgess et al. 2000). If respondents are faced with scenarios 
which appear unrealistic, lack of realism might also lead them to disregard dimensions of the 
choice set which they consider implausible. Respondents may also believe, for ideological or 
other reasons, that healthcare should be ‘free at the point of use.’ Finally, some respondents 
may interpret cost as something that can be ignored because in reality they don’t face a real 
cost (Ratcliffe 2000). 
 
If a proportion of respondents fail to factor in the monetary attribute into their decision making, 
then this would have the effect of making the estimated value of the coefficient upon the 
monetary attribute lower, which in its turn would have the effect of inflating estimated values 
of Marginal Willingness of Pay (MWTP). This is why in this chapter I present the methodology 
I have used to try to identify what proportion of respondents claim not to factor changes in the 
levels of the monetary attribute into their decision making, and then to evaluate what the 
impact of such behaviour might be upon estimated WTP. 
 
As pointed out in Chapter 2, I began the pilot DCE analysis for the analysis contained in this 
chapter about 9 - 10 years ago. Consequently, I had not had the benefit of seeing the findings 
of some other pertinent analyses (Skjoldborg and Gyrd-Hansen 2003; Gyrd-Hansen and 
Skjoldborg 2008). The earlier analysis (Skjoldborg and Gyrd-Hansen 2003) suggested that 
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estimates of WTP may be sensitive both to the range specified for the monetary attribute and 
to the presence or absence of payment per se. In contrast, the later analysis (Gyrd-Hansen 
and Skjoldborg 2008) reached the conclusion that respondents might be more influenced by 
the presence or absence of a non-zero cost than by the level of cost indicated by the 
monetary attribute. Furthermore, the suggestion that respondents might have a lexicographic 
aversion to the “concept of paying” (Skjoldborg and Gyrd-Hansen 2003) may have particular 
salience in contexts in which healthcare is provided ‘free at the point of use.’ However, this is 
not something that the analysis presented in this chapter was designed to establish. In 
addition, the insight (Johnson, Mohamed et al. 2011) that respondents may deploy heuristics 
involving recoding costs into categories such as low, medium, or high, is again relatively new, 
and consequently did not feature as a consideration for the purposes of this analysis of a 
‘One-Stop’ outpatient service model for women with menstrual disorders versus a new 
integrated care pathway service model.   
 
Another potential source of hypothetical bias which the previous DCE analysis did not explore 
is ‘framing effects’ (Howard and Salkeld 2009). However, because the DCE analysis reported 
in this paper relates to screening for colorectal cancer, and in the present Chapter it relates to 
the management of menstrual disorders (or other miscellaneous gynaecological problems), 
the issue of ‘framing effects’ of this kind is likely to be less pertinent.  
 
The focus of this chapter is upon the impact of hypothetical bias on estimates of WTP 
obtained using DCEs when healthcare is free at the point of use. The approach, as outlined, 
can be adopted even when it is not possible to compare stated preferences with actual or 
simulated market behaviour. Given that the potential for hypothetical bias is greatest with 
respect to goods and services which are free at the point of use (Ratcliffe 2000), an approach 
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which does not require external validation against actual or simulated market behaviour, is 
particularly useful. 
 
This analysis suggests that if respondents behave in line with economic theory, they should 
value money. Money provides a medium of exchange which can be used to purchase goods 
and services conferring utility. Therefore, if a substantial proportion of respondents claim to 
disregard the monetary attribute (‘cost to you’) when making choices, this may be evidence of 
hypothetical bias. Moreover, if it can be demonstrated that this affects estimated WTP, it may 
be possible to make some assessment of whether hypothetical bias seriously influences 
estimated WTP (an internal test of validity). Note, we realize that differences in WTP could be 
partly be driven by the use of an inappropriate price vector for the monetary attribute, or it 
could be partly driven by the use of a monetary attribute which is not fully incentive 
compatible. However, we would argue that when you use hypothetical questions to value 
healthcare provision in a context in which healthcare is usually provided free at the point of 
use, it may not be possible to define a “correct” price vector for the monetary vector, or to 
always have an incentive compatible WTP question. Therefore the price vector for the 
monetary attribute, and questions used to elicit WTP might inevitably themselves engender 
some hypothetical bias.   
 
Therefore when conducting the DCE discussed in this Chapter, which included a monetary 
attribute, I posed an additional question to establish whether respondents claimed to have 
factored in the monetary attribute into their decision-making. Subsequently, I went on to 
examine econometrically whether estimates of WTP varied according to how individuals had 
responded to this question. Any evidence of a statistically significant difference in WTP 
between those responding to this question in various ways would suggest that estimates of 
WTP / benefits may be biased. 
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3. Methods. 
 
3.1. The policy issue to be assessed. 
 
The DCE was applied to compare a One-Stop model for women with menstrual disorders or 
other Gynaecological problems, with a conventional approach. The One-Stop model involved 
women being referred by GPs to secondary care for outpatient consultation with hospital 
Consultants. This was compared to an integrated care pathway providing a bridge between 
primary and secondary care, allowing direct booking for investigations or treatments for 
patients who remained under the care of the GP (known as the Bridges Project). The model 
removed the traditional ‘referral’ between the healthcare sectors, allowing more involvement 
of GPs in the provision of specialized services. The DCE incorporated cost in the design; 
however, as the study population received NHS care ‘free at the point of use’, we assessed 
econometrically whether estimated WTP might be biased.  
 
3.2. Piloting and designing the DCE questionnaire. 
 
The DCE questionnaire was developed after extensive piloting. We established candidates 
for attributes based on insights from the medical literature, clinicians, and discussions with 
patients about whether they could relate to the range of attributes and levels we specified in 
the pilot questionnaire (which had been informed by insights from the medical literature and 
discussions with a small number of clinicians). We then conducted a ranking exercise using a 
sample of 60 patients to identify key attributes for inclusion in the pilot DCE questionnaire. 
We invited the patients to suggest other attributes and levels in one to one interviews. Any 
plausible suggested attributes would then be added to a list of candidate attributes which 
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could be included in the final questionnaire. This list would then be updated after every 
interview, and shown to other patients in later interviews so that they could rank attributes on 
the list (with associated levels listed next to them), in order of priority to them. We also 
conducted a ranking exercise in relation to the choice of descriptor for the monetary attribute. 
This involved presenting respondents with a range of possible ways of describing the 
monetary attribute, in order to establish which descriptor respondents felt most comfortable 
with (in order to inform the choice of monetary descriptor for the final questionnaire).  
 
A main effects pilot questionnaire was designed using SPEED version 2.1 (Bradley 1991) 
using a fixed comparator with levels set to correspond to our perception of actual levels in 
Leicestershire for a ‘typical’ patient.  The pilot questionnaire was completed by 60 
respondents (30 patients had a questionnaire with a WTP ceiling of £125, and 30 with a 
ceiling of £250). We used two different potential ranges for the monetary attribute because 
we wanted to establish what range for the monetary attribute might be most appropriate for 
the final questionnaire. A researcher observed respondents as they completed the 
questionnaire. Regression results from the pilot DCE, together with researchers’ 
observations, informed the final selection of attributes and levels.  
 
3.3. The final selection of attributes and levels, and the design for final questionnaire 
 
The final DCE questionnaire contained the attributes and levels described in table 1. The 
monetary descriptor ‘Cost to you’ was the one that most respondents felt comfortable with. 
Table 1 also indicates the variable names for attributes used for regression analyses. Having 
determined attributes and levels, we used SPEED again (Bradley 1991) to generate choice 
scenarios for a final main effects design. For the purposes of this DCE we used a fixed 
comparator and the 16 choices generated by SPEED were just paired off alongside against 
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this same fixed comparator for every choice specified in the design (see questionnaires in 
Appendix C). The 16 choices generated by SPEED were compared with a fixed comparator 
corresponding to the status quo in Leicestershire. The levels for the fixed comparator related 
to what we perceived the levels of the attributes would be for the average respondent under 
the traditional model of Consultant-led care in hospitals in Leicester (where this research was 
conducted). The fixed comparator assumed a 1 day wait for test results; no cost to you; care 
via a male consultant; a 12 week wait for an appointment; and getting to see the same doctor 
about half the time. All the Gynaecology hospital Consultants in Leicester at the time were 
men (so the attribute level relating to gender of the doctor was set to ‘Male’). With Consultant-
led care the average waiting time for test results was 1 day, and there was no charge for this 
NHS provision (so ‘Cost to you’ would = £0). The waiting time to see a consultant at the time 
was 12 weeks (in contrast if the provision was provided by GPs trained to provide this 
provision, it might be quicker). Moreover, under ‘Consultant-led’ care, patients could expect to 
see the same doctor about half of the time.  
 
We adopted a ‘fixed comparator’ because some of the respondents had not got particularly 
high cognitive ability according to the medical researcher undertaking the pilot analysis. We 
therefore considered that the respondents would find it easier to answer the questions, if they 
had a consistent benchmark (the status quo option, option A) against which to evaluate 
alternative models of service provision. After generating the choice options using SPEED, I 
used SPSS to ensure that there was no collinearity between attribute levels, as a final design 
check.  
 
The 16 choices which we used for the purposes of data analysis were divided, so any one 
respondent would only face half of them. Also, because of concerns that the ordering of 
questionnaire attributes (in the list of attributes faced by respondents), might affect 
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respondents’ valuation of them we rotated the order of attributes. This meant that we had 12 
final DCE questionnaires for women with ‘Period Problems’ and the ‘cost to you’ attribute and 
attributes were rotated so that the ‘cost to you’ attribute was 1st in the list for 2 versions, 2nd in 
the list for 2 versions, 3rd in the list for 2 versions, 4th in the list for 2 versions, 5th in the list for 
2 versions, and 6th for 2 versions. We did not have the intention of testing to see whether 
estimated WTP varied according to the positioning of the monetary attribute. However, we 
reasoned that if the positioning of the monetary attribute was varied in this consistent manner, 
then estimated WTP would not be biased due to attribute ordering effects. We also conducted 
a later DCE analysis upon women with a range of other Gynaecological problems (see 
chapter 4) in which about 1 / 3rd of the respondents faced the same DCE scenarios with a 
‘cost to you’ monetary descriptor. For the purposes of this later DCE analysis about 2 / 3rd of 
questionnaire respondents answered DCE questions which were otherwise the same except 
for the fact that the descriptor for the monetary variable was instead either ‘Amount lost’ or 
‘Willingness to Pay.’ (these respondents were not included in the analysis in this chapter). 
However, we included within the data analysis detailed in this chapter (chapter 3) those 
respondents answering a ‘Gynaecology healthcare’ survey’ who answered a questionnaire 
with a ‘Cost to you’ monetary descriptor. Once again there were 12 variants of this ‘cost to 
you’ ‘Gynaecology healthcare’ survey’ questionnaire. This was because we rotated the order 
of attributes (to avoid ordering effects), and each respondent only faced half of the scenarios 
emanating from the SPEED design template.   
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Table 1: Details of attributes and levels. 
Variable Variable / Attributes Levels 
typd The type of doctor you see GP or Consultant 
gend The sex of the doctor you see Male or Female 
wait Time spent waiting for an 
appointment to see the doctor 
(either the GP or the consultant) 
1 day, 4 days, 6 weeks, 12 weeks 
cont1 
 
 
cont2 
 
How often you get to see the same 
doctor 
All of the time, half of the time.  
 
 
Half of the time, none of the time. 
res How long you have to wait for test 
results 
1 day, 2 days, 2 weeks, 4 weeks 
cty Cost to you (i.e. perhaps because of 
absence from work or travel costs – 
Respondents were told to: Please 
assume you would lose this amount 
of money even if in reality you would 
not). 
£0, £25, £75, £125 
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Some attributes and levels require further explanation. During piloting, and as a consequence 
of interviews with patients, we found that over 40% of women had a preference for a female 
rather than a male doctor (no one expressed a preference for a male rather than female 
doctor). We therefore included an attribute to enable us to value any such preferences for 
gender of the doctor. This was important, because at the study sites, all Gynaecology hospital 
consultants were male. Therefore, women could not select a female hospital doctor. In 
contrast, within primary care there was more scope for patients to select a female doctor.  
 
The range for “time waiting for an appointment to see the doctor (either GP or Consultant)” 
was selected because a ceiling of 12 weeks corresponded to the maximum waiting time 
experienced by patients in the locality for a referral to a Consultant Gynaecologist. GP 
appointments can generally be arranged within a matter of days. However, GPs who provide 
Gynaecological support under the ‘Bridges’ model take on extra responsibility. Therefore 
patients who are non-emergency cases might be offered a pre-arranged appointment in 
several weeks’ time. Some GPs might offer more prompt provision, but that would be 
determined by local factors. Certain GPs could offer patients either a referral to a hospital 
Consultant, or a practice based attendance, perhaps in several weeks.  So the choice of 
levels for that attribute is not unrealistic. The levels for the “waiting for test results attribute”, 
was set with reference to the minimum and maximum anticipated turn-around time for a 
variety of tests that might be required in this patient group. Finally, we decided to use the 
lower ceiling of £125 for the WTP attribute, as trading between the monetary and other 
attributes happened more often with this ceiling on WTP in the pilot. 
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3.4. Other questions included in the questionnaire. 
 
We requested information on the socioeconomic status of respondents (see questionnaires in 
Appendix C).  In addition after the pairwise choices, we also asked whether respondents 
factored in the ‘cost to you’ attribute when making choices: 
 
Did differences in the amount of ‘cost to you’ for options A and B influence your choices? 
 
   Yes                                     No      Sometimes   
 
(Question 1) 
 
One limitation of posing a question about the influence of the monetary attribute upon 
respondent choice is of course that respondents might take ‘cost to you’ into account when 
answering some questions but not others. This was why it was essential that respondents 
had the option to indicate that they ‘Sometimes’ took ‘cost to you’ into account. 
 
Respondents had also been told in the questionnaire that average gross household income in 
Leicestershire was approximately £25,000. Respondents could then indicate whether they 
had above average, average, or below average income. 
 
3.5. Data analysis and hypotheses tested. 
 
3.6. Hypothesis that a basic model is adequate: 
 
If DCE responses are not affected by patients’ responses to question 1, then a random 
effects Probit model (model 1) using the variables defined in table 1 for all respondents could 
be used, and results would not be biased because of the failure of some respondents to 
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consider the ‘cost to you’ attribute. 
 
Yij = α0con+ α1typdij + α2gendij + α3waitij +α4cont1ij +α5cont2ij + α6resij + α7ctyij + μi + ξij 
 
          (Model 1) 
 
Here Yij is the binary dependent variable, from individuals i = 1…m, for observations j = 1…ni. 
The number of observations ni varies because the i individuals do not all complete every 
pairwise choice (a minority of respondents don’t answer all choices). The term μi is the 
random effects error term (which allows for multiple responses from i respondents), and ξij is 
the standard Probit error term for individuals i, for j observations. Given that the DCE involved 
the use of a fixed comparator, and we set the levels for the fixed comparator equivalent to 
what we thought the average respondent would experience, under the traditional Consultant-
led’ care model, then the constant if it is significant, might pick up whether or not respondents 
favoured the ‘status quo’ package bundle of attributes (option A) or not (so it could pick up an 
‘experience effect.’)    
 
3.7. Hypothesis that a segmented model is required: 
 
If results are sensitive to how respondents respond to question 1, then model 2 may provide 
more accurate estimates. Variables for all the models are as defined in table 2.  
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Table 2: Variables defined. 
Attributes Variables for 
the base group 
who claim they 
consider CTY 
when choosing 
or they 
‘sometimes’ 
consider CTY 
when choosing 
Dummy variables 
for those who say 
‘no’ they don’t 
consider CTY 
when choosing. 
The type of doctor you see typd Dntypd 
The sex of the doctor you see gend Dngend 
Time spent waiting for an appointment 
to see the doctor (either the GP or the 
consultant) 
wait Dnwait 
How often you get to see the same 
doctor 
 
All of the time rather than half of the 
time 
Half of the time rather than none of the 
time 
 
 
 
cont1 
 
cont2 
 
 
 
Dncont1 
 
Dncont2 
How long you have to wait for test 
results 
res Dnres 
Cost to you (i.e. perhaps because of 
absence from work or travel costs – 
Respondents were told to: Please 
assume you would lose this amount of 
money even if in reality you would not). 
cty Dncty 
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Model 2 runs a model equivalent to model 1, but uses an additive dummy plus interaction 
dummy variables (variables with a ‘Dn’ prefix) to value differences in attributes differently for 
the sample (66 / 180 [36.7%]) of respondents who claimed they do not consider ‘Cost to you’ 
when choosing.  
 
Yij = α0+α1typdij+α2gendij+α3waitij+α4cont1ij+α5cont2ij+α6resij+α7ctyij + α8Dnij+α9Dnijtypdij 
+α10Dnijgendij+α11Dnijwaitij+α12Dnijcont1ij +α13Dnijcont2ij+α14Dnijresij+α15Dnijctyij+μi+ξij 
 
 
          (Model 2) 
 
Respondents who truthfully respond that either ‘Yes’ they did take differences in the monetary 
attribute into account, or they ‘Sometimes’ did, may be behaving in an unbiased manner. 
Indeed since some respondent choices involved there not being a ‘Cost to you’ for both 
option A and B respondents, and so rationally respondents might ignore differences in ‘Cost 
to you’ for such options.  Whilst of course if respondents answered ‘Yes’ they did take 
differences in the monetary attribute into account, this is reassuring. 
 
However, if respondents truthfully answer that ‘No’ they did not take differences in the value 
of the monetary attribute into account then this may indicate that they are disregarding 
differences in ‘cost to you’ as a result of hypothetical bias. Therefore establishing separate 
estimates of coefficients for the group of respondents who answer ‘No’ may allow us to 
establish how this might impact upon estimated WTP. 
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3.8. Likelihood ratio test. 
 
A likelihood ratio test was used to compare the unrestricted model, model 2 (using the log-
likelihood from model 2), with the restricted model (using the log likelihood from model 1).  
 
4. Results. 
 
4.1. Patient sample profile: 
 
Most of the patients (n = 121) presented with menstrual disorder (and answered a 
questionnaire with a heading relating to ‘Period Problems’, but others (n=59) presented with 
other Gynaecological problems, and responded to a questionnaire with the same DCE 
choices, but with a different front cover on it. Details of some key patient sample 
characteristics are outlined in table 3.  
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Table 3: Respondents self reported age, household income, and response to the 
question about whether they consider ‘cost to you’.  
Age range of patients  
 
Patients with 
Menstrual 
disorder (n=121) 
Patients with 
other 
gynaecological 
symptoms 
(n=59) 
Combined group 
(n=180) 
20-30 
 
2 / 121 (1.7%) 10 / 59 (16.9%) 12 / 180 (6.7%) 
31-40 
 
14 / 121 (11.6%) 21 / 59 (35.6%) 35 / 180 (19.4%) 
41-50 
 
72 / 121 (59.5%) 13 / 59 (22.0%) 85 / 180 (47.2%) 
51-60 
 
30 / 121 (24.8%) 8 / 59 (13.6%) 38 / 180 (21.1%) 
60+ 0 / 121 2 / 59 (3.4%) 2 / 180 (1.1%) 
No response 
 
3 / 121 (2.5%) 5 / 59 (8.5%) 8 / 180 (4.4%) 
Average age of those 
responding 
 
44.87 years 39.47 years 43.10 years 
Household income of 
patients. 
   
Above average 
 
53 / 121 (43.8%) 12 / 59 (20.3%) 65 / 180 (36.1%) 
About average 
 
26 / 121 (21.5%) 23 / 59 (39.0%) 49 / 180 (27.2%) 
Below average 
 
37 / 121 (30.6%) 17 / 59 (28.8%) 54 / 180 (30%) 
No response 
 
5 / 121 (4.1%) 7 / 59 (11.9%) 12 / 180 (6.7%) 
Do respondents report 
they consider the ‘the 
cost to you attributes’ 
when making decisions 
   
Yes 
 
22 / 121 (18.2%) 18 / 59 (30.5%) 40 / 180 (22.2%  
No 
 
48 / 121 (39.7%) 18 / 59 (30.5%) 66 / 180 (36.7%) 
Sometimes 
 
51 / 121 (42.1%) 23 / 59 (39.0%) 74 / 180 (41.1%) 
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4.2. Econometric analysis. 
 
Random effects probit was conducted using STATA v. 9.2. After conducting the econometric 
analysis we calculated WTP for attributes, and associated asymptotic confidence intervals 
using the Delta method (Wooldridge 2002). The Delta method was implemented using the 
STATA non-linear confidence interval function, and Wald tests using the STATA non-linear 
test command.  
 
4.3. Comparison of restricted vs. unrestricted models using a likelihood ratio (LR) test. 
 
We obtained the likelihood ratios for model 1 (the restricted model) and model 2. The figures 
for model 1 and 2 respectively are 1097.5 and 1058.2 respectively. This suggests a likelihood 
ratio test value of 78.6. This compares with the critical value for 8 degrees of freedom of 15.5. 
Using an LR test, we therefore reject the null hypothesis that model 1 (the restricted model) 
provides an adequate characterization of the underlying data, compared to model 2. This 
suggests that WTP results are jointly significantly different amongst the group of respondents 
who indicated that ‘No’ they did not take differences in the monetary attribute into account. 
 
4.4. Findings from the econometric models. 
 
The variables are as defined in table 1, and econometric results for models 1 and 2 are in 
table 4.  
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Table 4: Econometric results for models 1, and 2. 
Attribute Model 1 
(Pooled model). 
 
Model 2 
(Coefficients for 
the base group 
who claim ‘yes’ 
they do, or they 
‘sometimes’ take 
differences in CTY 
into 
consideration). 
 
Model 2 
(Coefficients on 
dummy variables 
for the group who 
claim ‘no’ they do 
not take 
differences in CTY 
into 
consideration). 
Intercept -0.092 (p =0.058) -0.048 (p=0.512) -0.079 (p=0.516) 
typd 0.351 (p = 0.000) 0.316 (p = 0.000) 0.143 (p=0.296) 
gend 0.238 (p = 0.000) 0.149 (p=0.062) 0.251 (p=0.070) 
wait -0.012 (p = 0.000) -0.010 (p=0.000) -0.005 (p=0.003) 
cont1 0.301 (p = 0.000) 0.223 (p=0.011) 0.207 (p=0.165) 
cont2 0.290 (p = 0.001) 0.296 (p=0.005) -0.004 (p=0.983) 
res -0.026 (p = 0.000) -0.029 (p=0.000) 0.005 (p=0.362) 
cty -0.006 (p = 0.000) -0.008 (p=0.000) -0.004 (p=0.004) 
Sample size / 
observations 
180 patients in 
this sample 
114 / 180 patients 
(63.3%) in this 
category.  
66 / 180 patients 
(36.7%) in this 
category 
Likelihood 
ratio test 
model 1 
(restricted) vs. 
model 2. 
  78.6 is the actual 
value, the critical 
value for 8 degrees 
of freedom = 15.5: 
Jointly significant 
difference. 
 
Mc Faddens R-
squared 
0.1873  0.2163 
Percentage of 
actual values 
predicted.  
74.1%  74.9% 
 
 158 
 
4.5. Calculating WTP.  
 
We assume a ‘state of the world’ model in which WTP for one alternative is to be considered 
(Ryan 2004). Table 5 details the formulas underpinning the functional form for the WTP point 
estimates.  
 
Table 5: Coefficients used to derive estimates of WTP. 
Variable Model 1 – WTP 
estimates: 
Pooled model 
(using coefficients 
from model 1 
results) 
Model 2 – WTP 
estimates: Do or 
sometimes factor in 
‘Cost to you’ 
(using coefficients 
from model 2 results) 
Model 2 - WTP 
estimates: Don’t 
factor in ‘Cost to you’ 
(using coefficients 
from model 2 results) 
 
Type of doctor   
(α1)  /  -(α7) 
 
 
(α1) /  -(α7) 
 
 
(α1+α9) /  -(α7 +α15) 
 
Gender of 
doctor (α2)  / -(α7) 
 
(α2) / -(α7) 
 
 
(α2+α10) / -(α7+α15 ) 
 
Extra days 
waiting to see 
doctor 
 
(α3)  / -(α7) 
 
 
(α3) / -(α7) 
 
(α3 +α11) / -(α7+α15) 
 
Continuity 
(Same doctor 
all the time not 
half of the time) 
 
(α4)  / -(α7) 
 
 
 
(α4)  / -(α7) 
 
 
(α4+α12) / -(α7+α15) 
 
 
Continuity 
(Same doctor 
all the time not 
half of the time) 
 
(α5) / -(α7) 
 
 
 
(α5)  / -(α7) 
 
 
(α5+α13) / -(α7+α15) 
 
 
Extra days 
waiting for test 
results 
 
(α6) / -(α7) 
 
 
(α6) / -( α7) 
 
 
(α6+α14) / -( α7+α15) 
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4.6. WTP results. 
 
For illustrative purposes we interpret the results from model 1 (table 6) assuming they are 
unbiased. The results in table 4 suggest that the constant term is not statistically significant at 
the 5% level. So at the 5% significance level there is no statistically significant evidence of an 
‘experience effect’ i.e. respondents either favouring or disliking option A, which was 
equivalent to the bundle of characteristics the average respondent currently received (i.e. this 
questionnaire was used upon patients currently receiving Consultant-led care Gynaecological 
care before the new GP led provision was introduced). Given the coding we ascribed to the 
variables, the findings suggest that taking the sample overall respondents value having a 
Consultant rather than a GP at £58.13 (£32.87 : £83.39). A female rather than a male doctor 
is valued at £39.45 (£20.42 : £58.49). Avoiding an extra day spent waiting to see the doctor is 
valued at £1.92 (£1.46: £2.38). Getting to see the same doctor all of the time rather than half 
of the time is valued at £49.84 (£28.85 : £70.83); whilst seeing the same doctor half of the 
time rather than none of the time is valued at £48.02 (£17.07 : £78.97). Avoiding having to 
wait an extra day for test results is associated with a WTP of £4.23 (£2.78: £5.67). It follows 
that the interpretation of the results for models 2 is similar (because all the results are of the 
same sign). However, as table 6 shows WTP and corresponding confidence intervals does 
vary comparing the pooled model (model 1) with the unrestricted model (model 2).  
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Table 6: Estimated WTP for models 1 and 2. 
Variable Model 1 
Pooled model (all 
responders) 
Model 2 
Do or sometimes 
factor in ‘Cost to 
you’ group 
Model 2 
Don’t factor in ‘Cost 
to you’ group 
Type of doctor  £58.13** 
(£32.87 : £83.39) 
£40.67** 
(£17.90 : £63.43)  
£131.89* 
(£20.89 : £242.88) 
Gender of doctor £39.45** 
(£20.42 : £58.49) 
£19.15* 
(£0.21: £38.10) 
£.114.92** 
(£37.32: £192.53) 
Extra days waiting 
to see doctor 
-£1.92** 
(-£1.46 : -£2.38) 
-£1.34** 
(-£0.99 : -£1.67) 
-£4.52** 
(-£1.56 : -£7.48) 
Continuity (Same 
doctor all the time 
not half of the time) 
£49.84** 
(£28.85 : £70.83) 
 
£28.73** 
(£7.96 : £49.49) 
 
£123.61** 
(£40.18 : £207.04) 
 
Continuity (Same 
doctor all of the 
time not half of the 
time) 
£48.02** 
(£17.07 : £78.97) 
 
 
£38.13* 
(£8.60 : £67.66) 
 
 
£84.05 
(-£21.58 : £189.68) 
 
 
Extra days 
awaiting test 
results 
-£4.23** 
(-£2.78 : -£5.67) 
 
-£3.67** 
(-£2.34 : -£5.00) 
 
-£6.74* 
(-£1.05 : -£12.43) 
 
* denotes significant at the 5% level; **denotes significant at the 1% level; figures in brackets 
are 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
It is quite clear just from looking at estimated of WTP (table 6) that estimated WTP seems to 
vary considerably between the pooled model (model 1), and a model distinguishing between 
those who do and who do not factor ‘Cost to you’ into their decision making (model 2).  
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We conducted Wald tests to assess whether estimates of WTP generated using models 1 
and 2 varied. Details of Wald tests conducted, and results are tabulated in table 7. These 
Wald test results suggest that WTP differs significantly at the 5% level for 3 / 6 attributes in  
model 2 (comparing those who say they do or ‘sometimes’ factor ‘cost to you’ into their 
decision making and those who said they did not). 
 
Table 7: Wald tests of restrictions on WTP. 
Wald  
Test  
Do take monetary descriptor into 
account group vs. ‘sometimes’ 
take monetary descriptor into 
account group- Restriction 
tested 
 
(Model 2) 
Results 
 
 
n = 180 
1 α2  /  -(α8) = 
(α2 + α10)  /  -(α8 + α16) 
 
p = 0. 1146      
 
2 α3  / -(α8) = 
(α3 + α11)  / -(α8 + α16) 
 
p = 0.0188* 
 
3 α4  / -(α8) = 
(α4 + α12) / -(α8 + α16) 
p = 0.0361* 
 
4 α5  / -(α8) = 
(α5  + α13)/ -(α8 + α16) 
 
p = 0.0305* 
 
5 α6  / -(α8) = 
(α6 + α14) / -(α8 + α16) 
p = 0.4117 
 
6 α7  / -(α8) = 
(α7 + α15) / -(α8 + α16) 
p = 0.3036 
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5. Discussion. 
 
In this Chapter, I wanted to establish whether people are factoring in the actual level of ‘cost 
to you’ when making a decision about whether to choose option A or B. The fact that 66 / 180 
(36.7%) of respondents (table 3) say ‘No’ is of concern. If respondents behaved in line with 
economic theory, we would expect them to value money. Therefore, a failure to take CTY into 
account completely may be indicative of hypothetical bias. We concede that this bias might 
be reduced / prevented if we could ensure that a more appropriate price vector was used for 
the monetary attribute, perhaps by deploying more advanced methods to set the price vector 
for the monetary attribute (i.e. use of a payment card during piloting), or if we could find a 
WTP question which was more incentive compatible. Moreover, if respondents do not factor 
CTY into their decision making, the coefficient is likely to be underestimated for the sample 
overall, resulting in inflated estimates of WTP in the baseline analysis (i.e. model 1).   
 
One surprising result (table 4) is that the coefficient on ‘cost to you’ remains highly significant, 
even in the group of respondents who claimed they did not take this into account when 
making pairwise choices. If respondents had reported accurately whether or not they had 
taken differences in ‘cost to you’ into account, then we would have expected that this 
coefficient would prove insignificant for the group who claimed they did not take differences in 
‘cost to you’ into account. Part of the reason for this may be due to some respondents 
answering ‘No’, because they usually do not take differences in the monetary attribute into 
account (but in reality, for a few cases, they did take such differences into account). We had 
hoped that such respondents would have ticked the ‘Sometimes’ option instead. If this 
response did differ depending on the case, it may be worth posing a question about whether 
differences in the monetary attribute affected their choice after each DCE question.  
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Given that there is some evidence (Ozdemir, Johnson et al. 2009) that ‘cheap talk’ may be 
required to get respondents to focus on the actual levels of the monetary attribute when 
making choices, it is possible that posing a question about how the monetary attribute 
influenced their decision after each DCE choice may simply have a similar effect to ‘cheap 
talk’ in terms of making respondents more inclined to factor-in differences in the monetary 
attribute into their decision making. This might be useful if our aim is simply to make WTP 
estimates less prone to bias. But it would not help with addressing the question we planned to 
address in this Chapter; whether DCE questions involving a monetary attribute have a 
general susceptibility to hypothetical bias because respondents fail to factor differences in the 
levels of the monetary attribute into their decision-making.  
 
In the DCE presented here, the coefficient on the monetary attribute remains significant and 
negative, but is smaller amongst respondents who claimed they did not take differences in 
‘cost to you’ into account. Tables 6 details these WTP results. The Wald tests (table 7) 
provide evidence that for model 2 there are statistically significant differences in WTP with 
respect to 3 / 6 (50%) of variables (gend, wait, and continuity of provision) between those 
who do and do not factor in CTY into their decision making. For model 2 this suggests that 
the inclusion of a sample of respondents who claim not to take differences in CTY into 
account is associated with a statistically significant difference in WTP for 3 / 6 (50%) of the 
non-monetary attributes.  
 
It is interesting to note that, whilst the group that reports it does not consider the monetary 
attribute is associated with a lower weighting on the CTY coefficient than the base group, 
WTP remains significant in this group of respondents, in model 2. It is possible that a 
proportion of respondents may not like to admit to taking money into account when valuing 
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healthcare provision, resulting in an overestimate of those disregarding the CTY attribute. If 
this is the case it suggests our methodology might be open to question, because respondents 
cannot be relied upon to be honest (which is the main limitation of this approach). This 
inevitably means the policy implications of the DCE analysis in its current form would be open 
to question as well  
 
6. Conclusions. 
 
If DCEs are applied when healthcare is free at the point of use, there may be a lack of 
incentive to state preferences accurately, leading to the problem of hypothetical bias. In our 
study we found that 36.7% of respondents reported that differences in ‘cost to you’ did not 
influence their choices, and in econometric results we discovered that the inclusion of these 
respondents served to inflate estimated WTP. We consider that this is an extreme result 
which could have been avoided by firstly adopting more rigorous approaches to establishing 
an appropriate price vector for CTY, and then if we could establishing a more incentive 
compatible WTP question. That said, sometimes it will not be possible to establish a 
‘definitive’ price vector, especially when healthcare provision is free at the point of use, no 
matter how rigorous our attempts are to identify what it should be. Nor are we ever likely to be 
able to generate WTP questions which are completely incentive compatible for healthcare if it 
is free at the point of use. However, it has also been suggested to me that, because we opted 
for the lower of the two ranges from the pilot analysis for the monetary attribute (with a ceiling 
on WTP of £125, not £250), some respondents may simply have felt that the levels of ‘cost to 
you’ were insufficiently high to be worthy of consideration. 
 
For this reason, if I were to repeat a similar analysis I would both want to use mainstream 
WTP analysis to establish respondents’ maximum WTP in a pilot sample (and use this 
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information to establish a more rigorously determined set of levels for the monetary attribute), 
and I would also allow for the use of 2 or more payment ceilings upon the levels for the 
monetary attribute (using different versions of the questionnaire with different levels for the 
monetary attribute). This would enable me to establish whether decisions to take differences 
in the monetary attribute into account might be related to the appropriateness / 
inappropriateness of the levels set for this attribute. Ideally, I would also want to use 
qualitative approaches such as ‘think aloud’ exercises (Ryan, Watson et al. 2009) to establish 
whether respondents who claimed not to take differences in the monetary attribute into 
account, actually appeared to be behaving in this way when they ‘thought aloud’ about the 
choices they made.  It may also be worth using qualitative interviews  to probe which factors 
influence respondents who claim not to take differences in the monetary attribute into 
account. For example, is this choice related to a general feeling amongst such respondents 
that healthcare should be available free at the point of use; or is it related to a general 
insensitivity to changes in the levels of the monetary attribute; or is it related to a feeling that 
in reality a monetary attribute would not apply so differences in it should be ignored? 
 
The literature suggests that it is far from clear that responses to hypothetical questions in 
DCEs will necessarily elicit a carefully considered response (Braden, Kolstad et al. 1991). As 
a result, some respondents may fail to factor the monetary attribute into their decision 
making. This may mean that using ‘cheap talk’ (Ozdemir, Johnson et al. 2009) to reduce the 
number of respondents not taking a monetary attribute into account should be considered for 
piloting. Response patterns might be different in the context of ‘thinking aloud’ exercises than 
they would be if DCEs were conducted without a ‘think aloud’ exercise. Indeed, there is some 
evidence to suggest that unless ‘cheap talk’ is used to ensure respondents think about the 
different levels of a monetary attribute, their responses tend to be insensitive to changes in 
the levels of the monetary attribute (Ozdemir, Johnson et al. 2009). This suggests that the 
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use of ‘cheap-talk’ might be required to more accurately obtain estimates of WTP. Although 
‘cheap talk’ can help to ensure that the cost function is linear (Ozdemir, Johnson et al. 2009), 
if it is the case that some respondents deploy heuristics to recode costs into categories such 
as low, medium, or high (Johnson, Mohamed et al. 2011), or even worse have a 
lexicographic aversion to the concept of paying (Skjoldborg and Gyrd-Hansen 2003), then 
estimates of WTP obtained using DCE might inevitably be subject to some degree of bias. 
Such bias is especially likely if DCEs are applied in contexts in which healthcare is free at the 
point of use. 
 
Research also suggests that preferences may be subject to a ‘learning curve’, such that later 
responses in a DCE might be a better indicator of preferences than earlier responses 
(Johnson and Desvousges 1997; Carlsson and Martinsson 2001). This fits with evidence that 
estimates of WTP might be affected by the number of DCE choices that respondents face 
(Bech, Kjaer et al. 2011). This evidence is compatible with the view that respondents might 
use decision making heuristics (Lloyd 2003), and develop their decision making heuristics via 
ongoing learning. If respondents use simplifying heuristics (Lloyd 2003) they will ignore much 
of the evidence they are presented with, and adopt simplifying decision rules. It has been 
suggested that the more complex choices become in relation to options and variability within 
options, the less people are likely to engage in compensatory decision-making (Payne, 
Bettman et al. 1993). There is also evidence that more complex choice experiments are 
associated with more complexity-induced choice inconsistency (DeShazo and Fermo 2002); 
whilst other evidence suggests that ‘fatigue-effects’ may influence responses if more than 10 
or so choice comparisons are presented, such that the survey instrument itself exerts 
influences upon choice, which would not be present in actual choice situations (Bradley and 
Daly 1994). 
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The use of simplifying heuristics by respondents might result in a failure to consider the 
monetary attribute. It may also explain some evidence which indicates (Kjaer, Bech et al. 
2006) that the positioning of the price attribute within DCEs can affect price sensitivity. The 
current DCE analysis was designed to avoid this source of bias by rotating the positioning of 
the monetary attribute across different versions of the questionnaire, which were then 
distributed in equal numbers. Also, if the range set for the monetary attribute is inappropriate, 
there is evidence that this can affect WTP results (Ratcliffe 2000; Ryan and Wordsworth 
2000; Skjoldborg and Gyrd-Hansen 2003). This might be reflected in respondents failing to 
factor in the monetary attribute into their decision-making. 
 
This is why, if I were repeating a similar analysis again, I would use appropriate mainstream 
WTP analysis (not using DCEs but probably using payment cards) during the pilot exercise in 
order to more rigorously establish a sensible range for the monetary attribute.  I would also 
avoid using a descriptor for the monetary attribute like ‘cost to you.’ I used this descriptor 
because, in the pilot exercise, respondents preferred it over and above every other option. 
However, this descriptor may encourage cost based responses (i.e. people valuing things in 
terms of what they consider to be a reasonable cost rather than its actual value). In fact the 
analysis presented in the next chapter (Chapter 4) suggests that the use of other descriptors 
as an alternative to ‘cost to you’ (including ‘Amount lost’ and ‘Willingness to Pay’) is not 
associated with a statistically significant difference in estimated WTP. Therefore use of the 
descriptor ‘cost to you’ may not have resulted in much bias due to cost based responses. 
That said, the fact that we told respondents when explaining ‘Cost to you’ in the preamble to 
“Please assume you would lose this amount even if you would not” meant that the way the 
monetary attribute was presented was not particularly incentive compatible. Therefore, if I 
were to undertake a similar analysis again I would do whatever I could to ensure a more 
incentive compatible monetary attribute was presented to respondents. I would also conduct 
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a final analysis which allowed the range of the monetary attribute to vary, so that I could 
identify any possible influence of the levels used for the monetary attribute upon whether or 
not respondents take monetary differences into account. Moreover, I would also use 
qualitative research, including ‘think-aloud’ exercises, to gain more insight into respondent 
motivations and behavior. 
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Chapter 4: Estimating willingness to pay using choice experiments when healthcare is 
free at the point of use. Are we throwing too much caution to the wind? 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
This chapter reports on an assessment of a further potential source of bias in the use of 
DCEs as a measure of WTP. The question is how the use of different descriptors for a 
monetary attribute might affect estimated WTP (Ratcliffe 2000). Thus, this chapter examines 
the impact of using different descriptors for the monetary attribute upon estimated Marginal 
Willingness to Pay (MWTP). Moreover, the other issue raised in the previous chapter about 
hypothetical bias (whether respondents take differences in the monetary attribute into 
account when making DCE choices) is addressed again using different DCE data. 
 
In the interests of avoiding confusion, before outlining the theoretical background to this 
chapter, it is worthwhile explaining how the DCE analysis presented here, and the sample 
used, differs from that in Chapter 3. 
 
In chapter 3 of the thesis, I outlined an analysis approach adopted to establish whether 
respondents consider the monetary attribute when they answer DCE questions. The project 
team (of which I was a part) had been commissioned to undertake a DCE to establish 
whether women with menstrual disorders would prefer to receive care via a long established 
Consultant-led model of care (the One-stop model) or via a new integrated care pathway 
which involved a selected number of GPs being trained to provide specialist care for women 
with menstrual disorders using a jointly agreed care pathway protocol. This new integrated 
model removed the traditional ‘referral’ between healthcare sectors allowing more 
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involvement of GPs in the provision of specialized services to women with menstrual 
disorders.  
 
After undertaking the initial DCE analysis upon women with Menstrual disorders (heavy 
periods or menorrhagia) it was suggested to me by Dr Sophia Julian (a clinician who had 
interviewed the women for the pilot Menstrual disorders DCE project), that the attributes and 
levels we had specified for the ‘Period problems’ DCE questionnaire were sufficiently generic 
to be used to assess the preferences of women with other gynaecological complaints. 
Moreover, it was suggested that in this way we could readily expand our sample of DCE 
respondents. This would assist us in addressing the methodological problem highlighted in 
Chapter 3 (i.e. whether estimates of WTP might be subject to hypothetical bias because of 
the failure of respondents to ‘factor in’ changes in the monetary attribute). 
 
To recap, for the purpose of the analysis contained in the last chapter most of the DCE 
respondents (n=121) had Period problems, and so filled in a questionnaire with a cover which 
referred to ‘Health care for women with Period Problems’. However a minority of respondents 
(n=59), were presented with a questionnaire in which they faced the same DCE choice 
scenarios but, because they had a different gynaecological complaint, they instead completed 
a DCE questionnaire with a cover entitled ‘Gynaecology health care.’  
 
In this chapter, only DCE respondents answering the questionnaire about ‘Gynaecology 
health care’ are included in the analysis. Moreover, this follow-on DCE survey of women with 
other miscellaneous gynaecological problems was designed to allow us to address a further 
methodological question i.e. whether different ways of phrasing the monetary attribute (which 
do not affect who might pay) might affect estimates of WTP.  
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To this end I produced DCE questionnaires which were otherwise the same, except for the 
fact that the monetary attribute was described in 3 different ways. The 3 descriptors for the 
monetary attribute emerged from the DCE pilot exercise (described in Chapter 3). These 
were the descriptors that respondents most preferred when we asked them to indicate their 
preferences.  Also, because this new sample of respondents might also fail to take difference 
in the monetary attribute into account, I again used information from a question posed to 
respondents about whether they took differences in the monetary attribute into account when 
choosing either options A or B.  
 
However, on this occasion (in contrast to the analysis in chapter 3) because we had 3 
descriptors for the monetary attribute, the question posed asked about whether differences in 
either ‘cost to you’; ‘willingness to pay’; or ‘amount lost’ had affected a respondent’s choice of 
either option A or option B. Which of the 3 monetary descriptors was referred to in the 
question posed, was of course contingent upon how the monetary attribute was described in 
the early part of the questionnaire.   
 
2. Background. 
 
This chapter therefore reports on an assessment of two key potential sources of bias in the 
use of DCEs as a measure of WTP. The theoretical hypothetical bias issues surrounding our 
analysis about whether respondents take differences in the monetary attribute into account 
when making DCE choices are already extensively discussed in chapter 3 (so they are not 
discussed again here), although we repeat a similar analysis (using different DCE data) 
relating to this issue. The new issue this chapter examines which is not considered in the 
previous chapter however is that it is unclear how the use of different descriptors for a 
monetary attribute might affect estimated WTP (Ratcliffe 2000).  
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When applying DCEs to derive Willingness to Pay, the payment vehicle is often described in 
alternative ways, but descriptors usually refer to costs in some way. Examples of cost related 
descriptions include: ‘Cost’ (San Miguel, Ryan et al. 2000; Howard and Salkeld 2009; van der 
Pol, Shiell et al. 2009; Oteng, Marra et al. 2011; Whitty, Scuffham et al. 2011); ‘Costs’ 
(Musters, de Bekker-Grob et al. 2011); or ‘Cost to you’ (Ryan and Hughes 1997; Regier, 
Friedman et al. 2009; van der Pol, Shiell et al. 2009). 
 
A wide range of other variations include cost-related descriptors such as: ‘Total cost of MRI to 
the patient’ (Bryan, Buxton et al. 1998); ‘Monthly cost of treatment’ (Darba, Restovic et al. 
2011); ‘Cost of treatment per year (net)’ (Lloyd, Nafees et al. 2011);‘Total cost to patient’ (de 
Bekker-Grob, Essink-Bot et al. 2009); ‘Payment towards the total cost of care’ for antenatal 
care (Deverill, Lancsar et al. 2010); ‘the drug will cost you an extra £…’ for drug costs (Lloyd, 
McIntosh et al. 2005); ‘Cost of the smear’ (Wordsworth, Ryan et al. 2006); ‘Vaccine cost for 3 
doses of vaccine’ (Poulos, Yang et al. 2011); ‘Cost of test’ for prenatal diagnosis (Chan, 
Sahota et al. 2009); ‘Colorectal Cancer screening will cost you’ (Nayaradou, Berchi et al. 
2010); ‘Cost of therapy programme’ for post stroke rehabilitation (Laver, Ratcliffe et al. 2011); 
‘Personal cost to you per month not covered by insurance of rheumatoid arthritis care’ 
(Ozdemir, Johnson et al. 2009); ‘Additional cost for the hospital’ (Faggioli, Scalone et al. 
2011); ‘Cost of medicare therapy management’ (Hong, Liu et al. 2011). On other occasions 
indirect costs associated with the intervention, including ‘travel costs’ (McIntosh and Ryan 
2002), have been specified as the monetary attribute. 
 
Another popular approach for defining the monetary variable involves specifying price in 
some way, rather than ‘cost’, which is therefore an explicit way of establishing WTP. For 
example ‘Price’ (Ahmed and Fincham 2011); ‘Price one has to pay for surgery’ (Essers, van 
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Helvoort-Postulart et al. 2010); ‘Price of cigarettes’ (Goto, Takahashi et al. 2011); ‘Price: price 
for the complete treatment’ (Marti 2011); ‘Price of influenza vaccination’ (Pereira, Mulligan et 
al. 2011) ‘How much you have to pay’ (Scalone, Watson et al. 2011). Other similar 
descriptors include ‘The amount of money you have to spend to get the drug (£) (clinical 
advice provided + medicine + travel)’ (Tinelli, Ryan et al. 2009); Or alternatively, if 
respondents do not pay but instead might benefit, ‘Cash incentive’ for walking programmes 
(Brown, Finkelstein et al. 2009); or financial ‘Reward’ relating to smoking cessation (Goto, 
Takahashi et al. 2009) 
 
Prices are also frequently specified in terms of out of pocket expenditure for example 
‘Monthly out of pocket expenditure’ (Kjaer, Bech et al. 2006); ‘Out-of-pocket costs of 
medications’ (Brown, Pashos et al. 2011); ‘Out of pocket cost of treatment’(Sweeting, Whitty 
et al. 2011); ‘Out-of-pocket payment per month in excess of present expenditure for arthritis 
medication (DKK)’ (Skjoldborg, Lauridsen et al. 2009); or alternatively ‘Additional payments’ 
(Bogelund, Vilsboll et al. 2011); or ‘Co-payment per week’ for long term care services 
(Nieboer, Koolman et al. 2010). 
 
A limited number of papers specify tax payments. Examples include ‘Increase of healthcare 
taxes’ (Scalone, Mantovani et al. 2009); or ‘Additional tax contribution to healthcare’ 
(Scuffham, Whitty et al. 2010).  
 
The background literature indicates that there are a range of descriptors which have and can 
be used to describe the monetary attribute. Moreover, it is unclear to what degree the choice 
of descriptor can affect estimates of Willingness to Pay. There is every reason to anticipate 
that descriptors which, for example, refer to tax might meet with a difference response to 
those referring to price or cost. Therefore, estimates of WTP derived using a tax-based 
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monetary attribute (borne by the general public at large) may well be different from those 
derived using cost or price-based descriptors (for which respondents are asked to assume 
they bear the cost or price). What is less clear however, is whether or not other small 
changes in the way in which the money attribute is described (which do not affect who pays) 
might influence estimated WTP. The analysis presented in this chapter addresses this 
question.  
 
To explore this issue, we used the 3 descriptors for the monetary attribute which had proved 
most popular in pilot interviews (‘Cost to you’; ‘Amount lost’ or ‘Willingness to pay’) and 
distributed equal numbers of questionnaires with these descriptors. We then tried to establish 
whether estimated WTP was affected by the description of the monetary attribute. 
 
We also tested the premise, once again that, in the context of ‘free’ healthcare respondents 
may ignore cost in their decision-making (using a similar approach to that adopted in Chapter 
3). Once again, we identified the proportion of respondents who admitted they had not taken 
the monetary attribute into account, and then assessed the impact this had upon estimated 
WTP. 
 
3. Methods. 
 
A DCE questionnaire was produced for distribution amongst gynaecology patients attending a 
National Health Service hospital in Leicester, UK as part of an evaluation for the ‘Bridges 
project.’ The Bridges Project used a guideline based approach to provide an agreed 
integrated care pathway or bridge between primary and secondary care; this allows direct 
booking by GPs of investigations and treatments (i.e. surgery) for patients who remain under 
their care throughout (Julian, Naftalin et al. 2008). The new model therefore removes 
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traditional ‘referral’ between healthcare sectors, and places increased responsibility on GPs 
for providing specialized services.  
 
The DCE questionnaire was designed to test the robustness of applying DCEs to elicit WTP 
when healthcare is free at the point of use. The DCE questionnaire was originally piloted on 
women with menstrual disorders, and developed in order to assess the preferences of these 
women for a new Bridges project model of care as compared to their preferences for the 
existing status quo option of Consultant-led ‘One-stop’ provision. The new integrated care GP 
led model (Bridges project model) was therefore compared with the existing One-Stop 
Consultant delivered service in secondary care, using a DCE with attributes designed to allow 
differences in the attributes of the models of provision to be valued in monetary terms in 
patients with Menstrual disorders (see chapter 3). 
 
However because of the fact that the new integrated care GP led model (Bridges project 
model) could be used to provide gynaecological provision more generally (and not just for 
women with menstrual disorders), we also wanted to establish the preferences of 
gynaecological patients more generally for the two different models of provision.  
 
Moreover, because the original DCE which was applied to women with menstrual disorders 
was sufficiently generic in nature, as long as the cover sheet was changed to refer to 
‘Gynaecology health care’ the same DCE scenarios could be applied to patients with other 
miscellaneous gynaecological complaints rather than menstrual disorders patients. The 
results from applying the DCE upon women with a range of gynaecological complaints are 
therefore presented in this chapter. 
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3.1. Piloting and then designing the final DCE questionnaire. 
 
The DCE questionnaire was piloted on a group of women with menstrual disorders (for details 
of this please refer to Section 3.2 in chapter 3). The piloting was conducted by Dr Sophia 
Julian. Dr Julian was at the time a junior hospital doctor (Gynaecology). In her view the final 
attributes and levels which were finally selected for the final DCE questionnaire (designed to 
be applied to patients with menstrual disorders) were sufficiently generic to be applied to 
women with other Gynaecological problems. This meant that a separate repeat pilot exercise 
was not required to develop the ‘Gynaecology health care’ DCE questionnaire. Instead all 
that was required was that the title be change to reflect the fact that the questionnaire was 
now being used to evaluate a range of gynaecologically related provision rather than 
‘Menstrual disorders.’  
 
3.2. Attributes and levels. 
 
The final DCE questionnaire included attributes and associated levels as described in table 1. 
The design was a main effects design with 16 choices generated by SPEED. Half the 
questionnaires had the first half of the choices generated by SPEED in, and the other half 
had the other half of these choices in. We used a fixed comparator, with levels for the fixed 
comparator set as close as possible to existing One-stop Consultant-led provision (for further 
details of the selection of attribute levels for the fixed comparator see section 3.3 in chapter 
3). The fixed comparator assumed a 1 day wait for test results; no cost to you; care via a 
male consultant; a 12 week wait for an appointment; and getting to see the same doctor 
about half the time. After designing the choices we used SPSS to check for collinearity 
between attributes. 
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Table 1: Basic description of attributes, variable names, and levels. 
Attribute Variable 
name 
Levels 
The type of doctor typd GP or Consultant 
The gender of the doctor gend Male or Female 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the 
doctor (either GP or Consultant) 
wait 1 day, 4 days, 6 weeks, 12 
weeks 
Continuity of care (How often you get to see 
the same doctor) 
cont1 All of the time rather than 
half of the time 
Continuity of care (How often you get to see 
the same doctor) 
cont2 Half of the time rather than 
none of the time 
How long you have to wait for test results res 1 day, 2 days, 2 weeks, 4 
weeks 
The monetary attribute (either cost to you; 
amount lost; or willingness to pay) 
mon None, £25, £75, and £125 
 
The attributes and levels (for everything except the monetary attribute) are identical to those 
specified for the ‘Menstrual disorders’ DCE analysis. So in the interests of avoiding repetition 
we refer the reader to section 3.3 of chapter 3 which provides a full explanation for the 
rationale of the choice of attributes and levels used in this questionnaire (other than the 
monetary attribute which is explained here). 
 
The 3 descriptors for the monetary attribute emerged from the DCE pilot exercise which was 
described in section 3.2 of chapter 3. They were the 3 descriptors that respondents ranked 
most highly in a ranking exercise when we asked them to indicate which descriptor they 
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preferred.  The 3 most preferred monetary descriptors included ‘cost to you’, ‘amount lost’, 
and ‘willingness to pay.’  
 
I think it was particularly important to ensure that one of the descriptors had a descriptor 
which referred in some way to costs. This is because very often when a monetary attribute is 
used it is expressed in a manner which relates to cost. This is why the selection of ‘cost to 
you’ as one of the monetary descriptors was appropriate. Moreover, the descriptor ‘cost to 
you’ has been used before (Ryan and Hughes 1997; Regier, Friedman et al. 2009; van der 
Pol, Shiell et al. 2009). In addition we wanted to include a descriptor that implied a price had 
to be paid (because if monetary descriptors do not refer to cost they often refer to price). So 
the descriptor ‘willingness to pay’ was a useful one to include for that reason.  
 
Moreover it is interesting to look at the issue of whether respondents responded differently to 
the descriptor ‘willingness to pay’ to ‘cost to you.’ The descriptor ‘cost to you’ (like other cost 
based monetary descriptors) might be open to criticism because of concerns that it might 
encourage cost based responses (whereby respondents value differences in terms of what 
they feel they should cost rather than what they think they are worth). The term ‘willingness to 
pay’ in contrast should encourage a response more in line with what people think differences 
are worth to them (i.e. thereby including the element of ‘consumer surplus’ that should be 
incorporated when benefits are valued). The other term ‘amount lost’ was included because it 
was the third most popular descriptor. Moreover, if people suppose a monetary loss, then we 
would assume they would require a compensating variation (improvement in other attributes) 
in exchange for that loss (so it is a reasonable candidate descriptor to include for the 
purposes of this analysis).   
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In chapter 3 it was explained that for the purposes of the ‘Menstrual disorders’ DCE we had 
ended up with 12 different questionnaire designs. This was because in order to avoid 
respondents facing too many questions we had only wanted them to face half of the 16 
choices emanating from the SPEED design. Moreover, there were 6 attributes and we 
wanted to rotate them in the ordering of attributes within scenarios. This was because we 
were concerned that the ordering of attributes within scenarios might affect respondent 
valuation of attributes. This meant that we had 12 final DCE questionnaires for women with 
‘Period Problems’ and the ‘cost to you’ attribute and attributes were rotated so that the ‘cost 
to you’ attribute was 1st in the list for 2 versions, 2nd in the list for 2 versions, 3rd in the list for 2 
versions, 4th in the list for 2 versions, 5th in the list for 2 versions, and 6th for 2 versions.  
 
In the same way for the purposes of this ‘Gynaecology healthcare’ DCE study there were 12 
versions of the questionnaire with a ‘cost to you’ monetary attribute. However, because we 
also had questionnaires with a monetary attribute which was described as either ‘amount lost’ 
or ‘willingness to pay’ and because in the interests of consistency we needed 12 versions of 
each of these, we ended up with 36 different versions of the DCE questionnaire overall (we 
attempted to distribute numbers of each of the different versions as evenly as possible). As it 
is impractical and unnecessary to reproduce 36 questionnaires in the appendices, just 2 
samples ones are contained in appendix D, one with an ‘Amount Lost’ monetary attribute 
descriptor and the other with a ‘Willingness to Pay’ monetary attribute descriptor. It should be 
noted that the DCE did not provide consistency check type data for analysis.  
 
Once again as per the analysis in chapter 3, we did not have the intention of testing to see 
whether estimated WTP varied according to the positioning of the monetary attribute 
(because our sample may have been too small to facilitate such analysis anyway). However, 
we reasoned that if the positioning of the monetary attribute was varied in this consistent 
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manner, then estimated WTP would not be biased due to the ordering of attributes within 
scenarios.     
 
3.3. More details about the final questionnaire. 
 
Also, because respondents might also fail to take difference in the monetary attribute into 
account (in the same way that they did with respect to the ‘Menstrual disorders DCE), as with 
the analysis detailed in chapter 3 we again used information from a question posed to 
respondents about whether they took differences in the monetary attribute into account when 
choosing either options A or B.  
 
So, the questionnaire included a question to establish whether respondents factored the 
monetary attribute into their decision making. For those receiving the ‘cost to you’ variant it 
read: 
 
Did differences in the amount of ‘cost to you’ for options A and B influence your choices?    
Yes     No     Sometimes  
(Question 1) 
 
For those receiving ‘amount lost’ or ‘willingness to pay’ variants of the questionnaire, an 
equivalent question was included. 
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3.4. Data analysis and hypothesis testing. 
 
Data analysis was conducted using STATA in each case using Random Effects Probit. We  
calculated willingness to pay estimates and used the Delta method (Wooldridge 2002) which 
provides asymptotic confidence intervals. This was implemented using the non-linear 
confidence interval command in STATA v. 9.2. We conducted Wald tests using STATA. 
 
3.4.1. Hypothesis that a basic functional form is adequate for the entire sample. 
  
We assume a ‘state of the world’ model in which WTP for one alternative is to be considered 
(Ryan 2004). If DCE responses are not affected either by the descriptor for the monetary 
attribute, or the nature of patients’ responses to question 1, then a simple Random Effects 
Probit model using the variables defined in table 1, with the following functional form (model 
1) would produce estimates of WTP unaffected by these 2 potential sources of bias:  
 
Yij = α0 + α1typdij + α2gendij + α3waitij +α4cont1ij +α5cont2ij + α6resij + α7monij + μi + ξij 
          (Model 1) 
 
Here Yij is the binary dependent variable, from individuals i = 1…m, for observations j = 1…ni, 
The number of observations ni varies because the i individuals do not all complete every 
pairwise choice (a minority of respondents will not answer all choices). The term μi is the 
random effects error term (which allows for multiple responses from i respondents) and ξij is 
the standard Probit error term for individuals i for j observations. 
 
By implication because the monetary attribute is expressed in loss space (as it may be 
described as amount lost, cost to you, and willingness to pay), the model also assumes that a 
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representative and average individual may be indifferent also between detrimental changes in 
non-monetary attributes and monetary loss at calculated levels of Marginal Willingness to 
Pay. 
 
Marginal Willingness to Pay (MWTP) can be established for the attributes h (h=1,..,6). For an 
individual willingness to pay (WTPh) for a change in attribute variables h is given by: 
 
MWTPh = αh / -α7.          
          (Equation 1) 
 
Here α7 defines the value of a change in monetary units in loss space, therefore  
-α7 gives the value of a one unit change in monetary units in monetary gain space.  For model 
1 it is assumed that WTP can be established simply by establishing how much people value 
positive changes in the monetary attribute (mon), in indirect utility terms (which is estimated 
by -α7) and comparing this with how much people value changes in other attributes in indirect 
utility terms (estimated for attributes by αh).  
 
We therefore want to establish whether model 1 can reasonably be used to model the sample 
data and be accurately used to calculate MWTP.  If it can it suggests that MWTP results are 
invariant both to the choice of descriptor for MWTP, and also to whether or not respondents 
factor MWTP into their decision making. The accuracy of estimates of marginal willingness to 
pay (MWTPh) crucially depends upon obtaining a reliable estimate for α7, and reliable 
estimates of coefficients on non-monetary attribute variables (αh), which are not biased as a 
result of hypothetical or strategic bias. 
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3.4.2. Alternative hypothesis - a segmented model is required. 
 
If it is the case that results are sensitive either to the choice of descriptors used for the 
monetary attribute, or how respondents respond to question 1, then an alternative model 
(model 2) might better represent the data. Model 2 allows for the valuation of attributes 
separately according to whether respondents responded to a questionnaire with either an 
‘amount lost’ (Da), ‘cost to you’ (Dc), or ‘willingness to pay’ (Dw) descriptor for the monetary 
attribute. Model 2 also allows for separate calculation of MWTP amongst the sub-group of 
respondents who claim they did not take differences in the monetary attribute into account 
(Dn). Here Yij is the binary dependent variable, from individuals i = 1…m, for observations j = 
1…ni, 
 
Yij = α0Daij+ α1Daijtypdij + α2Daijgendij + α3Daijwaitij +α4Daijcont1ij +α5Daijcont2ij +  
 
α6Daijresij + α7Daijmonij + α8Dcij+α9Dcijtypdij + α10Dcijgendij + α11Dcijwaitij  
 
+α12Dcijcont1ij +α13Dcijcont2ij + α14Dcijresij + α15Dcijmonij + α16Dwij + α17Dwijtypdij +  
 
+ α18Dwijgendij + α19Dwijwaitij +α20Dwijcont1ij +α21Dwijcont2ij + α22Dwijresij  
 
+ α23Dwijmonij + α24Dnij + α25Dnijtypdij + α26Dnijgendij + α27Dnijwaitij +α28Dnijcont1ij  
 
+α29Dnijcont2ij + α30Dnijresij + α31Dnijmonij+ μi + ξij  
 
          (Model 2) 
 
The binary dependent variable Yij and the error terms μi, and ξij have the same interpretation 
as for model 1. The model includes additive dummies (Da, Dc, Dw), to provide information 
upon the intercept term for each of the monetary descriptor groups respectively (amount lost, 
cost to you, willingness to pay), such that Da = 1 for the amount lost group, or 0 otherwise; Dc 
= 1 for the cost to you group, or 0 otherwise; Dw = 1 for the Willingness to pay group, or 0 
otherwise. We also included (Dn) for the group that do not factor the monetary attribute into 
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their decision making, Dn = 1 for those who do not factor in the monetary attribute, or 0 
otherwise.  
 
A likelihood ratio test can be conducted comparing the restricted model (model 1) with the 
unrestricted model (model 2). If there is evidence of a jointly significant difference, then this 
would suggest that model 2 better represents the underlying data than model 1. 
 
3.4.3. Establishing whether estimated Willingness to Pay is sensitive to the monetary 
descriptor used – in the sub-group who claim they do not take differences in the 
monetary attribute into account when making choices. 
 
MWTP for each of the 3 monetary descriptor groups for the respondents who ‘do not’ take 
differences in the monetary attribute into account can be expressed (for details of variables 
see table 1), for m=1…6, as: 
 
a) ‘Amount lost’ group:  MWTPm,AL = (αm+αm+24) / (-α7-α31)   
          (equation 2) 
b) ‘Cost to you’ group: MWTPm,CTY= (αm+8+αm+24) / (-α7-α31)   
          (equation 3) 
c) ‘Willingness to Pay’ group: MWTPm,WTP= (αm+16+αm+24) / (-α7-α31)   
          (equation 4) 
 
Wald tests 1-6 are conducted to examine the proposition that estimates of MWTP are 
sensitive to the choice of monetary descriptor.  
 
The Wald test restrictions require that: 
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 MWTPm,AL = MWTPm,CTY = MWTPm,WTP       
           (equation 5) 
 
Wald tests (1-6) which are detailed in the results section (table 8), test the restriction that 
estimated WTP is not sensitive to the descriptor used for the monetary attribute amongst 
those who ‘do not’ take differences in the monetary attribute into account when making 
pairwise choices. Evidence of a difference between the groups at the 5% significance level 
would require a p-value (prob > chi2) of ≤ 0.05. 
 
3.4.4. Establishing whether estimated Willingness to Pay is sensitive to the monetary 
descriptor used – for the sub-group who claim they do or ‘sometimes’ take differences 
in the monetary attribute into account when making choices. 
 
MWTP for each of the 3 monetary descriptor groups for the respondents who do or 
‘sometimes’ take differences in the monetary attribute into account can be expressed as: 
 
a) ‘Amount lost’ group:   MWTPm,AL = (αm)/ (-α7)    
(equation 6) 
 
b) ‘Cost to you’ group:  MWTPm,CTY= (αm+8) / (-α15)   
(equation 7) 
 
c) ‘Willingness to Pay’ group:  MWTPm,WTP= (αm+16) / (-α23)   
          (equation 8) 
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Wald tests (for m =1…6) can also be undertaken to test the same proposition that WTP 
estimates are insensitive to the choice of monetary descriptor used, for the group of 
respondents who claim they do or ‘sometimes’ take differences in the monetary descriptor 
into account.  
 
 MWTPm,AL= MWTPm,CTY = MWTPm,WTP       
           (equation 9) 
 
The Wald test restrictions (tests 7-12) are again detailed in the results section in table 8, 
together with details of the restriction tested for each test using model 2. Evidence of a 
difference between the groups at the 5% significance level would again require a p-value 
(prob > chi2) of ≤ 0.05. 
 
3.4.5. Establishing whether results are sensitive to whether or not respondents claim 
not to factor the monetary attribute into their decision making, for each monetary 
descriptor: 
 
We may want to establish whether or not there is a difference in estimates of MWTP 
comparing those who claim they ‘do’ or ‘sometimes’ take differences in MWTP into account 
when making pairwise choices vs. those who say they do not do so1.  
 
We need however to first establish whether there is a difference in estimated MWTP 
according to the monetary descriptor group, using the approach outlined in sections 3.4.3, 
                                                 
1 As a very small number of respondents (6 / 188) failed to indicate whether they did or did not take differences 
in the monetary attribute into account, we subsumed their responses into the group who answered ‘yes’ or 
‘sometimes’ to question 1. i.e. we did not put them in the group who answered ‘no’ because they had not 
responded with the clear answer ‘no.’  
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and 3.4.4. If we discover there is, then we can examine the proposition that there is a 
difference between those who claim they ‘do’ or ‘sometimes’ take differences in MWTP into 
account when making pairwise choices vs. those who say they do not, separately for each of 
the 3 groups of questionnaires (i.e. for amount lost, cost to you, and willingness to pay 
descriptors). Therefore if any of the results obtained when undertaking the analyses indicated 
in section 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 indicate a statistically significant difference in estimated MWTP by 
descriptor used for the monetary attribute, then the following Wald tests (for m=1…6) should 
be conducted upon model 2:    
 
a) ‘Amount lost’ group:  MWTPm,AL =  (αm) / (-α7) = (αm+αm+24) / (-α7-α31)  
          (equation 10) 
 
b) ‘Cost to you’ group:   MWTPm,CTY = (αm+8) / (-α15) = (αm+8+ αm+24) / (-α15-α31)  
          (equation 11) 
 
c) ‘WTP’ group:   MWTPm,WTP = (αm+16) / (-α23) = (αm+16+αm+24) / (-α23-α31)  
(equation 12) 
 
Once again evidence of a difference between the groups at the 5% significance level requires 
a p-value (prob > chi2) of ≤ 0.05. 
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3.4.6. Establishing whether results are sensitive to whether or not respondents claim 
not to factor the monetary attribute into their decision making, using a pooled sample 
of all respondents: 
 
In the event that the analyses outlined in both section 3.4.3 and section 3.4.4 do not provide 
any evidence that estimated MWTP varies according to the monetary descriptor used in the 
questionnaire, then econometric model 3 should be used:  
 
 
Yij = α0j+ α1typdij + α2gendij + α3waitij +α4cont1ij +α5cont2ij + α6resij + α7monij +  
 
α8Dnij + α9Dnijtypdij + α10Dnijgendij + α11Dnijwaitij +α12Dnijcont1ij +α13Dnijcont2ij +  
 
α14Dnijresij + α15Dnijmonij+ μi + ξij  
 
          (Model 3) 
 
Here once again the binary dependent variable Yij and the error terms μi, and ξij have the 
same interpretation as for model 1. The model now pools all the data in such a way that it 
does not discriminate between respondents according to the monetary descriptor that they 
face. Therefore variables with the coefficients α0….α7 in model 3 are exactly the same as 
those in model 1, whilst those with the coefficients α8…α15 in model 3 are equivalent to those 
with the coefficients α24…α31 in model 2. 
 
A likelihood ratio test can be used to test for the joint significance of the dummy variables, 
comparing model 1 and 3. A Wald test for joint significance of these variables can also be 
undertaken comparing model 1 and model 3. 
 
Individual Wald tests (table 9) for each attribute (for h=1..6) can then be used to test the 
restriction that WTP does not vary between those who ‘do’ or ‘sometimes’ take differences in 
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the monetary attribute into account vs. those who do not take differences in the monetary 
attribute into account, when they make choices.  
 
Evidence of a difference between the groups at the 5% significance level again requires a 
Wald test p-value (prob > chi2) of ≤ 0.05.  
 
4. Results. 
 
4.1 Sample characteristics. 
 
We distributed 218 questionnaires and obtained 188 responses (86% response rate). There 
were 62 completed responses from the ‘cost to you’ group, 61 from the ‘amount lost’ group, 
and 65 from the ‘willingness to pay’ group. Information on household income in the three 
groups is reported in table 2.  
 
Table 2: Average household income by questionnaire type. 
Type of 
questionnaire 
received 
Income above  
Average 
Income about 
average 
Income below 
average 
Non –
responders to 
question 
Cost to you 13 / 62 
(21%) 
 
23 / 62 
(37%) 
18 / 62 
(29%) 
8 / 62 
(13%) 
Amount lost 17 / 61 
(28%) 
 
12 / 61 
(19.5%) 
26 / 61 
(42.5%) 
 6 / 61 
(10%) 
Willingness To Pay 12 / 65 
(18.5%) 
 
18 / 65 
(27.5%) 
25 / 65 
(38.5%) 
10 / 65 
(15.5%) 
 
 
We conducted a chi-squared test for the equality of sample distributions for the 3 monetary 
descriptor groups with respect to household income.  The null hypothesis for this was that all 
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the samples for those with cost to you, amount lost, and willingness to pay monetary 
descriptors, had the same frequency distribution with respect to the percentage of 
respondents from above average income, average income, below average income, and non-
response answers to the income category question. The p-value generated from that test for 
6 degrees of freedom was P ≤ 0.14301, so at the 5% level we could clearly reject the 
alternative hypothesis that the underlying sample distribution for the 3 monetary descriptor 
groups differed with respect to average household income levels according to type of 
monetary descriptor respondents faced.  Respondents were otherwise representative of 
women presenting to hospital outpatient gynaecology clinics in Leicestershire with a typical 
cross section of gynaecological complaints referred to such departments. Detailed 
information about the medical conditions of respondents was not collated, because of the 
methodological rather than clinical focus of the study. 
 
4.2. Responses to the question about whether the monetary attribute is considered 
when making choices. 
 
Table 3 indicates the extent to which respondents reported that they factor differences in the 
monetary attribute into their decision making. Overall, 33.5% stated they did not factor the 
monetary attribute into their choices, and some small differences are apparent, contingent 
upon the type of monetary descriptor used. 
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Table 3: Whether respondents take the monetary attribute into account. 
Type of 
questionnaire 
received 
Differences in monetary attribute affected my 
choices 
Non –
responder to 
question Yes  No Sometimes 
Cost to you 18 / 62 
(29%) 
 
18 / 62 
(29%) 
24 / 62 
(39%) 
2 / 62 
(3%) 
Amount lost 17 / 61 
(28%) 
 
24 / 61 
(39%) 
17 / 61 
(28%) 
3 / 61 
(5%) 
Willingness To Pay 27 / 65 
(41.5%) 
 
21 / 65 
(32%) 
16 / 65 
(25%) 
1 / 65 
(1.5%) 
 
We also conducted a chi-squared test for the equality of sample distributions for the 3 
monetary descriptor groups with respect to whether or not respondents claimed to take the 
monetary attribute into account. The null hypothesis for this was that all the samples had the 
same frequency distribution with respect to the percentage of respondents who claimed ‘Yes’ 
they did take differences in the monetary attribute into account; claimed ‘No’ they did not take 
differences in the monetary attribute into account; claimed they ‘Sometimes’ took differences 
in the monetary attribute into account; or did not answer the question. The p-value generated 
from that test for the required 6 degrees of freedom was P ≤ 0.22035. So at the 5% level we 
could clearly reject the alternative hypothesis that the underlying sample distribution differed 
with respect to whether or not the respondents took the monetary attribute into account.   
 
4.3. Results (Model 1). 
 
If we examine the results from model 1 (see table 4) in isolation without recourse to results 
from models 2 and 3, they look broadly reassuring. The constant is insignificant which means 
that there is (rather like the analysis in chapter 3) no evidence of an ‘experience effect’ 
involving a preference for the bundle of characteristics associated with the status quo option 
of Consultant-led ‘One-stop’ provision for gynaecological problems. Given the coding 
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ascribed to the variables, the baseline (model 1) results imply the following: respondents 
prefer a consultant gynaecologist to a GP for consultations (the typd coefficient is both 
positive and significant and quite large at 0.2312) and implies a WTP of £39.08 (£18.66 / 
£59.50) for a consultant rather than a GP; they also appear to prefer a female to a male 
doctor (gend is both positive and significant and has quite a large coefficient at 0.2226) and 
are WTP £37.62 (£19.63 / £55.60) for a female rather than male doctor. Avoiding an extra 
day spent waiting for a consultation is valued (wait has a significant although small coefficient 
of 0.072) and patients will thus pay £1.21 (£0.91 / £1.51) to avoid an extra day for an 
appointment to see the doctor. Avoiding waiting for test results for an extra day is also valued 
(res has a significant, larger negative coefficient of 0.0225) and patients will pay £3.79 (£2.62 
/ £4.97) to avoid an extra day waiting for test results. In terms of continuity, seeing the same 
doctor half of the time rather than none of the time is highly valued (cont2 is significant, 
positive and has a large coefficient at 0.3602) and patients will pay £60.87 (£34.08 / £87.66) 
for it; surprisingly the difference between seeing the same doctor all of the time rather than 
half of the time is not significant (cont1 has p=.353). Finally, the monetary attribute (mon) is 
significant and of the expected sign (-0.0059).  
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Table 4. Results - Random Effects Probit (Model 1).  
Variable name / 
Attribute details 
Coefficient P-value WTP P- value 
con: Constant -0.83012 
(-0.1883 /0.0223)3 
 
0.122  0.135 
typd: Type of doctor 0.2312 
(0.1241 / 0.3384) 
 
0.000 £39.084 
(£18.66 / £59.50) 
5 
0.000 
gend: Gender of 
doctor 
0.2226 
(0.1107 / 0.3345) 
 
0.000 £37.62 
(£19.63 / £55.60) 
0.000 
wait: Wait for 
appointment to see 
doctor 
0.072 
(0.0057 / .0.0086) 
 
0.000 £1.21 
(£0.91 / £1.51) 
0.000 
cont1: Continuity of 
care (All rather than 
half time) 
0.0548 
(-0.0608 / 0.1704) 
 
0.353 £9.27 
(-£10.09 / £28.62) 
0.348 
cont2: Continuity of 
care (Half time not 
none of time) 
0.3602 
(0.2273 / 0.4932) 
 
0.000 £60.87 
(£34.08 / £87.66) 
0.000 
Res: Waiting for test 
results 
0.0225 
(0.0175 / 0.0274) 
 
0.000 £3.79 
(£2.62 / £4.97) 
0.000 
mon: Monetary 
attribute 
-0.0059 
(-0.0047 / -0.0071) 
 
0.000   
Sample size: n = 188 
Log-likelihood: -
1241.8 
Mc Faddens R2: 0.103 % of actual 
values 
predicted:  
68.6% 
 
4.4. Results Model 2 and Model 3. 
 
The results from model 2 are reported in table 5, and then estimated WTP based upon model 
2 is presented in table 6 (alongside estimated WTP from model 1 so any differences in point 
estimates can be seen). Econometric results for model 3 and estimates of WTP for the same 
model are presented in table 7.  
                                                 
2 Point estimate generated using Random Effects Probit in STATA v.9.2. 
3 95% Confidence intervals for point estimates generated again using Random Effects Probit in STATA v.9.2. 
4 Willingness to Pay point estimate. 
5 Asymptotic 95% confidence intervals using the Delta method as described in Wooldridge (2002), and 
implemented in STATA v.9.2. 
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Table 5: Results - Random Effects Probit (Model 2).  
Variable name Amount lost descriptor 
 
n = 62 
Cost to you descriptor 
 
n=61 
Willingness to pay 
descriptor 
n=65 
Don’t factor in 
monetary attribute 
n=63 
 Coefficient P – value Coefficient P – value Coefficient P – value Coefficient P – value 
Type of doctor .0171 0.875 .2773 0.007 .1525 0.143 .2250 0.050* 
Gender of doctor .2403 0.040* .1001 0.353 .3021 0.005* .0591 0.629 
Wait for appointment .2403 0.000* .0093 0.000* .0075 0.000* .0004 0.815 
Continuity of care 1 -.0035 0.976 .0397 0.722 -.1937 0.081 .3225 0.010* 
Continuity of care 2 .4683 0.000* .2703 0.031* .5902 0.000* -.2135 0.137 
Waiting for test results .0170 0.001* .0261 0.000* .0215 0.000* .0036 0.491 
Monetary factor -.0098 0.000* -.0102 0.000* -.0093 0.000* .0093 0.000* 
Intercept term -.1591 0.124 -.0204 0.835 -.1049 0.277 -.0270 0.810 
Mc Faddens R2 = 0.143; Percentage of actual values accurately predicted by the model = 71.8%; Log-likelihood is -1193.5; 
 
LR test comparison with model 1: λ = 113, Critical value for 24 degrees of freedom = 36.4 
 
* highlights p-values which are statistically significant  5% 
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Table 6: Summary of WTP results: Marginal willingness to pay (£) from the model 2 vs. model 1. 
 
Variable 
 
WTP descriptor 
 
Model 2 Model 1 
Respondents who do or 
sometimes factor in the monetary 
variable 
Respondents who do not factor in the 
monetary variable 
 
Pooled: Whole sample 
Point estimate (95% CI) Point estimate (95% CI) Point estimate (95% CI) 
Type of Dr (Consultant vs GP) 
Amount lost 
Cost to you 
Willingness to pay 
 
£1.76 (-£20.13 / £23.64) 
£27.21 (£5.92 / £48.51)** 
£16.46 (-£6.50 / £39.43) 
 
£605.53 (-£3,253.96 / £4465.02) 
     £598.46 (-£1428.81 / £2625.73) 
-£4597.15 (-£150524 / £141329.90) 
 
£39.08 
 (£18.66 / £59.50)** 
Gender of Dr (Female vs Male) 
Amount lost 
Cost to you 
       Willingness to pay 
 
£24.64 (£2.29 / £47.00)* 
£9.83 (£30.04 / £10.39) 
£32.61 (£11.25 / £53.97)** 
 
-£738.13 (-£5174.73 / £3,698.48) 
-£188.41 (-£799.20 / £422.38) 
£4358.07 (-£135095 / £143812) 
 
£37.62  
(£19.63 / £55.60)** 
Waiting for appointment (per day) 
Amount lo 
Cost to you 
Willingness to pay 
 
£0.59 (£0.28 / £0.91)** 
£0.92 (£0.61 / £1.22)** 
£0.82 (£0.51 / £1.12)** 
 
£15.14 (-£77.70 / £107.97) 
£11.48 (-£25.72 / £48.68) 
-£95.58 (-£3,142.51 / £2,942.51) 
 
 
-£1.21  
(-£0.91 / -£1.51)** 
Continuity of care (all vs ½ the time) 
Amount lost 
Cost to you 
Willingness to pay 
 
 
-£0.36 (-£23.55 / £22.83) 
£3.90 (-£17.49 / £25.28) 
-£20.92 (-£45.55 / £3.73) 
 
 
£786.45 (-£4043.40 / £5616.29) 
£428.53 (-£981.75 / £1838.83) 
-£1553.57 (-£51331 / £48224) 
 
 
£9.27  
(-£10.09 / £28.62) 
Continuity of Care (1/2 vs nil time) 
Amount lost 
Cost to you 
Willingness to pay 
 
£48.02 (£17.74 / £78.30)** 
£26.53 (£0.74 / £52.31)* 
£63.72 (£30.89 / £96.54)** 
 
£628.01 (-£3432.99 / £4689.02) 
£67.21 (-£376.17 / £510.58) 
-£4544.85 (-£148,791 / £139,702) 
 
£60.87  
(£34.08 / £87.66)** 
Wait test results (per day) 
Amount lost 
Cost to you 
Willingness to pay 
 
£1.74 (£0.61 / £2.88)** 
£2.56 (£1.46 / £3.66)** 
£2.32 (£1.17 / £3.47)** 
 
£50.81 (£-268.76 / £370.37) 
£35.19(-£82.98 / £153.37) 
-£303.10 (-£9922.44 / £9,316.25) 
 
£3.79  
(£2.62 / £4.97)** 
Confidence intervals (CI) are in brackets after point estimates for WTP. They are 95% CIs derived using the Delta method (Wooldridge 2002). 
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Table 7: Results - Random Effects Probit (Model 3).  
 
Variable name Those who say they ‘do’ 
or ‘sometimes’  take the 
monetary attribute into 
account 
(n = 125) 
MWTP for those who say 
they do or ‘sometimes’ take 
the monetary attribute into 
account 
(n= 126) 
Those who say they don’t 
factor in the monetary 
attribute 
 
(n=63) 
MWTP for those who say they 
don’t factor in the monetary 
attribute 
 
(n=63) 
 Coefficient P – value MWTP P – value Coefficient P – value MWTP P – 
value 
Type of doctor .1494 0.031* £15.62 
(£0.91 / 30.32) 
0.037* .2203 0.057 £1325.60 
(-£8028 / £10679) 
0.781 
Gender of doctor .2073 0.004** 21.68 
(£7.46 / 35.89) 
0.003** .0667 0.582 £982.54 
(-£5723 / £7688) 
0.774 
Wait for appointment .0075 0.000** 0.79 
(£0.58 / 0.99) 
0.000** .0002 0.918 £27.55 
(-£163 / £218) 
0.778 
Continuity of care 1 -.0530 0.474 -5.55 
(-£20.88 / £9.78) 
0.478 .3133 0.012* £933.45 
(-£5545 /-£7412) 
0.778 
Continuity of care 2 .4442 0.000** 46.46 
(£26.75 / £66.16) 
0.000** -.2104 0.140 £838.45 
(-£5182 / £6859) 
0.785 
Waiting for test results .0218 0.000** £2.28 
(£1.51 / £3.04) 
0.000** .0030 0.562 £89.10 
(-£717 / £539) 
0.781 
Monetary factor -.0096 0.000** 1  1    
Intercept term -.0912 0.161   -.0302 0.788   
 
Mc Faddens R2 = 0.138; Percentage of actual values accurately predicted by the model = 71.7%; Log-likelihood is 1201.04; 
LR test comparison model 3 vs. model 2: λ = 15.1, Critical value for 16 degrees of freedom = 26.3; LR test comparing model 3 vs. model 1: λ =  
97.9, Critical value for 8 degrees of freedom = 15.51; Wald test comparing model 3 vs. model 2: p=0.0000;* highlights p-values which are statistically 
significant  5% but not at the 1% level; ** highlights p-values which are statistically significant  
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4.5. Comparison of model 1 vs. model 2; model 1 vs. model 3; and model 2 vs. model 3 
using a likelihood ratio (LR) test, models 1 vs. 3 using a Wald test and measures of 
‘goodness of fit’. 
 
We calculated the likelihood ratios (LR) for model 1 (the restricted model) and model 2 (the 
unrestricted model). These figures are -1250 and -1193.5 respectively. This suggests a value 
for λ of 113. This compares with the appropriate critical value for 24 degrees of freedom of 
36.4. We can therefore reject the null hypothesis that the restricted model (model 1) provides 
an adequate characterization of the underlying data on the basis of the LR test.   
 
Comparing likelihood ratios to obtain λ in order to compare model 1 (restricted model) vs. 
model 3 (the unrestricted model) we have figures of -1250 and -1201.04 respectively. This 
suggests a value for λ of 97.9. This compares with the appropriate critical value for 8 degrees 
of freedom of 15.5.  We can therefore once again reject the null hypothesis that the restricted 
model provides an adequate characterization of the underlying data on the basis of the LR 
test. This finding was confirmed by an equivalent Wald test, which tested the hypothesis that 
all the dummy variables = 0, the hypothesis was very clearly rejected (p=0.0000).  
 
The findings from the comparison of model 1 vs. model 3 (using both LR and Wald tests for 
joint significance) therefore provide evidence that there is a jointly significant difference in 
coefficients which can be attributed to a difference between those who ‘do’ or ‘sometime’ take 
differences in estimated WTP into account. 
 
Using an LR test to compare model 3 (restricted model) vs. model 2 (the unrestricted model) 
we have figures of 1201.04 and 1193.49 respectively. This suggests a value for λ of 15.1. 
This compares with the appropriate critical value for 16 degrees of freedom of 26.3.  We 
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therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis that the restricted model provides an adequate 
characterization of the underlying data on the basis of the LR test. This implies that estimated 
WTP may not be sensitive to the choice of monetary descriptor used.  
 
Findings from LR tests (model 1 vs. model 2; and model 1 vs. model 3; and model 3 vs. 
model 2) therefore suggest that allowing for a difference in the econometric model between 
those who say they do or sometimes take differences in the monetary attribute into account 
vs. those who don’t, is worthwhile (model 3 rather than model 1). However, adopting a model 
which also allows for differences in estimated WTP according to monetary descriptor (model 
2) rather than just according to whether people claim they ‘do’ or ‘sometimes’ take differences 
in the monetary attribute into account vs. those who don’t (model 3) is not justified based 
upon tests for joint significance (the dummy variables in model 2 which are not in model 3 are 
not jointly significant). 
 
4.6. Marginal Willingness to Pay results. 
 
Table 4, provides estimates of MWTP for model 1, alongside regression results for model 1. 
Table 5, details the econometric results obtained when estimating model 2, whilst table 6 
summarises the willingness to pay results for models 1 and 2, so that differences in point 
estimates for MWTP and the significance or otherwise of variables are apparent comparing 
the 2 models. The 95% confidence intervals upon point estimates of MRS, are derived using 
the Delta method (Wooldridge 2002). Point estimates for MWTP which are significant at the 
1% level are denoted by 2 asterisks, and those significant at the 5% but not 1% level are 
denoted by 1 asterisk. Table 6 therefore provides details of MWTP results from the pooled 
model (model 1), and MWTP results obtained when sub-dividing sample into the 3 monetary 
descriptors used i.e. ‘amount lost’, ‘cost to you’ and ‘willingness to pay’, as well as between 
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those who say they do or sometimes take differences in the monetary attribute into account 
vs. they do not take differences in the monetary attribute into account (model 2). The most 
striking finding is that none of the point estimates of MWTP in model 2 are significantly 
different from zero at the 5% significance level for respondents who claim not to take 
differences in the monetary attribute into account when making choices. This is what we 
might expect if these respondents are unwilling to register a willingness to pay.  
 
In table 7, we present the results for model 3. We find that whilst 5 / 6 of point estimates of 
MWTP are statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level for the group who ‘do’ 
or ‘sometimes’ take the monetary attribute into account when making choices, only  
1 / 6 of these point estimates for MWTP are significant for the group who say they don’t factor 
differences in the monetary attribute into account when making choices.  
 
4.7. Use of Wald tests to establish whether estimated MWTP for attributes is related to 
the monetary descriptor used. 
 
Using Wald tests we can establish whether there is evidence that estimated MWTP for 
attributes is related to the choice of monetary descriptor used conducting the tests outlined in 
section 3.4.3 and 3.4.4. We already know from a comparison of model 2 versus model 3, that 
tests for joint significance do not support the proposition that distinguishing by monetary 
descriptor group (model 2) rather than not doing this (model 3), results in a jointly significant 
difference. 
 
Results of the Wald tests are detailed in table 8 below. Differences which are significant at 
the 1% level are denoted by 2 asterisks, and those significant at the 5% but not 1% level are 
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denoted by 1 asterisk. The absence of asterisks indicates that any differences which may 
exist are not statistically significant. 
 
Table 8: Wald tests. – Test hypothesis results insensitive to monetary descriptor used 
for the group who ‘do not’ factor differences in the monetary attribute into their 
decision making (tests 1-6), and those who do (tests 7-12). 
Wald 
test 
Restriction tested 
(Model 2) 
Results: 
Amount  
lost n= 61 
Cost to  
you 
n= 62 
WTP n = 65. 
Wald  
test 
Restriction  
tested 
(Model 2) 
Results: 
Amount  
lost n= 61 
Cost to  
you 
n= 62 
WTP n = 65. 
1 (α1+ α25) / (-α7-α31)=  
 
(α9+α25) / (-α15-α31)=  
 
(α17+α25) / (-α23-α31) 
p = 0.2187 7 (α1) / (-α7)=  
 
(α9) / (-α15)=  
 
(α17) / (-α23) 
p = 0.2057 
2 (α2+α26) / (-α7-α31)  =  
 
(α10+α26) / (-α15-α31) =  
 
(α18+ α26) / (-α23-α31) 
 
 
p = 0.2835 8 (α2) / (-α7)  =  
 
(α10) / (-α15) =  
 
(α18) / (-α23)  
p = 0.2536 
3 (α3+α27) / (-α7-α31)  =  
 
(α11+α27) / (-α15-α31) =  
 
(α19+ α27) / (-α23-α31) 
p = 0.2001        9 (α3) / (-α7)  =  
 
(α11) / (-α15) =  
 
(α19) / (-α23) 
p = 0.2611 
4 (α4+α28) / (-α7-α31)  =  
 
(α12+α28) / (-α15-α31) =  
 
(α20+α28) / (-α23-α31) 
 
p = 0.2659     10 (α4) / (-α7)  =  
 
(α12) / (-α15) =  
 
(α20) / (-α23) 
 
p = 0.2397 
5 (α5+ α29) / (-α7-α31)  =  
 
(α13+α29) / (-α15-α31) =  
 
(α21+α29) / (-α23-α31) 
p = 0.1566 11 (α5) / (-α7)  =  
 
(α13) / (-α15) =  
 
(α21) / (-α23) 
p = 0.1599 
6 (α6+ α30) / (-α7-α31)  =  
 
(α14+α30) / (-α15-α31) =  
 
(α22+α30) / (-α23-α31) 
p = 0.4416 
 
12 (α6) / (-α7)  =  
 
(α14) / (-α15) =  
 
(α22) / (-α23) 
p = 0.5196 
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It can be clearly seen that for all 12 Wald tests, we cannot reject any of the restrictions at the 
5% significance level.  There is therefore no evidence of a significant difference in MWTP for 
any attribute comparing different descriptors used for the monetary attribute (none of the p-
values ≤ 0.05). This finding holds both amongst respondents who claim they do not take 
differences in the monetary attribute into account (tests 1-6), and amongst those who say 
they ‘do’ or ‘sometimes’ take differences in the monetary attribute into account (tests 7-12). 
This further reinforces the findings obtained using likelihood ratio tests. 
 
Since there is no evidence that MWTP varies according to the descriptor used for the 
monetary attribute, it is appropriate to proceed to use model 3 to establish whether estimates 
of WTP varies comparing those who ‘do’ or ‘sometimes’ take differences in the monetary 
attribute into account vs. those who do not. This means that conducting the Wald tests 
outlined in section 3.4.5 on model 2 is unnecessary.  The results (tests 13-18) are presented 
in table 9 below. Differences which are significant at the 1% level are denoted by 2 asterisks, 
and those significant at the 5% but not 1% level are denoted by 1 asterisk. 
Table 9: Wald tests – Are estimates of MWTP biased due to inclusion of respondents 
that say they ‘do not’ take differences in the monetary attribute into account (‘amount 
lost’ and ‘cost to you’ respondents). 
Wald  
Test  
‘WTP’ group - 
Restriction tested 
 
(Model 3) 
Results 
 
 
n = 65 
Wald  
Test 
Whole sample – 
Restriction tested 
 
(Model 3) 
Results 
 
 
n = 188 
13 (α1) / (-α7) =  
 
(α1+α9) / (-α7-α15) 
 
p = 0.6479       
 
16 (α4) / (-α7) =  
 
(α4+α12) / (-α7-α15) 
p = 0.0487*    
 
14 (α2) / (-α7) =  
 
(α2+α10) / (-α7-α15) 
 
p = 0.4381   
 
17 (α5) / (-α7) =  
 
(α5+α13) / (-α7-α15) 
 
p = 0.0026* 
 
15 (α3) /  (-α7) =  
 
(α3+α11) / (-α7-α15) 
 
 
p = 0.0020** 
 
18 (α6) / (-α7) =  
 
(α6+α14) / (-α7-α15) 
 
 
p = 0.0183*        
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Wald tests for equality of MWTP comparing those who ‘do’ or ‘sometimes’ take differences in 
MWTP into account relative to those who say they do not (tests 13 – 18) provide evidence 
that estimated MWTP varies between the groups . Although tests 13 and 14 do not 
demonstrate a clear statistically significant difference in estimated MWTP between the two 
groups, for the attributes typd and gend, tests 15-18 all suggest a statistically significant 
difference at the 5% level for the remaining attributes. Therefore these findings from Wald 
tests, confirm the findings from tests of joint significance (LR and Wald tests comparing 
model 3 with model 1), and suggest that estimated MWTP does vary between those who ‘do’ 
or ‘sometimes’ take differences in MWTP into account vs. those who do not, with respect to 4 
/ 6 attributes at the 5% significance level. 
 
5. Discussion. 
 
Firstly, our findings provide no evidence of statistically significant differences in estimates of 
MWTP by type of monetary descriptor using Wald tests for individual variables (table 8), or 
using tests for joint significance There is every reason to suppose that preferences and also 
MWTP should be sensitive to the issue of who bears a cost (Bryan and Dolan 2004). 
Consequently, we would anticipate that if the descriptor changed in such a way that it 
affected who paid, or the method of payment (i.e. tax vs. out of pocket expenditure), then 
differences in estimated MWTP between groups (according to monetary descriptor) would be 
apparent.  
 
Moreover, in section 3.2 of this chapter I speculated that the use of a cost based monetary 
descriptor such as ‘cost to you’ might be more likely to encourage ‘cost based responses’ 
(whereby respondents try to value differences in ‘cost to you’ according to what they think 
improvements in other attributes might cost). In contrast, if the descriptor ‘willingness to pay’ 
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was used, I speculated it would be more likely to encourage a response which related to how 
much respondents value things (i.e. thereby including the element ‘consumer surplus’ which 
cost based responses might exclude). If these two premises hold, I would expect to find 
evidence that estimated MWTP obtained using a ‘willingness to pay’ descriptor might be 
higher than estimates obtained using a ‘cost to you’ descriptor. Therefore, the finding that 
there was no evidence that estimated MWTP varied according to choice of monetary 
descriptor used is reassuring. This is because it may mean that some descriptors which refer 
to ‘cost’ can be used without them necessarily encouraging ‘cost based responses.’ Since 
‘cost based responses’ strip out ‘consumer surplus’ from benefits estimates, we would not 
want to conduct MWTP analysis using information from ‘cost based responses.’ The 
observed results mean that the use of a monetary descriptor that refers to cost or costs will 
not necessarily introduce bias. Moreover, when applying DCEs where healthcare is free at 
the point of use, it is common to use another descriptor other than willingness to pay for the 
monetary attribute. The results here suggest that, so long as this does not impact upon who 
pays, this need not significantly affect estimated MWTP results. That said the results here are 
based upon a relatively small sample. Ideally therefore we would want to conduct a similar 
analysis using a larger sample to be fully assured that our results would still hold. 
 
Secondly, rather like the results of the previous analysis discussed in chapter 3, we found 
that about a third of respondents (33.5%) claimed that they had not factored differences in the 
monetary attribute into their decision making. This occurred irrespective of which descriptor 
was used (i.e. 29% for ‘cost to you’; 39% for amount lost; and 32% for ‘willingness to pay’). Of 
course, it could be argued that the existence of a large proportion of respondents who do not 
take differences in the monetary attribute into account when making decisions could be a by-
product of inappropriately pitching the levels for the monetary attribute. I fully concede that 
this may be the case. Moreover, if I were to conduct a similar analysis again I would use the 
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payment card method during the pilot exercise to try to establish the most appropriate range 
for the monetary attribute for the final questionnaire. This might reduce the number of 
respondents failing to consider the monetary attribute in their decision making. However, 
even if I did this I could not be sure that the price vector we assumed for the monetary 
attribute would necessarily be appropriate because it is unclear that a definitive ‘correct’ 
vector can be established, especially for services which are not traded. Note also that 
inappropriate price vectors lead to hypothetical bias defined in terms of the definition we used 
(i.e. hypothetical bias as the error arising when questions do not elicit responses consistent 
with actual behaviour, because of the hypothetical nature of questions (Champ and Bishop 
2001). An important point to make is that, just because some of the respondents who said 
they did not take differences in the monetary attribute into account may have taken these 
differences into account if the range for the monetary attribute had been set differently 
(following the use of a pilot payment card exercise), some hypothetical bias may remain if the 
payment vector is not appropriate for every respondent. What it does mean though is that the 
extent of hypothetical bias might be lower if more robust methods were to be used to set the 
range for the monetary attribute than those deployed here. Moreover, if we could arrive at a 
WTP question which was more incentive compatible than the one used here, this might 
reduce the scale of hypothetical bias. However, it is more difficult to develop incentive 
compatible WTP questions to value healthcare when it is free at the point of use. 
 
Thirdly, we demonstrated using Wald tests in Model 3 (table 9) that the value of coefficients 
used to calculate WTP varied significantly between individuals who do or ‘sometimes’ factor 
in the monetary attribute vs. those who do not factor in the monetary attribute, for 4 / 6 
attributes. Therefore, the inclusion of a significant minority of respondents who fail to take into 
account differences in the monetary attribute may bias results in the way it has done in this 
WTP analysis. It would therefore be interesting to establish in future analyses whether similar 
 210 
 
results emerge following more elaborate and robust attempts to establish a sensible range for 
monetary attributes (such as the use of payment cards etc) and also in the presence or 
absence of ‘cheap talk’ (Ozdemir, Johnson et al. 2009).  
 
Moreover, if I repeated this analysis again, I would establish econometrically (using an 
appropriate methodology (Gyrd-Hansen and Skjoldborg 2008)) whether respondents 
responded to the presence or absence of a non-zero price proxy, or to differences in the 
levels of the price proxy, or both.  There is also evidence to suggest that the cost gradient 
may not be continuous and linear (Johnson, Ozdemir et al. 2010) as is commonly supposed 
when attempting to estimate WTP. This suggests the need to explore alternative 
specifications for estimating cost when calculating WTP. It has been suggested (Johnson, 
Ozdemir et al. 2010) that respondents may deploy heuristics which involve recoding costs 
into categories such as low, medium, and high, thereby undermining the validity of WTP 
estimates. If this is the case it is argued incorporating ‘cheap talk’ or graphic representations 
of attribute cost levels in questionnaire preambles might prevent this (Johnson, Ozdemir et al. 
2010). Indeed it has been shown (Ozdemir, Johnson et al. 2009) that the cost function for a 
cheap talk subsample appears to be linear in contrast to the cost function for the main sample 
of respondents not engaged in ‘cheap talk’. It also follows that if respondents do deploy 
recoding heuristics then different price vectors may trigger different recoding heuristics, 
underlining the importance of rigorous attempts to establish an appropriate price vector for 
the monetary attribute. 
 
However, as discussed in Chapter 3, the policy implications of our findings are not clear cut. 
The reason for this is that incentive compatibility of the monetary attributes used for this 
analysis is open to question. Indeed, if I were to repeat a similar analysis again I would make 
sure that the questionnaire preamble did not ask respondents to “Please assume you would 
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not lose this amount of money even if you would not”, and I would pay particular attention to 
ensuring that I framed and selected monetary attributes in a way that ensured that they were 
as ‘incentive compatible’ as possible. In addition a strong qualitative agenda (alongside use 
of the approach suggested here, to establish whether respondents take differences in the 
monetary attribute into account) would be helpful. This could involve the use of ‘think aloud’ 
experiments being undertaken as respondents fill in DCE questionnaires. Such exercises 
might shed light upon whether respondents who indicated either they did or did not take 
differences in the monetary attribute into account were usually being truthful or not.  
 
6. Conclusions. 
 
The broad conclusion of the analysis presented in this chapter is that describing a monetary 
attribute differently in a manner which does not impact upon the issue of ‘who pays’ will not 
necessarily affect estimates of WTP. Reassuringly, the descriptor which referred to costs 
(‘cost to you’) was associated with similar estimated levels of WTP to those obtained using 
the other 2 descriptors (including one which referred to ‘willingness to pay’). This suggests 
that using a monetary descriptor which refers to cost or some variation upon cost (such as 
‘cost to you’) does not necessarily encourage ‘cost based responses.’ 
 
Considering the findings of both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 suggests that a substantive 
minority (about a third) of respondents claim not to take the monetary attribute into account 
when making DCE choices. Moreover, estimated WTP for this group differs when compared 
to respondents who do or sometimes take differences in the monetary attribute into account. 
These results are likely to be partly a by-product of a lack of incentive compatibility in the 
descriptions surrounding the monetary attribute (i.e. respondents are told to “Please assume 
you would lose this amount of money even if you would not” in questionnaire preambles). So 
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there may be a case for repeating the analysis again using either a more incentive compatible 
monetary attribute (or if the aim is to again assess differences according to choice of 
monetary descriptor, more incentive compatible monetary attributes). Such an analysis 
though would need to address the issue of how the levels for price vector specified for the 
monetary attributes might affect whether respondents take the monetary attribute into 
account. It should also be accompanied by ‘think aloud’ exercises and qualitative interviews 
which can probe why respondents do or do not take differences in the monetary attribute into 
account when making DCE choices. 
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Chapter 5: Who should be prioritized for renal transplantation?: Analysis of key 
stakeholder preferences using discrete choice experiments. 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
I was the principal investigator for the UK’s first DCE study related to establishing allocation 
criteria for kidney transplantation. This chapter both summarizes the methodology applied, as 
well as some of the results and conclusions emanating from this study.   
 
In addition to collecting data on the DCE preferences of renal patients, the project team also 
wanted to gather data relating to the preferences of other key stakeholders including 
healthcare professionals; live kidney donors / relatives of deceased kidney donors; and those 
who care for renal transplant patients. Moreover, ethnic minority patients are more 
susceptible to many diseases that lead to renal disease, and organ donation rates are also 
lower amongst ethnic minority groups. So if ethnic minority patients require a kidney 
transplant they may be less likely to get one from a closely matching donor. Therefore, we 
needed to assess whether the preferences of ethnic minority patients differed from those of 
other patients.  
 
We also wanted to be able to establish whether the preferences of respondents of healthcare 
professionals, carers and donor groups differed from patients. This was in the same way that 
we needed to establish whether ethnic minority patients had different preferences to other 
patients. To do this rigorously, we needed to establish whether any differences in the way in 
which non-patient respondent groups valued a particular attribute relative to the patient 
group, were statistically significant. Also we needed to establish whether ethnic minorities had 
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statistically significantly different preferences for attributes compared to non-ethnic minority 
patients. 
 
At a methodological level (as indicated in Chapter 1, section E1.3) there are therefore 
numerous issues related to preference heterogeneity that needed to be addressed for the 
purposes of this research. In Chapter 1 (section E1.3) I pointed out that a variety of 
approaches can be used in order to look at differences in preferences. For example, we could 
have simply run separate econometric models for different sub-groups of respondents. If we 
also ran a pooled model, then a likelihood ratio (LR) test could then be used to establish 
whether preferences differed in a statistically significant manner, comparing the sub-groups 
with the pooled sample. However, a limitation of this approach is that it would not confer 
information about whether preferences for a given attribute (relating to a given potential 
transplant allocation criterion) differed in a statistically significant manner. That is why we 
decided to use interaction dummy variables to establish whether preferences differed for 
certain attributes comparing healthcare professionals, donors / relatives of deceased donors, 
and carers with patients. Using interaction dummy variables you can establish whether 
preferences for a given attribute are statistically significant compared to the patient (base) 
group. This same approach was used to compare ethnic minority versus non-ethnic minority 
patients.  
 
In Chapter 1 (section D) the findings of a review of DCEs relating to health are summarized. It 
is pointed out (section D.7.2) that in order to present DCE results in a form which policy 
makers can readily use, some kind of summary measure can be deployed. In the past the 
main ones used related to ‘per WTP unit’ or some kind of monetary welfare measure. 
However, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 there are a range of methodological problems 
associated with such an approach. In addition, when it comes to renal transplantation, we 
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considered that the use of a monetary attribute would be inappropriate. This is because, if a 
transplant has a reasonable probability of being successful, it is usually far less expensive to 
provide a transplant than for a patient to remain on dialysis (which is very expensive). 
Therefore, in the context of renal transplantation the scarce resource is the organ. Moreover, 
in the UK legislation prohibits the sale of organs, so it might be considered unethical to pose 
questions designed to get people to value kidneys in monetary terms.  
 
In practice, in the UK people who are on the transplant list have to wait to see if a suitable 
kidney becomes available. Thus they operate in an environment in which there is rationing by 
queues. Therefore, we decided to summarise our findings in terms of a measure of marginal 
rate of substitution (MRS) which relates differences in other attributes (potential transplant 
priority criteria) to waiting time for renal transplants. Once a summary outcome measure of 
this sort is adopted, it begs the question (if you are trying to establish if preferences vary 
between key stakeholder groups) of whether any differences in MRS are statistically 
significant differences in MRS between stakeholder groups for attributes. We have therefore 
gone further than most DCE studies published to date, in that we have applied Wald tests 
(implemented using the econometric package STATA) in order to establish whether MRS for 
attributes differs between stakeholder groups. 
 
2. Background.  
 
In the United Kingdom (UK), in January 2011, 6,610 patients were awaiting renal 
transplantation (this figure has risen 8% annually since 2004), and in 2009-10, 1,482 patients 
received a deceased donor transplant, and 1,038 received live donor transplants (NHS 
(Blood  and transplant  2011). This growing imbalance between demand and supply led to the 
2008 Organ Donation Taskforce Report (Department of Health 2008)  which outlined 
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initiatives to increase organ supply by 50% within 5 years. Despite this, demand will continue 
to outstrip supply despite increased supply, so criteria do need to be in place to allocate the 
limited supply of kidneys available for transplantation. Efficiency requires organs be 
transplanted to patients who will derive the greatest health benefit. Equity of access 
concerns, however, may conflict with efficiency ones. Thus, patients waiting a long time may 
be given a transplant on equity grounds, even if someone else who has not waited as long 
would obtain greater health benefit from transplantation. 
 
UK transplant policy was previously re-appraised in 2006. The existing policy was recognized 
to disadvantage those with less common tissue types and blood groups, especially ethnic 
minorities (Higgins, West et al. 1997). At the same time, populations such as African 
Caribbeans and South Asians have a 3-4 times greater risk of end stage renal disease 
(Department of Health 2008), related to the higher prevalence of type 2 diabetes  (Raleigh 
1997). The increased risk of renal disease is also linked to an increased risk of hypertension 
(Norris, Tareen et al. 2008) combined with increased cardiovascular disease (Cappuccio, 
Oakeshott et al. 2002). Moreover, ethnic minorities donate fewer organs (Cappuccio, 
Oakeshott et al. 2002) so patients are less able to obtain closely matched transplants. 
  
The 2006 re-appraisal reduced priority attached to HLA matching, allowing consideration of 
other criteria (Koenne 2002). The resulting guidelines (NHS Blood and Transplant  2006) 
recommended that more priority should be given to long waiters and to paediatric and 
younger adult recipients. Research in the USA and Australia had indicated that such changes 
would be acceptable to professionals and patients (Louis, Sankar et al. 1997; Browning and 
Thomas 2001). 
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At the same time, DCEs were increasingly being used to address healthcare priority setting 
issues in primary care (Rubin, Bate et al. 2006) and secondary care  (Allepuz, Espallargues 
et al. 2008; Youngkong, Baltussen et al. 2010). Some DCE transplantation work had been 
published, including work assessing factors influencing willingness to donate body parts 
(Bennett and Savani 2004) and a UK DCE to establish priorities for liver transplantation 
(Ratcliffe and Buxton 1999; Ratcliffe 2000) . In renal transplantation, the first published DCE 
findings emanated from my own study which was conducted in the UK (Clark, Gumber et al. 
2009). This publication looked at diversity issues and assessed whether patient preferences 
varied by ethnicity and gender (the subject of Chapter 6 of this thesis). In contrast, the 
present chapter considers the preferences of other stakeholder groups including renal 
healthcare professionals, renal carers, and live donors / relatives of deceased donors, 
alongside those of patients. Also, it examines how patient preferences vary between ethnic 
minority (including white ethnic minorities) and non-ethnic minority patients. In the following 
chapter (Chapter 6), and in our published paper (Clark, Gumber et al. 2009), we examine 
differences in preferences for non-white patients vs. all other patients, and South Asian 
patients vs. all other patients. More recently, there has also been some renal DCE research 
relating to patient and healthcare professional preferences for chronic kidney disease (CKD) 
care more generally (including kidney transplantation) in Canada (Davison, Kromm et al. 
2010). 
 
Unlike the general public (who lack personal experience of renal disease, and are unlikely to 
ever require kidney transplants unless they suffer from hypertension, diabetes, cardiovascular 
disease or obesity), the stakeholder groups considered in this chapter are likely to have a 
more direct interest in transplant decisions. For example, patients, carers and healthcare 
professionals all have an interest in who is prioritized for transplantation, either because they 
have renal disease (patients) or care for those with renal disease (renal carers / renal 
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healthcare professionals). Moreover, donors or relatives of deceased donors are also clearly 
concerned to ensure that kidneys are appropriately allocated. Therefore, these four 
stakeholder groups can be expected to be generally better informed than the general public 
about transplantation. 
 
3. Methods. 
 
This DCE involves respondents making choices, about which one of two hypothetical 
transplant recipients (differing in characteristics) should receive a kidney. DCE respondents 
trade-offs are established so weightings given to different recipient characteristics (attributes) 
are quantified. The pilot study began in 2005; the main study in 2006. Final data analysis was 
during 2007–09. 
 
3.1. Pilot exercise. 
 
We developed a pilot DCE questionnaire using SPEED (Bradley 1991). Attributes and level 
selection, was mainly informed by discussions with clinicians. We paired choices generated 
by SPEED to minimize attribute overlap and level imbalance (Huber and Zwerina 1996). We 
interviewed 60 respondents (who completed questionnaires and ranked potential attributes) 
to inform attribute and level selection. Respondents included 41 patients including 8 ethnic 
minorities, 16 healthcare professionals, 1 donor, 1 carer, and a renal Consultants secretary).  
They completed a DCE questionnaire, and ranked attributes (as described in the 
questionnaire and written on cards) in priority order. Pilot respondents could also suggest 
other potential attributes, and details of these were written on cards. They then ordered cards 
in order of priority. Most respondents (n = 56) came from the University Hospital, Coventry, 
including 4 ethnic minorities. Another 4 ethnic minority patients came from Ealing NHS Trust 
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to boost minority responses. Pilot DCE attributes and levels included: Waiting time (levels: 1 
month, 2 years, or 10 years); tissue match (levels: non-favourable, favourable, and perfect,); 
employment status (levels: unemployed, part-time, or full time); number of dependent children 
or adults (levels: 0, 1, or 4); extra years of life expectancy (levels: 1, 5 or 12 years); recipient 
age (levels: 20, 45, or 70 years); and other recipient diseases (levels: healthy accept for 
kidney disease, kidney disease plus a condition affecting activities [asthma], and kidney 
disease plus a condition affecting daily activities [severe arthritis]).  
 
3.2. Attributes and levels - final DCE. 
 
We analyzed the pilot data using Random Effects Probit and all the attributes (with the 
exception of the employment status attribute) proved significant at the 5% level. Early during 
piloting respondents expressed disquiet about the employment attribute, arguing it 
represented unwarranted discrimination against the retired or those unemployed because of 
illness. We therefore asked respondents whether this should be an attribute, and most 
respondents said ‘no’, so we dropped it.  However findings from attribute rankings suggested 
the following warranted inclusion. Most respondents thought people with adult and child 
dependents ought to be prioritized, so the dependents attribute was amended to include 
adults. Age was considered relevant but the recipient age ceiling was reduced to 65, because 
clinicians suggested transplantation was unlikely amongst over 65s. The separate life 
expectancy and other recipient diseases attributes although highly ranked, resulted in 
unrealistic DCE scenarios. One pairwise choice resulted in a choice between a 70 year old 
with severe arthritis with 12 years life expectancy, and a 45 year old without co-morbidities 
having shorter life expectancy. The comparison did not make sense, since you expect a 45 
year old without co-morbidities to have longer life expectancy than a 70 year old with severe 
arthritis.  So we replaced the life expectancy attribute with one relating to whether a potential 
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recipient had diseases predominantly affecting life expectancy. This resulted in more realistic 
scenarios, improving DCE identification and efficiency properties.  
 
Other highly ranking attributes included patient compliance / whether illness was self-inflicted. 
This assumed a higher ranking than it normally would because the pilot exercise arose when 
George Best (a former international football player) was dying after liver transplantation 
because of on-going alcohol misuse. We wanted to prevent health professionals’ preferences 
over-riding respondents preferences, but healthcare professionals rightly pointed out kidney 
disease rarely arises because of alcohol misuse, so the issue was not pertinent. Also 
healthcare professionals pointed out those who are thought likely to abuse their bodies or be 
non-compliant would not be transplanted. So we excluded this attribute. Table i indicates final 
attributes and levels. 
 
DCE attributes and levels were explained in the questionnaire preamble. We expected 
respondents to prioritize those waiting longer for a transplant on equity grounds, so 
anticipated a positive coefficient on a year’s less waiting time (‘wait’). The questionnaire 
preamble explained transplant survival rates obtained from UK Transplant were contingent 
upon donor / recipient tissue match, and said categories included perfect matches (90% 12 
month transplant survival rate when all 6 tissue types match); favourable matches (89% 12 
month transplant survival rate when 4-5 tissue types match); or non-favourable matches 
(86% 12 month survival rate when less than 4 tissue types match). On efficiency grounds we 
thought respondents would generally prefer to transplant to recipients with the highest chance 
of success, so improvements in kidney survival would be positively valued, but, some ethnic 
minority groups might not have this preference if there are a lack of organs closely matching 
their own. We considered that recipients with child or adult dependents or more dependents 
would be prioritized because more people benefit from recipients improved health if they care 
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for others, so expected a positive coefficient. DCE attributes and levels were explained in the 
questionnaire preamble. We expected respondents to prioritize those waiting longer for a 
transplant on equity grounds, so anticipated a positive coefficient on a year’s less waiting time 
(‘wait’). 
 
Table i: Final attributes and levels. 
Attribute Variable 
name 
Levels Interpretation of coefficients.  
Time spent 
awaiting 
transplantation 
Wait 1 month, 2 years, and 10 years. Indirect utility of each 1 year 
reduction in transplant recipient 
waiting time. 
Tissue type 
matching 
Tiss Non-favourable match: 86% 
average kidney survival rate post-
transplant. 
 
Favourable match: 89% average 
kidney survival rate post-
transplant. 
 
Perfect match: 90% average 
kidney survival rate post-
transplant. 
Indirect utility of prioritizing people 
for each 1% improvement in 
kidney survival. 
How many child 
or adult  
dependents 
recipients have 
Dep None, 1, or 4 dependents. Indirect utility of each additional 
dependent. 
Recipient age Age 20 years, 45 years, and 65 years Indirect utility for each 1 year 
reduction in recipient age. 
Diseases 
predominantly 
affecting life 
expectancy 
dis1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
dis2 
No disease affecting life 
expectancy (other than Kidney 
disease) vs. moderate disease 
(uncontrolled hypertension or 
obesity) & Kidney disease. 
 
Moderate disease (uncontrolled 
hypertension or obesity) affecting 
life expectancy vs. severe disease 
(heart attack, stroke, or diabetes 
with complications). 
Indirect utility of having no rather 
than moderate disease 
predominantly affecting life 
expectancy. 
 
 
Indirect utility of having moderate 
disease rather than severe 
disease predominantly affecting 
life expectancy. 
Diseases 
predominantly 
affecting quality 
of life 
ill1 
 
 
 
 
 
ill2 
No disease affecting quality of life 
(other than Kidney disease) vs. 
moderate disease (mild asthma).  
 
Moderate disease (mild asthma) 
affecting quality of life vs. severe 
disease (severe arthritis). 
Indirect utility of having no 
disease rather than a moderate 
disease predominantly affecting 
quality of life.  
 
Indirect utility of having a 
moderate disease rather than a 
severe disease predominantly 
affecting quality of life. 
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The questionnaire preamble explained transplant survival rates obtained from UK Transplant 
were contingent upon donor / recipient tissue match, and said categories included perfect 
matches (90% 12 month transplant survival rate when all 6 tissue types match); favourable 
matches (89% 12 month transplant survival rate when 4-5 tissue types match); or non-
favourable matches (86% 12 month survival rate when less than 4 tissue types match). On 
efficiency grounds we thought respondents would generally prefer to transplant to recipients 
with the highest chance of success, so improvements in kidney survival would be positively 
valued, but, some ethnic minority groups might not have this preference if there are a lack of 
organs closely matching their own. We considered that recipients with child or adult 
dependents or more dependents would be prioritized because more people benefit from 
recipients improved health if they care for others, so expected a positive coefficient. All other 
things being equal you expect older patients to benefit less from a transplant because they 
have a lower life expectancy, so the coefficient on reductions in recipient age should be 
positive. We anticipated respondents for efficiency reasons would prioritize those with no 
diseases predominantly affecting life expectancy over those with moderate diseases 
predominantly affecting life expectancy, and those with moderate diseases predominantly 
affecting life expectancy over those with severe diseases predominantly affecting life 
expectancy, so expected positive coefficients. Likewise we anticipated respondents would 
value prioritizing those with no disease predominantly affecting quality of life to those with 
moderate diseases predominantly affecting quality of life, and those with moderate diseases 
predominantly affecting quality of life to those with severe diseases predominantly affecting 
quality of life, so expected positive coefficients.     
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3.3 Development of final DCE.  
 
We wanted to force a choice, so used a binary dependent model, because in reality 
transplant decisions have to be made, and medical professionals face a forced choice when 
allocating kidneys because of donor scarcity. Moreover pilot interviews revealed many 
respondents felt uncomfortable with deciding who to transplant. Therefore having a ‘cannot 
decide’ option would have triggered such responses from respondents who in reality were not 
indifferent, so we forced a choice. We could have allowed choices between more than 2 
potential recipients using a multinomial model, or had more attributes and levels, but this 
would complicate decision making (Amaya-Amaya, Gerard et al. 2008). Moreover, many 
renal patients suffer from fatigue, so we wanted to avoid complexity, because when 
complexity increases respondents may be more inclined to use simplifying heuristics (Lloyd 
2003) compromising response reliability.  
 
The final DCE design did not use SPEED, but was again an Orthogonal Main Effects Plan 
(OMEP) design involving independent valuation of attributes. To ensure a perfectly 
orthogonal design we used an OMEP design supplied by leading DCE designers (Street, 
Burgess et al. 2005) improving efficiency. We blocked 18 choices into 2 blocks of 9 questions 
(versions A and B) to reduce respondent fatigue; otherwise the patient questionnaire would 
have been too long. Respondents chose between transplanting patient A or B. For example 
for one choice patient A waited 2 years; had an 89% chance of 1 year transplant success; 
had 4 dependents; was 20 years; had severe diseases predominantly affecting life 
expectancy (heart attack, stroke, or diabetes with complications); but no diseases 
predominantly affecting quality of life except Kidney disease. Patient B waited 10 years; had a 
90% chance of 1 year transplant success; had no dependents; was 45 years; had no 
diseases predominantly affecting life expectancy except kidney disease; and had moderate 
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disease affecting quality of life (mild asthma). See appendix E which contains copies of the 
questionnaires which were tailored for the 4 main different stakeholder groups 
 
3.4. Questionnaire distribution.  
 
The National Kidney Federation included a flyer and freepost envelope in ‘Kidney Life’ 
(circulation c.20,000) inviting patients, carers, donors, or healthcare professionals to request 
questionnaires. Members of the British Organ Donor Society had questionnaires posted to 
them. We sent questionnaires to healthcare professionals listed in UK transplants service 
directory, and targeted transplanting units with transplant coordinators or transplant 
physicians. To increase ethnic minority responses we provided translated questionnaires.  A 
reputable translation organization was used to translate questionnaires into Punjabi, Hindi, 
Bengali, Gujarati, and Urdu. The bilingual researcher administering the questionnaires upon 
non-English speaking patients then checked the questionnaires translations accuracy, and 
chased ethnic minority patient responses obtaining 18 additional responses from Ealing NHS 
Trust, and 5 from University Hospital, Coventry.  
 
3.5. Econometric / statistical analysis. 
 
We used Random Effects Probit (model 1), to establish stakeholder preferences. 
 
Yij = β0 + β1waitij +β2tissij +β3depij+β4ageij+β5dis1ij +β6dis2ij +β7ill1ij+β8ill2ij + β9Dcij+ β10Dcijwaitij  
 
+β11Dcijtissij +β12ijDcdepij +β13ijDcageij +β14Dcijdis1ij +β15Dcijdis2ij +β16Dcijill1ij+β17Dcijill2ij+  
 
β18Ddij+β19Ddijwaitij+β20Ddijtissij+β21Ddijdepij+β22Ddijageij+β23Ddijdis1ij+β24Ddijdis2ij+β25Ddijill1ij+ 
 
β26Dijdill2ij+ β27Dhij +β28Dhijwaitij+β29Dhijtissij+β30Dhijdepij+β31Dhijageij+β32Dhijdis1ij  
 
+β33Dhijdis2ij+β34Dhijill1ij+β35Dhijill2ij+µi+ξij           (Model 1)  
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The term Yij is a binary dependent variable, from individuals i = 1...m, for observations j = 
1...ni. Observations ni vary because the i individuals do not all complete every pairwise choice 
(some respondents do not answer all choices), µi is the random effects error term (which 
allows for multiple responses from i respondents), and εij is the probit error term for 
individuals i for j observations.Variables are defined in table i. Prefixes on dummy variables 
(Dc, Dd, and Dh), indicate carer, donor, and healthcare professional preferences respectively, 
Dc = 1 for carers, 0 otherwise; Dd = 1 for donor / relatives of deceased donors, 0 otherwise; 
and Dh = 1 for healthcare professionals, 0 otherwise. Model 1 establishes whether carers, 
donors, or healthcare professional preferences differ from patients. If β9, β18, or β27, are 
significant this indicates general non-attribute specific differences in carer, donor, or 
healthcare professional preferences compared to patients. Other dummy variables are 
interaction dummies. If any carer coefficients (β10….β17) are significant, this indicates that 
preferences for associated attribute(s) differ between carers and patients. If dummies for 
donors (β19….β26) are significant, it indicates preferences between donors and patients for the 
attribute(s) differ. Likewise, if interaction dummies for healthcare workers (β28….β35) are 
significant, it indicates different preferences between them and patients for attribute(s).  
 
Model 2 compares ethnic and non-ethnic minority patient preferences. The ethnic minority 
patient category included all patients in an ethnic category except ‘White British.’ Yij, μi, and ξij 
are as previously defined, DE is a dummy variable, DE = 1, for ethnic minorities, 0 otherwise. 
 
Y ij = β0 + β1waitij +β2tissij+β3depij+β4ageij+β5dis1ij+β6dis2ij+β7ill1ij+β8ill2ij+β9DEij+β10DEijwaitij 
 
+β11DEijtissij+β12DEijdepij+β13DEijageij+β14DEijdis1ij+β15DEijdis1ij+β16DEijill1ij+β17DEijill2ij+µi+ξij 
       
 
(Model 2) 
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Model 2 establishes whether preferences differ between ethnic and non-ethnic minority 
patients. If β9 is significant it suggests non-attribute specific differences in preferences 
between ethnic and non-ethnic minority patients. If ethnic minority interaction dummies 
(β10….β17) are significant, it indicates preferences differ between ethnic minorities and non-
ethnic minorities for significant associated attribute(s).   
 
3.6. Statistical methods for Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS). 
 
MRS indicates the ratio of changes in other attributes to changes in waiting times (see table 
ii) We used the Delta method (Wooldridge 2002) using command ‘nlcom’ in STATA, for 95% 
confidence intervals, to establish statistical significance. 
 
Wald tests using ‘testnl’ in STATA established whether MRS differed significantly between 
groups, comparing patients with carers, donors, and healthcare professionals (model 1), and 
ethnic minority vs. non-ethnic minority patients (model 2).  Thus to establish (model 2) 
whether preferences for tissue matching differed between ethnic and non-ethnic minorities, 
the hypothesis is β2 / β1 = (β2 + β11) / (β1 + β10) i.e. was tissue match MRS for non-ethnic and 
ethnic minorities identical (p ≤ 0.05 indicates a difference at the 5% level). 
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Table ii: Calculating MRS – Valuing attributes compared to a 1 year difference in wait time. 
Model 1 
Variable 
Patient MRS Model 1 
Variable 
Carer MRS 
Wait  Wait  
Tiss β2 / β1  Tiss (β2 + β11) / (β1 + β10) 
Dep β3 / β1  Dep (β3 + β12) / (β1 + β10) 
Age β4 / β1  Age (β4 + β13) / (β1 + β10) 
dis1 β5 / β1  dis1 (β5 + β14) / (β1 + β10) 
dis2 β6 / β1  dis2 (β6 + β15) / (β1 + β10) 
ill1 β7 / β1  ill1 (β7 + β16) / (β1 + β10) 
ill2 β8 / β1  ill2 (β8 + β17) / (β1 + β10) 
Model 1 
Variable 
Donor MRS Model 1 
Variable 
Healthcare 
professional MRS 
Wait  Wait  
Tiss (β2 + β20) / (β1 + β19) Tiss (β2 + β29) / (β1 + β28) 
Dep (β3 + β21) / (β1 + β19) Dep (β3 + β30) / (β1 + β28) 
Age (β4 + β22) / (β1 + β19) Age (β4 + β31) / (β1 + β28) 
dis1 (β5 + β23) / (β1 + β19) dis1 (β5 + β32) / (β1 + β28) 
dis2 (β6 + β24) / (β1 + β19) dis2 (β6 + β33) / (β1 + β28) 
ill1 (β7 + β25) / (β1 + β19) ill1 (β7 + β34) / (β1 + β28) 
ill2 (β8 + β26) / (β1 + β19) ill2 (β8 + β35) / (β1 + β28) 
Model 2 
 
Variable 
 
 
Non-ethnic minority 
MRS 
Model 2 
 
Variable 
 
 
Ethnic minority MRS 
Wait  Wait  
Tiss β2 / β1  Tiss (β2 + β11) / (β1 + β10) 
Dep β3 / β1  Dep (β3 + β12) / (β1 + β10) 
Age β4 / β1  Age (β4 + β13) / (β1 + β10) 
dis1 β5 / β1  dis1 (β5 + β14) / (β1 + β10) 
dis2 β6 / β1  dis2 (β6 + β15) / (β1 + β10) 
ill1 β7 / β1  ill1 (β7 + β16) / (β1 + β10) 
ill2 β8 / β1  ill2 (β8 + β17) / (β1 + β10) 
 
4. Results.  
 
4.1.Sample characteristics.   
 
Table iii indicates respondent characteristics.  UK Renal Registry data (Byrne, Ford et al. 
2008; Byrne, Steenkamp et al. 2008) was used to assess patient sample representativeness. 
Of the 895/ 908 patients indicating ethnicity, 799 / 895 patients (89.3%) were white (British), 
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and 27 / 895 (3%) were white ethnic minorities, so 92.3% are white. UK incidence data 
(Byrne, Ford et al. 2008) suggested 79.7% of renal patients are white, so whites are over-
represented in our survey.  Overall, 69 / 895 (7.7%) patients indicating ethnicity were non-
white, compared with a 20.3% incidence rate (Byrne, Ford et al. 2008), 50 / 69 non-white 
patients were South Asians (5.6% of those indicating ethnicity) compared to a 10.5% 
incidence (Byrne, Ford et al. 2008).  508 /908 patients (55.9%) were male, 397 / 908 (43.7%) 
were female, 3 / 908 (0.3%) did not say. Graphically presented Renal Registry data (Byrne, 
Ford et al. 2008) reassuringly indicated slightly higher proportions of male than female 
patients across age groups. Average sample patient age was 54.88 years (median 57 years), 
and Renal Registry data median age (57.3 years) was virtually identical (Byrne, Steenkamp 
et al. 2008).  
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Table iii: Sample characteristics. 
 Patients 
(n = 908) 
Carers 
(n=41) 
Donors (n 
=48) 
Healthcare 
workers 
(n=113) 
AGE     
Mean age 54.88 years 52.37 years 54.67 years 43.23 years 
     
GENDER     
Male 508 (55.9%) 10 (24.4%) 14 (29.2%) 51 (45.1%) 
Female 397 (43.7%) 31 (75.6%) 34 (70.8%) 61 (54.0%) 
Not indicated 3 (0.3%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (0.9%) 
     
ETHNICITY     
White (British) 799 (88%) 38 (92.7%) 44 (91.7%) 89 (78.8%) 
White ethnic 
minorities 
27 (2.9%) 1 (2.4%) 1 (2.1%) 9 (8%) 
Non-white ethnicity 
(excluding Asians) 
19 (2.1%) 1 (2.4%) 0 (0%) 2 (1.8%) 
Non-white ethnicity 
(Asians)  
50 (5.5%) 1 (2.4%) 1 (2.1%) 9 (8%) 
Not indicated 13 (1.4%) 0 (0%) 2 (4.2%) 4 (3.5%) 
     
DEPENDENT 
CHILDREN 
    
0 755 (83.1%) 33 (80.5%) 36 (75%) 51 (45.1%) 
1  72 (7.9%) 2 (4.9%) 5 (10.4%) 22 (19.5%) 
2  49 (5.4%) 5 (12.2%) 2 (4.2%) 26 (23.0%) 
3  12 (1.3%) 0 (0%) 3 (6.3%) 9 (8.0%) 
> 3  7 (0.8%) 1 (2.4%) 1 (2.1%) 3 (2.7%) 
Not indicated 13 (1.4%) 0 (0%) 1(2.1%) 2 (1.8%) 
     
DEPENDENT 
ADULTS 
    
0 750 (82.6%) 16 (39.0%) 39 (81.2%) 98 (86.7%) 
1  121 (13.3%) 17 (41.5% 6 (12.5%) 11 (9.7%) 
2  17 (1.9%) 6 (14.6%) 2 (4.2%) 3 (2.7%) 
> 2 8 (0.9%) 1 (2.4%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Not indicated 12 (1.3%) 1 (2.4%) 1 (2.1%) 1 (0.9%) 
 
 
The patient sample comprised: 468 / 908 (51.5%) with successful transplants; 118 / 908 
(13%) whose transplant failed; 279 / 908 (30.7%) awaiting transplants (average wait 22.6 
months). Some patients whose transplant failed also appeared as awaiting transplantation; 
237 / 908 (26.3%) had dialysis without transplantation; and 57 / 908 (6.3%) had kidney 
disease, not requiring dialysis. Renal Registry prevalence data (Byrne, Steenkamp et al. 
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2008) suggests 46.9% of patients have successful transplants (close to our figure). There is 
no incidence / prevalence data for other patient categories. Amongst non-whites (including 
Asians) figures are 18 / 69 patients (26%) with successful transplants; 10 / 69 (14.5%) whose 
transplant failed; 35 / 69 patients (50.7%) awaiting a transplant on dialysis (average wait: 
21.45 months); and 3 / 69 (4.3%) with kidney disease, not requiring dialysis. Unfortunately 
renal registry data (Byrne, Steenkamp et al. 2008) does not indicate ethnicity. However, lower 
percentage figures for successes, and higher transplant failures figures are expected (ethnic 
minorities are less likely to be closely matched).      
 
There were 48 donor responses (21 live donors, and 27 deceased donor relatives). 
Healthcare professionals comprised: 9 renal surgeons; 37 renal physicians; 17 transplant co-
ordinators; 31 nurses; 9 clinical scientists; 1 GP; 1 dietician; 1 network manager; 1 transplant 
scientist; 1 medical student; 1 transplant immunologist; 1 tissue typer; 1 clinical audit 
manager; 1 renal technologist; and a pathologist. 
 
4.2. Data analysis.  
 
Table iv indicates model 1 results, figures under MRS are 95% confidence intervals (CIs). 
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Table iv: Model  1:  Results, and MRS, for patients, carers, donors, and healthcare 
workers. 
Attribute Coefficient 
: Patients 
 
 
  
Implied MRS 
for patients 
 
 Coefficient 
: Dummies 
for the 
carer 
group 
Implied MRS 
for carers 
Wald test 
p-values: 
Carers vs. 
patients 
Wait .0443** 1  -.0156 1  
Tiss .0624** 1.41** 
(1.08 / 1.74)  
 -.0407 0.76 
(-1.42 / 2.93) 
p=0.0024 
Dep .0635** 1.43** 
(1.17 / 1.69) 
 -.0585* 0.17 
(-1.54 / 1.89) 
p<0.0001 
Age .0069** 0.16** 
(0.12 / 0.19) 
 .0006 0.26 
(-0.03 / 0.56 ) 
p=0.0750 
dis1 -.0004 -0.01 
(-1.03 / 1.01) 
 .1205 4.18 
(-3.25 / 11.62) 
p=0.2965 
dis2 .6789** 15.32** 
(13.45 / 17.20) 
 -.1971 16.79* 
(2.69 / 30.89) 
p<0.0001 
ill1 -.1207** -2.73** 
(-1.45 / -4.00) 
 .1130 -0.27 
(-9.55 / 9.01) 
p=0.1236 
ill2 .1850** 4.18** 
(3.12 / 5.23) 
 -.0334 5.28 
(-2.27 / 12.83) 
p=0.0910 
Intercepts .1208**   -.0034   
Attribute Coefficient 
: Dummies 
for the 
donor 
group 
Implied MRS 
for donors 
Wald 
test 
p-
values: 
Donors 
vs. 
patients  
Coefficient 
: Dummies 
for the 
healthcare 
worker 
group 
Implied MRS 
for healthcare 
workers 
Wald test 
p-values: 
Healthcare 
workers vs. 
patients 
Wait -.0086 
 
1  -.0039 1  
Tiss -.0667* -0.12 
(-1.62 / 1.38) 
p<0.000
1 
-.0110 1.27* 
(0.24 / 2.31) 
p=0.0027 
Dep -.0468* 0.47 
(-0.79 / 1.73)  
p<0.000
1 
-.0003 1.56** 
(0.72 / 2.41) 
p=0.0017 
Age -.0023 0.13 
(-0.05 / 0.31) 
p=0.006
7 
.0127** 0.48** 
(0.31 / 0.66) 
p=0.0300 
dis1 .1508 4.22 
(-1.38 / 9.81) 
p=0.166
9 
.1823** 4.50** 
(1.09 / 7.91 ) 
p=0.0265 
dis2 -.2676* 11.54** 
(2.90 / 20.17) 
p<0.000
1 
.1056 19.42** 
(12.71 / 26.14) 
p<0.0001 
ill1 .0520 -1.93 
(-8.66 / 4.80) 
p=0.230
1 
.0501 -1.75 
(-5.74 / 2.24) 
p=0.1048 
ill2 .0245 5.87* 
(0.18 / 11.57) 
p=0.194
2 
.1790* 9.01** 
(5.44 / 12.59 ) 
p=0.9818 
Intercepts -.112   .0844   
*: Significant at 5% level; **:Significant at 1% level 
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Coefficients interpretation is indicated in table i. MRS in table iv indicates indirect utility values 
for changes in attributes (for direction of change see table i) relative to indirect utility values 
for prioritizing a recipient waiting an extra year for transplantation (table ii indicates MRS 
formulae). Measures of ‘goodness of fit’ for model 1 show that 63.06% of actual values are 
predicted by the model, and Mc Faddens R2 = 0.1088. A likelihood ratio test to test for the 
joint significance of the dummy variables has 27 degrees of freedom with a critical value of 
40.11, compared with λ=71.90, so the dummy variables are jointly significant. The tissue 
match coefficient (tiss) in table iv indicates the impact of a 1% difference in 12 month kidney 
survival. Difference in survival rates between a perfect vs. favourable match is 1%, so the 
MRS figure of 1.41 (table iv) also appears in table v, for ‘Prioritizing perfect not non-
favourable tissue matches’.  Table v indicates MRS for the ’Prioritizing someone with a 
favourable not non-favourable match’ (1.41 x 3 [a 3% difference in kidney survival rate] = 
4.23). It also indicates how much respondents value other changes in attributes to a 1 year 
wait. Moreover 5 year MRS figures are presented in table v. If waiting time increases 5 fold, 
MRS for a 5 year wait is 1 / 5th of 1 year MRS. Figures under MRS are 95% CIs, CIs for 5 
year MRS are 1 / 5th of 1 year CIs.  
 
4.2.1. Patient preferences. 
 
Patients’ MRS figures (table v) suggest all other things being equal (ceteris paribus) patients 
would prioritize recipients with perfect over favourable tissue matches (tiss) more than those 
waiting an extra year (1 year MRS =1.41, exceeding indirect utility from avoiding a 1 year wait 
of 1.00). However, if a favourably matching patient waited 5 years longer, they would be a 
higher priority than the perfect match (MRS = 0.28) <1. Prioritizing someone with a favourable 
not non-favourable match (ceteris paribus) is valued more than prioritizing someone waiting 
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for 1 year (MRS = 4.23), but if the other potential recipient waited 5 years longer, prioritizing 
the longest waiter is optimal (MRS = 0.85) < 1. 
  
Patient respondents prioritize someone with an extra dependent more than waiting a year 
longer (MRS for ‘dep’=1.43), ceteris paribus. However if the other potential recipient waited 5 
years longer MRS = 0.29, so prioritizing an extra dependent is a lower priority. Ceteris 
paribus prioritizing someone 1 year younger is valued less than a 1 year or 5 year reduction 
in waiting time (‘age’ 1 year MRS = 0.16, 5 year = 0.03). Patients would not prioritize those 
with no vs. moderate diseases predominantly affecting life expectancy significantly (‘dis 1’ is 
insignificant), but prioritized (dis2) those with moderate rather than severe diseases 
predominantly affecting life expectancy highly (1 year MRS = 15.32; 5 year MRS = 3.06). So 
prioritizing someone with a moderate not severe disease predominantly affecting life 
expectancy is prioritized (MRS >1).  
 
Paradoxically patients prioritized those with moderate not no diseases predominantly 
affecting quality of life (‘ill1’ has a 1 year waiting time MRS of -2.73) ceteris paribus, perhaps 
because many patients have moderate diseases. However, 5 year MRS = -0.55, so long 
waiters are a higher priority than those with moderate rather than no disease predominantly 
affecting quality of life. Finally, patients prioritized those with moderate rather than severe 
diseases predominantly affecting quality of life (‘ill2’ 1 year MRS = 4.18; 5 year MRS = 0.84) 
so ceteris paribus, someone with moderate not severe disease predominantly affecting life 
expectancy would be a higher priority than someone waiting 1 year longer (MRS>1), but 
lower priority than someone waiting 5 years longer (MRS < 1).  
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4.2.2. Carer preferences. 
 
Carer results are compromised by sample size (n=41), so MRS was only significant for 1 
variable - prioritizing those with dependents (dep). The fact other MRS figures are 
insignificant may partly be attributable to the sample size. Table iv indicates Wald test results, 
p-values ≤ 0.05 indicate statistically significant differences in MRS between other stakeholder 
groups and patients (5% level).  They suggest MRS for prioritizing perfect over favourable 
tissue matches is lower amongst carers than patients (1 year MRS = insignificant vs. 1.41; 5 
year MRS = insignificant vs. 0.28); and lower for prioritizing favourable over non-favourable 
matches (1 year MRS = insignificant vs 4.23; 5 year MRS = insignificant vs. 0.85). Moreover, 
Wald tests show carer preference for prioritizing those with dependents is less than patients 
(1 year MRS = insignificant vs. 1.43; 5 year MRS = insignificant vs. 0.29). Wald tests also 
show carers prioritize those with moderate not severe diseases predominantly affecting life 
expectancy (dis2) more than patients (1 year MRS = 16.79 vs. 15.32; 5 year MRS = 3.36 vs. 
3.06).  
 
4.2.3 Donor family / live donor preferences. 
 
Donor family / live donor findings are also compromised by small sample size (n=48), which 
may explain why MRS is only significant for 2 variables (‘dis2’ and ‘ill2’). Wald tests 
suggested donors value tissue match (tiss) less than patients (1 year MRS = insignificant vs. 
1.41; 5 year MRS = insignificant vs. 0.28) for perfect not favourable matches, and also value 
favourable not non-favourable matches less (1 year MRS = insignificant vs. 4.23; 5 year MRS 
= insignificant vs. 0.85). Moreover, Wald tests suggest donors value prioritizing dependents 
(dep) less than patients (1 year MRS = insignificant vs. 1.43; 5 year MRS = insignificant vs. 
0.29). They also suggest donors value prioritizing the young (age) less than patients (1 year 
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MRS = insignificant vs. 0.16; 5 year MRS = insignificant vs. 0.03), and indicate donors 
prioritized those with moderate rather than severe diseases predominantly affecting life 
expectancy less than patients (1 year MRS = 11.54 vs. 15.32 ; 5 years MRS = 2.31 vs. 3.06). 
Wald tests do not indicate other differences.   
 
4.2.4. Healthcare professional preferences. 
 
Healthcare professional MRS is significant for 6 / 7 variables and  Wald tests suggest 
healthcare professional preferences vary from patients for 5 / 7 variables. They valued 
prioritizing those with better tissue matches ‘tiss’ less than patients (1 year MRS = 1.27 vs. 
1.41; 5 year MRS = 0.25 vs. 0.28) for perfect not favourable matches, and also prioritized 
favourable vs. non-favourable matches less (1 year MRS = 3.82 vs. 4.23 ; 5 year MRS = 0.76 
vs. 0.85). Wald tests also suggested healthcare professionals prioritized those with 
dependents (dep) more (1 year MRS = 1.56 vs. 1.43 ; 5 year MRS = 0.31 vs. 0.29) and 
younger patients (age) more (1 year MRS = 0.48 vs. 016; 5 year MRS = 0.10 vs. 0.03). They 
also valued prioritizing (dis1) those with no vs. moderate diseases predominantly affecting life 
expectancy when patients do not (1 year MRS = 4.50 vs insignificant; 5 year MRS = 0.90 vs. 
insignificant). Healthcare professionals prioritized (dis2) those with moderate rather than 
severe diseases predominantly affecting life expectancy more than patients (1 year MRS = 
19.42 vs. 15.32; 5 year MRS = 3.88 vs 3.06). There is no evidence healthcare professionals 
prioritized those with diseases predominantly affecting quality of life differently from patients 
(Wald tests for ill1 and ill2 are insignificant). The fact that healthcare professionals have 
statistically significant differences to patients for 5 / 7 variables, suggests that if healthcare 
professionals’ preferences prevail in transplant decision making (likely if they make decisions) 
it could result in transplantation allocation decisions which inadequately reflect patient 
preferences. 
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Table v: Model  1:  MRS, for patients, carers, donors and healthcare workers. 
Variable Patient trade-
off between 
variable & 1 
year wait  
Patient 
trade-off 
between 
variable & 5 
years wait 
Carers trade-
off between 
variable & 1 
year wait 
Carers trade-
off between 
variable & 5 
years wait 
Prioritizing perfect not 
favourable tissue matches.  
1.41** 
(1.08 / 1.74)  
0.28** 
(0.22 / 0.35) 
0.76 
(-1.42 / 2.93) 
0.15 
(-0.28 / 0.59) 
Prioritizing favourable not 
non- favourable tissue 
matches. 
4.23** 
(3.23 / 5.22) 
0.85** 
(0.65 / 1.05) 
2.27 
(-4.25 / 8.80) 
0.45 
(-0.85 / 1.76) 
Prioritizing a recipient with 
dependents – per extra 
dependent 
1.43** 
(1.17 / 1.69) 
0.29** 
(0.23 / 0.34) 
0.17 
(-1.54 / 1.89) 
0.03 
(-0.31 / 0.38) 
Prioritizing a younger recipient 
– per year younger 
0.16** 
(0.12 / 0.19) 
0.03** 
(0.02 / 0.04) 
0.26 
(-0.03 / 0.56 ) 
0.05 
(-.01 / 0.11) 
Prioritizing those with ‘no’ not 
‘moderate’ diseases affecting 
life expectancy 
-0.01 
(-1.03 / 1.01) 
0.00 
(-0.21 / 0.20) 
4.18 
(-3.25 / 11.62) 
0.84 
(-0.65 / 2.32) 
Prioritizing those with 
moderate not severe diseases 
affecting life expectancy 
15.32** 
(13.45 / 17.20) 
3.06** 
(2.69 / 3.44) 
16.79* 
(2.69 / 30.89) 
3.36* 
0.54 / 6.18) 
Prioritizing those with no not 
moderate diseases affecting 
QoL 
-2.73** 
(-1.45 / -4.00) 
-0.55** 
(-0.29 / -0.80) 
-0.27 
(-9.55 / 9.01) 
-0.05 
(-1.91 / 1.80) 
Prioritizing those with 
moderate not severe diseases 
affecting QoL 
4.18** 
(3.12 / 5.23) 
0.84** 
(0.62 / 1.05) 
5.28 
(-2.27 / 12.83) 
1.06 
(-0.45 / 2.57) 
Variable Donors trade-
off between 
variable & 1 
year wait 
Donors 
trade-off 
between 
variable & 5 
year wait 
Healthcare 
workers trade-
off between 
variable & 1 
year wait 
Healthcare 
workers trade-
off between 
variable & 5 
year wait 
Prioritizing perfect not 
favourable tissue matches.  
-0.12 
(-1.62 / 1.38) 
-0.02 
(0.32 / 0.28) 
1.27* 
(0.24 / 2.31) 
0.25 
(0.05 / 0.46) 
Prioritizing favourable not 
non- favourable tissue 
matches. 
-0.36 
(-4.86 / 4.14) 
-0.07 
(-0.97/ 0.83) 
3.82* 
(0.72  / 6.93) 
0.76* 
(0.14 / 1.39) 
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Table v: Model  1 (contd):  MRS, for patients, carers, donors and healthcare workers. 
Prioritizing a recipient with 
dependents – per extra 
dependent 
0.47 
 
(-0.79 / 1.73)  
0.09 
 
(-0.16 / 0.35) 
1.56** 
 
(0.72 / 2.41) 
0.31** 
 
(0.14 / 0.48) 
Prioritizing a younger recipient 
– per year younger 
0.13 
(-0.05 / 0.31) 
0.03 
(-0.01 / 0.06) 
0.48** 
(0.31 / 0.66) 
0.10** 
(0.06 / 0.13)  
Prioritizing those with no not 
moderate diseases affecting 
life expectancy 
4.22 
(-1.38 / 9.81) 
0.84 
(-0.28 / 1.96) 
4.50** 
(1.09 / 7.91 ) 
0.90** 
(0.22 / 1.58) 
Prioritizing those with 
moderate not severe diseases 
affecting life expectancy 
11.54** 
(2.90 / 20.17) 
2.31** 
(0.58 / 4.03) 
19.42** 
(12.71 / 26.14) 
3.88** 
(2.54 / 5.23) 
Prioritizing those with no not 
moderate diseases affecting 
QoL 
-1.93 
(-8.66 / 4.80) 
-0.39 
(-1.73 / 0.96) 
-1.75 
(-5.74 / 2.24) 
-0.35 
(-1.15 / 0.45) 
Prioritizing those with 
moderate not severe diseases 
affecting QoL 
5.87* 
(0.18 / 11.57) 
1.17* 
(0.04 / 2.31) 
9.01** 
(5.44 / 12.59 ) 
1.80** 
(1.09 / 2.52) 
*: Significant at 5% level; **: Significant at 1% level.  
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Table vi: Model 2: Ethnic minorities vs. others (96 out of 908 are ethnic minorities).  
Variable Coefficient 
for non-
ethnic 
minorities 
MRS for 
non-ethnic 
minorities. 
Coefficients 
on ethnic 
minority 
dummy 
variables   
MRS for 
ethnic 
minority 
patients 
Wald test 
 
p-values 
Wait .0451** 1 -.0061 1  
Tiss .0698** 1.54** 
(1.19 / 1.90) 
-.0630** 0.17 
(-0.82 / 1.17) 
p<0.0001 
Dep .0595** 1.32** 
(1.05 / 1.59) 
.0351* 2.42** 
(1.40 / 3.44) 
p=0.2755 
Age .0071** 0.16** 
(0.12 / 0.20) 
-.0011 0.15*  
(0.03 / 0.27) 
p=0.0024 
dis1 .0039 0.09 
(-0.98 / 1.15) 
-.0398 -0.92 
(-4.41 / 2.57) 
p=0.6014 
dis2 .7158** 15.86** 
(13.87/17.85) 
-.3153** 10.25** 
(4.96 / 15.53) 
p<0.0001 
ill1 -.1085** -2.40** 
(-1.06/-3.74) 
-.0903 -5.08* 
(-0.83/ -9.33) 
p=0.9050 
ill2 .1773** 3.93** 
(2.82 / 5.03) 
.0647 6.19** 
(2.51 / 9.88) 
p=0.2558 
Intercepts .1269**  -.0510   
Variable Non-ethnic 
minorities 
trade-off 
between 
variable & 1 
year wait 
Non-ethnic 
minorities 
trade-off 
between 
variable & 5 
year wait 
Ethnic 
minority 
trade-off 
between 
variable & 1 
year wait 
Ethnic 
minority 
trade-off 
between 
variable & 5  
year wait 
 
Prioritizing perfect not 
favourable tissue 
matches.  
1.54** 
(1.19 /1.90) 
0.31** 
(0.24 / 0.38) 
0.17 
(-0.82/1.17) 
0.35 
(-0.16/0.23) 
 
Prioritizing favourable 
not non- favourable 
tissue matches. 
4.64** 
(3.57 /5.70) 
0.93** 
(0.71 / 1.14) 
0.52 
(-2.46 / 3.50) 
0.10 
(-0.49 /0.70) 
 
Prioritizing a recipient 
with dependents – per 
extra dependent 
1.32** 
(1.05/1.59) 
0.26** 
(0.21 / 0.32) 
2.42** 
(1.40/ 3.44) 
0.48** 
(0.28 / 0.69) 
 
prioritizing a younger 
recipient – per year 
younger 
0.16** 
(0.12/ 0.20) 
0.03** 
(0.02 / 0.04) 
0.15*  
(0.03/ 0.27) 
0.03* 
(0.01 / 0.05) 
 
Prioritizing those with no 
not moderate diseases 
affecting life expectancy 
0.09 
(-0.98/1.15) 
0.02 
(-0.20 / 0.23) 
-0.92 
(-4.41/2.57) 
-0.18 
(-0.88 / 0.51) 
 
Prioritizing those with 
moderate not severe 
diseases affecting life 
expectancy 
15.86** 
(13.87/17.85) 
3.17** 
(2.77 / 3.57) 
10.25** 
(4.96/15.53) 
2.05** 
(0.99 / 3.11) 
 
Prioritizing those with no 
not moderate diseases 
affecting QoL 
-2.40** 
(-1.06 / -3.74) 
-0.48** 
(-0.21/ -0.75) 
-5.08* 
(-0.83 / -
9.33) 
-1.02* 
(-0.17 / -
1.87) 
 
Prioritizing those with 
moderate not severe 
diseases affecting QoL 
3.93** 
(2.82 / 5.03) 
0.79** 
(0.56 / 1.01) 
6.19** 
(2.51 / 9.88) 
1.24** 
(0.50 / 1.98) 
 
*: Significant at the 5% level; **: Significant at the 1% level.. 
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4.2.5. Ethnic minority patient preferences. 
Measures of ‘goodness of fit’ for model 2 indicate 62.09% actual values are predicted by the 
model, and Mc Faddens R2 = 0.133. A likelihood ratio test for the significance of the dummy 
variables has λ = 35.83, which compares with a critical value for 9 degrees of freedom of 
16.92, so the dummy variables are jointly significant. Table vi compares ethnic and non-
ethnic minority patients. Coefficients are defined in table i, and MRS specified in table ii. 
Overall 3 dummy variables (tiss, dep and dis2) are significant, but Wald tests suggest more 
variation. Wald tests suggest the following differences. Ethnic minorities do not prioritize 
recipients with better tissue matches, (tiss) but non-ethnic minorities do (1 year MRS = 
insignificant vs. 1.54; 5 years MRS = insignificant vs. 0.31 for perfect rather than non-
favourable matches). For favourable rather than non-favourable matches only non-ethnic 
minorities valued favourable matches significantly (1 year MRS = insignificant vs. 4.64; 5 
years MRS = insignificant vs. 0.93), perhaps because ethnic minorities are disadvantaged if a 
close tissue match is required, due to a lack of ethnic minority donors.   
 
Wald test results indicate MRS for prioritizing younger (age) rather than older recipients 
differs marginally between ethnic minority and non-ethnic minority patients (1 year MRS = 
0.15 vs. 0.16; 5 year MRS = 0.03 vs. 0.03); Wald tests suggest ethnic minority patients 
valued prioritizing recipients with moderate vs. severe diseases (dis2) predominantly affecting 
life expectancy less than other patients (1 year MRS = 10.25 vs. 15.86; 5 year MRS = 2.05 vs 
3.17), perhaps due to higher prevalence of severe diseases predominantly affecting life 
expectancy amongst ethnic minorities. Wald tests do not indicate valuation of other attributes 
varies by ethnicity.    
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5. Discussion. 
 
This study is unique because although DCEs have been used in relation to liver 
transplantation on the public (Ratcliffe 2000) and patients (Ratcliffe and Buxton 1999), this is 
the first application of DCEs exclusively relating to prioritizing renal transplants.  Moreover, 
the extent of comparison between stakeholder respondent groups is unprecedented. 
 
5.1. Summary of patient preferences (and how they differ by ethnicity).  
 
Patients valued prioritizing patients with closer tissue matches, but also valued other factors 
significantly including prioritizing long waiters; those with child or adult dependents; and 
younger recipients. Those with moderate rather than severe diseases predominantly affecting 
life expectancy were a priority, but not those with moderate rather than no diseases 
predominantly affecting life expectancy. Patients also prioritized those with moderate rather 
than no diseases predominantly affecting quality of life, and those with moderate rather than 
severe diseases predominantly affecting quality of life. Ethnic minority patients, unlike non-
ethnic minority patients did not value tissue match significantly, and valued prioritizing those 
with severe rather than moderate disease predominantly affecting life expectancy less than 
non-ethnic minority patients. 
 
5.2. Summary of Carer preferences. 
 
Some Carer preferences differed from patients. Carers did not value prioritizing those with 
better tissue matches or dependents significantly, but valued prioritizing those with moderate 
not severe diseases predominantly affecting life expectancy more than patients. Whilst it is 
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interesting that carer preferences differ from patients, patient preferences may be considered  
more important if the objective of transplant policy is to maximise benefits to patients.  
 
5.3. Summary of Donor family / Live donor preferences. 
 
Donor families / live donors also did not value prioritizing better tissue matches significantly, 
and valued transplants to those with dependents, younger recipients, and those with 
moderate rather than severe disease predominantly affecting life expectancy, less than 
patients. Donor family / live donor preferences are important, because without donors 
transplantation is impossible. In hindsight if we repeated the research again to obtain a larger 
sample we would target people on the organ donor register as well as donor families / live 
donors. 
 
5.4. Summary of Healthcare professionals’ preferences. 
 
Healthcare professionals’ preferences differed from patients; they valued prioritizing better 
tissue matches less than patients but valued prioritizing those with dependents more. They 
would prioritize those with no rather than moderate diseases predominantly affecting life 
expectancy when patients would do the opposite, and severe rather than moderate disease  
predominantly affecting quality of life more than patients.  
 
5.5 The importance of examining the preferences of different stakeholder groups. 
 
Usually when DCEs are used to address healthcare issues they look at patient preferences. 
In contrast our study compares preferences across an unprecedented range of different 
stakeholder groups. The approach allows for comparison of preferences between groups, 
 247 
 
and assessment of whether differences are statistically significant. Importantly, findings 
indicate that if you target DCE questionnaires at different stakeholder groups, preferences 
may differ. So analyses only eliciting preferences for one group may fail to take into account 
preference heterogeneity. In transplantation establishing that preferences vary between 
groups is important. Healthcare professionals usually ultimately make transplantation 
decisions. If they based decisions upon their own preferences they would prioritize those with 
better tissue matches less than patients, and those with dependents more than patients, and 
those with moderate rather than severe diseases predominantly affecting quality of life more 
than patients. They would also prioritize those with no rather than moderate diseases 
predominantly affecting life expectancy when patients would not. Note the latter choice may 
be justified if patient preferences are biased because many patient respondents have 
moderate diseases affecting life expectancy. However, it is less clear that there is a case for 
healthcare professionals’ preferences overriding patients’ preferences such that there is less 
emphasis upon closeness of donor – recipient tissue match; recipients with dependents are 
prioritized more; and those with moderate not severe diseases predominantly affecting life 
expectancy are prioritized more. Crucially therefore this analysis suggests that if healthcare 
professionals base transplant allocation decisions on their preferences this may be in conflict 
with patient preferences. 
 
5.6. The implications of these findings for the 2006 revisions to UK kidney transplant 
policy  
 
Our findings are broadly supportive of the 2006 revisions to UK kidney transplant policy, 
which prioritized long waiters and young adults. Although the analysis presented here shows 
this is justified, it also suggests other criteria (i.e. prioritizing those with dependents) ought to 
be considered. Our findings can be compared with other international studies. Australian 
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based renal research, unlike ours, has adopted a general public perspective (Browning and 
Thomas 2001). In this case respondents prioritized long waiters and the young, but had a 
split verdict over whether to prioritize those with children. In the USA, renal research into 
black Americans (Louis, Sankar et al. 1997) has suggested that allocation based upon HLA 
matching is considered unfair, although black Americans did not want to receive organs with 
a lower survival rate (note since this paper’s publication graft survival for poorer matches has 
improved).  In Scotland, a Glasgow based patient renal study (Geddes, Rodger et al. 2005) 
which used a non-DCE scenario approach reported some findings which conflicted with ours 
(i.e. tissue matching was not a major allocation criterion). However, like our research, 
preference was given to prioritizing long-waiters (albeit defined by time on dialysis, not on 
waiting lists). In contrast, more recently Canadian DCE research (Davison, Kromm et al. 
2010) has found that respondents preferred to prioritize kidney transplants on the basis of a 
‘best’ match rather than ‘first come, first served.’ However, their DCE also included attributes 
relating to organ procurement, and the organization of care for patients with chronic kidney 
disease in general. So, in contrast to our research, it attempted to value a range of attributes 
related to CKD and, as such, provided only a very limited analysis of preferences for kidney 
transplant allocation i.e. there was just one attribute relating to kidney transplant allocation 
(“How should deceased donor kidneys for transplantation be allocated for transplantation”) 
with just 2 possible levels ‘best’ match, or ‘first come, first served.’ Moreover, unlike our DCE 
study which furnished respondents with data from UK transplants highlighting the fact that the 
12 month likelihood of a kidney transplant being successful varied only slightly between non-
favourable matches (86% average kidney survival, 12 months post transplantation) and 
perfect matches (90% average kidney survival 12 months post transplantation), it is not clear 
from the Canadian paper that similar information was provided to their DCE respondents to 
ensure an informed response. The findings reported in this chapter, and those reported in our 
earlier analysis (Clark, Gumber et al. 2009) suggest that both time spent waiting and the 
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quality of tissue match between donor and recipient are of importance to healthcare workers 
and to non-ethnic minority patients, but that amongst ethnic minority patients closeness of 
tissue match is not a significant determinant of patient preferences. 
 
6. Conclusions. 
 
The main conclusions that can be drawn from a methodological point of view are that the use 
of econometric models which use interaction dummy variables to establish how preferences 
differ between patients and other key stakeholder groups (healthcare professionals; donor 
families / live donors; and carers), and to establish how preferences vary between ethnic 
minority patients and non-ethnic minority patients, seem to work well.  
 
I also conclude that the choice of a summary outcome measure (MRS) which expresses the 
value of other attributes in terms of transplant waiting times provides an appropriate way of 
summarizing results (in a manner which is relatively easy to comprehend). Moreover, the use 
of Wald tests to establish whether MRS for attributes differs significantly between stakeholder 
groups proved to be useful. The main changes I would make if I were to repeat this study 
again would be to implement measures to increase the sample of carers and donors available 
for data analysis. Had I been aware that we would only be able to obtain 41 carer responses 
through our appeals via Kidney Life, I would have asked patient respondents who requested 
a questionnaire to supply the name and address of their carer (if they had one). In this way 
we could have obtained more carer responses for analysis. Similarly, in order to obtain more 
information about donor preferences, it might have been worth seeking permission to contact 
people who are registered as kidney donors, in order to ask them to complete a DCE 
questionnaire. 
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The main conclusions for policy making purposes are that the findings of our DCE analysis 
are generally supportive of the changes introduced when the kidney transplant policy was last 
re-appraised in 2006 (see section 5.6 of this chapter). Although our respondents did not think 
employment status should be a factor in allocation (which led to its exclusion as a DCE 
attribute after the pilot stage), having dependents was valued. So the issue of prioritizing 
those with dependents might be considered when transplant policy is next re-appraised.  
 
Our findings do however raise significant questions around allocation to those from ethnic 
minority groups, which is why these issues are probed in more detail in the following chapter 
(Chapter 6). Moreover, the study highlights statistically significant differences in preferences 
between healthcare professionals and patients. The information on how healthcare 
professional and patient preferences differ (see sections 5.4 and 5.5 of this chapter) might be 
of particular use to professionals involved in transplant allocation decisions; it might give them 
a feel for how the preferences of an average patient differ from those of an average 
healthcare professional. These findings add to the growing international literature relating to 
transplant allocation policy, and they ought to be considered when UK renal transplant policy 
is next re-appraised. 
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Chapter 6: Prioritizing patients for renal transplantation? Catering for diversity by 
analyzing patient preferences for kidney allocation according to ethnicity and 
gender. 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
In chapter 1 of this thesis (section E1.3), I pointed out that a range of techniques have 
been used to explore whether respondents’ preferences are heterogeneous using DCEs. 
In this chapter (rather like chapter 5), I apply the interaction dummy variable approach in 
order to establish whether preferences vary by ethnicity and by gender. It should be noted 
that the ‘non-white ethnic minority’ and ‘South Asian ethnic minority’ categories included in 
this chapter vary from the ethnic minority patient category of respondents considered in 
chapter 5 of this thesis (i.e. the white ethnic minority is not included in this chapter).  
 
Of course, it would have been possible to simply run separate regressions models to look 
at preferences for the different groups. Indeed, many of the DCE studies published during 
2009 – 2011 which I identified in the systematic review used this approach (Guimaraes, 
Marra et al. 2009; Scalone, Mantovani et al. 2009; Tinelli, Ryan et al. 2009; van Til, 
Stiggelbout et al. 2009; Essers, Dirksen et al. 2010; Torbica and Fattore 2010; van Dam, 
Hol et al. 2010; Faggioli, Scalone et al. 2011; Pereira, Mulligan et al. 2011; Thrumurthy, 
Morris et al. 2011). However, a limitation of this approach is that, although you can test for 
differences in the joint significance of preferences using a likelihood ratio test (comparing 
a pooled model with two separate models), you cannot establish whether preferences for 
individual attributes vary in a statistically significant manner.  
 
However, if a model with interaction dummy variables is used, you can also test to 
establish whether sub-groups of respondents have a statistically significant difference in 
preferences with respect to certain attributes. Moreover, in this analysis (like the analyses 
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in chapters 3, 4, and 5) I also take the interaction dummy variable analysis one step 
further, by testing for differences in the relevant summary ratios between sub-groups. In 
chapters 3 and 4, we looked for differences in Marginal Willingness to Pay for attributes 
between sub-groups using Wald tests. In the analyses in chapters 5 and 6, we look at 
differences in Marginal Rates of Substitution (expressed in terms of transplant waiting 
times) between sub-groups of respondents using Wald tests. 
 
Most of the material in this chapter has now been published (Clark, Gumber et al. 2009), 
and should therefore figure in the body of evidence that is used when UK renal transplant 
policy is next re-appraised (although this chapter updates the literature review presented 
in our published paper). Having established in chapter 5 that preferences between ‘ethnic 
minority’ patients and other patients differed, it was apparent that the equality and 
diversity issues this raises ought to be probed in more detail. Given that the DCE analysis 
presented here relates to renal transplantation, it is especially important to establish 
whether preferences in relation to who should be prioritized for renal transplantation might 
differ across ethnic minority groups for the following reasons: 
 
 There is a lack of information on the preferences of renal patients generally for 
different priority criteria for renal transplantation. 
 
 Ethnic minorities, including South Asians, black Africans and African Caribbeans, 
are more susceptible to renal disease, and there are lower levels of organ 
donation in these communities. 
 
 Ethnic-minority groups are therefore disadvantaged if allocation is primarily 
directed towards recipients who can be closely tissue matched with donor organs. 
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What this chapter adds: 
 
 The analysis provides information about patient preferences and patients’ 
willingness to decide between different priority criteria for transplantation using 
discrete choice experiments. 
 
 The analysis demonstrates that South Asian and non-white ethnic-minority 
patients have preferences that differ from those of other patients, in particular that 
they would not prioritise patients with closer tissue matches or younger 
respondents. This is in contrast to other patients who are not in these ethnic-
minority groups. 
 
 Although there is evidence that preferences for prioritising transplants may differ 
between male and female patients, gender-related differences in preferences are 
not particularly pronounced. 
 
2. Background. 
 
Revisions to UK transplant allocation policy in 2006 marked a policy shift towards giving 
higher priority to people who had been waiting for a long time for transplants, and to 
young adults, at the expense of emphasising tissue match between donor and recipient. 
This benefited members of ethnic minorities because of a shortage of donors from some 
ethnic groups. However, the change was informed by dated research which was not 
specific to the UK, and which failed to address ethnic or gender-related differences in 
preferences. 
 
In the UK, in January 2011, 6,610 patients awaited renal transplantation (rising 8% 
annually since 2004); and in 2009-10, 1,482 received deceased donor transplants, and 
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1,038 received live donor transplants. The growing imbalance between demand for and 
supply of transplants had led to the 2008 Transplant Workforce Report (Department of 
Health  2008), which outlined initiatives to facilitate a 50% increase in cadaveric 
transplants within five years. Despite this, demand will exceed supply, especially among 
members of ethnic minority groups. This is because they are more susceptible to certain 
diseases linked to renal failure necessitating transplants (Raleigh 1997; Churak 2005; 
Davis and Randhawa 2006; UK Transplant 2006). They are also less likely to obtain 
closely matched transplants (Higgins, West et al. 1997; UK Transplant 2006). The 
increased risk among members of ethnic-minority populations, compared with white 
patients, of developing end-stage renal disease (Churak 2005) is partly related to the 
higher prevalence of type 2 diabetes. A UK study indicates a prevalence among black 
African and Caribbean patients that is 3.5 times higher than that among white patients 
(Raleigh 1997). Type 2 diabetes prevalence is reported to be three to four times higher 
in UK South Asian adults and the disease may occur a decade earlier than in the white 
European majority population (Bellary, O'Hare et al. 2008). South Asians are also more 
susceptible to diabetes and heart failure leading to renal disease (Bennett and Savani 
2004). Greater demand for renal transplants in these communities is matched by reduced 
rates of organ donation (Bennett and Savani 2004). Therefore, systems that prioritize on 
the basis of donor and recipient tissue matching will disadvantage some ethnic groups. 
 
Improved anti-rejection drugs have reduced the importance of tissue matching in 
determining transplant success, so other criteria now merit greater consideration (Koene 
2002). Moreover, by applying discrete choice experiments (DCEs), it is possible to 
quantify trade-offs between different priority criteria. A DCE study of this kind has already 
been undertaken in relation to liver transplantation (Ratcliffe and Buxton 1999; Ratcliffe 
2000). In this chapter we report on differences in preferences between non-white ethnic-
minority patients and other patients, and between South Asian patients and other patients. 
We also consider whether preferences vary according to gender. 
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3. Materials and methods. 
 
This DCE involved respondents making a series of choices about which one of two 
hypothetical transplant recipients who differ in their characteristics should receive a 
kidney. Using DCEs, the weight that respondents give to differences in characteristics can 
be quantified. The steps involved in undertaking this DCE are summarized below. 
 
3.1. Pilot exercise. 
 
We interviewed 60 respondents (including eight members of ethnic-minority groups), 
consisting of 41 patients, 16 healthcare professionals, one donor, one carer and one renal 
consultant’s secretary. These respondents completed a DCE questionnaire and ranked 
potential priority criteria for renal transplantation. Most of the 60 respondents in the pilot 
exercise came from the University Hospitals of Coventry and Warwickshire (UHCW) NHS 
Trust, although 4 came from Ealing Hospital NHS Trust to boost responses (for full details 
refer to section 3.1 in chapter 5). 
 
3.2. Selection of attributes and levels. 
 
Details of the approach used to select final DCE attributes and levels are provided in 
section 3.1 of chapter 5. The final attributes and levels are listed in table 1 below (identical 
to that in chapter 5), reproduced here to remind the reader.  
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Table 1: Final attributes and levels. 
Attribute Variable name Levels Interpretation of 
coefficients.  
Time spent 
awaiting 
transplantation 
wait 1 month, 2 years, and 
10 years. 
Indirect utility of each 1 
year reduction in transplant 
recipient waiting time. 
Tissue type 
matching 
tiss Non-favourable match: 
86% average kidney 
survival rate post-
transplant. 
 
Favourable match: 
89% average kidney 
survival rate post-
transplant. 
 
Perfect match: 90% 
average kidney survival 
rate post-transplant. 
Indirect utility of prioritizing 
people for each 1% 
improvement in kidney 
survival. 
How many 
child or adult  
dependents 
recipients 
have 
dep None, 1, or 4 
dependents. 
Indirect utility of each 
additional dependent. 
Recipient age age 20 years, 45 years, and 
65 years 
Indirect utility for each 1 
year reduction in recipient 
age. 
Diseases 
predominantly 
affecting life 
expectancy 
dis1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
dis2 
No disease affecting 
life expectancy (other 
than Kidney disease) 
vs. moderate disease 
(uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity) & Kidney 
disease. 
 
Moderate disease 
(uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity) affecting life 
expectancy vs. severe 
disease (heart attack, 
stroke, or diabetes with 
complications). 
Indirect utility of having no 
rather than moderate 
disease predominantly 
affecting life expectancy. 
 
 
 
 
 
Indirect utility of having 
moderate disease rather 
than severe disease 
predominantly affecting life 
expectancy. 
Diseases 
predominantly 
affecting 
quality of life 
ill1 
 
 
 
 
 
ill2 
No disease affecting 
quality of life (other 
than Kidney disease) 
vs. moderate disease 
(mild asthma).  
 
Moderate disease (mild 
asthma) affecting 
quality of life vs. severe 
disease (severe 
arthritis). 
Indirect utility of having no 
disease rather than a 
moderate disease 
predominantly affecting 
quality of life.  
 
Indirect utility of having a 
moderate disease rather 
than a severe disease 
predominantly affecting 
quality of life. 
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3.3. Design of the final questionnaire. 
 
Details of the approach used to design the questionnaire can be found in section 3.3 of 
chapter 5. It should be noted that the questionnaire was made available in Punjabi, Hindi, 
Bengali, Gujarati and Urdu, as well as English. The questionnaires elicited information on 
gender and posed a question about ethnicity (see ethnicity question below). The first 
questionnaire in appendix E is the patient renal questionnaire in English. 
 
Which of the following ethnic groups do you consider that you belong to?  
 
(Please tick 1 box only): 
 
White – British      
 
White – Irish       
 
White – Any other white background   
- please describe__________________________ 
 
Mixed – White / Black Caribbean    
 
Mixed – White / Black African    
 
Mixed – White / Asian     
 
Any other mixed background     
- please describe__________________________ 
 
Black or black British (Caribbean)    
 
Black or black British (African)    
 
Black or black British (Any other background  
 
Asian or Asian British (Indian)    
 
Asian or Asian British (Pakistani)    
 
Asian or Asian British (Bangladeshi)    
 
Asian or Asian British (Any other background)  
 
Chinese        
 
Any other ethnic group     
- please describe__________________________ 
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3.4. Questionnaire distribution. 
 
A total of 20 000 flyers with Freepost reply envelopes were enclosed in the UK National 
Kidney Federation’s publication Kidney Life, inviting people to request questionnaires, 
including alternative-language versions if required. As we did not receive a large enough 
sample of ethnic-minority patients from the postal questionnaire, a bilingual researcher (Dr 
Anil Gumber) obtained 18 additional responses from members of ethnic minority groups at 
Ealing NHS Trust and five additional responses from members of ethnic-minority groups 
at University Hospitals of Coventry and Warwickshire NHS Trust. 
 
3.5. Data analysis. 
 
We used the same underlying econometric model to compare patient preferences for non-
white ethnic-minority patients versus others (model 1), South Asian patients versus others 
(model 2), and female patients versus others (model 3). The term Yij is a binary dependent 
variable, from individuals i = 1...m, for observations j = 1...ni. Observations ni vary because 
the i individuals do not all complete every pairwise choice (some respondents do not 
answer all choices), µi is the random effects error term (which allows for multiple 
responses from i respondents), and εij is the probit error term for individuals i for j 
observations. 
 
Variables are defined in the Materials and Methods section. Ds is a dummy variable and is 
equal to 1 if the respondent is in the subgroup, otherwise it is equal to 0.  
 
Yij = β0+β1waitij+β2tissij+β3depij+ β4ageij+β5dis1ij+β6dis2ij+β7ill1ij+  
 
β8ill2ij+β9Dsij+β10Dsijwaitij+β11Dsijtissij+β12Dsijdepij+β13Dsijageij+β14Dsijdis1ij+β15Dsijdis2ij+  
 
β16Dsijill1ij+β17Dsijill2ij+µi+ εij 
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        (Models 1, 2, and 3). 
 
3.6. Establishing the marginal rate of substitution (MRS).  
 
MRS relates changes in attributes to a 1-year change in waiting time as a ratio. We used 
the Delta method (Wooldridge 2002) to establish whether MRS was significant. This was 
because the binary dependent variable model that we used (random effects probit) was 
non-linear, and the Delta method can be used to establish confidence intervals for 
estimated parameters for these types of models (Greene 2000). Moreover, the approach 
allows researchers to establish the significance or otherwise of a ratio of coefficients. 
Since MRS is a ratio, it allows clarification of whether MRS for a given variable is 
significant both for the defined subgroups of patients, and also for patients who are not in 
the defined ethnic specific or female subgroups (see Table 2). These tests for statistical 
significance were performed using the command ‘nlcom’ in STATA. 
 
We also performed Wald tests to establish whether MRS in a subgroup differed in a 
statistically significant manner from MRS among other patients, in other words whether 
the non-white ethnic minorities, South Asian ethnic minorities or female subgroups had a 
different MRS to other patients who were not in that subgroup. So, for example, in relation 
to the variable tissue, the test we conducted was whether β2 / β1 = (β2 / β11)/( β1 / β10).  
 
These tests were performed using the command ‘testnl’ in STATA. Wald tests establish 
whether there is a significant difference in MRS comparing MRS for base groups, versus 
defined subgroups for each attribute. Differences in MRS at the 5% level are indicated by 
P-values of ≤0.05. 
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Table 2 Calculation of MRS 
Variable Base group MRS Variable MRS for subgroup 
of respondents 
Waiting time N /A Waiting time N /A 
Tissue β2 / β1 Tissue (β2 + β11)/ (β1 + β10) 
Dependent β3 / β1 Dependent (β3 + β12)/ (β1 + β10) 
Age  β4 / β1 Age (β4 + β13)/ (β1 + β10) 
Disease1 β5 / β1 Disease1 (β5 + β14)/ (β1 + β10) 
Disease2 β6 / β1 Disease2 (β6 + β15)/ (β1 + β10) 
ill1 β7 / β1 ill1 (β7 + β16)/ (β1 + β10) 
ill2 β8 / β1 ill2 (β8 + β17)/ (β1 + β10) 
 
 
4. Results. 
 
4.1. Sample characteristics. 
 
The UK National Kidney Federation, which publishes Kidney Life, could not provide us 
with data that might allow us to assess the representativeness of our sample, so instead 
we used data from the UK Renal Registry (Farrington, Hodsman et al. 2008; Farrington, 
Udayaraj et al. 2008). 
 
In total, 895 out of 908 respondents indicated their ethnic origin. Of these, 799 out of 895 
patients (89.3%) were white (British), and 27 out of 908 (3%) were members of white 
ethnic minorities, so overall 92.3% of our sample was white. This compares with incidence 
data (Farrington, Udayaraj et al. 2008) which suggest that, across the UK, 79.8% of renal 
patients are white, so in our sample white patients were over-represented. Moreover, 69 
out of 895 patients (7.7%) were members of non-white ethnic minorities, compared with a 
17.9% incidence rate (Farrington, Udayaraj et al. 2008). Of the 69 members of nonwhite 
ethnic minorities, 50 patients were of South Asian origin. Therefore, 50 of the 895 patients 
in our sample (5.6%) were of South Asian origin, compared with a 10% incidence rate 
(Farrington, Udayaraj et al. 2008). 
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Members of non-white ethnic minorities consisted of two out of 69 mixed (white/black 
Caribbean), one out of 69 mixed (white/black African), one out of 69 mixed (white South 
Asian), two out of 69 with any other mixed background, including a Luso-Indian, one out of 
69 Anglo-Indian / English-Portuguese. In total, seven out of 69 were black or black British 
Caribbean, three out of 69 were black or black British (African), one out of 69 was black or 
black British (any other background), and two patients were Chinese. The 50 South Asian 
patients in the non-white sample included 29 out of 69 South Asian or South Asian British 
(Indian) patients, nine out of 69 South Asian or South Asian British (Pakistani) patients, 
two out of 69 South Asian or South Asian British Bangladeshi patients, seven out of 69 
South Asian or South Asian British (any other background) patients, plus one Filipina, one 
Persian and one Iranian patient. In total, 508 out of 908 patients (55.9%) were male, 397 
out of 908 patients (43.7%) were female, and three out of 908 patients (0.3%) did not 
indicate their gender. This is reassuring, as Renal Registry data that have been presented 
graphically (Farrington, Udayaraj et al. 2008) show a trend towards slightly higher 
proportions of men than women among renal patients for all age groups. 
 
The average patient age was 54.88 years (median 57 years). For members of white ethnic 
minorities the average age was 55.65 years (median 57 years), for those belonging to 
non-white ethnic minorities it was 54.12 years (median 56 years), and for patients of 
South Asian origin it was 55.38 years (median 56.5 years). Among male patients 
(508/908) the average age was 56.49 years (median 58 years), and among female 
patients (397/908) it was 52.85 years (median 54 years). Unfortunately the Renal Registry 
data (Farrington, Hodsman et al. 2008) are not specific for ethnic origin or gender. 
However, the median age for all patients is 56.9 years, which is remarkably close to our 
figure of 57 years. 
 
The sample consisted of 468 out of 908 patients (51.5%) with successful transplants, 118 
out of 908 patients (13%) whose transplant failed, and 279 out of 908 patients (30.7%) 
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who were awaiting transplants, with an average waiting period of 22.6 months. Some 
patients whose transplant failed are also included in the data for those awaiting 
transplants. This also applies to all gender and ethnic-minority groups. A total of 237 out 
of 908 patients (26.3%) were on dialysis without transplantation, and 57 out of 908 
patients (6.3%) had kidney disease that did not require dialysis. Renal Registry 
prevalence data (Farrington, Hodsman et al. 2008) suggest that 46.6% of patients have 
successful transplants (as this is their current treatment modality), which is reassuringly 
close to our figure. However, there are no data for patients with failed transplants, or for 
those awaiting transplants, on dialysis without transplantation, or with kidney disease not 
requiring transplantation. Among non-white ethnic minorities there were 18 out of 69 
patients (26%) with successful transplants, 10 out of 69 patients (14.5%) whose transplant 
failed, 35 out of 69 patients (50.7%) awaiting a transplant on dialysis (average waiting 
period 21.45 months), and three out of 69 patients (4.3%) with kidney disease not 
requiring dialysis. Among those of South Asian origin, 10 out of 50 patients (20%) had 
successful transplants, eight out of 50 patients (16%) had failed transplants, 28 out of 50 
patients (56%) were awaiting transplants (average waiting period 23.1 months), and three 
out of 50 patients (6%) were on dialysis without transplantation. Unfortunately, the 
available data (Farrington, Hodsman et al. 2008) were not analysed by ethnic origin. 
However, given the shortage of transplants available to ethnic-minority groups, and their 
lower success rates, because they are likely to be poorer tissue matches, the lower 
percentage figure for transplant successes and the higher percentage figure for transplant 
failures might be expected. 
 
4.2. Data analysis. 
 
The results for models 1 to 3 are presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5.  
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4.2.1. Non-white ethnic minorities vs. other patients. 
 
The likelihood ratio test for model 1 (see Table 3) is significant, which suggests that 
preferences do vary between members of non-white ethnic minorities and other patients.  
 
Table 3 Model 1: patients – dummy variables for non-white ethnic minority patients 
Attribute Coefficient 
excluding 
non-white 
ethnic 
minorities 
MRS excluding non-
white ethnic 
minorities 
Coefficient 
for dummy 
variables 
for non-
white 
ethnic 
minorities 
MRS for non-white 
ethnic minorities 
Wald test 
(p-value) 
wait 0.448** 1 -0.0025 1  
tiss 0.690** 1.54**    (1.19 / 1.89) -0.0718** -0.07 (-1.13 / 1.00) <0.001 
dep 0.0605** 1.35**    (1.08 / 1.62) 0.03450 2.26**(1.16 / 3.36) 0.311 
age 0.0074** 0.16**    (0.13 / 0.20) -0.0045 0.07  (-0.05 / 0.19) <0.001 
dis1 0.0067 0.15     (-0.90 / 1.21) -0.0773 -1.67 (-5.55 / 2.21) 0.375 
dis2 0.7138** 15.93**(13.96/17.91) -0.3649** 8.25**(2.86 /13.64) <0.001 
ill1 -0.1113** -2.48** (-1.16 /-3.81) -0.1049 -5.11*(-0.45 /-9.78) 0.992 
ill2 0.1829** 4.08**    (2.99 / 5.18) 0.0263 4.95*   (0.97 / 8.92) 0.149 
Intercepts 0.1306**  -0.0952   
Percentage 
of actual 
values 
predicted 
62.64% Sample 908 
patients 
(69 are 
non-white 
ethnic 
minorities) 
Mc Fadden’s R2 0.113 
LR test (λ) 29.14 Dummy variables 
jointly significant 
Yes CV 
for 9 dfs = 
16.92 
Log-likelihood -4987.2 
*Denotes significance at 1% level; **Denotes significance at 5% level but not at 1% level. 
 
The Wald tests for three variables are also significant, which suggests that MRS differs 
significantly between the two patient groups for these three variables. For non-white 
ethnic minorities, MRS on the variable tiss is non-significant. This relates to prioritizing 
recipients with a good tissue match, so members of non-white ethnic minorities would not 
prioritize to recipients with better tissue matches. For other patients it is positive and 
significant, implying a preference for prioritising recipients with better tissue matches. 
Another difference relates to age. Among members of non-white ethnic minorities the 
variable age is non-significant, so they would not prioritise younger recipients, whereas 
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among other patients this variable is positive and significant, suggesting a preference for 
prioritizing younger recipients. Finally, there is evidence that preferences vary in relation 
to prioritizing those with diseases that affect life expectancy. The variable dis2 relates to 
prioritizing those with moderate rather than severe diseases that affect life expectancy. 
Members of non-white ethnic minorities place less emphasis than do other patients on 
prioritizing those with moderate rather than severe diseases that affect life expectancy 
(MRS = 8.25 vs. 15.93). 
 
4.2.2. South Asian patients vs. other patients. 
 
A similar pattern emerges in the South Asian patient sample (see Table 4), which is not 
unexpected, as they represented a large proportion (50 out of 69) of the non-white ethnic-
minority group. Once again likelihood ratio tests suggest that preferences do vary 
between the two patient groups, and the Wald tests suggest that these differences relate 
to the same three variables. There is no evidence that South Asian patients would 
prioritize those with a better tissue match, as the variable tiss is non-significant. However, 
among other patients, the variable is positive and significant, which suggests a preference 
for prioritizing recipients with better tissue matches. South Asian patients would not 
prioritize the young rather than the old, as the variable age is non-significant, whereas 
among other patients it is positive and significant. Finally, although both South Asian 
patients and the rest of the patient sample would prioritize those with moderate (dis2) 
rather than severe diseases that affect life expectancy, South Asian patients would be 
less likely to prioritize on the basis of this criterion (MRS = 7.57 vs. 15.78). 
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Table 4 Model 2: patients – dummy variables for South Asian patients 
Attribute Coefficient 
excluding 
South 
Asian 
ethnic 
minorities 
MRS excluding 
South Asian ethnic 
minorities 
Coefficient 
for South 
Asian 
ethnic 
minorities 
MRS for South 
Asian ethnic 
minorities 
Wald test 
(p-value) 
wait 0.0450** 1 -0.0069 1  
tiss 0.0681** 1.51**      (1.17/1.85) -0.0824** -0.38  (-1.74 / 0.99) 0.001 
dep 0.0609** 1.36**     (1.09 /1.62) 0.0386 2.61**  (1.07 / 4.16) 0.434 
age 0.0073** 0.16**    (0.13 / 0.20) -0.0055 0.048 (-0.11 / 0.21) 0.002 
dis1 0.0023 0.05       (-0.99/1.08) -0.0243 -0.58  (-5.58 / 4.43) 0.803 
dis2 0.7095** 15.78**(13.84/17.71) -0.4214** 7.57**(0.71 / 14.42) <0.001 
ill1 -0.1119** -2.49**(-1.19 / -3.80) -0.1371 -6.54*(-0.42/-12.65) 0.827 
ill2 0.1807** 4.02**    (2.94 / 5.10) 0.0785 6.81*   (1.49 / 8.92) 0.417 
Intercepts 0.1286**  -0.0932   
Percentage 
of actual 
values 
predicted 
62.71% Sample 908 
patients 
(50 are 
South 
Asian  
ethnic 
minorities) 
Mc Fadden’s R2 0.113 
LR test (λ) 27.76 Dummy variables 
jointly significant 
Yes CV 
for 9 dfs = 
16.92 
Log-likelihood -4987.85 
*Denotes significance at 1% level; **Denotes significance at 5% level but not at 1% level. 
 
4.2.3. Preferences and gender. 
 
The results of the likelihood ratio test do not provide evidence of a difference in 
preferences between male and female patients (see Table 5). However, Wald tests 
suggest that preferences may vary in relation to four out of eight variables. These tests 
suggest that preferences vary in relation to prioritizing on the basis of tissue match (tiss). 
Both male and female patients valued this criterion significantly. However, it appears that 
females value it marginally more than do males (MRS = 1.45 vs. 1.34). The Wald test also 
suggests that preferences differ with regard to prioritizing recipients with child or adult 
dependants. The variable ‘dep’ is significant for both groups, but female patients appear to 
value this marginally more (MRS = 1.61 vs.1.28). The Wald test suggests that preferences 
for prioritizing younger rather than older dependents might also differ. Female patients 
place marginally more emphasis on this variable (age) than do males (MRS = 0.17 vs. 
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0.14). Finally, both female and male patients value prioritizing those with severe rather 
than moderate diseases that affect life expectancy (dise2) significantly. However, this 
variable seems to be valued marginally less by female patients (MRS = 14.86 vs. 15.43).  
 
Table 5 Model 3: patients with female patient dummy variables  
 Coefficient 
for male 
patients 
MRS for male patients Coeffici
ent for 
female 
patients 
MRS for female 
patients 
Wald 
test  
(p-
value) 
wait 0.0448** 1 -0.0003 1  
tiss 0.0603** 1.34**     (0.90 / 1.78) 0.0045 1.45**   (0.95 / 1.96) 0.009 
dep 0.0575** 1.28**     (0.94 / 1.62) 0.0141 1.61**   (1.20 / 2.01) 0.014 
age 0.0064** 0.14**     (0.10 / 0.19) 0.0011 0.17**   (0.11 / 0.22) 0.026 
dis1 -0.0373 -0.83     (-2.21 / 0.54) 0.0704 0.74     (-0.80 / 2.28) 0.137 
dis2 0.6917** 15.43**(12.91/ 17.93) -0.0295 14.86**(12.07/17.64) <0.00
1 
ill1 -0.1150** -2.56**  (-0.85 /-4.27) -0.0131 -2.87** (-0.94 /-4.80) 0.285 
ill2 0.1615** 3.60**     (2.19 / 5.01) 0.0520 4.79**    (3.18 / 6.40) 0.175 
Intercepts 0.1144**  0.0201   
Percentage 
of actual 
values 
predicted 
62.50% Sample 908 
patients 
(397 
are 
female) 
Mc Fadden’s R2 0.110 
LR test (λ) 5.00 Dummy variables 
jointly significant 
Yes CV 
for 9 
dfs = 
16.92 
Log-likelihood -
4908.
40 
*Denotes significance at 1% level; **Denotes significance at 5% level but not at 1% level. 
 
4.2.4. Summary of how preferences differ by ethnicity and gender. 
 
These findings suggest that patients who are not members of ethnic minorities value 
prioritizing patients with closer tissue matches, whereas South Asian patients and those 
from non-white ethnic minorities do not. Patients in general, including those who belong to 
ethnic minorities, prioritize those who have had to wait a long time for a transplant, and 
those with child or adult dependents. However, prioritizing younger people is not valued 
among South Asians and non-white ethnic minorities, whereas it is among other patients. 
Those with moderate, rather than severe diseases that affect life expectancy are a priority 
for patients in general, but less of a priority among South Asian patients and non-white 
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ethnic minorities. All ethnic groups value prioritizing those with moderate, as opposed to 
no, disease that affect quality of life. This may seem a somewhat odd result, but it could 
be explained by enlightened self-interest, in that many respondents themselves would 
have moderate disease in addition to kidney disease, which affect their quality of life. 
Moreover, there is no evidence that the ethnic-minority groups value prioritizing those with 
moderate rather than severe diseases that affect quality of life differently. Both groups 
would prioritize potential recipients with moderate rather than severe diseases that affect 
quality of life. 
 
Although there is evidence that preferences vary according to gender, these differences 
are not particularly pronounced. However, women do have a slightly greater tendency to 
prioritize recipients who are better tissue matches to donors. Women are also slightly 
more likely to prioritize those with child or adult dependents, and younger people, and 
slightly less likely to prioritize those with moderate rather than severe diseases that affect 
life expectancy. 
 
5. Discussion. 
 
Discrete choice experiments (DCEs) are increasingly used in health technology 
assessment (Ryan 1999) and health economics (Ryan and Gerard 2003). Indeed, 
searches on PubMed have identified several hundred health-related DCEs. However, 
although some DCEs have addressed the concerns of ethnic minorities (Bennett and 
Savani 2004; Dwight-Johnson, Lagomasino et al. 2004; Byrne, Souchek et al. 2006; Hall, 
Fiebig et al. 2006; Peacock, Apicella et al. 2006; Hawley, Volk et al. 2008; Lee, Brooks et 
al. 2008; Constantinescu, Goucher et al. 2009; Bridges, Selck et al. 2011; Thrumurthy, 
Morris et al. 2011), the majority have assessed preferences for respondents overall, rather 
than distinguishing those of minority groups.  Also a small number of DCEs have looked at 
whether preferences vary according to gender (Brown, Swinyard et al. 2003; Mays and 
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Zimet 2004; Tsang, Chan et al. 2004; Kjaer, Gyrd-Hansen et al. 2006; Hjelmgren and 
Anell 2007; Gerard, Salisbury et al. 2008; Goto, Takahashi et al. 2009; Hauber, Mohamed 
et al. 2009; Mentzakis, Stefanowska et al. 2011; Thrumurthy, Morris et al. 2011).  This 
chapter has therefore addressed both these shortcomings in the context of a DCE used to 
evaluate preferences for kidney allocation.   
 
DCEs have strong theoretical foundations in economics. They are compatible with 
Lancaster’s characteristics theory of demand (Lancaster 1966) and random utility theory 
(McFadden 1999). They are often used to establish how much people are willing to pay 
for different attributes of healthcare provision. However, there are methodological issues 
which need to be addressed before it can be assumed that DCE estimates of willingness 
to pay (WTP) are accurate (Ryan, McIntosh et al. 1998; Ratcliffe 2000; Ryan and Farrar 
2000; Ryan, Watson et al. 2003). One major concern is that, if they are applied in a 
context in which healthcare is free at the point of use (see chapters 3 and 4), respondents 
may indicate an unrealistically high WTP because they know that they will not in fact bear 
a cost, leading to hypothetical bias. 
 
We did not elicit WTP in this DCE, thereby avoiding many of these potential problems. 
However, it must be conceded that our results are sensitive to the choice of attributes 
selected, and can only give an indication of trade-offs in relation to the actual attributes 
included. Since there are no definitive criteria for establishing the appropriate attributes 
and levels to include in a DCE, researchers simply have to consult a wide range of 
opinion, including patients and professionals, before deciding upon which attributes and 
levels to include, and ensure that their choice of attributes has emerged from a thorough 
pilot exercise. This is why we invested a great deal of time piloting the questionnaire.  
 
Although DCEs have been applied to determine priorities for UK liver transplants (Ratcliffe 
and Buxton 1999; Ratcliffe 2000), that particular study did not collect ethnicity data, only 
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gender data. Also, although the study reported differences in responses by gender, the 
data were not analyzed to establish whether preferences varied with gender. The only 
other DCE work in the area of transplantation available in 2009 when we published our 
paper (Clark, Gumber et al. 2009) was another UK study of factors that influence people’s 
willingness to donate body parts for transplantation in the event of their death (Bennett 
and Savani 2004). This considered three groups (white, South Asian and Afro-Caribbean) 
but concluded that ‘being of a particular ethnicity or gender did not affect outcomes in any 
meaningful ways’, so the authors only reported results for respondents overall (Bennett 
and Savani 2004). More recently, however, a Canadian analysis has been published 
(Davison, Kromm et al. 2010) which applies DCEs to assess patient and professional 
preferences for organ allocation and procurement, end-of-life care, and organization of 
care for patients with chronic kidney disease. Information on respondents’ race and 
gender were collated but, once again, the issue of whether preferences varied by ethnicity 
and gender was not addressed.  More to the point the DCE only contained one attribute 
relating to kidney allocation policy which was ‘How should deceased donor kidneys be 
allocated for transplantation’ which had levels of ‘first come first served’ or ‘best match.’ In 
contrast to the renal transplant DCE presented in this thesis, most of the DCE’s attributes 
concerned themselves with other issues such as who should provide dialysis; how should 
kidneys be obtained; when should end of life discussions be started; how much 
information on end of life care issues should be provided; and how should decisions to 
stop dialysis be made. 
 
In the field of transplantation there are of course other studies which do not use DCE 
methodology. Such kidney allocation studies have been conducted in Australia and 
America (Louis, Sankar et al. 1997; Browning and Thomas 2001), and may not be 
generalizable to the UK. The Australian study (Browning and Thomas 2001) involved 
respondents ranking possible priority criteria for transplantation, including age, gender, 
occupation, education, work status, income, whether potential recipients were parents, 
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post-transplantation prognosis, and length of time for which recipients had been on the 
transplant list. They therefore avoided addressing the issue of whether to prioritize on the 
basis of ethnicity. They found that over 90% of 238 respondents considered that recipient 
gender, socioeconomic status, employment status and occupation should not influence 
decisions about kidney transplant allocation. Instead, most of the respondents (87.4%) 
considered that those who had been on the transplant list for a long period of time should 
have priority, and 79% would prioritize those with a good prognosis, whilst 65% would 
prioritize younger recipients. 
 
The American study (Louis, Sankar et al. 1997) noted that the American point-based 
allocation system disadvantaged African Americans because of its emphasis on antigen 
matching, as African Americans typically have a disproportionate number of rare antigens. 
They used semi-structured interviews with 33 patients who were awaiting transplants, 
including some black Americans, who considered that discrimination in organ allocation by 
antigen matching was unfair. However, there was a paradox in that they did not want to 
receive organs that gave them a reduced likelihood of survival. So these results differ from 
ours, but of course the rate of graft survival has increased since the American study 
because of improvements in anti-rejection drugs, so this may partly explain the differences 
in findings, as may the small sample and methodology used. The authors did not address 
the issue of gender-related differences. 
 
There is one other study (Geddes, Rodger et al. 2005) which was conducted in Scotland. 
A total of 295 respondents were asked to choose one of two hypothetical patients from 
eight scenarios to establish whether the patients agreed with the current criteria for 
transplant allocation in the UK. Ethnicity was not taken into consideration in this research, 
although gender was addressed. The findings suggested that neither age nor gender of 
the recipient should be used when making decisions about the allocation of kidneys. The 
former is somewhat at odds with our findings for the white majority patients who, unlike 
274 
 
the ethnic minorities, would tend to prioritize younger recipients. This research was 
conducted prior to the UK Transplant 2006 reforms to transplant allocation criteria. It 
seemed to broadly support a shift away from the previous emphasis on tissue matching. 
The main conclusion was that allocation should favour respondents who had waited for 
longer, and of course UK transplant policy did evolve to place more emphasis on those 
who have waited a long time for a transplant. 
 
6. Conclusions. 
 
Our main conclusions, in relation to the methodology used in this chapter, are that it 
appeared to perform well in terms of demonstrating that the non-white ethnic minorities 
and Asian ethnic minorities have distinctly different preferences in relation to priority 
criteria for renal transplantation, compared with patients who are not in these minority 
groups. The use of interaction dummy variables also allowed us to demonstrate that 
preferences for specific attributes differed in a statistically significant manner. In addition 
the approach we adopted of expressing results in terms of Marginal Rates of Substitution 
(MRS) with respect to waiting time worked well. Moreover, using Wald tests to establish 
whether MRS for attributes differed by ethnicity served to further reinforce our findings.  
 
In relation to whether preferences varied according to the gender of respondents, we 
obtained results which were conflicting. The individual interaction dummy variables for 
female patients were all insignificant. However, Wald test results which looked at whether 
MRS for an attribute varies between the male and female respondent group, suggested 
that there was evidence that MRS varied in a statistically significant manner for 4 
variables (even though actual differences in MRS were generally not that large). 
 
Our DCE findings clearly have policy implications in that they are broadly supportive of 
revisions to UK transplant kidney allocation policy in 2006, which reduced the emphasis 
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on transplanting to patients with good tissue matches. However, although the policy shift 
placed less emphasis on tissue matching as an allocation criterion, current policy still 
retains quality of tissue matching as an allocation criterion. Even though this might be 
supported by the majority of patients, evidence from the research presented in this 
chapter suggests that it would not be supported by South Asians and members of non-
white ethnic minorities more generally. Non-white ethnic minorities and South Asians 
would prefer the quality of tissue type matching between donor and recipient to be 
abandoned as a criterion for allocation. They are disadvantaged if transplant allocation is 
based on tissue matching, which no doubt accounts for this finding. UK Transplant’s policy 
shift towards prioritizing those who have waited a long time for a transplant is supported 
by our findings for all ethnic-minority groups, irrespective of gender. However, the other 
shift in emphasis, towards prioritizing younger patients, does not appear to be supported 
by ethnic-minority groups, although it is supported by other patients. 
 
Finally, although we have found some evidence that preferences do vary with gender, 
these differences are not particularly pronounced, which suggests that an attempt to 
facilitate the preferences of people according to gender is a low priority, and that 
addressing the specific needs and disadvantages of ethnic-minority groups should be a 
more urgent consideration, when transplant policy is reassessed. 
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Chapter 7: When simple may be more efficient - Econometric modelling of patient 
discrete choice experiment (DCE) data. Exploring preference heterogeneity, using 
Mixed Logit, a Latent Class Model, or Conditional Logit with dummy variables. 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
In Chapters 5 and 6 issues relating to differences in preferences between respondents’ 
groups for the renal transplant project were addressed using interaction dummy variables. In 
this chapter I explore the application of both Mixed Logit and Latent Class Modelling (LCM) 
which expose unobserved preference heterogeneity, upon data relating to patient 
preferences for renal transplants. As indicated in Chapter 1 (section D), Mixed Logit is now 
increasingly used to establish DCE preferences econometrically in a manner that, at the 
same time, facilitates some assessment of whether preferences are heterogeneous. In 
addition, Latent Class Models (LCM) have also begun to be used in recent years. Such 
models provide an alternative form of econometric analysis which can be used to assess 
whether DCE respondents’ preferences are characterized by preference heterogeneity at all. 
Prior to the introduction of these econometric approaches, health economists often relied on 
the application of interaction dummy variables to explore observable preference 
heterogeneity using DCE data. In this chapter, I compare all 3 approaches to examining 
preference heterogeneity, alongside models which do not cater for heterogeneity. This is to 
establish what additional information these methods catering for preference heterogeneity 
provide. The techniques are applied to patient DCE data relating to respondents’ preferences 
for alternative priority criteria for kidney transplantation. 
 
We analysed discrete choice experiment (DCE) data using Random Effects Logit, Conditional 
Logit, Mixed Logit, LCM, and Conditional Logit with dummy variables. Data were analysed for 
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a sample of 863 renal patient responses elicited using the patient renal transplant DCE 
questionnaire (whose responses were complete enough for them to be analysed using all 5 
econometric models). 
 
I recognize that both Mixed Logit and LCM are welcome additions to the health economist’s 
tool box. This is because models which don’t cater for preference heterogeneity and present 
average valuations might mask preference heterogeneity which Mixed Logit / LCM could 
expose. In addition, I wanted to compare the application of Mixed Logit and LCM to a more 
basic Conditional Logit model with interaction dummy variables. The reason for this is 
because I wanted to establish whether, if differences in preferences are anticipated for 
defined respondent groups, a simpler econometric model informed by prior expectations 
might be more revealing than reliance upon Mixed Logit / LCM (without the use of interaction 
dummy variables, or having an LCM which looks at the impact of respondent characteristics 
upon latent class membership). 
 
2. Background.  
 
Recently a number of discrete choice experiment analyses have been conducted which also 
assess preference heterogeneity using either Mixed Logit of Latent Class Models. 
 
During 2001 – 2008 there were 6 such studies (Hall, Fiebig et al. 2006, Goto, Nishimura et al. 
2007, Lancsar, Hall et al. 2007, Hole 2008, Kjae and Gyrd-Hansen 2008, Negrin, Pinilla et al. 
2008) which used Mixed Logit (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012). One of these studies 
(Hole 2008) also conducted LCM alongside Mixed Logit (the only paper using such analysis 
during 2001 – 2008). 
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However, more recently for the period 2009 – 2011 there have been far more published 
analyses using Mixed Logit (Eberth, Watson et al. 2009, Hauber, Mohamed et al. 2009, 
Howard and Salkeld 2009, Ozdemir, Johnson et al. 2009, Regier, Friedman et al. 2009, van 
Helvoort-Postulart, Dellaert et al. 2009, van Helvoort-Postulart, van der Weijden et al. 2009, 
Blaauw, Erasmus et al. 2010, de Bekker-Grob, Hofman et al. 2010, Johnson, Ozdemir et al. 
2010, Scuffham, Whitty et al. 2010, Wittink, Cary et al. 2010, Goto, Takahashi et al. 2011, 
Mohamed, Epstein et al. 2011, Oteng, Marra et al. 2011, Potoglou, Burge et al. 2011, 
Scalone, Watson et al. 2011, Sweeting, Whitty et al. 2011, Whitty, Scuffham et al. 2011)  
Also, during this period 3 analyses used LCM (Grindrod, Marra et al. 2010, Mentzakis, Ryan 
et al. 2011, Mentzakis, Stefanowska et al. 2011).  
 
3. Methods. 
 
The DCE study involves respondents making choices, about which one of two hypothetical 
transplant recipients (differing in characteristics) should receive a kidney. The data used is 
DCE patient data from the renal transplant study (full details are provided in Chapter 5). For 
the purposes of the analysis contained in this chapter, only the DCE responses obtained from 
patients are evaluated. 
 
3.1. Pilot exercise. 
 
Details of the thorough DCE pilot exercise conducted are provided in Chapter 5 (section 3.1). 
 
3.2. Attributes and levels –final DCE. 
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Details of how attributes and levels were selected for the final DCE are provided in section 
3.2 of Chapter 5. Details of final attributes and levels are in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Final attributes and levels. 
Attribute Variable 
name 
Levels Interpretation of 
coefficients.  
Time spent 
awaiting 
transplantation 
wait 1 month, 2 years, and 10 years. Indirect utility of each 1 
year reduction in transplant 
recipient waiting time. 
Tissue type 
matching. 
tiss Non-favourable match: 86% 
average kidney survival rate post-
transplant. 
 
Favourable match: 89% average 
kidney survival rate post-transplant. 
 
Perfect match: 90% average kidney 
survival rate post-transplant. 
Indirect utility of prioritizing 
people for each 1% 
improvement in kidney 
survival. 
How many 
child or adult  
dependents 
recipients 
have 
dep None, 1, or 4 dependents. Indirect utility of each 
additional dependent. 
Recipient age age 20 years, 45 years, and 65 years Indirect utility for each 1 
year reduction in recipient 
age. 
Diseases 
predominantly 
affecting life 
expectancy 
dis1 
 
 
 
 
 
dis2 
Moderate disease (uncontrolled 
hypertension or obesity) & Kidney 
disease rather than no disease 
affecting life expectancy (other than 
Kidney disease). 
 
Severe disease (heart attack, 
stroke, or diabetes with 
complications) rather than no 
disease affecting life expectancy 
(other than Kidney disease). 
Indirect utility of having 
moderate rather than no 
disease predominantly 
affecting life expectancy. 
 
 
Indirect utility of having 
severe disease rather than 
no disease predominantly 
affecting life expectancy. 
Diseases 
predominantly 
affecting 
quality of life 
ill1 
 
 
 
 
 
ill2 
Moderate disease (mild asthma) 
rather than no disease affecting 
quality of life (other than Kidney 
disease) 
 
 
Severe disease (severe arthritis) 
affecting quality of life rather than 
no disease affecting quality of life 
(other than Kidney disease) 
Indirect utility of having 
moderate disease rather 
than no disease 
predominantly affecting 
quality of life.  
 
Indirect utility of having 
severe disease rather than 
no disease predominantly 
affecting quality of life. 
 
 
3.3. Development of final DCE.  
 
Details of design of the DCE are reported in Chapter 5 (section 3.3). 
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3.4. Questionnaire distribution.  
 
Details of questionnaires distribution is provided in Chapter 5 (section 3.4). The patient 
questionnaire is the first one in appendix E. 
 
 3.5.0 Selection of Econometric models. 
 
Some authors have argued that for forced choice DCE designs, random effects probit or 
random effects logit should normally be considered the econometric model of choice (Amaya-
Amaya and Gerard 2008, de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012).  Such models automatically 
cater for multiple responses from each respondent..The increased interest in the use of 
conditional logit as an alternative to random effects logit or random effects probit is in part 
related to the increased use of DCE models with more than 2 choices. For example, when 
there are 2 choices plus an opt out (Kruijshaar, Essink-Bot et al. 2009), or where there are 3 
choices (de Bekker-Grob, Essink-Bot et al. 2008), or 2 choices plus a do-nothing option 
(Rennie, Porteous et al. 2012).  
 
However, recently an increasing number of published DCEs have involved the application of 
conditional logit when only 2 options are compared without an opt-out (Guimaraes, Marra et 
al. 2009, Guimaraes, Marra et al. 2010, Stolk, Oppe et al. 2010, Swinburn, Lloyd et al. 2011, 
Park, Jo et al. 2012, Robyn, Barnighausen et al. 2012, McNamara, Chen et al. 2013). The 
use of conditional logit may be justified in such circumstances if conditional logit models are 
associated with improvements in the ‘goodness of fit’ in the model over and above models 
such as random effects logit. This is why in this analysis a basic  random effects logit model 
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(3.5.1) is compared with a basic conditional logit model (3.5.2) to see which model appears to 
be associated with a better ‘goodness of fit’.  
 
I also wanted to apply conditional logit, because a comparison between conditional logit with 
interaction dummy variables alongside mixed logit or LCM, may then be generalizable to 
cases with more than 2 response options (for which random effects logit or random effects 
probit are not applicable). However, since the basic  conditional logit model does not involve 
an error term catering for multiple responses from each respondent (like random effects logit 
or random effects problit) the error term needs correcting to allow for multiple responses from 
each respondent through the specification of a data clustering command. This chapter begins 
by applying two very basic models which do not provide any information relating to 
preference heterogeneity. They are random effects logit - model 1 (3.5.1) and conditional logit 
with a clustering error term controlling for multiple responses - model 2 (3.5.2). Thereafter, 
models which allow for unobserved preference heterogeneity are adopted including Mixed 
Logit - model 3 (3.5.3) and a Latent Class Model (LCM) -model 4 (3.5.4). Finally a conditional 
logit model with interaction dummy variables – model 5 (3.5.5) for ethnic minority respondents 
is adopted (including the clustering command). This model makes some preference 
heterogeneity not observable in models 1 and 2 (relating to differences in preferences 
amongst ethnic minority respondents) observable. However, it does not allow for assessment 
of other unobserved preference heterogeneity which the Mixed Logit and LCM models cater 
for.  For the final analysis – model 5 (3.5.5) I decided I would apply a conditional logit model 
rather than a random effects model, if data analysis comparing model 1 (random effects logit) 
and 2 (conditional logit with an error correction term) showed that model 2 was associated 
with better ‘goodness of fit’ compared to model 1(measured by Mc Faddens R2 and the % of 
values accurately predicted by the model). 
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3.5.1 Econometric model – Random Effects Logit. 
 
All the econometric analysis was conducted in STATA. We first used a Random Effects Logit 
model (model 1), to establish patient preferences. Variables are defined in table 1. Here, we 
assume a utility model (Uit) which can be modeled as a function of the levels of attributes, 
using a binary dependent model (Yit), for individuals (i = 1 to n), where ‘n’ denotes the total 
number of respondents, in each choice set (t = 1 to16). The term µi is the random effects error 
term and ξit is the other error term. 
 
Uit = β0 + β1waitit +β2tissit +β3depit+β4ageit+β5dis1it +β6dis2it +β7ill1it+β8ill2it + µi+ξit 
 
Yit = β0 + β1waitit +β2tissit +β3depit+β4ageit+β5dis1it +β6dis2it +β7ill1it+β8ill2it + µi+ξit  
      
 
(Model 1) 
3.5.2. Econometric model – Conditional Logit. 
 
Here, we again assume a utility model (Uijt) which can be modeled using the dependent 
variable Yijt which is a function of the specified attribute variables, and ξijt (the error term). The 
term µi caters for multiple responses from each respondent using the clustering command in 
STATA. With the conditional logit model (model 2) choice amongst alternatives is modeled as 
function of the characteristics of the alternatives, so it is well suited to estimating behavioural 
models (Hoffman and Duncan 1988). Here we have individuals (i = 1 to n), were ‘n’ denotes 
the total number of respondents who choose an alternative (j = 1 or 2), in each choice set (t = 
1 to 16). 
 
Uijt = β1waitijt +β2tissijt +β3depijt+β4ageijt+β5dis1ijt +β6dis2ijt +β7ill1ijt+β8ill2ijt + µi +ξijt 
 
Yijt = β1waitijt +β2tissijt +β3depijt+β4ageijt+β5dis1ijt +β6dis2ijt +β7ill1+β8ill2ijt+ µi +ξijt 
 
(Model 2) 
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3.5.3. Econometric model – Mixed Logit. 
 
In order to establish whether there was preference heterogeneity we used Generalized Linear 
Latent and Mixed Models [GLAMMs] (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal et al. 2004). The Mixed Logit 
model establishes the mean value of coefficients, and then provides a secondary layer of 
coefficients indicating the standard deviation of each of the regressors. The initial estimating 
equation (Eberth, Watson et al. 2009) specified has a similar form to Model 2 (although a 
Mixed Logit model needs to be specified in the econometric package used, which in this case 
was STATA). The similarity of the estimating  model is because Mixed Logit is similar to 
Conditional Logit except for the fact that parameters are permitted to vary according to 
prescribed statistical distributions. Therefore preference heterogeneity is incorporated into the 
model by treating the coefficients as random rather than fixed parameters (Eberth, Watson et 
al. 2009).  
 
With Mixed Logit an important issue is “choosing the coefficients that are allowed to vary and 
the distribution they should take” (P1084) (Hole 2008). This means I needed to decide 
whether all the variables are specified with random coefficients, or some are specified as 
fixed, and also what distribution to assume for the random parameters.  
In relation to the choice of distribution for the random coefficients, the most common 
assumption when applying Mixed Logit seems to be to assume a normal distribution (Hole 
2008) which is what I assumed. However, an alternative might be to assume a log normal 
distribution (Revelt and Train 1998, Hole 2008) for the error term, and for the random 
variables. A log normal distribution has the property that “Since the log-normal distribution 
has positive probabilities only for values greater than zero, specifying a coefficient to be log-
normally distributed ensures that it has a positive sign for all individuals. If an attribute is 
expected to have a negative coefficient (such as waiting time and cost) the attribute is 
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multiplied by -1 before entering the model and the estimated distribution interpreted as the 
mirror image of the actual distribution of the coefficient” (Hole 2008). However for our data 
assuming a log normal distribution would impose unrealistic restrictions upon preferences. 
This is because a group of DCE respondents do not value the priority criteria as we might 
expect. It may appear counter-intuitive to prioritize those who have waited a short time rather 
than those who have waited a long time, or to prioritize those with poor tissue match rather 
than good tissue match, etc. However, some respondents might do so out of self-interest, 
because they want  to prioritize potential recipients with similar characteristics to themselves. 
Whilst there may be a case for assuming a log-normal distribution to cater variables for which 
we would expect all respondents to have the same sign (Revelt and Train 1998), because 
some patient respondents prioritized potential recipients like themselves whilst others 
responded altruistically, all our attributes might rationally be valued either positively or 
negatively. Therefore I assumed a normal distribution for all random variables. Moreover, 
because all the variables might potentially be subject to preference heterogeneity I specified 
a model which allowed all the variables to be treated as random. I also assumed a utility 
model (Uijt) which can be modeled using Yijt  (the dependent variable), which is a function of 
the variables listed below, and ξijt (the error term). We have individuals (i = 1 to n), were ‘n’ 
denotes the total number of respondents who choose an alternative (j = 1,..2), in each choice 
set (t = 1,…16). 
 
Uijt = β1waitijt +β2tissijt +β3depijt+β4ageijt+β5dis1ijt +β6dis2ijt +β7ill1ijt+β8ill2ijt +ξijt 
 
Yijt = β1waitijt +β2tissijt +β3depijt+β4ageijt+β5dis1ijt +β6dis2ijt +β7ill1ijt+β8ill2ijt + ξijt 
 
(Model 3) 
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3.5.4. Econometric model – Latent Class Model. 
 
After running a Mixed Logit model we ran a LCM (model 4). Like Mixed Logit the LCM 
technique  allows coefficients to vary between respondents (Hole 2008). A good exposition of 
the statistical methodology underpinning both Mixed Logit and the LCM technique is provided 
in the discussion paper and published paper produced by Hole (Hole 2007, Hole 2008). So 
readers with an interest in the underlying statistical methodology are referred to that work. 
The crucial defining characteristic of the LCM technique (Mentzakis, Ryan et al. 2011) is that 
the continuous distribution of heterogeneity is approximated by a number of finite ‘points of 
support,’ which can be understood as sorting individuals into discrete classes (Greene 2007). 
However, ‘which class contains any particular individual, whether known or not to that 
individual is unknown to the analyst’ (Greene 2007). 
 
In order to determine the optimum number of classes for the Latent Class model we 
increased the number of classes until the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and Bayesian 
Information Criteria (BIC) suggested we had the optimum number of classes. We continued 
to increase the number of classes by one class until the AIC and BIC figures stopped falling 
and began to increase. Both the AIC and BIC reached their lowest level when the model had 
4 latent classes, and then began to increase as the number of latent classes increased to 5. 
Consequently, both the AIC and BIC suggested that the optimum number of latent classes for 
the Latent Class model was 4. So in the results section we present results for a Latent Class 
model with 4 latent classes (model 4 in the results section).  
 
This model is very complex and therefore is not readily amenable to being expressed using 
long hand estimating equations like models 1, 2, 3, and 5. Moreover, it is unlike models 1, 2, 
3, and 5, in the sense that the number of classes chosen for analysis is not pre-specified, but 
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it is determined by increasing the number of classes of an LCM until the Akaike Information 
Criteria (AIC), and Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) both reach their lowest level 
(something that is determined by expanding the number of classes until both the AIC and BIC 
stop falling and begin to rise).  
 
So given the models complexity I am following the convention of a previous published LCM 
analysis of DCE data (Grindrod, Marra et al. 2010), in that I only present the details of the 
estimating equations for more basic models in this methods section. Indeed in their analysis 
(Grindrod, Marra et al. 2010), the authors only outlined the details of the estimating equation 
for a more basic multinomial model which they estimated alongside their LCM. However, by 
setting out the estimating model for their multinomial model first, before conducting their LCM, 
the authors gave readers an indication of the variables that must be estimated for LCM 
(although of course the LCM model has to also allow for estimation of coefficients for each of 
these variables, for each of the latent classes). 
 
Therefore in the same way, I am pointing out here that for our LCM we attempted to obtain 
coefficient estimates for the value of attribute changes for exactly the same attributes, 
specified in the equation for the Conditional Logit model (model 2). However the LCM model 
derives these coefficients separately for each of the 4 latent class groupings. This should be 
readily apparent from the LCM results reported in section 4.5 of this chapter. 
 
3.5.5. Conditional Logit Model with interaction dummy variables. 
 
Model 5, is a Conditional Logit Model which compares ethnic and non-ethnic minority patient 
preferences. I decided to use interaction dummy variables to see how preferences varied in 
the ethnic minority group because I considered that for the reasons discussed in Chapters 5 
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and 6, there are strong reasons to expect preferences might vary across different ethnic 
groups of respondents in relation to transplant allocation criteria. Moreover, from a policy 
making perspective in my view this is probably the most important dimension of preference 
heterogeneity that requires consideration. In Chapters 5 and 6, I have used Random Effects 
Probit models. However, because all the models used in this chapter are Logit Models I have 
used Conditional Logit with dummy variables in this chapter instead (so that for consistency 
all the models considered in this chapter are Logit models). 
 
The ethnic minority patient category (like that used in Chapter 5) included all patients in an 
ethnic category except ‘White British.’ Here, we assume the underlying utility model Uijt is 
modeled using the dependent variable Yijt , which is a function of variables listed in the 
equation below, and ξijt (the error term). The term µi caters for multiple responses from each 
respondent using the clustering command in STATA. We have individuals (i = 1 to n), where 
‘n’ denotes the total number of respondents, who choose an alternative (j = 1,..2), in each 
choice set (t = 1,…16). DE is a dummy variable, DE = 1, for ethnic minorities, 0 otherwise. 
 
Yijt = β1waitijt +β2tissijt +β3depijt+β4ageijt+β5dis1ijt +β6dis2ijt +β7ill1ijt+β8ill2ijt 
 
+β9DEijtwaitijt+β10DEijttissijt+β11DEijtdepijt+β12DEijtageijt+β13DEijtdis1ijt+ 
 
+β14DE ijt dis1ijt +β15DE ijt ill1ijt +β16DE ijt ill2 ijt+ µi +ξijt      
  
 
(Model 5) 
 
Model 5 establishes whether preferences differ between ethnic and non-ethnic minority 
patients. If any ethnic minority interaction dummies (β9….β16) are significant, they indicate that 
preferences differ between ethnic minorities and non-ethnic minorities for the associated 
attribute(s).   
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3.6. Statistical methods for Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS). 
 
MRS relates the ratio of changes in other attributes to changes in waiting times (see table 2). 
In order to make sense of the MRS formula for the LCM analysis, the reader is also referred 
to the third column in Table 8 (in the LCM model results section), which indicates the 
coefficient labels used for MRS & Wald tests for each of the coefficients in the estimated 
model. We used the Delta method (Wooldridge 2002) using command ‘nlcom’ in STATA, for 
95% confidence intervals, to establish the statistical significance or insignificance of MRS. 
 
Wald tests using ‘testnl’ in STATA for model 4 considered whether MRS differed significantly 
between the 4 latent classes for a given variable. So for example the Wald test conducted 
relating to tissue match is β2 / β1 = β11 / β10 = β20 / β19= β29 / β28.  
 
Wald tests using ‘testnl’ for model 5 established whether MRS differed significantly between 
ethnic minority vs. non-ethnic minority patients.  Thus to establish (model 5) whether 
preferences for tissue matching differed between ethnic and non-ethnic minorities, the 
hypothesis is β2 / β1 = (β2 + β10) / (β1 + β9) i.e. was tissue match MRS for non-ethnic and 
ethnic minorities identical (p ≤ 0.05 indicates a difference at the 5% level). 
 
4. Results.  
 
4.1. Sample.   
 
Table 3 indicates respondent characteristics.  UK Renal Registry data (Byrne, Ford et al. 
2008, Byrne, Steenkamp et al. 2008) was used to assess patient sample representativeness. 
Of the 850 / 863 patients who indicated ethnicity, 762 / 850 patients (89.65%) were white 
(British), and 24 / 850 (2.82%) were white ethnic minorities, so 92.47% are white. UK 
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Table 2: Calculating MRS – Valuing attributes compared to a 1 year difference in 
waiting time . 
Models 1, 2, & 3 
 
Variable 
 
 
MRS 
  
wait    
tiss β2 / β1    
dep β3 / β1    
age β4 / β1    
dis1 β5 / β1    
dis2 β6 / β1    
ill1 β7 / β1    
ill2 β8 / β1    
Model 4 
Variable 
MRS – Latent 
class 1 
Model 4 
Variable 
MRS – Latent class 
2 
wait  wait  
tiss β2 / β1  tiss β11 / β10 
dep β3 / β1  dep β12 / β10 
age β4 / β1  age β13 / β10 
dis1 β5 / β1  dis1 β14 / β10 
dis2 β6 / β1  dis2 β15 / β10 
ill1 β7 / β1  ill1 β16 / β10 
ill2 β8 / β1  ill2 β17 / β10 
Model 4 
Variable 
MRS – Latent 
class 3 
Model 4 
Variable 
MRS – Latent class 
4 
wait  wait  
tiss β20 / β19 tiss β29 / β28 
dep β21 / β19 dep β30 / β28 
age β22 / β19 age β31 / β28 
dis1 β23 / β19 dis1 β32 / β28 
dis2 β24 / β19 dis2 β33 / β28 
ill1 β25 / β19 ill1 β34 / β28 
ill2 β26 / β19 ill2 β35 / β28 
Model 5 
Variable 
Non-ethnic 
minority MRS 
Model 5 
Variable 
Ethnic minority 
MRS 
wait  wait  
tiss β2 / β1  tiss (β2 + β11) / (β1 + β10) 
dep β3 / β1  dep (β3 + β12) / (β1 + β10) 
age β4 / β1  age (β4 + β13) / (β1 + β10) 
dis1 β5 / β1  dis1 (β5 + β14) / (β1 + β10) 
dis2 β6 / β1  dis2 (β6 + β15) / (β1 + β10) 
ill1 β7 / β1  ill1 (β7 + β16) / (β1 + β10) 
ill2 β8 / β1  ill2 (β8 + β17) / (β1 + β10) 
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incidence data (Byrne, Ford et al. 2008) suggested 79.7% of renal patients are white, so 
whites are over-represented in our survey.  Overall, 60 / 850 (7.06%) patients indicating 
ethnicity were non-white, compared with a 20.3% incidence rate (Byrne, Ford et al. 2008), 43 
/ 60 non-white patients were South Asians (4.98% of those indicating ethnicity) compared to a 
10.5% incidence (Byrne, Ford et al. 2008).  480/863 patients (55.62%) were male, 383 / 863 
(44.38%) were female. Graphically presented Renal Registry data (Byrne, Ford et al. 2008) 
reassuringly indicated slightly higher proportions of male than female patients across age 
 
Table 3: Sample characteristics. 
 Patients 
(n = 863) 
AGE  
Mean age 54. 75years 
  
GENDER  
Male  480 (55.62%) 
Female  383(44.38%) 
  
  
ETHNICITY  
White (British) 762 (88.19%) 
White ethnic minorities 24 (2.78%) 
Non-white ethnicity (excluding Asians) 17 (1.97%) 
Non-white ethnicity (Asians)  43 (4.98%) 
Not indicated 13 (1.51%) 
  
DEPENDENT CHILDREN  
0 718 (83.19%) 
1  70 (8.11%) 
2  48 (5.56%) 
3  12 (41.39%) 
> 3  7 (0.81%) 
Not indicated 8 (0.93%) 
  
DEPENDENT ADULTS  
0 717 (83.08%) 
1  113 (13.09%) 
2  16 (1.85%) 
> 2 6 (0.70%) 
Not indicated 11 (1.27%) 
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groups. Average sample patient age was 54.75 years (median 56.9 years), and Renal 
Registry data median age (57.3 years) was virtually identical (Byrne, Ford et al. 2008).  
 
The patient sample comprised:  440 / 863 (50.98%) with successful transplants and 116 / 863 
(13.44%) whose transplant failed. Renal Registry prevalence data (Byrne, Steenkamp et al. 
2008) suggests 46.9% of patients have successful transplants (close to our figure). There is 
no incidence / prevalence data for other categories.  
 
4.2. Econometric results - Model 1 (Random Effects Logit). 
 
Table 4: Random Effects Logit (model 1). 
Attribute Coefficient MRS p-value for MRS 
    
wait .1333**   
tiss .1440** 1.08** 0.000 
dep .1894** 1.42** 0.000 
age --.0101** -0.08** 0.000 
dis1 -.1004* -0.76* 0.030 
dis2 --1.641** -12.30** 0.000 
ill1 ..1738** 1.30** 0.004 
ill2 .0712 0.53 0.234 
    
Mc Fadden R2 0.1726 Proportion of 
values  accurately 
predicted by the 
model 
64.20% 
* Indicates significance at the 5% level, but no at the 1% significance level 
** Indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
Results from the Random Effects Logit model 1 (table 4) suggest that patients value a 1% 
improvement in the 12 month kidney transplant survival rate significantly (MRS=1.08) slightly 
more than a 1 year additional wait (the denominator for MRS). Patients also value prioritizing 
those with more dependent adults or children more, and MRS is significant and equals 1.42 
for each additional dependent (i.e. those with dependents should wait 1.42 years less for 
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every dependent they have). Potential transplant recipients who are older are prioritized less 
(MRS = -0.08). Those with a moderate disease (uncontrolled hypertension or obesity) & 
Kidney disease affecting life expectancy rather than no disease other than kidney disease are 
prioritized less than those with no disease affecting life expectancy (apparent because the 
MRS on dis1 is negative and = -0.76). Likewise those with a severe disease (heart attack, 
stroke, or diabetes with complications) affecting life expectancy rather than no disease other 
than kidney disease affecting life expectancy are prioritized far less than those with no 
disease (apparent because the MRS on dis2 is negative and = -12.30). 
 
Those with moderate disease (mild asthma) rather than no disease affecting quality of life 
(other than Kidney disease) are prioritized more than those with no disease affecting quality 
of life (MRS on ill1 is significant and = 1.30), this may be because many patient respondents 
themselves may have moderate diseases affecting quality of life. The MRS for ill2 is 
insignificant, suggesting that having severe rather than no disease affecting quality of life 
should not be a significant determinant of who is prioritized for transplants according to our 
patient group (a somewhat unexpected result). 
 
4.3. Econometric results - Model 2 (Conditional Logit). 
 
The Conditional Logit model (involving the use of the clustering command to control for 
multiple responses from each respondent) performs better than Random Effects Logit in 
terms of measures of goodness of fit (Mc Fadden R2and the proportion of values accurately 
predicted by the model). Results from model 2, (table 5) again suggest that patients value a 
1% improvement in the 12 month kidney transplant survival rate of 1% significantly (MRS = 
1.19). Patients also value prioritizing those with more dependent adults or children more, and 
MRS is significant and equals 1.60 for each additional dependent. Potential transplant 
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recipients who are older are prioritized less (MRS = -0.09). Those with a moderate disease 
(uncontrolled hypertension or obesity) & Kidney disease affecting life expectancy rather than 
no disease other than kidney disease are prioritized less than those with no disease affecting 
life expectancy (apparent because the MRS on dis1 is negative and = -0.99). Likewise those 
with a severe disease (heart attack, stroke, or diabetes with complications) affecting life 
expectancy rather than no disease other than kidney disease affecting life expectancy are 
prioritized far less than those with no disease (apparent because the MRS on dis2 is negative 
and = -13.33).The MRS for ill1 and ill2 are both insignificant, suggesting that having moderate 
or severe diseases affecting quality of life should not be a determinant of who is prioritized for 
transplants according to our patient group. 
 
Table 5: Conditional Logit (model 2). 
Attribute Coefficient MRS p-value for MRS 
wait .0968**   
tiss .1151** 1.19** 0.000 
dep .1550** 1.60** 0.000 
age -.0090** -0.09** 0.000 
dis1 -.0961* -0.99* 0.025 
dis2 -1.290** -13.33** 0.000 
ill1 -.0206 -0.21 0.719 
ill2 -.0050 -0.05 0.931 
    
Mc Fadden R2 0.2199 Proportion of 
values  accurately 
predicted by the 
model 
71.14% 
* Indicates significance at the 5% level, but no at the 1% significance level 
** Indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
4.4. Econometric results - Model 3 (Mixed Logit). 
 
The Mixed Logit results (model 3, table 6) also suggest that  that patients value a 1% 
improvement in the 12 month kidney transplant survival rate of 1% significantly (MRS=1.24). 
Patients also value prioritizing those with more dependent adults or children more, and MRS 
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is significant and equals 1.82 for each additional dependent. Potential transplant recipients 
who are older are prioritized less (MRS = -0.08). dis1 is insignificant suggesting that those 
with moderate diseases affecting life expectancy are not prioritized more than those with no 
diseases affecting life expectancy. However, those with a severe disease (heart attack, 
stroke, or diabetes with complications) affecting life expectancy rather than no disease other 
than kidney disease affecting life expectancy are prioritized far less than those with no 
disease (apparent because the MRS on dis2 is negative and = -13.44). The MRS for ill1 and 
ill2 are both insignificant, suggesting that having moderate or severe diseases affecting 
quality of life should not be a determinant of who is prioritized for transplants.  
 
Table 6: Mixed Logit results (model 3) 
Attribute Coefficient MRS p-value for MRS 
    
Mean    
wait .1210**   
tiss .1506** 1.24** 0.000 
dep .2201** 1.82** 0.000 
age -.0099** -.08** 0.000 
dis1 -.0838 -.07 0.123 
dis2 -1.626** -13.44** 0.000 
ill1 -.0400 -.33 0.619 
ill2 .0387 .32 0.622 
    
Standard deviation    
wait -.0568**   
tiss -.0207   
dep .2145**   
age -.0145**   
dis1 .0362   
dis2 1.172**   
ill1 .0957   
ill2 .0159   
    
Mc Fadden R2 0.2411 Proportion of 
values  accurately 
predicted by the 
model 
72.78% 
* Indicates significance at the 5% level, but not at the 1% significance level 
** Indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Most importantly in terms of investigating preference heterogeneity the Mixed Logit results 
suggest that preference heterogeneity is statistically significant with respect to the variables 
wait, dep, age, and dis2. Given that wait is the denominator used to calculate MRS, this 
suggests that preference heterogeneity might impact upon estimated MRS when a Latent 
Class model is used. 
 
When standard deviations (SD) are significant upon attributes with significant mean values, 
then if the SD are large in relation to the mean, then this indicates that there is “considerable 
diversity in the way people value these attributes” (Hall, Fiebig et al. 2006). If you want to 
cater for diversity you may want to offer a range of provision which varies for those attributes 
which patients seem to value differently (i.e. with significant standard deviation), particularly if 
SD is large relative to the mean.  
 
Of importance is the fact that the standard deviations (for those coefficients which are 
significant) are sometimes quite large in relation to the mean values. For ‘wait’ the SD = -
.0568, which is sizeable compared to the mean .1210. For ‘tiss’ the SD (.0207) is 
insignificant, for ‘dep’ SD (.2145), is a similar size to the mean (.2201); for ‘age’ SD (-.0145) 
and mean (-.0099). For dis1 both the mean and SD are insignificant. For ‘dis2’ the SD (1.172) 
is sizeable relative to the mean (-1.626). Finally ill1 and ill2 both have an insignificant SD and 
mean, so these variables do not impact preferences in a significant manner.  
 
It is also possible to use information from the Mixed Logit model to permit calculation of the 
proportion of the population for whom a treatment characteristic has a positive or negative 
effect (Hole 2008, Eberth, Watson et al. 2009) if both the mean and standard deviation are 
significant.  This may provide useful information to enable healthcare providers to select the 
characteristics of service provision in a manner which is utility maximizing for a diverse 
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patient population. So using the significant results from the basic  Mixed Logit Model (table 5), 
For ‘wait’ 9.7% valued it negatively and 90.3% valued it positively; for ‘dep’ 16.8% valued it 
negatively and 83.2% valued it positively; for ‘age’ 68.9% valued it negatively and 31.1% 
valued it positively; for ‘dis2’ 86.3% valued it negatively and 13.7% valued it positively. 
However, such figures may simply be an artefact of the assumption of normality (Hole 2008), 
so if the assumption of normally distributed random parameters does not hold neither will 
such figures. To be confident these results might be valid, we would want to ensure a scale 
heterogeneity model was not a better fit for the data (Fiebig, Keane et al. 2010), and also that 
the assumption of normality for the random parameters was valid. 
 
Often if a cost variable is included in analysis it is treated as fixed, because “willingness to 
pay for each attribute (which is the ratio of the attribute’s coefficient to the price coefficient) is 
thereby distributed in the same way as the attribute’s coefficient” (Revelt and Train 1998). 
This “ensures that the coefficient has the right sign: a normally distributed cost coefficient 
implies that some individuals may prefer an appointment with higher cost which is counter-
intuitive” (Hole 2008). However for this DCE we did not have a cost attribute. Rather instead 
we had a variable relating to waiting time for a transplant, used as the denominator for MRS 
(Marginal Rate of Substitution). 
 
When significant preference heterogeneity in terms of cost cannot be ruled out, there is 
evidence to suggest that models where the data is allowed to vary may fit the data better 
(Meijer and Rouwendal 2006, Hole 2008). Although this DCE did not have a cost attribute we 
had to decide whether to treat the value of the ‘wait’ attribute (used to derive MRS) as fixed or 
to allow it to vary. Since significant preference heterogeneity in relation to the ‘wait’ attribute 
could not be ruled out, and some respondents would value differences in ‘wait’ positively and 
others would value it negatively, we allowed the variable ‘wait’ to vary like all the others.  
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4.5. Econometric results - Model 4 (Latent Class Model). 
 
Table 7: Latent Class Model results (AIC and BIC) according to the number of classes 
in the model. 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 
AIC 
 
8415.54 7889.75↓ 7714.96↓ 7482.22↓ 7545.94↑ 
BIC 
 
8476.75 8019.81↓ 7913.88↓ 7750.00↓ 7882.57↑ 
 
We kept running Latent Class models with increasing numbers of latent classes until both the 
AIC and BIC figures ceased to improve. Both figures continued to improve (i.e. declined) until 
the model had 4 classes (table 7). They then began to deteriorate when a model was applied 
with 5 latent classes. We therefore used a model with 4 latent classes, and some of the 
results are presented in table 8a. Important results presented in table 8a are the fact that the 
probability of belonging to latent class 1 is 0.3017; probability of belonging to latent class 2 is 
0.1983; probability of belonging to latent class 3 is 0.1768; and the probability of belonging to 
latent class 4 is 0.3233. This means that taking the sample as a whole there are different 
probabilies that a respondent will belong to each of the 4 latent class groups (each of which 
are associated with different coefficients for the attributes). 
 
In table 8a the results of the econometric analysis which involves 4 latent classes are 
presented. In order that it can be readily seen which results relate to which latent class, the 
latent class a particular coefficient relates to is indicated by the terms ‘_lc1’ or ‘_lc2’ or ‘_lc3’ 
or ‘_lc4’ after the variable names. This is in order to indicate whether coefficients relate to 
latent classes 1, 2, 3, or 4 respectively. 
 
MRS figures suggest (table 8a) that MRS with respect to tissue match (the value of a 1% 
change in the likelihood of a kidney transplant succeeding for 12 months or more compared 
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to someone waiting one year longer) is always significant and positive, and varies from a 1.28 
low, to a 1.73 high across the 4 latent classes suggesting that patients value prioritizing those 
with a better tissue match between recipient and donor. However, Wald test results (table 9) 
do not support the hypothesis that MRS for tissue match varies across latent classes 
(p=0.4069). The MRS relating to prioritizing those with an extra dependent adult or child 
varies from a low of 0.20 to a high of 3.70 across the 4 latent classes, so MRS is very 
sensitive to class membership for prioritizing those with more dependents, implying that there 
is quite a lot of preference heterogeneity with respect to valuing having dependents. This is 
confirmed by the Wald test (p=0.000) which suggests that MRS for ‘dep’ varies across latent 
classes. MRS relating to the age of recipients varies. Intuitively we would expect people to 
prioritize younger rather than older recipients (because younger recipients generally have 
more potential to benefit from a transplant) so we expect the sign on MRS with respect to 
being a year older to be negative. Interestingly however the coefficient changes sign across 
latent classes. It is positive and significant for classes 1 and 2 (0.13 and 0.11 respectively) 
and becomes negative and significant in classes 3 and 4 (-0.54 and -0.042 respectively). This 
preference heterogeneity is confirmed by the Wald test for MRS for ‘age’ which confirms that 
MRS differs across latent classes (p=0.000). The MRS for ‘dis1’ is not significant in latent 
classes 1 and 4. In latent class 2, MRS is positive and significant at 5.32 and in latent class 3 
it is also positive and significant but higher at 14.52. Wald test results suggest that MRS for 
‘dis1’ varies across latent classes (p=0.000). MRS for dis2 is always significant. In latent class 
2 it is positive at 3.23, but in classes 1, 3, and 4 it is negative, it is -24.59 in latent class 1,  
-11.10 in latent class 3, and -5.36 in latent class 4. Wald test results suggests that MRS for 
‘dis2’ varies across latent classes (p=0.000).  
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Table 8a: Latent Class Model (model 4) results for 4 Latent Classes. 
Attribute Coefficient Coefficient 
label for 
MRS in table 
2, and the 
Wald test in 
table 9 
MRS p-
value 
wait_lc1 .1986** β1   
tiss_lc1 .2541** β2   1.28** 0.000 
dep_lc1 .1465** β3   0.73* 0.012 
age_lc1 .0254 β4   0.13** 0.008 
dis1_lc1 .1421 β5   0.72 0.541 
dis2_lc1 -4.883** β6   -24.59** 0.000 
ill1_lc1 2.219* β7   11.17** 0.000 
ill2_lc1 1.157 β8   5.83* 0.014 
P2_1 -.0691    
wait_lc2 4.198** β10   
tiss_lc2 6.673** β11  1.59** 0.000 
dep_lc2 0.853** β12  0.20** 0.000 
age_lc2 0.441** β13  0.11** 0.000 
dis1_lc2 22.34** β14  5.32** 0.000 
dis2_lc2 13.56** β15  3.23** 0.000 
ill1_lc2 22.47** β16  5.35** 0.000 
ill2_lc2 41.91** β17  9.98** 0.000 
P2_2 -.489**    
wait_lc3 0.252** β19   
tiss_lc3 0.435** β20  1.73** 0.000 
dep_lc3 0.648** β21  2.57** 0.000 
age_lc3 -0.136** β22  -0.54** 0.000 
dis1_lc3 3.659** β23  14.52** 0.000 
dis2_lc3 -2.798** β24  -11.10** 0.000 
ill1_lc3 -0.253 β25  -1.00 0.535 
ill2_lc3 1.50** β26  6.11** 0.002 
P2_3 -.0604**    
wait_lc4 .064** β28   
tiss_lc4 .0838** β29  1.30** 0.000 
dep_lc4 0.2388** β30 3.70** 0.000 
age_lc4 -0.003 β31  -.042 0.329 
dis1_lc4 -0.164* β32  -2.55 0.069 
dis2_lc4 -0.346* β33  -5.36** 0.002 
ill1_lc4 -0.250* β34  -3.87 0.051 
ill2_lc4 -0.152 β35  -2.36 0.205 
Probability class 1: 0.3017  Probability class 2:  0.1983 
Probability class 3: 0.1768  Probability class 4: 0.3233 
Mc Fadden R2 0.3115  Proportion of 
values  accurately 
predicted by the 
model 
83.48
% 
* Indicates significance at the 5% level, but not at the 1% significance level 
** Indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 8b: Latent Class Model (model 4) – Class assignment model information. 
 
 Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 
Probability of 
belonging to 
the class 
0.3017 0.1983 0.1768 0.3233 
     
Variable 
relating to 
patient 
respondent 
characteristics 
Class 1  Class 2 
coefficients 
Class 3 
coefficients 
Class 4 
coefficients 
constant Base class 
 
.955** 1.514** .279** 
ethnic_min Base class .099 .487** .762** 
gender _male Base class -.333** .035 -.099** 
age Base class -.021** -.038** -.005** 
dep_children Base class -.243** -.225** -.099 
dep_adults Base class .201** .066 .251** 
     
* Indicates significance at the 5% level, but not at the 1% significance level. 
** Indicates significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
Table 9: Latent Class Model (model 4) Wald test results for MRS. 
MRS Wald test hypothesis p-value of Wald test 
tiss β2 / β1 = β11 / β10 = β20 / β19 = β29 / β28 0.4069 
dep β3 / β1 = β12 / β10  = β21 / β19 = β30 / β28 0.0000 
age β4 / β1 = β13 / β10 = β22 / β19 = β31 / β28 0.0000 
dis1 β5 / β1 = β14 / β10 = β23 / β19 = β32 / β28 0.0000 
dis2 β6 / β1 = β15 / β10 = β24 / β19 = β33 / β28 0.0000 
ill1 β7 / β1 = β16 / β10 = β25 / β19 = β34 / β28 0.0000 
ill2 β8 / β1 = β17 / β10  = β26 / β19 = β35 / β28 0.0000 
 
The MRS for ‘ill1’ is significant in latent classes 1 and 2 but insignificant in classes 3 and 4. In 
latent class 1 it is 11.17, and in latent class 2 it is 5.35. Wald test results suggest that MRS for 
‘ill1’ varies significantly across latent classes (p=0.000). MRS for ‘ill2’ is significant in classes 
1, 2, and 3. It is 5.83 in class 1, 9.98 in class 2, and 6.11 in class 3, but insignificant in class 
4. Wald test results also suggest that MRS for ‘ill2’ varies significantly across latent classes 
(p=0.000). Therefore the general picture emerging from the 4 class Latent Class model is that 
MRS differs in a statistically significant manner across latent classes for every variable except 
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‘tiss’ (tissue match). This suggests that adopting econometric modeling which allows for 
preference heterogeneity is appropriate. 
 
Information in table 8b is particularly helpful as it indicates whether the patient characteristics 
in question influence the likelihood of being in a particular latent class. With respect to the 
class assignment model variable relating to ethnic minorities (ethnic_min), the dummy 
variable (=1 for ethnic minorities and 0 otherwise) is not significantly different in class 2 
relative to class 1. However, it is significantly different from class 1 in class 3 (coefficient = 
.487) and also for class 4 (coefficient = .762). The coefficients in classes 3 and 4 are both 
positive which implies that individuals in classes 3 and 4 are more likely to be ethnic 
minorities. It is important to note that the valuation of the tissue match coefficient (.0838) is 
lower in class 4 than for all the other latent classes (class 1 = .2541, class 2 = 6.673, class 3 
= 0.435). Moreover class 4 is the class with the highest proportion of ethnic minorities in it. 
This suggests that the presence of ethnic minorities in this latent class group may serve to 
lower the average respondents valuation of the tissue match attribute within that latent class 
group. This fits with the hypothesis that ethnic minorities may disadvantage themselves if 
they value a close tissue match between donor and recipient positively. Somewhat counter-
intuitively however, it would appear that the valuation of having a close tissue match between 
donor and recipient (tiss) is higher in class 3 (coefficient = 0.435) than in class 1 (.2541), 
when class 3 members are statistically significantly more likely to be ethnic minorities than 
class 1 members. This means that the LCM model fails to demonstrate a clear cut 
relationship between the ethnic minority status of respondents and them valuing a close 
tissue match between donor and recipient by less than non-ethnic minorities. In contrast a 
more clear-cut relationship between these variables is illustrated in model 5 below.   
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In relation to the dummy variable (gender _male) relating to gender (=1 for male respondents 
and 0 otherwise), the dummy variable is not significantly different from class 1 in class 3. 
However, it is significantly different and negative in class 2 (coefficient = -.333) and in class 4 
(coefficient= -.099), which implies that individuals in classes 2 and 4 are less likely to be 
male.  
 
In relation to the variable relating to respondents actual age (age), the coefficients for classes 
2 (coefficient = -.021), 3 (=-.038), and 4 (= -.005) all differ significantly, and are all negative 
relative to class 1. This implies just like the published LCM analysis (Mentzakis, Ryan et al. 
2011) which also had negative significant variables relating to age, that individuals in these 
classes (classes 3 and 4) are more likely to be younger.   
 
In relation to the dummy variables relating to whether respondents have dependent children 
(dep_children), this dummy variable  is not significantly different from class 1 in class 4. 
However, in both class 2 (coefficient = -.243) and class 3 (coefficient = -.225), it is 
significantly different and negative relative to class 1.This implies that individuals in classes 2 
and 3 are less likely to have dependent children. 
 
In relation to the dummy variables relating to whether respondents have dependent adults 
(dep_adults), this dummy variable is not significantly different from class 1 in class 3. 
However, it is significantly different and positive in class 2 (coefficient =.201) and class 4 
(coefficient = .251). This implies that individuals in classes 2 and 4 are more likely to have 
adult dependents to look after. 
  
The relevance of latent classes to the policy maker are that the latent classes allow policy 
makers to be aware that within an overall pooled DCE sample there may exist different 
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classes of respondents who value attributes differently. If a policy maker wants to tailor 
healthcare provision to cater for diversity he or she could attempt to ensure that healthcare 
provision is tailored to the needs of respondents from each of the latent classes identified in a 
DCE.  Also, because information on the percentage of the whole sample falling into each of 
the latent classes is generated, this allows the policy maker who wants to customize 
healthcare provision to meet the needs of different latent class groups, to know what 
proportion of people would prefer provision characterized by different provision tailored to the 
preferences of different latent class groups. For example an LCM analysis (Grindrod, Marra 
et al. 2010) found that for the sample of 87 students they had 2 latent classes with 50% in 
each group, the first valued the service type attribute over and above everything else, and 
preferred to work in hospital pharmacies or research internships, whilst the other class of 
students valued personal income and job satisfaction above all the other attributes. Those 
arranging work placements for students could therefore use this information to tailor provision 
for the 2 different classes of students accordingly. In a similar way other latent class DCE 
analyses (Hole 2008, Mentzakis, Ryan et al. 2011, Mentzakis, Stefanowska et al. 2011, 
Waschbusch, Cunningham et al. 2011, Naik-Panvelkar, Armour et al. 2012, Carroll, Al-Janabi 
et al. 2013, de Bekker-Grob, Rose et al. 2013, Whitty, Stewart et al. 2013) define different 
numbers of latent classes, and the analyses show that classes vary in the valuation of 
different attributes. 
 
The relevance of having 4 latent classes for this DCE is that it can be seen that in a relatively 
large sample of respondents (n = 863), 4 different latent classes of respondents can be 
defined who value the attributes relating to priority criteria for renal transplantation differently. 
The fact that we have 4 latent classes is not surprising because we have a relatively large 
sample of DCE respondents. Each of the latent classes is defined by different coefficients for 
the attributes (table 8a). Our LCM analysis (which incorporates class assignment prediction 
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modelling), also allows us to establish whether particular latent classes are more or less likely 
to be categorized by certain respondent characteristics (table 8b).  The findings suggest that 
compared to class 1 (who make up about 30% of the sample, probability = 0.3017), class 2 
members (who make up about 20% of the sample, probability = 0.1983) are less likely to be 
male, less likely to be older (and hence more likely to be younger), less likely to have 
dependent children, but more likely to have dependent adults to care for.  Also compared to 
class 1, class 3 members (who make up about 18% of the sample, probability = 0.1768) are 
more likely to be ethnic minorities, less likely to be older (and hence more likely to be 
younger), and less likely to have dependent children.  Finally, compared to class 1, class 4 
members (who make up about 32% of the sample, probability = 0.3233) are more likely to be 
ethnic minorities, less likely to be male, less likely to be older (and hence more likely to be 
younger), and more likely to have dependent adults to care for. 
 
Crucially however because the objective of renal transplant policy is to establish a set of 
allocation criteria for the UK overall, it is unlikely that a policy could be derived for different 
latent classes of patient preference simultaneously. So in this policy context, the main use of 
the latent class information is to establish those attributes for which patient valuations may 
change sign, or for which the valuation of attributes varies a lot in magnitude. It could be that 
criteria that appear to be valued very differently across the latent classes may be weaker 
candidates to use as allocation criteria, compared to those attributes which never change 
sign, or do not vary as much in magnitude.  
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4.6. Econometric results - Model 5 (Conditional Logit with interaction dummy variables 
for ethnic minorities). 
 
Results for model 5 (table 10) which involves the application of conditional logit using the 
clustering command, suggest that MRS differs in a statistically significant manner between 
ethnic minorities and non-ethnic minorities with respect to tiss, dep, age, dis1 and dis2. Non-
ethnic minority respondents value prioritizing recipients with a closer tissue match positively, 
but ethnic minorities do not (MRS is insignificant). Non-ethnic minorities would prioritize 
recipients with dependents (dep is positive and significant), but amongst ethnic minorities 
MRS for dep is insignificant. Non-ethnic minorities would prioritize older recipients less (MRS 
for age is negative and significant), but amongst ethnic minorities MRS for age is insignificant. 
Non-ethnic minorities have a negative MRS for dis1 which is -1.34, but ethnic minorities have 
a positive MRS of 2.61. However, both figures for MRS are insignificant, but the Wald test 
does suggest that MRS differs significantly between the 2 groups. For dis2, MRS is negative 
and significant amongst non-ethnic minorities (-14.05) amongst ethnic minorities though it is 
positive and significant (6.74). This suggests that non-ethnic minorities would not prioritize 
those with severe disease affecting life expectancy over those with no disease affecting life 
expectancy, whereas ethnic minorities would prioritize those with severe diseases affecting 
life expectancy over those with no disease (perhaps because ethnic minorities are more likely 
to suffer from severe diseases affecting life expectancy). Amongst both non-ethnic minorities 
and ethnic minorities ill1 and ill2 is insignificant (also Wald tests do not suggest that MRS 
differs between non-ethnic minorities and ethnic minorities with respect to ill1 or ill2).  
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Table: 10: Conditional Logit with interaction dummy variables (model 5) for ethnic 
minority groups (88 out of 863 are ethnic minorities).  
Variable Coefficient 
for non-ethnic 
minorities 
MRS for non-
ethnic 
minorities. 
Coefficient 
for dummy 
variables 
for ethnic 
minorities  
MRS for 
ethnic 
minority 
patients 
Wald 
test 
 
p-values 
wait .0099** 1 -.0174 1  
tiss .1242** 1.25** 
 
(0.97 / 1.53) 
-.0609* 0.51 
(-1.08 / 
0.68) 
p=0.000
0 
dep .1584** 1.59** 
 
(1.29 / 1.90) 
-.0114 0.026 
(-0.70/ 
0.75) 
p=0.000
4 
age -.0096** -0.10** 
 
(-.13 / -.07) 
.0040 0.13  
(-.08 / 
0.10) 
p=0.044
3 
dis1 -.1333** -1.34** 
 
(-2.25 / -.43) 
-.2748* 2.61 
(-0.03 / 
5.25) 
p=0.011
5 
dis2 -1.397** -14.05** 
 
(-12.17/ -
15.92) 
.8108** 6.74** 
(3.35 / 
10.14) 
p=0.000
0 
ill1 -.0324 -0.33 
(-1.56 / 0.91) 
.0650 0.60 
(-2.47 / 
3.68) 
p=0.623
5 
ill2 -.0440 -0.44 
(-1.71 / 0.83) 
.2359 2.31 
(-0.815 / 
5.44) 
p=0.154
9 
Mc Fadden R2 0.2235  Proportion 
of values  
accurately 
predicted 
by the 
model 
73.69%  
* Indicates significance at the 5% level, but no at the 1% significance level 
** Indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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5. Discussion. 
 
Baseline findings which do not consider whether preferences are heterogeneous or not 
(models 1 and 2) are broadly supportive of 2006 revisions to UK kidney transplant policy 
which prioritized long waiters and young adults. These analyses indicate that this shift in 
policy was justified, but suggest that other criteria (i.e. prioritizing those with dependents) 
ought to be considered when UK transplant policy is re-appraised. 
 
Models 3 and 4 (Mixed Logit and Latent Class) are general models which can be used to 
assess the extent to which preferences are heterogeneous. Both analyses highlight the fact 
that preferences for some variables are heterogeneous. The Mixed Logit results indicate that 
preference are statistically significantly different (heterogeneous) with respect to 4 / 8 of the 
variables (wait, dep, age, and dis2) indicated by a statistically significant measure of standard 
deviation.  
 
For the Latent Class Model a slightly different measure of heterogeneity was deployed. Here 
we considered it logical to normalize our valuation of all of the other variables in terms of 
waiting time (wait) as in Chapters 5 and 6. So we used ‘wait’ which relates to 1 year of waiting 
time for the denominator to derive MRS. We then used Wald tests to test for equality of MRS 
for each variable across the 4 latent classes.  
 
Both the Mixed Logit and the LCM results in table 8a and 9 failed to provide strong  support 
for the view that preferences for ‘tiss’ (prioritizing those with a close tissue match between 
recipient and donor) were heterogeneous. For the Mixed logit model, the coefficient relating  
to preference heterogeneity, i.e. SD on ‘tiss’ (.0207) was insignificant, Also the Wald test 
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results (table 9) did not provide any evidence to support the view that the valuation of the 
‘tiss’ attribute varied in a statistically significant manner across the 4 latent classes.  
 
The evidence from the LCM class assignment model (table 8b) fails to provide clear-cut 
evidence that ethnic minorities valued the closeness of tissue match variable (tiss) less than 
non-ethnic minorities. Class 4 latent class members have the largest positive coefficient 
relating to ethnic minority status (.762), and they are statistically significantly more likely to be 
ethnic minorities than class 1 members, they also have a lower valuation of the ‘tiss’ variable 
than any other group (.0838). This fits with our hypothesis that ethnic minorities value the 
‘tiss’ variable less than non-ethnic minorities. However, class 3 members are also significantly 
more likely to be ethnic minorities (coefficient = .487) than class 1 members, but they value 
the closeness of tissue match variable more highly (coefficient =.435) in class 3, than those in 
class 1 (coefficient =.2541).   
 
The Wald test results (table 9) for the Latent Class Model (model 4) suggested that 
preferences differed across latent classes for all the other variables (i.e. 6 / 7 of the measures 
of MRS). This is in contrast to the results from the conditional logit model with dummy 
variables which suggested that preferences for ‘tiss’ varied according  to ethnicity. That said 
both the Mixed Logit and LCM uncovered evidence of unobserved preference heterogeneity, 
which the conditional logit with dummy variables model (model 5) could not uncover. 
 
If you take the findings from the Mixed logit and LCM at face value, they might be considered 
to imply that the Latent Class results indicate more preference heterogeneity than Mixed Logit 
results (for which only 4 / 8 variables had a statistically significant standard deviation). 
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This finding should not be unexpected. This is because our Mixed Logit results indicated that 
there is preference heterogeneity with respect to the variable ‘wait’. Since the variable ‘wait’ is 
the denominator that was used to derive MRS for the Latent Class Model, it follows that we 
always use a denominator to derive MRS which is subject to preference heterogeneity. 
Moreover, since our Wald tests for MRS look at variation across 2 variables, whereas the 
Mixed Logit standard deviation measure of heterogeneity assesses heterogeneity only with 
respect to one variable, it is hardly surprising that our Wald test measures for the 4 class 
Latent Class Model seem to imply more evidence of heterogeneity than Mixed Logit results.  
 
Mixed Logit has the advantage that it is simpler to undertake that LCM, and the results 
generated are shorter and hence easier to interpret. However, the main problem with the 
method is that for the results to be valid your distributional assumptions have to be valid. 
Although I consider that there are strong grounds for considering that the use of a log 
distribution is less appropriate than assuming that preference heterogeneity is normally 
distributed (our assumption) for this DCE application, I cannot rule out the possibility that in 
reality preference heterogeneity might exhibit a skewed rather than normal distribution. If this 
was the case then the results of the Mixed Logit (applied here) which assume a normal 
distribution for preference heterogeneity will not be valid. Moreover,  unless I run a scale 
heterogeneity model on this data (Fiebig, Keane et al. 2010) for comparison, I cannot be sure 
that some of the heterogeneity that may be attributed to preference heterogeneity might in 
reality be attributable to scale heterogeneity. There is some support for these concerns, in a 
comparison of results from a Juster scale with a Mixed Logit (MXL) for a health application, 
the analysis concluded that findings lent “support to the findings of Fiebig and colleagues and 
suggests that MXL may not be the optimal model for this dataset.”(Whitty, Rundle-Thiele et 
al. 2012). 
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On balance comparing Mixed Logit and LCM, I consider that the results from the LCM model 
may be more accurate (because such analysis does not require the imposition of 
distributional assumptions relating to heterogeneity). For the Latent Class Model a slightly 
different measure of heterogeneity was deployed. Here we considered it logical to normalize 
our valuation of all of the other variables in terms of waiting time (wait) like all the other 
models in this paper. So we used ‘wait’ which relates to 1 year of waiting time for the 
denominator to derive MRS. However, in contrast to the Mixed Logit model we then used 
Wald tests to test for equality of MRS for each variable across the 4 latent classes. Neither 
the Mixed Logit or LCM results provide much support for the view that preferences for ‘tiss’ 
(prioritizing those with a close tissue match between recipient and donor) were 
heterogeneous in a clear cut manner, a finding which conflicts with the findings of the 
conditional logit with dummy variables model (model 5). 
 
An advantage of the LCM is that distributional assumptions do not have to be made, because 
the discrete distributions in the latent class model can be interpreted as non-parametric 
estimates of the continuous distributions in the mixed logit model (Hole 2008). Whilst a 
difficulty remains in terms of determining the optimal number of latent classes with latent 
class analysis, criteria such as Bayesian and Akaike information criteria can be used to help 
inform the optimal number of latent classes.  
 
One reason why Mixed Logit rather than LCM has been used more for DCEs, is that it is 
computationally easier to undertake. However, as already pointed out information obtained 
from LCM models (Grindrod, Marra et al. 2010) may have the advantage that it can be used 
to customize health care provision to meet the needs of different latent classes of service 
users. Although the Mixed Logit approach is less powerful in this respect, if valid distributional 
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assumptions are applied it may help you identify the fact that certain attributes are subject to 
heterogeneity using a less complicated model than LCM. 
 
The policy implications of the these findings are that Models 1 and Model 2 which did not 
cater for preference heterogeneity at all inevitably failed to identify preference heterogeneity 
exposed by Mixed Logit, LCM, and the conditional logit model with dummy variables. For the 
methodological reasons I have just outlined I am unsure about how reliable the findings from 
the Mixed Logit model are. This means that the policy making value of this analysis, and also 
the information on the percentage of the sample (for variables with significant standard 
deviations) with negative as opposed to positive coefficients may simply be an artifact of 
inappropriate distributional assumptions. Therefore if the distributional assumptions are 
incorrect then the policy making value of the findings is questionable. Without comparing 
Mixed Logit preference heterogeneity model with a scale heterogeneity model (to see which 
is a better fit) I may be attributing some of the heterogeneity to preference heterogeneity 
using Mixed Logit when this is incorrect (Fiebig, Keane et al. 2010).    
 
In contrast the LCM model has the advantage that it does not require us to make 
distributional assumptions about preference heterogeneity, just the number of classes 
included in the model (a process that can be guided using Bayesian and Akaike information 
criteria). So its policy making utility is not particularly questionable on the grounds that the 
results may be invalid because of the potential imposition of inappropriate assumptions about 
the distribution of preference heterogeneity. 
 
Like the Mixed Logit Model, the LCM did not identify any clear cut pattern of preference 
heterogeneity with respect to the ‘tiss’ (closeness of tissue match) variable  (which could be 
related to the ethnic minority status of respondents). In contrast the conditional logit model 
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with interaction dummy variables model did allow us to reach the very policy relevant 
conclusion that the ‘tiss’ variable was valued positively and significantly amongst non-ethnic 
minorities (coefficient on ‘tiss’ was .1254, with a significant MRS of 1.25) however amongst 
ethnic minorities both the coefficient on the variable and MRS were insignificant, and the 
Wald test indicated a significant difference in MRS for this variable between the groups. Of 
course however, the conditional logit with dummy variables model is not equipped to identify 
unobserved preference heterogeneity, whereas the Mixed Logit and LCM models did provide 
information about this. 
 
 
6. Conclusions. 
 
The main finding to highlight, emerging from this analysis, is the fact that whilst both the 
Mixed Logit and LCM results provide no evidence of preference heterogeneity with respect to 
the tissue match attribute (tiss), this is at odds with the findings of the Conditional Logit model 
with dummy variables (model 5). Interestingly, model 5 has dummy variables for ethnic 
minority patient respondents. Many ethnic minorities would be disadvantaging themselves as 
an ethnic group if they favoured prioritizing recipients with a close tissue match between 
donor and recipient. This is because low levels of organ donation amongst some ethnic 
minority groups, mean that these populations are far less likely to be able to get a closely 
tissue matched transplant. Therefore, the fact that model 5 results show that non-ethnic 
minorities would prioritize recipients with a close donor tissue match (MRS = 1.25 for ‘tiss’ 
and highly significant) whereas MRS for ‘tiss’ is insignificant amongst ethnic minorities (a 
difference also highlighted by the Wald test result [p=0.000]) makes intuitive sense. It is 
probably the most noteworthy finding in relation to preference heterogeneity, both in the 
analysis in model 5 reported here, and also in the earlier analysis reported in Chapters 5 and 
6.  
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However, had we not employed an interaction dummy variable model such as model 5 to 
establish whether preferences differ between non-ethnic minorities and ethnic minorities, we 
may have reached the misleading conclusion (based only on Mixed Logit and LCM results 
without interaction dummy variables) that there is no clear-cut evidence of preference 
heterogeneity with respect to the tissue match attribute. This finding suggests that we cannot 
just rely upon blanket application of Mixed Logit or LCM analysis in order to pinpoint 
variations in preferences. Instead, if we anticipate that preferences might vary between 
defined respondent groups, we ought to use dummy variable models to test for this perhaps 
within a Mixed Logit model, or an LCM model . The model 5 results in this paper, and those 
reported in our earlier analysis (see Chapters 5 and 6), suggest that both time spent waiting 
and the quality of tissue match between donor and recipient are of importance to non-ethnic 
minority patients, but that amongst ethnic minority patients closeness of tissue match is not a 
significant determinant of patient preferences. These findings highlight significant issues 
about kidney transplant allocation to those from ethnic minority groups.  
 
In total we obtained 908 patient responses, and 863 of these proved to be complete enough 
to be amenable to data analysis using all 5 econometric models. Both Mixed Logit and LCM 
analysis highlighted the fact that preferences appear to be heterogeneous across many 
variables, and identified a lot of unobserved preference heterogeneity. This was not a 
surprising result given that we had such a large sample for analysis. However, the Mixed 
Logit and LCM applied, proved insufficiently sensitive to highlight any preference 
heterogeneity with respect to the variable ‘tiss’. Only when a model using interaction dummy 
variables for ethnic minority groups was used, did a clear cut pattern of preference 
heterogeneity for this attribute between ethnic groups become apparent. We would therefore 
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suggest that deploying interaction dummy variable models can be particularly useful in that 
they provide an extra layer of information.  
 
The main purpose of the analysis presented in this chapter was to demonstrate that the 
blanket application of either Mixed Logit or LCM techniques to DCE response data is no 
substitute for giving adequate forethought prior to data analysis as to whether or not sub-
groups of respondents might be expected to have different preferences. If differences are 
anticipated then, by using interaction dummy variables, or establishing how preferences 
might vary for sub-groups of respondents using LCM, any differences in preferences for 
defined respondent sub-groups can potentially be established. Indeed, in terms of ‘policy 
making utility’, arguably the findings of the Conditional Logit model with interaction dummy 
variables conferred more information of policy significance about preference heterogeneity 
than the Mixed Logit without dummy variables or our LCM model . 
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Chapter 8: Whose utility is it anyway? Respondent quality of life and choice 
experiment preferences, under a veil of altruism. 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
As indicated in chapter 1 (section E1.4), the DCEs that have been deployed in health (see 
papers reviewed in section D of chapter 1) tend to assume that respondents have a neo-
classical self interested perspective when they answer a DCE.  However, the DCE analysis 
for the renal transplant project (chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8) was applied in a context in which 
altruistic motivations may apply. Indeed, as pointed out in chapter 1, altruistic concerns for 
the welfare of others have been widely cited as the main motivation for organ donation 
(Siminoff, Mercer et al. 2007; Gill and Lowes 2008; Patel, Chadha et al. 2011) Admittedly, 
because we are looking at a slightly different issue from a different direction (i.e. we are 
considering what criteria should be used to allocate kidneys that others have donated), 
altruistic considerations might be less pronounced but may still be relevant. This is why I 
considered it relevant to attempt to establish what motivates patients (i.e. how altruistic they 
might be), when they express their preferences in terms of who should be prioritized for 
kidney transplants. Moreover, having attempted to obtain patients’ self reported information 
about whether they were altruistic when answering the DCE renal transplant questionnaire, 
we then went on to see how the perspective respondents stated they had adopted might have 
affected their preferences. 
 
This chapter reports in more detail the results obtained from analysis of renal patient 
responses to our renal transplant DCE questionnaire. As indicated in earlier chapters 
respondents faced a series of choices which required them to allocate a transplant to either 
patient A or patient B. Levels of attributes varied between the patient A and patient B choices. 
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Attributes for the final questionnaire included time spent awaiting a transplant; quality of 
donor / recipient tissue match; number of adult / child dependents that recipients had; 
whether recipients had diseases affecting life expectancy; and whether recipients had other 
diseases affecting quality of life.  
 
For the patient group of respondents, information on respondent quality of life (measured 
using both Eq-5d and the Visual Analogue Scale) was obtained. We also acquired 
information upon respondents’ self reported altruistic motivations. To this end we posed a 
question to patients about what perspective they adopted when answering the questionnaire. 
Response options for this question were either related to answering in terms of what was best 
for them; answering in terms of what was best for themselves and others; or answering only 
in terms of what was best for others. 
 
Using econometric analysis the possible impact of altruistic motivations upon a respondent’s 
choice was first assessed using an econometric model which attempted to compare the 
preferences of respondents who claimed they had only considered others (which I will call 
‘altruistic responders’) with other responders. It should be noted that although we would have 
liked to have compared responses econometrically for all 3 groups of respondents (i.e. those 
who claimed they answered in terms of what was best for them, for themselves and others, or 
only in terms of what was best for others) this was not possible. This was because only 30 / 
895 patients (3.3% who indicated the perspective they adopted), said they only considered 
what was best for them (i.e. that they were purely self-motivated). This provided too small a 
sample to allow us to establish DCE preferences separately for this group of respondents 
using interaction dummy variables. 
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We hypothesized that, if respondents behaved in a self-interested manner, then their own 
quality of life (as measured by Eq-5d or VAS) might influence their preferences, such that 
they would favour prioritizing people with similar characteristics to themselves. This would 
imply that respondents with poor quality of life ratings might be more inclined to prioritize 
hypothetical transplant recipients with serious diseases affecting life expectancy or with 
serious diseases affecting quality of life (because both states are likely to be associated with 
lower scores as measured by Eq-5d or VAS). In contrast, amongst respondents with more 
altruistic motivations, we might expect less association between their actual quality of life and 
their willingness to prioritize those with diseases affecting length of life or quality of life.   
 
This hypothesis was examined econometrically. We endeavoured to divide the sample of all 
the patients who answered a question about the perspective they adopted when answering 
up into quartiles in terms of respondents quality of life status both as measured by Eq-5d; and 
also as measured by VAS. We then ran a series of regression analyses to establish whether 
preferences for attributes differed, comparing the preferences of patients in the upper and 
lower ranges of quality of life status to those whose reported quality of life was in the mid-
range category. We wanted to establish links between respondent quality of life (as measured 
by Eq-5d), depending on whether respondents were altruistic, and their preferences. So, this 
analysis was run on a pooled sample; a respondent grouping who admitted to at least some 
self-interested motivations when answering the DCE questions; and a respondent group who 
reported only altruistic motivations. We repeated exactly the same analysis with respect to 
the same three groups to establish the links between quality of life (as measured by VAS), 
and preferences (i.e. we ran this analysis upon a pooled sample; upon a respondent grouping 
who admitted to at least some self-interested motivations when answering the DCE 
questions; and upon a respondent group who admitted to only altruistic motivations). 
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2. Background. 
 
In chapter 1 (section E1.4) I suggested that, at a theoretical level, the concept of the ‘caring 
externality’ (Culyer 1976) might be used to explain altruistic motivations. The concept of the 
‘caring externality’ (Culyer 1976) allows for the possibility that the utility an individual derives 
from healthcare provision may not solely derive from the utility obtained from treatment or 
care she / he benefits from. Rather instead altruistic concerns (about the health status of 
others) might enter into individual’s utility functions. The concept of the caring externality, has 
been used to explain the existence of the NHS and welfare state more generally (Culyer 
1980). However, it could also be used to explain why altruistic motivations might apply when 
patients express their preferences in terms of who should be prioritized for renal transplants.  
 
It should be noted that the concept of the ‘caring externality’ does not require that decisions 
need to be completely altruistic (disregarding self interest). The concept implies that 
individuals will choose on the basis of their own preferences, but their preferences include 
benevolent ones, such that utility is derived from the amount of utility enjoyed by others 
(Dowie 1985). There is some evidence (Jacobsson, Carstensen et al. 2005) who conducted a 
mainstream WTP analysis (which did not involve the use of DCEs) that ‘caring externalities’ 
exist. The preferences of 180 Swedish respondents (who primarily worked in healthcare, but 
others were administrators, farmers, entrepreneurs, students, retired persons and blue-collar 
workers) were surveyed. Respondents were asked to value 7 different health states with 
different levels of severity of ill health. For internal preference WTP questions, respondents 
were asked to reveal their WTP to be cured from each health state. Alternatively the ‘caring 
externality’ questions dealt with respondents WTP for someone else to be cured from the 
same health state. The findings suggested that “Caring externalities were present in all health 
states. Even concerning the mildest health state, 52% of respondents were willing to pay to 
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cure the sick person.” (Jacobsson, Carstensen et al. 2005, P176). However, the mean value 
of caring externality WTP was always lower than the mean value of internal WTP, suggesting 
that respondents consistently valued health benefits to themselves more than health benefits 
to others. Moreover, respondents were more likely to positively value (express a WTP) for 
health benefits conferred upon others for more severe health states. This research suggests 
to me that in the context of a severe condition like renal disease which is severe enough for 
someone to be on the kidney transplant list, that ‘caring externalities’ might account for a 
substantive amount of DCE respondents’ utility. Relatively few analyses seem to have looked 
at the association between results from quality of life measures and preferences findings from 
choice experiments, although, some work involving both techniques has been undertaken 
(Bryan, Weatherburn et al. 2001; Ratcliffe, Buxton et al. 2005; Hjelmgren and Anell 2007; 
Ossa, Briggs et al. 2007; Aspinall, Johnson et al. 2008; Grant, Wileman et al. 2008). I think 
this is an important issue, and the distinguishing characteristic of the analysis in this chapter, 
is that we focus upon how quality of life status as measured by Eq-5d and VAS, might impact 
upon stated preferences expressed in choice experiments, and in particular upon how these 
links might be affected if you have altruistic responders. 
 
We wanted to establish whether any link between respondent quality of life and a 
respondent’s valuation of attributes might be affected by the perspective respondents 
adopted when answering the questionnaire. Even if respondents are unaffected by the issues 
raised, they may be concerned about the impact on the health of others, i.e. they have 
altruistic concerns (Johansson 1994). Moreover, the very fact that people consent for an 
organ to be donated without a reward, is difficult to explain if one begins with the assumption 
that narrow self-interest must explain behaviour (Schenk 1987). Therefore given that altruistic 
motives do apply in the context of transplantation, it is useful to consider how they might 
impact upon respondent’s stated preferences for prioritizing people for transplants.  
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Of course altruism may be impure, and motivated by a “warm glow” feeling (Khalil 2004), 
which could be obtained when making choices that might benefit others. There is also the 
concept of ‘reciprocal altruism’, whereby people reciprocate, and are motivated by the 
prospect of future rewards (Trivers 1971; Grossmann 2002). This means that a respondent’s 
willingness to consider others may be motivated by the consideration that they would like 
their interests also to be considered by others. However, there is every reason to assume that 
behaviour based upon self-interest cannot explain all empirical behaviour (Haltiwanger and 
Waldman 1993), and if we impose such assumptions of behaviour without question, this may 
fly in the face of empirical observation (Sen 1977). 
 
We therefore wanted to establish what perspective respondents adopted when answering the 
questionnaire. We asked respondents whether when answering the questionnaire they 
answered in terms of what would be best for them; in terms of what would be best for them 
and others; or disregarding what is best for them and only considering what is best for others.  
The first group of respondents who claimed they considered just what was best for them, 
have preferences in line with theory which implies that individuals are self interested utility 
maximisers. The group of respondents who claim they considered what is best for them and 
others have preferences in line with the concept of the ‘caring externality.’ Clearly only the 
final group of respondents could be defined as having entirely altruistic motivations.  
 
In this chapter I consider whether respondent’s own quality of life characteristics (as 
measured by Eq-5d and the Visual Analogue Scale [VAS]) are linked to their preferences for 
particular attributes. We address this issue using a pooled sample (comprising all the patients 
who answered the question about the perspective they adopted when answering the 
questionnaire, and also provided quality of life information). We also run separate 
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econometric models for responders who indicate their motivations are at least in part self-
interested, and altruistic responders respectively, to establish whether a veil of altruism might 
affect the link between respondent quality of life status and preferences. 
 
Logically we might expect that respondents’ own quality of life would impact more upon their 
preferences if they are less altruistic. This fits with an approach to research in the context of 
altruism that imputes a motive to an actual choice (Hudson and Jones 1994). Therefore, I 
would posit that those who have a good quality of life may prefer prioritizing patients with no 
or less serious diseases affecting quality of life and / or life expectancy, because they 
themselves fall into this category. Therefore, such people would themselves be more likely to 
benefit from these priority criteria. In contrast if respondents are altruistic, we would not 
expect them to be prioritizing people based upon such motivations. This paper assesses the 
extent to which the perspective that a respondent adopts impacts upon their choice, and how 
this might affect the link between quality of life and preferences.  
 
3. Methods. 
 
3.1 Piloting the questionnaire 
Details are provided in chapter 5 Section 3.1. 
 
3.2 Selection of final attributes and levels 
Details of the approach used to select final attributes and levels, are provided in chapter 5 
Section 3.2. For convenience the table (table 1 below) which details attributes and levels and 
associated variable names is reproduced below. 
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Table 1: Final attributes and levels. 
Attribute Variable name Levels Interpretation of coefficients.  
Time spent 
awaiting 
transplantation 
Wait 1 month, 2 years, and 10 
years. 
Indirect utility of each 1 year 
reduction in transplant recipient 
waiting time. 
Tissue type 
matching 
Tiss Non-favourable match: 
86% average kidney 
survival rate post-
transplant. 
 
Favourable match: 89% 
average kidney survival 
rate post-transplant. 
 
Perfect match: 90% 
average kidney survival 
rate post-transplant. 
Indirect utility of prioritizing people 
for each 1% improvement in 
kidney survival. 
How many child 
or adult  
dependents 
recipients have 
Dep None, 1, or 4 
dependents. 
Indirect utility of each additional 
dependent. 
Recipient age Age 20 years, 45 years, and 
65 years 
Indirect utility for each 1 year 
reduction in recipient age. 
Diseases 
predominantly 
affecting life 
expectancy 
dis1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
dis2 
No disease affecting life 
expectancy (other than 
Kidney disease) vs. 
moderate disease 
(uncontrolled 
hypertension or obesity) 
& Kidney disease. 
 
Moderate disease 
(uncontrolled 
hypertension or obesity) 
affecting life expectancy 
vs. severe disease (heart 
attack, stroke, or diabetes 
with complications). 
Indirect utility of having no rather 
than moderate disease 
predominantly affecting life 
expectancy. 
 
 
 
 
Indirect utility of having moderate 
disease rather than severe 
disease predominantly affecting 
life expectancy. 
Diseases 
predominantly 
affecting quality 
of life 
ill1 
 
 
 
 
 
ill2 
No disease affecting 
quality of life (other than 
Kidney disease) vs. 
moderate disease (mild 
asthma).  
 
Moderate disease (mild 
asthma) affecting quality 
of life vs. severe disease 
(severe arthritis). 
Indirect utility of having no 
disease rather than a moderate 
disease predominantly affecting 
quality of life.  
 
Indirect utility of having a 
moderate disease rather than a 
severe disease predominantly 
affecting quality of life. 
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3.3 Development of the final questionnaire 
 
Details are provided in chapter 5 Section 3.3 
 
3.4 Distribution of the questionnaire 
 
Details are provided in chapter 5 Section 3.4 
 
3.5. Information relevant to this analysis obtained using the patient DCE questionnaire. 
 
Readers should be aware that patient renal transplant questionnaires (see appendix E) also 
contained both Eq-5d quality of life questions, and the VAS scale. Moreover, of particular 
importance for this analysis was that a question was posed to help to ascertain how altruistic 
respondents might have been, when they answered the DCE questionnaire. The question 
asked: 
 
What perspective did you adopt when answering this questionnaire?: (Please tick 1 box only): 
 
 
Answering the questions in terms of what  
would be best for me      
 
Answering the questions in terms of what  
would be best for me and others     
 
Disregarding what is best for me and only 
considering what is best for others    
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3.6 Data analysis. 
 
We use model type A, to compare preferences patient preferences for altruistic patients with 
respondents who do not claim to only consider others (i.e. who acknowledge that self-interest 
influence either partly or wholly influences their DCE choices) when making choices. Here Yij 
is the binary dependent variable, from individuals i = 1…m, for observations j = 1…ni. The 
number of observations ni varies because the i individuals do not all complete every pairwise 
choice (a minority of respondents don’t answer all choices). The term μi is the random effects 
error term (which allows for multiple responses from i respondents), and εij is the standard 
Probit error term for individuals i for j observations. The other variables are as defined in table 
1. The DA prefix indicates a dummy variable, for the altruistic responders question (see table 
2). 
 
 
Yij= β0+ β1waitij +β2tissij+β3depij+β4ageij+β5dis1ij+β6dis2ij+β7ill1ij+β8ill2ij  
 
+ β9DA+β10DAijwaitij+β11DAijtissij+β12DAijdepij+β13DAijageij+β14DAijdis1ij  
 
+β15DAijdis2+β16DAijill1ij+β17DAijill2ij+µi+εij        
 
(Model type A: models 1). 
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Table 2: Dummy variables. 
Model type A  (Model 1).  
Respondent grouping Dummy variable (prefix 
upon variable name) 
Coding for dummy 
variable 
Base group (preferences 
for non-altruistic patients) 
Not / Applicable Not required: Preferences 
for non-altruistic responders 
Preferences for altruistic 
patients 
DA DA = 1 for altruistic 
responders. 
 
DA= 0 otherwise 
Model type B  (Models 2,3,4,5,6 and 7).  
Respondent grouping Dummy variable (prefix 
upon variable name) 
Coding for dummy 
variable 
Base group (preferences 
for patients not in the 
defined sub-groups) 
Not / Applicable Not required: Preferences 
of those not in the upper or 
lower groupings 
Those in the lowest quartile 
of the continuously 
distributed variable 
DLQ DLQ = 1 for respondents in 
the lowest quartile 
 
DLQ = 0 otherwise 
Those in the highest 
quartile (or QALY =1 
category for Eq-5d) of the 
continuously distributed 
variable 
DHQ DHQ = 1 for respondents in 
the highest quartile (or top 
28% for which QALY =1 for 
Eq-5d) 
 
DHQ = 0 otherwise 
 
 
Model type B, can be used when you want to compare the upper and lower quartiles of a 
continuously distributed patient attribute, such as quality of life, with the inter-quartile range or 
‘mid-range’ grouping. Note we found that 28% of respondents overall had an Eq-5d score of 
1. Therefore instead of having an upper quartile when analysing Eq-5d scores, we had an 
upper quality of life grouping for Eq-5d scores containing all those with an Eq-5d score of 1 
(i.e. the top 28%) 
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For model B, Yij, μi, and εij are as previously defined, whilst the DLQ and DHQ prefixes are as 
defined in table 3. 
 
 
Yij = β0+ β1waitij +β2tissij +β3depij +β4ageij +β5dis1ij+β6dis2ij+β7ill1ij+β8ill2ij+β9DLQ+β10DLQijwaitij  
 
 
+β11DLQijtissij+β12DLQijdepij+β13DLQijageij+β14DLQijdis1ij +β15DLQijdis2ij+β16DLQijill1ij+β17DLQijill2ij   
 
 
+β18DHQij+ β19DHQijwaitij+β20DHQijtissij+β21DHQijdepij+β22DHQijageij+β23DHQijdis1ij+β24DHQijdis2ij  
 
 
+β25DHQijill1ij+β26DHQijill2ij+µi+εij 
 
(Model type B: models 2,3,4,5, 6 and 7). 
 
 
This model can be applied to establish how respondent Eq-5d status, or VAS status affects 
their preferences, both for a pooled sample; a respondent group who do not claim to only 
consider others (who are at least in part self-interested); or altruistic responders (who 
consider only others). 
 
3.7 Establishing Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS). 
 
To express the value of changes in attributes with respect to changes in another we calculate 
MRS (see table 3). MRS values changes in the other variables compared with a 1 year 
change in waiting time. To establish whether MRS is significant we used the Delta method 
(Wooldridge 2002) which was executed using the ‘nlcom’ command in STATA v. 9.2, to 
derive 95% confidence intervals. We use Wald tests (executed using ‘testnl’ in STATA) to 
establish whether there is a statistically significant difference in MRS between the base group 
and dummy variables group(s). Difference in MRS is indicated by a Wald test p-value ≤ 0.05. 
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Table 3: Calculating MRS. 
Model type A 
 
Variable 
 
 
Base group MRS 
Model type A 
 
Variable 
 
 
Defined sub-group  
MRS 
wait N / A wait N / A 
tiss β2 / β1  tiss (β2 + β11) / (β1 + β10) 
dep β3 / β1  dep (β3 + β12) / (β1 + β10) 
age β4 / β1  age (β4 + β13) / (β1 + β10) 
dis1 β5 / β1  dis1 (β5 + β14) / (β1 + β10) 
dis2 β6 / β1  dis2 (β6 + β15) / (β1 + β10) 
ill1 β7 / β1  ill1 (β7 + β16) / (β1 + β10) 
ill2 β8 / β1  ill2 (β8 + β17) / (β1 + β10) 
Model type B 
 
Variable 
 
 
Base group MRS 
Model type B 
 
Variable 
 
 
Lower quartile MRS 
wait N / A wait N / A 
tiss β2 / β1  tiss (β2 + β11) / (β1 + β10) 
dep β3 / β1  dep (β3 + β12) / (β1 + β10) 
age β4 / β1  age (β4 + β13) / (β1 + β10) 
dis1 β5 / β1  dis1 (β5 + β14) / (β1 + β10) 
dis2 β6 / β1  dis2 (β6 + β15) / (β1 + β10) 
ill1 β7 / β1  ill1 (β7 + β16) / (β1 + β10) 
ill2 β8 / β1  ill2 (β8 + β17) / (β1 + β10) 
Model type C 
 
Variable 
 
 
Higher quartile MRS 
  
wait    
tiss (β2 + β20) / (β1 + β19)   
dep (β3 + β21) / (β1 + β19)   
age (β4 + β22) / (β1 + β19)   
dis1 (β5 + β23) / (β1 + β19)   
dis2 (β6 + β24) / (β1 + β19)   
ill1 (β7 + β25) / (β1 + β19)   
ill2 (β8 + β26) / (β1 + β19)   
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4. Results.  
 
4.1. Results - Sample characteristics.   
Table 4: Sample characteristics. 
 Patients 
(n = 908) 
AGE  
Mean age 54.88 years 
  
GENDER  
Male 508 (55.9%) 
Female 397 (43.7%) 
Not indicated 3 (0.3%) 
  
ETHNICITY  
White (British) 799 (88%) 
White ethnic minorities 27 (2.9%) 
Non-white ethnic minorities 69 (7.6%) 
Asian groups (also included in non-Asian ethnic 
minority category) 
50 (5.5%) 
Not indicated 13 (1.4%) 
  
DEPENDENT CHILDREN  
0 755 (83.1%) 
1  72 (7.9%) 
2  49 (5.4%) 
3  12 (1.3%) 
> 3  7 (0.8%) 
Not indicated 13 (1.4%) 
  
DEPENDENT ADULTS  
0 750 (82.6%) 
1  121 (13.3%) 
2  17 (1.9%) 
> 2 8 (0.9%) 
Not indicated 12 (1.3%) 
 
Table 4 indicates respondent characteristics.  UK Renal Registry data (Byrne, Ford et al. 
2008; Byrne, Steenkamp et al. 2008) was used to assess patient sample representativeness. 
Of the 895/ 908 patients indicating ethnicity, 799 / 895 patients (89.3%) were white (British), 
and 27 / 895 (3%) were white ethnic minorities, so 92.3% are white. UK incidence data 
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(Byrne, Ford et al. 2008) suggested 79.7% of renal patients are white, so whites are over-
represented in our survey.  Overall, 69 / 895 (7.7%) patients indicating ethnicity were non-
white, compared with a 20.3% incidence rate (Byrne, Ford et al. 2008), 50 / 69 non-white 
patients were South Asians (5.6% of those indicating ethnicity) compared to a 10.5% 
incidence (Byrne, Ford et al. 2008).  508 /908 patients (55.9%) were male, 397 / 908 (43.7%) 
were female, 3 / 908 (0.3%) did not say. Graphically presented Renal Registry data (Byrne, 
Ford et al. 2008) reassuringly indicated slightly higher proportions of male than female 
patients across age groups. Average sample patient age was 54.88 years (median 57 years), 
and Renal Registry data median age (57.3 years) was virtually identical (Byrne, Steenkamp 
et al. 2008).  
 
The patient sample comprised: 468 / 908 (51.5%) with successful transplants; 118 / 908 
(13%) whose transplant failed; 279 / 908 (30.7%) awaiting transplants (average wait 22.6 
months). Some patients whose transplant failed also appeared as awaiting transplantation; 
237 / 908 (26.3%) had dialysis without transplantation; and 57 / 908 (6.3%) had kidney 
disease, not requiring dialysis. Renal Registry prevalence data (Byrne, Steenkamp et al. 
2008) suggests 46.9% of patients have successful transplants (close to our figure). There is 
no incidence / prevalence data for other patient categories. Amongst non-whites (including 
Asians) figures are 18 / 69 patients (26%) with successful transplants; 10 / 69 (14.5%) whose 
transplant failed; 35 / 69 patients (50.7%) awaiting a transplant on dialysis (average wait: 
21.45 months); and 3 / 69 (4.3%) with kidney disease, not requiring dialysis. Unfortunately 
renal registry data (Byrne, Steenkamp et al. 2008) does not indicate ethnicity. However, lower 
percentage figures for successes, and higher transplant failures figures are expected (ethnic 
minorities are less likely to be closely matched). 
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Overall 895 / 908 patients responded to the question about the perspective they adopted, 30 
considered only what was best for them, 323 claimed they considered what was best for them 
and others, and 542 considered what was best only for others (altruistic responders). 
 
4.2. Econometric results. 
Table 5 - Model 1: Whole sample – Other patients vs. Altruistic patients  
Attribute Coefficient 
for patients 
in general 
Implied MRS 
for patients in 
general 
Coefficient  
for dummy  
variable for  
the patients  
who are  
Altruistic.  
Implied  
MRS for  
the  
altruistic  
group  
Wald  
test 
 
p-values 
wait .0478** 1 -.0057 1  
tiss .0568** 1.19** 
(0.71 / 1.66) 
.0101 1.59** 
(1.12 / 2.05) 
p=0.0490 
dep .0830** 1.74** 
(1.34 / 2.14) 
-.0326** 1.20** 
(0.85 / 1.54) 
p=0.0000 
age .0081** 0.17** 
(0.12 / 0.22) 
-.0019 0.15** 
(0.10 / 0.20) 
p=0.0001 
dis1 .0458 0.96 
(-0.55 / 2.46) 
-.0750 -0.70 
(-2.09 / 0.70) 
p=0.1257 
dis2 .6181** 12.92** 
(10.41 / 15.44) 
.1087 17.26** 
14.53 / 20.00) 
p=0.0000 
ill1 -.1032* -2.16* 
(-0.28 / -4.04) 
-.0294 -3.15** 
(-1.41 / -4.89) 
p=0.4912 
ill2 .2158** 4.51** 
(2.96 / 6.07) 
-.0510 3.91** 
(2.47 / 5.36) 
p=0.0015 
Intercepts .1315**  -.0148   
% of actual values 
predicted: 
63.14% Sample:  908 patients   
(542 are  
altruistic)  
McFaddens  
R2: 
0.112 
LR test (λ): 23.49 Jointly 
significant? 
Yes: CV for  
9 dfs = 16.92 
Log- 
likelihood: 
-4989.99 
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4.3. Comparing those who only thought of others (labelled ‘altruistic responders’) vs. 
other respondents. 
 
I used an interaction dummy variable model to establish whether preferences varied for those 
claiming to have only thought of others (who I labelled ‘altruistic’ vs. other patients (model 1, 
table 5). The model accurately predicts 63.14% of responses and McFaddens R2 = 0.112 
The findings of a likelihood ratio (LR) test for joint significance (λ = 23.49, when the critical 
value (CV) for 9 degrees of freedom is 16.92) suggest that the dummy variables for the 
altruistic responder group are jointly significant. However, 7 / 8 of the dummy interaction 
variables are not statistically significant. Findings suggest that those who identify themselves 
as altruistic responders attach a lower valuation to prioritising patients having child / adult 
dependents, and there is also a statistically significant difference in MRS with respect to this 
variable (p=0.000) according the Wald test. The MRS (MRS = 1.20 [CI: 0.85 / 1.54] vs. 1.74 
[CI: 1.34 / 2.14]) for this variable is lower for altruistic responders than for non-altruistic 
responders. Wald tests also suggest that MRS is statistically significantly different with 
respect to 4 other variables. The variable tiss varies (p=0.0490) according to the Wald test. 
MRS (MRS = 1.59 [CI: 1.12 / 2.05] vs. 1.19 [CI: 0.71 / 1.66]) is higher amongst altruistic 
responders, who value prioritizing those with better tissue matches more highly. MRS for age 
is also significantly different (p=0.0001), and MRS (MRS = 0.15 [CI: 0.10 / 0.20] vs. 0.17 [CI: 
0.12 / 0.22]), is lower for altruistic responders who value prioritizing younger recipients less. 
MRS for dis1 also differs (p=0.0000), and MRS (MRS =17.26 [CI: 14.53 / 20.00] vs. 12.92 [CI: 
10.41 / 15.44]) is higher amongst altruistic responders, who value prioritizing those with 
moderate rather than severe diseases affecting life expectancy more highly. Finally there is 
evidence that MRS for ill2 (p=0.0015) differs between the 2 groups. The MRS (MRS = 3.91 
[CI: 2.47 / 5.36] vs. 4.51 [CI: 2.96 / 6.07]), is lower for altruistic responders suggesting they 
would prioritize those with moderate rather than severe diseases affecting life expectancy 
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less than non-altruistic respondents. These results taken together suggest that there may be 
a case for modelling the preferences of non-altruistic and altruistic respondents separately.  
 
4.4. Analysis of data for the whole sample. Comparing the preferences of those with 
preferences in the lower and upper range of Eq-5d scores, with mid-range scores. 
 
I considered whether patient responses are affected by patient quality of life as measured 
using Eq-5d. We ran an econometric model with interaction dummy variables both for lower 
and upper quartiles (model 2 – table 6) for the whole sample of patients who answered the 
‘altruism’ question. In actual fact c.28% of the combined sample of respondents had a QALY 
score of 1. So to accommodate this, our top grouping only approximates a quartile, being 
slightly larger, it contains 28% rather than 25% of patient respondents. This means that we 
have a mid-range sample which contains 47% of respondents i.e. it excludes 28% of 
respondents which have QALY =1, and excludes the 25% of respondents in the lowest QALY 
quartile (it is thus in reality marginally less than the inter-quartile range so we refer to it as the 
‘mid-range’ sample). 
 
The model accurately predicts 63.26% of responses and McFaddens R2 = 0.113 
Findings from the likelihood ratio test (λ = 20.68, critical value = 28.87 for 18 degrees of 
freedom) suggest that the dummy variables are not jointly significant. Moreover, none of the 
coefficients on any of the dummy variables are statistically significant, so variable impacts do 
not appear to vary according to which grouping of Eq-5d status respondents are in. 
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Table 6 – model 2: Whole sample of patients with interaction dummy variables for 
those in the lowest and highest quartiles for quality of life as measured by Eq-5d.   
Attribute Coefficient 
for ‘mid 
range’ 
MRS for ‘mid 
range’ 
Coefficient  
on dummy  
for  
those in  
quartile 1 
MRS for  
lowest  
Eq-5d  
Quartile 
Wald  
test 
 
p-values 
wait .0466** 1 -.0069 1  
tiss .0621** 1.33** 
(0.87 / 1.79) 
.0060 1.72** 
(0.93 / 2.50) 
p=0.0237 
dep .0570** 1.22** 
(0.87 / 1.58)  
.0203 1.95** 
(1.31 / 2.59) 
p=0.0727 
age .0081** 0.17** 
(0.12 / 0.23) 
-.0034 0.12** 
(.04 / 0.20) 
p=0.0000 
dis1 -.0014 -0.03 
(-1.46 / 1.40) 
-.0130 -0.36 
(-2.68 / 1.96) 
p=0.8826 
dis2 .7009** 15.03** 
(12.44 / 17.62) 
-.1094 14.91** 
(10.72 / 19.09) 
p=0.0000 
ill1 -.0940* -2.02* 
(-0.20 / -3.83) 
-.0058 -2.52 
(-5.38 / 0.35) 
p=0.4262 
ill2 .1552** 3.33** 
(1.84 / 4.82) 
.0069 4.09** 
(1.70 / 6.47) 
p=0.1041 
Intercepts .1225**  -.0061   
Attribute Coefficient 
for ‘mid 
range’ 
MRS for ‘mid 
range’ 
Coefficient  
on dummy  
for the top 
28% of 
scores. 
MRS for  
highest  
Eq-5d  
Quartile 
Wald  
test 
 
p-values 
wait .0466** 1 .0003 1  
tiss .0621** 1.33** 
(0.87 / 1.79) 
-.0016 1.29**  
(0.70 / 1.88) 
p=0.0095 
dep .0570** 1.22** 
(0.87 / 1.58)  
.0045 1.31** 
(0.85 / 1.77) 
p=0.0083 
age .0081** 0.17** 
(0.12 / 0.23) 
-.0015 0.14** 
(0.08 / 0.21) 
p=0.0005 
dis1 -.0014 -0.03 
(-1.46 / 1.39) 
.0071 0.12 
(-1.73 / 1.97) 
p=0.9161 
dis2 .7009** 15.03** 
(12.44 / 17.62) 
.0313 15.60** 
(12.18 / 19.02) 
p=0.0000 
ill1 -.0940* -2.01* 
(-0.19 / -3.82) 
-.0930 -3.98** 
(-1.69 / -6.28) 
p=0.9749 
ill2 .1552** 3.33** 
(1.83 / 4.81) 
.1075 5.60** 
(3.67 / 7.53) 
p=0.6410 
Intercepts .1225**  .0154   
% of actual 
values predicted: 
63.26% Sample:  892 patients:  
223 in first  
quartile and  
253 in top  
28%. 
McFaddens  
R2: 
0.113 
LR test (λ): 20.68 Jointly 
significant? 
No : CV for  
18 dfs =  
28.87 
Log- 
likelihood: 
-4901.1 
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There is however some evidence that MRS for individual attributes may differ in the lowest 
and highest quartile groups. For the respondents in the lowest Eq-5d quartile, Wald tests 
suggest there is a difference in MRS compared to the mid-range with respect to tiss 
(p=0.0237), age (p=0.0000), and dis2 (p=0.0000). Whilst for those in the QALY = 1 group, 
there is a statistically significantly difference relative to the mid-range for tiss (p=0.0095), dep 
(p=0.0083), age (p=0.0005), and dis1 (p=0.0000). 
 
Taking the findings for the lowest quartile group first. For tiss MRS differences (MRS = 1.72 
[CI: 0.93 / 2.50] vs. 1.33 [CI: 0.87 / 1.79]), suggest that those in the lowest quartile of Eq-5d 
status may place more emphasis upon prioritising those who are a good tissue match 
compared to other patients, this is confirmed by a Wald test (p=0.0237). In relation to age, 
MRS differs (p=0.0000) and the differences (MRS = 0.12 [CI: 0.04 / 0.20] vs. 0.17 [CI: 0.12 / 
0.23]) suggest those in the lowest quartile in terms of quality of life place less emphasis upon 
prioritizing younger patients.  For dis2 the MRS difference (MRS = 14.91 [CI: 10.72 / 19.09] 
vs. 15.03 [CI: 12.44 / 17.62]) is also confirmed by the Wald test (p=0.0000), but it is very 
slight. 
 
For the highest Eq-5d grouping (top 28% for which QALY = 1) the MRS for tiss (MRS = 1.29 
[CI: 0.70 / 1.88] vs. 1.33 [CI: 0.87 / 1.79]), differs between the highest quartile and the mid-
range according to a Wald test (p=0.0095). However, the difference in MRS is slight. With 
respect to dep (MRS = 1.31 [CI: 0.85 / 1.77] vs. 1.22 [CI: 0.87 / 1.58]), the point estimates 
suggest that those in the highest 28% of the Eq-5d distribution may prioritise those with child 
or adult dependents more than those in the mid-range, something confirmed by the Wald test 
(p=0.0083), but, the difference is marginal. In relation to age (MRS = 0.14 [CI: 0.08 / 0.21] vs. 
0.17 [CI: 0.12 / 0.23]) the Wald test suggests that MRS differs for those in the highest Eq-5d 
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grouping (p=0.0005). However, the difference in MRS is slight, but suggests a lower 
preference for those with QALY = 1 for prioritizing the young. 
 
For dis2 (MRS = 15.60 [CI: 12.18 / 19.02] vs. 15.03 [CI: 12.44 / 17.62]), and the Wald test 
again suggests that MRS varies between the groups (p=0.0000). However, once again the 
difference in relative terms is not large. Wald tests do not confirm any other differences in 
MRS. 
 
4.5. Analysis of data for (for respondents who do not claim to only consider others). 
Comparing the preferences of those with preferences in the lower and upper range of 
Eq-5d scores, with mid-range scores. 
 
You can consider whether it is appropriate to model preferences separately for altruistic vs. 
non-altruistic respondents for Eq-5d data, or whether a pooled model is adequate by 
comparing the restricted pooled model (model 2) with the unrestricted separate models for 
non-altruistic (model 3) and altruistic (model 4) respondents using a likelihood ratio test. The 
value of λ (42.43) just exceeds the critical value (40.11) at the 5% level, which suggests that 
using 2 separate models is more appropriate.  
 
In model 3 (table 7) I conduct the same analysis relating to Eq-5d status and preferences for 
those who are ‘non-altruistic’ responders. When I refer to the group which is in the top 28% 
for Eq-5d status or the lowest quartile, I am referring to those in the top 28% for the patient 
sample overall (they comprise 103 / 359 [28.7%] of the non-altruistic sample). 
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Table 7 – model 3: Analysis for the group of patients who do not claim to only consider 
others with interaction dummy variables for those in the lowest and highest quartiles 
relating to quality of life as measured by Eq-5d.   
Attribute Coefficient 
for ‘mid 
range’ 
MRS for ‘mid 
range’ 
Coefficient  
on dummy   
for those in 
quartile 1 
MRS for  
lowest  
Eq-5d  
quartile 
Wald test 
 
p-values 
wait .0499** 1 -.0029 1  
tiss .0669** 1.34** 
(0.64 / 2.04) 
-.0261 0.87 
(-0.02 / 1.75) 
p=0.0188 
dep .0720** 1.44** 
(0.89 / 2.00)  
.0307 2.18** 
(1.33 / 3.04) 
p=0.2091 
age .0086** 0.17** 
(0.09 / 0.25) 
-.0048 0.08 
(-0.01 / 0.18) 
p=0.0020 
dis1 .0154 0.31 
(-1.87 / 2.48) 
.0918 2.28 
(-0.69 / 5.25) 
p=0.5551 
dis2 .6581** 13.18** 
(9.52 / 16.84) 
-.1680 10.43** 
(5.96 / 14.89) 
p=0.0000 
ill1 -.0362 -0.72 
(-3.53 / 2.08) 
-.1244 -3.42 
(-6.98 / 0.15) 
p=0.5963 
ill2 .1521** 3.05** 
(0.80 / 5.29) 
.0852 5.05** 
(2.04 / 8.06) 
p=0.6658 
Intercepts .1190**  -0025.   
Attribute Coefficient 
for ‘mid 
range’ 
MRS for ‘mid 
range’ 
Coefficient  
on dummy for 
patients in the 
top 28% of  
Eq-5dscores  
MRS for  
patients in  
the top 28%  
of Eq-5d  
scores 
Wald test 
 
p-values 
wait .0499** 1 -.0002 1  
tiss .0669** 1.34** 
(0.64 / 2.04) 
-.0133 1.08**  
(0.19 / 1.97) 
p=0.0456 
dep .0720** 1.44** 
(0.89 / 2.00)  
.0092 1.63** 
(0.89 / 2.37) 
p=0.0552 
age .0086** 0.17** 
(0.09 / 0.25) 
.0030 0.23** 
(0.12 / 0.34) 
p=0.2109 
dis1 .0154 0.31 
(-1.87 / 2.48) 
.0112 0.54 
(-2.30 / 3.37) 
p=0.9789 
dis2 .6581** 13.18** 
(9.52 / 16.84) 
.0376 13.98** 
(9.05 / 18.90) 
p=0.0005 
ill1 -.0362 -0.72 
(-3.53 / 2.08) 
-.1292 -3.32** 
(-6.85 / -0.210) 
p=0.5826 
ill2 .1521** 3.05** 
(0.80 / 5.29) 
.1719 6.51** 
(3.50 / 9.52) 
p=0.8477 
Intercepts .1190**  .0520   
% of actual 
values 
predicted: 
63.28% Sample:  359 patients: 103 
in 1st quartile 
and 94 (top 28%) 
McFaddens  
R2: 
0.120 
LR test (λ): 18.77 Jointly 
significant? 
No : CV for 18 
dfs = 28.8 
Log- 
likelihood: 
-.1951.8 
 
Likewise those referred to as in the bottom quartile are those in the bottom 25% of the patient 
sample overall (they comprise of 94 / 359 [26.2%] of responders who do not claim to only 
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consider others). I wanted to ensure that those respondents classified as in the top 28% of 
the sample, or in the bottom quartile of the sample overall, also formed part of those same 
groups when I ran two separate models in the interests of comparability. I therefore ensured 
that the Eq-5d cut off points for the highest quality of life group (was always QALY =1), and 
for the lowest quality of life group (lowest quartile), remained consistent. I adopted the same 
approach for the later analysis relating to respondent Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) ratings, 
and their preferences.  
 
Overall 359 / 892 patients formed this respondent group. The model accurately predicts 
63.26% of responses and McFaddens R2 = 0.120.The likelihood ratio test (which is λ = 18.77, 
compared with a critical value of 28.8 for 18 degrees of freedom), suggests that like the 
sample overall, the dummy variables are not statistically significant. Furthermore none of the 
coefficients on dummy variables are statistically significant at the 5% level. This means there 
is no evidence that attribute values differ in a jointly significant manner between patients for 
whom QALY = 1, or those in the lowest Eq-5d status quartile, compared with the ‘mid range’ 
sample in this group of the sample who have not claimed to only consider others. 
 
There is however evidence that MRS for certain variables might differ significantly. The value 
of MRS is different for 3 variables (wait, age, and dis2) comparing those in the lowest Eq-5d 
quartile, and the mid-range part of the sample. There is a difference in MRS for tiss 
(p=0.0188), the difference in MRS (MRS = 0.87 [CI: -0.02 / 1.75] vs. 1.34 [CI: 0.64 / 2.04]) 
which indicates that this group of patient respondents in the lowest Eq-5d score grouping 
have less of a preference for prioritizing people with a better tissue match.  
 
There is also evidence (p=0.0020) that MRS varies for age amongst non-altruistic 
responders. It appears that those in the lowest Eq-5d quartile for quality of life, do not 
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necessarily value prioritizing younger recipients (MRS is not significantly different from zero at 
the 5% level), whilst those in the ‘mid-range’ of the sample do value prioritizing younger 
recipients. There is also evidence that MRS for dis2 (p=0.0000). The MRS (MRS = 10.43 [CI: 
5.96 / 14.89] vs. 13.18 [CI: 9.52 / 16.84]) is lower for this group of patients in the lowest Eq-5d 
quartile, compared to the ‘mid-range’ of the sample. This suggests that for this sample those 
who are in the lowest Eq-5d quartile value prioritizing those with moderate rather than severe 
diseases affecting quality of life, less than non-altruists in the ‘mid-range’ of the quality of life 
spectrum. It makes sense that responders who do not claim to only consider others who have 
a low quality of life, should prefer not to prioritize those with moderate rather and severe 
diseases affecting life expectancy as much as those with mid-range Eq-5d ratings, as it fits 
with them being at least in part self interested. 
 
Comparing those in the ‘mid-range’ with those with Eq-5d scores equal to 1 (perfect health) 
there is evidence that amongst who do not claim to only consider others, MRS varies with 
respect to two variables. It varies for tiss (p=0.0456), and MRS differences (MRS = 1.08 [CI: 
0.19 / 1.97] vs. 1.34 [CI: 0.64 / 2.04]), suggest that amongst this respondent group there is 
evidence that those in the top 28% (QALY =1), have a slightly lower preference for prioritizing 
towards those with better recipient / donor tissue matches, compared to those in the Eq-5d 
‘mid-range’. Also MRS for dis2 differs (p=0.0005). Differences in MRS (MRS = 13.98 [CI: 9.05 
/ 18.90] vs. 13.18 [CI: 9.52 / 16.84]) suggest that non-altruistic respondents with QALY =1, 
attach a marginally greater priority towards prioritizing those with moderate rather than severe 
diseases affecting life expectancy, which can be explained in terms of enlightened self-
interest There is no evidence from Wald tests that MRS varies between other dummy 
variables and the ‘mid-range’ group. 
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4.6. Analysis of data for (for respondents who claim to only consider others, who we 
label ‘altruistic’). Comparing the preferences of those with preferences in the lower and 
upper range of Eq-5d scores, with mid-range scores. 
 
For the altruistic sample (model 4, table 8), once again like models 2, and 3, there is no 
evidence that dummy variables are jointly significant (λ = 20.33, against a critical value of 
28.8 for 18 degrees of freedom). The model accurately predicts 64.82% of responses and 
McFaddens R2 = 0.114.Moreover once again none of the interaction dummy variables are 
significant. Wald tests do however provide some evidence that MRS varies between the 
groups. Comparing those in the lowest Eq-5d quartile, with the mid-range Eq-5d status group, 
there is evidence that valuation of age differs (p=0.0037) and MRS (MRS = 0.17 [CI: 0.04 / 
0.30] vs. 0.18 [CI: 0.11 / 0.25]) is very marginally lower for those in the lowest Eq-5d status 
quartile. Similarly for dis2, MRS differs (p=0.0000) and MRS is higher for those in the lowest 
Eq-5d status grouping (MRS = 20.43 [CI: 12.34 / 28.52] vs. 16.52 [CI: 12.85 / 20.18]). This 
suggests that altruistic patients in the lowest Eq-5d status quartile would prioritize those with 
moderate rather than severe diseases affecting life expectancy more than altruistic 
responders in the mid-range in terms of Eq-5d status. This is a finding that can be explained 
by them being altruistic. 
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Table 8 – model 4: Altruistic patients with interaction dummy variables for those in the 
lowest and highest quartiles relating to quality of life as measured by Eq-5d.   
Attribute Coefficient 
for ‘mid 
range’ 
MRS for ‘mid 
range’ 
Coefficient  
on dummy   
for those in 
quartile 1 
MRS for  
lowest  
Eq-5d  
quartile 
Wald 
test 
 
p-values 
wait .0443** 1 -.0104 1  
tiss .0600** 1.36** 
(0.73 / 1.97) 
.0318 2.71** 
(1.26 / 4.17) 
p=0.3959 
dep .0468** 1.06** 
(0.59 / 1.53)  
.0087 1.64** 
(0.68 / 2.60) 
p=0.1467 
age .0079** 0.18** 
(0.11 / 0.25) 
-.0022 0.17** 
(0.04 / 0.30) 
p=0.0037 
dis1 -.0116 -0.26 
(-2.17 / 1.65) 
-.0918 -3.06 
(-6.93 / 0.82) 
p=0.4386 
dis2 .7316** 16.52** 
(12.85 / 20.18) 
-.0408 20.43** 
(12.34 / 28.52) 
p=0.0000 
ill1 -.1279* -2.88* 
(-5.30 / -0.48) 
.0697 -1.72 
(-6.35 / 2.90) 
p=0.1565 
ill2 .1548** 3.50** 
(1.49 / 5.50) 
-.0539 2.98** 
(0.84 / 6.81) 
p=0.0739 
Intercepts .1239**  -.0090   
Attribute Coefficient 
for ‘mid 
range’ 
MRS for ‘mid 
range’ 
Coefficient  
on dummy  
for patients  
in the top  
28% of  
Eq-5d 
scores  
MRS for  
patients  
in the top  
28%  
of Eq-5d  
scores 
Wald 
test 
 
p-values 
wait .0443** 1 .0021 1  
tiss .0600** 1.35** 
(0.73 / 1.97) 
.0039 1.38** 
(0.60 / 2.15) 
p=0.0741 
dep .0468** 1.06** 
(0.59 / 1.53)  
.0054 1.12** 
(0.54 / 1.71) 
p=0.1018 
age .0079** 0.18** 
(0.11 / 0.25) 
-.0042 0.08** 
(0.00 / 0.16) 
p=0.0007 
dis1 -.0116 -0.26 
(-2.17 / 1.65) 
-.0016 -0.28 
(-2.68 / 2.11) 
p=0.9250 
dis2 .7316** 16.52** 
(12.85 / 20.18) 
.0292 16.41** 
(11.85 / 20.96) 
p=0.0000 
ill1 -.1279* -2.89* 
(-5.30 / -0.48) 
-.0751 -4.38 
(-1.42 / -7.34) 
p=0.7221 
ill2 .1548** 3.49** 
(1.49 / 5.50) 
.0773 5.00** 
(2.53 / 7.48) 
p=0.5211 
Intercepts .1239**  .0019   
% of actual 
values predicted: 
64.82% Sample:  533 patients:  
120 in first 
quartile and  
159 in top 
28% 
McFaddens  
R2: 
0.114 
LR test (λ): 20.33 Jointly 
significant? 
No : CV for 
18 dfs = 28.8 
Log- 
likelihood: 
-.2928.09 
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Comparing those in the top Eq-5d status group (QALY = 1) with those in the mid-range, MRS 
is statistically different with respect to age (p=0.0007) and dis2 (p=0.0000). MRS for difage 
(MRS = 0.08 [CI: 0.00 / 0.16] vs. 0.18 [CI: 0.11 / 0.25]) is lower for altruistic responders who 
have QALY = 1. This suggests that altruists in the highest Eq-5d status grouping would 
prioritize younger recipients less than altruists with mid-range quality of life. There is also 
evidence that MRS for dis2 differs between those in the highest Eq-5d grouping compared 
with the mid-range, according to the Wald test (p=0.0000), however MRS (MRS = 16.41 [CI: 
11.85 / 20.96] vs. 16.52 [CI: 12.85 / 20.18]) varies only slightly. There is however evidence 
that those in highest Eq-5d status groupings value prioritizing those with moderate rather than 
severe diseases affecting quality of life marginally less, which is again compatible with them 
being altruistic. 
 
4.7. Analysis of data for the whole sample. Comparing the preferences of those with 
preferences in 1st and 4th quartiles of VAS scores, with the inter-quartile range. 
 
We assess the impact of differences in quality of life as measured by VAS upon preferences, 
in model 5 (table 9) for both non-altruistic and altruistic patients. We evaluate whether there 
are differences between both the lower and upper quartiles in terms of quality of life relative 
to the inter-quartile range. The model accurately predicts 62.66% of responses and 
McFaddens R2 = 0.112.Evidence from the likelihood ratio test suggests that the dummy 
variables for lower and upper quartiles are jointly significant (λ = 34.82, the critical value for 
18 degrees of freedom is 28.87). 
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Table 9 – model 5: Patients overall: Dummy variables for 1st & 4th VAS quartiles.   
Attribute Coefficient 
for inter-
quartile 
range 
MRS for inter-
quartile range 
Coefficient 
on dummy  
for those in 
quartile1   
MRS for 
lowest  
quartile 
Wald  
test 
 
p-values 
wait .0449** 1 .0035 1  
tiss .0728** 1.62** 
(1.13 / 2.11) 
-.0181 1.13** 
(0.55 / 1.71) 
p=0.0003 
dep .0743** 1.65** 
(1.27 / 2.04) 
-.0070 1.39** 
(0.92 / 1.86) 
p=0.0000 
age .0066** 0.15** 
(0.10 / 0.20) 
-.0005 0.13** 
(0.06 / 0.19)  
p=0.0102 
dis1 -.0272 -0.61 
(-2.07 / 0.86) 
.0550 0.57 
(-1.28 / 2.43) 
p=0.3140 
dis2 .733** 16.30** 
(13.54 / 19.07) 
-.216** 10.67** 
(7.80 / 13.54) 
p=0.0000 
ill1 -.1344* -2.99** 
(-1.17 / -4.81) 
.0462 -1.82 
(-4.15 / 0.52) 
p=0.0865 
ill2 .2039** 4.54** 
(3.03 / 6.04) 
-.0432 3.32** 
(1.37 / 5.26) 
p=0.0049 
Intercepts .1446**  -.0352   
Attribute Coefficient 
for inter-
quartile 
range 
MRS for inter-
quartile range 
Coefficient 
on dummy 
for those in 
quartile 4 
MRS for 
highest 
quartile 
Wald  
test 
 
p-values 
wait .0449** 1 -.0056 1  
tiss .0728** 1.62** 
(1.13 / 2.11) 
-.0242 1.24** 
(0.50 / 1.97) 
p=0.0001 
dep .0743** 1.65** 
(1.27 / 2.04) 
-.0383** 0.91** 
(0.36 / 1.47) 
p=0.0000 
age .0066** 0.15** 
(0.10 / 0.20) 
.0017 0.21** 
(0.12 / 0.30) 
p=0.0585 
dis1 -.0272 -0.61 
(-2.07 / 0.86) 
.0350 0.20 
(-2.08 / 2.48) 
p=0.4494 
dis2 .733** 16.30** 
(13.54 / 19.07) 
.0047 18.74** 
(13.98 / 23.51) 
p=0.0000 
ill1 -.1344* -2.99** 
(-1.17 / -4.81) 
.0134 -3.08** 
(-0.21 / -5.95) 
p=0.1677 
ill2 .2039** 4.54** 
(3.03 / 6.04) 
.0336 4.33** 
(1.94 / 6.72) 
p=0.0069 
Intercepts .1446**  -.0491   
% of actual 
values predicted: 
62.66% Sample:  895 patients: 
224 in first 
quartile and 
224 in 4th 
quartile.  
McFaddens 
R2: 
0.112 
LR test (λ): 34.82 Jointly 
significant? 
Yes : CV for 
18 dfs = 
28.87 
Log-
likelihood: 
-4916.88 
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Only 2 of the interaction dummy variables proved to be significant at the 5% significance 
level. There is evidence at the 1% significance level that the variable dis2 differs for those in 
the lowest quartile of VAS scores relative to the inter-quartile range. MRS for dis2 (MRS = 
10.67 [CI: 7.80 / 13.54] vs. 16.30 [CI: 13.54 / 19.07]), differs according to the Wald test 
(p=0.0000). These differences in MRS suggest that those in the lowest quartile of quality of 
life (as measured by VAS) prioritize those with moderate as opposed to severe diseases 
affecting life expectancy by less. There is also evidence at the 1% level that dep differs in 
terms of attribute impacts for those in the highest quartile (the dummy variable on dep is 
significant at the 1% level). MRS for this variable is also different according to the Wald test 
(p=0.0000), and MRS is lower for those in the highest quality of life quartile (MRS = 0.91 [CI: 
0.36 / 1.47] vs. 1.65 [CI: 1.27 / 2.04]), who value prioritizing those with dependents less.  
 
Evidence from the Wald tests suggests that there are also differences in MRS with respect to 
a number of variables. Amongst respondents in the lowest quartile of VAS scores, the Wald 
tests suggest that there are statistically significant differences in MRS with respect to tiss 
(p=0.0003); dep (p=0.0000); age (p=0.0102); dis2 (p=0.0000) and dif_ill_m_to_s (p=0.0049) 
compared to the inter-quartile range. Amongst those in the highest quartile in terms of VAS 
score, the evidence is that according to the Wald test there are statistically significant 
differences in MRS with respect to tiss (p=0.0001); dep (p=0.0000); dis2 (p=0.0069) 
compared to the inter-quartile range. 
 
In relation to tiss, comparing the lower quartile VAS score with those not in the inter-quartile 
range (MRS = 1.13 [CI: 0.55 / 1.71] vs. 1.62 [CI: 1.13 / 2.11]), the Wald test (p=0.0003) 
suggests that those with lower quartile VAS scores have a lower preference for transplanting, 
to those with better tissue matches. With respect to dep (MRS = 1.39 [CI: 0.92 / 1.86] vs. 1.65 
[CI: 1.27 / 2.04]), the Wald test suggests that MRS varies between the 2 groups (p=0.0000). 
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Those with lower quartile VAS scores may prioritise those with child or adult dependents less 
than other respondents.  
 
For age (MRS = (0.13 [CI: 0.06 / 0.19] vs. 0.15 [CI: 0.10 / 0.20]), the Wald test suggests that 
MRS differs between the two groups (p=0.102). The point estimates suggest that those in the 
lowest quartile in terms of VAS scores may place less of a priority upon prioritizing younger 
patients. MRS for dis2 varies (p=0.0000) between those with lower quartile VAS scores and 
those in the inter-quartile range (MRS = 10.67 [CI: 7.80 / 13.54] vs. 16.30 [13.54 / 19.07]). 
Those in the lowest quartile value prioritizing those with moderate rather than severe 
diseases affecting life expectancy by less than other respondents, which is compatible with 
self-interested behaviour. 
 
For ill2 (MRS = 3.32 [CI: 1.37 / 5.26] vs. 4.54 [CI: 3.03 / 6.04]) the Wald test (p=0.0049) 
suggests a difference between the groups, and those with lower quality of life appear to 
prioritize those with moderate rather than severe diseases affecting quality of life by less. This 
is again compatible with self-interested behaviour. 
 
Comparing those in the highest quartile in terms of quality of life with those in the inter 
quartile range, we have already noted a difference in attribute impact and MRS for dep, but 
MRS might vary for other attributes. For tiss (MRS = 1.24 [CI: 0.50 / 1.97] vs. 1.62 [CI: 1.13 / 
2.11]), there is evidence that those with higher quartile VAS scores, place less emphasis 
upon prioritising those who are a good tissue match, compared to other respondents, 
according to the Wald test (p=0.0001) 
 
In relation to dis2 (MRS = 18.74 [CI: 13.98 / 23.51] vs. 16.30 [CI: 13.54 / 19.07]) the Wald test 
(p=0.0000) suggest that MRS varies between those in the highest quartile of VAS scores, and 
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those in the inter-quartile range. Those in the highest VAS score quartile seem to value 
prioritizing those with moderate rather than severe diseases affecting life expectancy by 
more. Also the Wald test (p=0.0069) suggests that MRS differs (MRS = 4.33 [CI: 1.94 / 6.72] 
vs. 4.54 [CI: 3.03 / 6.04]) in relation to ill2 between those in the highest VAS score quartile 
and those with a VAS score in the inter-quartile range. Those in the highest quartile value 
prioritizing those with moderate rather than severe diseases affecting quality of life less. 
There is no evidence of statistically significant differences in the valuation of any other 
attributes in terms of MRS. 
 
4.8. Analysis of data for (for respondents who do not claim to only consider others). 
Comparing the preferences of those with preferences in 1st and 4th quartiles of VAS 
scores, with the inter-quartile range.  
 
We can consider whether it is appropriate to model preferences separately for altruistic vs. 
non-altruistic respondents for VAS data, or whether a pooled model is adequate by 
comparing the restricted pooled model (model 5) with the unrestricted separate models for 
non-altruistic (model 6) and altruistic (model 7) respondents using a likelihood ratio test. The 
value of λ (45.31) just exceeds the critical value (40.11) at the 5% level, which suggests that 
using 2 separate models is also more appropriate for the VAS data.  
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Table 10 – model 6: For respondents who do not claim to only consider others: dummy 
variables for 1st & 4th VAS quartiles.   
Attribute Coefficient 
for inter-
quartile 
range 
MRS for inter-
quartile range 
Coefficient 
on dummy  
for those in 
quartile 1 
 
Implied MRS 
for lowest 
quartile 
Wald test 
 
p-values 
wait .0482** 1 .0097 1  
tiss .0643** 1.33** 
(0.64 / 2.03) 
-.0299 0.59 
(-0.09 / 1.28) 
p=0.0144 
dep .0901** 1.87** 
(1.28 / 2.45) 
-.0038 1.49** 
(0.89 / 2.09) 
p=0.0027 
age .0055** 0.11** 
(0.04 /0.19) 
.0039 0.16** 
(0.08 / 0.24)  
p=0.8249 
dis1 .0044 0.09 
(-2.06 / 2.24) 
.1520 2.70* 
(0.31 / 5.09) 
p=0.2437 
dis2 .5858** 12.15 
(8.65 / 15.65) 
-.0555 9.15** 
(5.77 / 12.52) 
p=0.0001 
ill1 -.1209 -2.51 
(-5.19 / 0.18) 
.0060 -1.98 
(-4.89 / 0.93) 
p=0.4436 
ill2 .1537** 3.19** 
(0.96 / 5.41) 
.1615 5.44 
(3.02 / 7.86) 
p=0.9077 
Intercepts .1422**  .0212   
Attribute Coefficient 
for inter-
quartile 
range 
MRS for inter-
quartile range 
Coefficient 
on dummy  
for those in 
quartile 4 
 
Implied MRS 
for highest 
quartile 
Wald test 
 
p-values 
wait .0482** 1 -.0127 1  
tiss .0643** 1.33** 
(0.64 / 2.03) 
-.0075 1.60* 
(0.11 / 3.10) 
p=0.0703 
dep .0901** 1.87** 
(1.28 / 2.45) 
-.0341 1.58** 
(0.42 / 2.74) 
p=0.0002 
age .0055** 0.11** 
(0.04 /0.19) 
.0064* 0.33** 
(0.14 / 0.53) 
p=0.8861 
dis1 .0044 0.09 
(-2.06 / 2.24) 
-.0366 -0.91 
(-5.39 / 3.58) 
p=0.7511 
dis2 .5858** 12.15 
(8.65 / 15.65) 
.1967 22.05** 
(11.73 / 32.38) 
p=0.0273 
ill1 -.1209 -2.51 
(-5.19 / 0.18) 
.0889 -0.90 
(-6.58 / 4.78) 
p=0.2214 
ill2 .1537** 3.19** 
(0.96 / 5.41) 
.0628 6.10* 
(1.42 / 10.79) 
p=0.5509 
Intercepts .1422**  -.0159   
% of actual 
values predicted: 
65.90% Sample:  357 patients: 
105 in first 
quartile and 
75 in 4th 
quartile.  
McFaddens 
R2: 
0.119 
LR test (λ): 24.09 Jointly 
significant? 
No : CV for 
18 dfs = 
28.87 
Log-
likelihood: 
-1942.08 
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Model 6 (table 10) relates to respondents who do not claim to only consider others (357 / 895 
responses). The likelihood ratio test (λ = 24.09, and the critical value = 28.87 for 18 degrees 
of freedom) suggests that the dummy variables are not jointly significant. The model 
accurately predicts 65.90% of responses and McFaddens R2 = 0.119. 
Moreover, only 1 / 16 of the interaction dummy variables is significant at the 5% level (age) 
which relates to a comparison between those in the highest quartile in terms of VAS score, 
and the inter-quartile range but MRS is not significantly different for this variable. 
 
Comparing those in the lowest quartile with those in the inter-quartile range, MRS varies in a 
statistically significant way (at the 5% level) for 3 variables according to the Wald test. It 
varies with respect to tiss (p=0.0144), and MRS (MRS = 0.59 [CI: -0.09 / 1.28] vs. 1.33 [CI: 
0.64 / 2.03]) is insignificant for non-altruistic respondents in the lowest VAS quartile. 
However, it is positive and significant for those in the inter-quartile range (who do value 
prioritizing those with better tissue matches). It also varies with respect to dep (p=0.0027), 
and differences in MRS (MRS = 1.49 [CI: 0.89 / 2.09] vs. 1.87 [CI: 1.28 / 2.45]), suggest that 
non-altruistic respondents in the lowest VAS quartile, would prioritize those with dependents 
by less than those in the VAS inter-quartile range. There is also a difference with respect to 
dis2 (p=0.0001), and those in the lowest VAS quartile have a lower MRS to those in the inter-
quartile range (MRS = 9.15 [CI: 5.77 / 12.52] vs. 12.15 [CI: 8.65 / 15.65]), meaning non-
altruistic respondents in the lowest VAS quartile would not prioritize those with moderate 
diseases rather than severe diseases affecting quality of life as much as those in the inter-
quartile range (with a better quality of life).  This finding might be explained by pursuit of self-
interest. 
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Comparing those in the highest quartile with those in the inter-quartile range, MRS varies 
significantly for 2 variables. MRS varies with respect to dep (p=0.0002) and differences in 
MRS (MRS = 1.58 [CI: 0.42 / 2.74] vs. 1.87 [CI: 1.28 / 2.45]), suggest that those in the highest 
VAS quartile have a lower MRS (MRS = 1.58 [CI: 0.42 / 2.74] vs. 1.87 [CI: 1.28 / 2.45]), and 
would prioritize those with dependents less than those in the inter-quartile range. MRS also 
varies with respect to dis2 (p=0.0273), and MRS is considerably higher for those in the 
highest VAS score quartile (MRS = 22.05 [CI: 11.73 / 32.38] vs. 12.15 [CI: 8.65 / 15.65]). 
Non-altruistic responders who are in the highest VAS score quartile, place more emphasis 
upon prioritizing those with moderate rather than severe diseases affecting life expectancy, 
than those in the VAS score inter-quartile range, which could be explained in terms of self 
interested behaviour. MRS does not vary with respect to any other variables. 
 
4.9. Analysis of data for (for respondents who claim to only consider others, who we 
label ‘altruistic’). Comparing the preferences of those with preferences in 1st and 4th 
quartiles of VAS scores, with the inter-quartile range. 
 
Model 7 (table 11) relates to altruistic responders, its dummy variables are jointly significant 
(λ =33.24, whereas the critical value for 18 degrees of freedom is 28.87). The model 
accurately predicts 64% of responses and McFaddens R2 = 0.115.Also 3 dummy variables 
are significant. They include the dummy variables dis2, and ill2 for the lowest VAS quartile 
group, and dep for the highest VAS quartile group.  
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Table 11 – model 7: Altruistic patients: dummy variables for 1st & 4th VAS quartiles.   
Attribute Coefficient 
for inter-
quartile 
range 
MRS for 
inter-quartile 
range 
Coefficient  
on dummy   
for  
those in  
quartile 1 
MRS for  
lowest  
quartile 
Wald  
test 
 
p-values 
wait .0430** 1 -.0026 1  
tiss .0789** 1.84** 
(1.15 / 2.52) 
-.0087 1.74** 
(0.72 / 2.77) 
p=0.0077 
dep .0639** 1.49** 
(0.98 / 1.99) 
-.0116 1.30** 
(0.55 / 2.04) 
p=0.0039 
age .0074** 0.17** 
(0.10 / 0.24) 
-.0039 0.09 
(-0.01 / 0.19)  
p=0.0015 
dis1 -.0478 -1.11 
(-3.11 / 0.88) 
-.0196 -1.67 
(-4.74 / 1.40) 
p=0.8031 
dis2 .8312** 19.34** 
(15.17 / 
23.51) 
-.3248** 12.55** 
(7.52 / 17.57) 
p=0.0000 
ill1 -.1429* -3.32** 
(-5.79 / -0.86) 
.0672 -1.88 
(-5.69 / 1.94) 
p=0.1285 
ill2 .2362** 5.50** 
(3.44 / 7.55) 
-.2047* 0.78 
(-2.53 / 4.09) 
p=0.0001 
Intercepts 0.147**  -.0451   
Attribute Coefficient 
for inter-
quartile 
range 
MRS for 
inter-quartile 
range 
Coefficient  
on dummy   
for  
those in  
quartile 4 
MRS for  
highest  
quartile 
Wald  
test 
 
p-values 
wait .0430** 1 -.0017 1  
tiss .0789** 1.84** 
(1.15 / 2.52) 
-.0343 1.08* 
(0.24 / 1.92) 
p=0.0005 
dep .0639** 1.49** 
(0.98 / 1.99) 
-.0375* 0.64* 
(0.00 / 1.28) 
p=0.0001 
age .0074** 0.17** 
(0.10 / 0.24) 
-.0009 0.16** 
(0.06 / 0.25) 
p=0.0165 
dis1 -.0478 -1.11 
(-3.11 / 0.88) 
.0760 0.68 
(-1.97 / 3.33) 
p=0.2368 
dis2 .8312** 19.34** 
(15.17 / 
23.51) 
-.1127 17.40** 
(12.10 / 22.70) 
p=0.0000 
ill1 -.1429* -3.32** 
(-5.79 / -0.86) 
-.0217 -3.99* 
(-7.32 / -0.65) 
p=0.3804 
ill2 .2362** 5.50** 
(3.44 / 7.55) 
-.0882 3.58* 
(-0.79 / 6.38) 
p=0.0034 
Intercepts 0.147**  -.0650   
% of actual values 
predicted: 
64.00% Sample:  538 patients: 
119 in 1st 
quartile & 
149 in 4th.  
McFaddens  
R2: 
0.115 
LR test (λ): 33.24 Jointly 
significant? 
Yes : CV for 
18 dfs = 
28.87 
Log- 
likelihood: 
-.2952.1 
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Comparing the lowest VAS score quartile with the inter-quartile range, MRS differs with 
respect to 5 variables for altruistic responders (tiss, dep, age, dis2, and ill2). For tiss 
(p=0.0077), the, small difference in MRS (MRS = 1.74 [CI: 0.72 / 2.77] vs. 1.84 [CI: 1.15 / 
2.52]) suggests that those in the lowest VAS quartile would prioritize potential recipients with 
better tissue matches marginally less than those with inter-quartile range VAS scores. With 
respect to dep there is again a significant difference in MRS (p=0.0039), and the difference 
(MRS = 1.30 [CI: 0.55 / 2.04] vs. 1.49 [CI: 0.98 / 1.99]) implies that those with lower VAS 
scores have a lower preference for prioritizing those with dependents than those with inter-
quartile range VAS scores. For age, MRS again varies significantly (p=0.0015), and MRS 
(MRS = 0.09 [CI: -0.01 / 0.19] vs. 0.17 [CI: 0.10 / 0.24]) is insignificant for those in the lowest 
VAS quartile, but positive and significant for those with inter-quartile range VAS scores. There 
is a difference in MRS (p=0.0000) with respect to dis2, and MRS is lower for those in the 
lowest VAS quartile relative to the inter-quartile range (MRS = 12.55 [CI: 7.52 / 17.57] vs. 
19.34 [CI: 15.17 / 23.51]). This suggests that even amongst altruistic respondents those with 
poor quality of life (in the lowest VAS quartile), have less of a preference for prioritizing those 
with moderate rather than severe diseases affecting quality of life, this is a finding that would  
be easier to explain if the respondents had been non-altruistic. 
 
Also MRS varies for ill2 (p=0.0001) and MRS (MRS = 0.78 [CI: -2.53 / 4.09] vs. 5.50 [CI: 3.44 
/ 7.55]), it is insignificant for those in the lowest VAS quartile, but positive and significant for 
those in the inter-quartile range. Again, this is a finding that is hard to explain in a sample of 
patients that report having considered only others (unless of course they empathise more 
with the plight of those similarly adversely affected in terms of quality of life to themselves). 
 
Comparing those in the highest VAS quartile with those in the VAS inter-quartile range, MRS 
varies with respect to 5 variables. For tiss MRS differs significantly (p=0.0005), and MRS 
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(MRS = 1.08 [CI: 0.24 / 1.92] vs. 1.84 [CI: 1.15 / 2.52]) is lower for those in the highest VAS 
quartile, so they value prioritizing potential recipients based upon tissue match less. For 
difdep MRS differs statistically (p=0.0001), and MRS is lower amongst those in the highest 
quartile of VAS scores compared with the inter-quartile range (MRS = 0.64 [CI: 0.00 / 1.28] 
vs. 1.49 [CI: 0.98 / 1.99]), so those with high quartile VAS scores value prioritizing those with 
dependents by less. 
 
With respect to age, the Wald test (p=0.0165) suggests MRS differs. However MRS (MRS = 
0.16 [CI: 0.06 / 0.25] vs. 0.17 [CI: 0.10 / 0.24]) is only marginally lower for those in the highest 
VAS quartile. Also MRS for dis2 differs (p=0.0000), and MRS (MRS = 17.40 [CI: 12.10 / 
22.70] vs. 19.34 [CI: 15.17 / 23.51]) is lower amongst respondents who are in the highest 
VAS quartile, who prioritize those with moderate rather than severe diseases affecting life 
expectancy by less, which is compatible with altruistic behaviour. Finally, there is evidence 
that MRS differs with respect to ill2 (p=0.0034) and that MRS (MRS = 3.58 [CI: -0.79 / 6.38] 
vs. 5.50 [CI: 3.44 / 7.55]) is lower for those in the highest VAS quartile. So those in the 
highest VAS quartile would prioritize those with moderate rather than severe diseases 
affecting quality of life less, which is again compatible with altruistic behaviour. There is no 
evidence that MRS for other variables does differs for this model. 
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5. Discussion. 
 
Before we discuss this data, probably the most immediate question we need to address is the 
value of including the Visual Analogue Scale (VAS). There is evidence that VAS tends to elicit 
different results to those based upon Eq-5d (Robinson, Dolan et al. 1997). Therefore, 
because it is likely that the links between VAS scores and respondent choices might differ, 
we chose to use both Eq-5d and VAS. However, the use of VAS has been challenged on a 
variety of grounds. Firstly, it does not involve a widely accepted measure of utility, and it has 
therefore been argued it lacks theoretical foundations. Moreover, some attempts to redress 
this problem by converting VAS scores into standard gamble utilities have foundered 
(Robinson, Loomes et al. 2001). The claim that VAS lacks theoretical foundations is of course 
open to question, as it is consistent with the non-welfarist foundations of both QALYs and 
cost-utility analysis (Parkin and Devlin 2006). Also a case can be made that VAS could play a 
continuing, limited but useful, role with respect to preference evaluation (Torrance, Feeny et 
al. 2001; Brazier and McCabe 2007) alongside collection of ordinal data, which is why we 
included it. It is therefore worth establishing how respondent quality of life as measured by 
VAS appears to affect preferences, as well as looking at the links between respondent Eq-5d 
status and respondent preferences. 
 
5.1. Evidence of differences in preferences between the pooled model and separate 
models according to how respondents replied to the question relating to the 
perspective they adopted.  
 
The findings of the 2 likelihood tests comparing the pooled models (model 2 and model 5) 
with the equivalent separate models (models 3 and 4, and models 6 and 7 respectively), 
suggests that preferences do differ between respondents who do not claim to only consider 
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others and altruistic responders, both when looking at the links between Eq-5d status and 
preferences, and VAS status and preferences.  
 
This supports the case for modelling preferences separately for respondents who do not 
claim to only consider others and altruistic responders. However, for analyses relating to Eq-
5d, the within model likelihood ratio tests which test for the joint significance of the dummy 
variables are insignificant in all 3 models (models 2, 3, and 4). Moreover, attribute impacts do 
not vary significantly according to which Eq-5d status grouping respondents are in (i.e. 
bottom quartile, mid-range 47%, or those for whom QALY = 1). The evidence for this is that 
the dummy variables are never jointly significant in either model 2, 3, or 4, nor do any of them 
have significant dummy variables. 
 
5.2. Links between respondents Eq-5d status, the perspective they adopted, and their 
preferences for different transplant prioritization criteria.  
 
We considered that it was conceivable that the relationship between Eq-5d status and 
preferences for the pooled model (model 2) might have been muted. This is because the 
majority of the pooled sample of respondents (which includes respondents who do not claim 
to only consider others and altruistic responders) indicated they had an altruistic perspective. 
This perspective might blunt the relationship between patient respondent quality of life status 
(as measured by Eq-5d) and patient preference (particularly for attributes relating to diseases 
affecting life expectancy, and diseases affecting quality of life). If patients are altruistic it 
should mean that their own quality of life measured using Eq-5d does not influence their 
preferences for attributes such as diseases affecting life expectancy or quality of life, based 
upon their own self interest. This means that associations between quality of life and 
preferences, which we might expect, might be hidden under an altruistic veil. 
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Therefore we conjectured that the relationship between respondent Eq-5d status and 
preferences should be more apparent amongst respondents who do not claim to only 
consider others (model 3), because low or high Eq-5d status respondents have an incentive 
to prioritize people for transplant who have similar quality of life characteristics. But, just like 
the whole sample (model 2), the dummy variables in model 3 proved to be jointly insignificant; 
and none of the dummy variables were singularly significant in the group that do not claim to 
only consider others (who are at least partly self interested). This same picture of the dummy 
variables not being either jointly or singularly coefficient emerges for model 4. There is 
however some evidence that the MRS figures vary according to which Eq-5d grouping 
respondents are in. Comparing model 2 (pooled sample), with model 3 (respondents who do 
not claim to only consider others), 3 / 7 of the MRS figures differ between those in the lowest 
quartile of MRS in model 2, and the same 3 / 7 are different in model 2. What is interesting 
though is that, whilst those in the lowest Eq-5d sample would prioritize tiss more in model 2 
(whole sample), the respondents who do not claim to only consider others (at least partly self 
interested) for model 3 in the lowest Eq-5d quartile prioritize those with better tissue matches 
less. 
 
Comparing model 2 (pooled sample) with model 3 (respondents who do not claim to only 
consider others) when comparing those in the highest Eq-5d quartile with the ‘mid-range’ 4 / 7 
estimates of MRS are different in model 2 (pooled sample), but only 2 / 7 estimates of MRS 
differ comparing the top Eq-5d grouping with the mid-range (model 3).  The 2 / 7 estimates of 
MRS which do differ in model 3 also differ in model 2, and the difference in MRS between 
respondents in the top Eq-5d grouping and the ‘mid-range’ is in the same direction. At the 
same time, those in the top Eq-5d grouping, who are in the sample of respondents who do 
not claim to only consider others (model 3), do not have a statistically significant different 
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MRS to those in the mid-range for dep and age when there is a difference in model 2 (the 
whole sample). 
 
Comparing model 2 (the pooled sample), with model 4 (altruistic responders), 3 / 7 MRS 
figures differ significantly between those in the lowest Eq-5d status quartile and those in the 
mid-range in the pooled sample. Amongst altruistic responders 2 / 7 MRS figures differ 
significantly (age and dis2), both of which are significantly different within the pooled sample. 
Moreover the direction of difference is the same for age, with those in the lowest Eq-5d 
quartile valuing difage less than those in the ‘mid-range.’ However, in relation to dis2 those in 
the lowest Eq-5d quartile who are altruistic have a significantly different MRS compared to 
those in the ‘mid-range.’ (MRS =20.43 [12.34 / 28.52] vs. 16.52 [12.85 / 20.18]). This 
suggests that altruistic responders in the lowest Eq-5d quartile would prioritize those with 
moderate rather than severe diseases affecting life expectancy by more than those with ‘mid-
range’ Eq-5d status. This cannot be self-interested behaviour but is compatible with people 
behaving altruistically. 
 
If you take the sample as a whole however (model 2), you find dis2 is valued differently (MRS 
=14.91 [10.72 / 19.09] vs. 15.03 [12.44 / 17.62]), and respondents in the lowest quartile in the 
sample overall value prioritizing those with moderate rather than severe diseases affecting 
life expectancy by less than those in the ‘mid-range.’ This is compatible with self-interested 
behaviour by many respondents within the pooled sample.   
 
 370 
 
5.3. Links between respondents VAS status, the perspective they adopted, and their 
preferences for different transplant prioritization criteria.  
 
In relation to the models which relate VAS status to choice experiment preferences (models 
5, 6, and 7), we find evidence that the dummy variables are jointly significant for model 5 (the 
pooled sample). This provides some evidence that quality of life as measured by VAS has an 
impact upon practices. Moreover, it appears that 2 / 16 dummy variables are significant, for 
this model. The likelihood ratio test indicates that the dummy variables are however not jointly 
significant in model 6 (the non-altruistic responders), and only 1 / 16 of the dummy variables 
prove significant (age comparing those in the highest quartile with those in the inter-quartile 
range), which suggests that those in the highest VAS quartile value prioritizing younger 
respondents more. These findings are surprising because we would expect stronger links 
between quality of life (as measured by VAS) and patient preferences amongst patients who 
are non-altruistic (because self interest might encourage such patients to allow their own 
quality of life to inform their preferences). Equally, it is difficult to understand why the 
likelihood ratio test for joint significance of the dummy variables is significant for the altruistic 
group (model 7) when it is not, as we have discussed, for non-altruistic respondents (model 
6). Moreover, in model 7 which relates to the altruistic group, 3 / 16 dummy variables are 
significant, including dis2 when those in the lowest quartile are compared with the inter-
quartile range; ill2 when comparing those in the lowest quartile with the inter-quartile range; 
and dep comparing those in the highest quartile with those in the inter-quartile range. 
 
We found that for non-altruistic responders (model 6), the likelihood ratio test proved the 
dummy variables to be jointly significant, and 1 / 16 variables proved significant also. So we 
have the unexpected result that the relationship between VAS status and preferences 
appears to be stronger for altruistic respondents than non-altruistic respondents.   
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Finally, in the pooled model (model 5) differences in MRS are statistically significant in 
relation to 9 / 16 variables. In the non-altruistic group (model 6), 5 / 16 variables are 
statistically significantly different, and all of these are also significant for the pooled sample 
(model 5). Overall 3 / 16 of the 5 / 16 variables that have a statistically different MRS relate to 
differences between the lowest quartile and the inter-quartile range, and these differences are 
all in the same direction. The other 2 / 16 compare those in the highest VAS quartile with the 
inter-quartile range, and once again all the differences in MRS between the highest quartile 
and the inter quartile range are in the same direction.  
 
Comparing the pooled model (model 5) with the altruistic group (model 7), there is evidence 
that dummy variables are significantly different for 9 / 16 variables in model 5, and for 10 / 16 
variables in model 7. All the attributes that are statistically different in the pooled model 
(model 5) differ amongst altruistic responders (model 7). However, additionally MRS for 
difage varies amongst the altruistic responders, such that MRS for those in the highest 
quartile in model 7 for the altruistic group is statistically significantly lower for those in the 
highest quartile, but only marginally so (MRS =0.16 [0.06 / 0.25] vs. 0.17 [0.10 / 0.24]) for 
age. The direction of statistically significant differences in MRS is always the same comparing 
the dummy variable groups with the inter-quartile range except in the case of dis2. For the 
altruistic sample (model 7) those in the highest quartile of the VAS distribution have a lower 
MRS for dis2 (MRS =17.40 [12.10 / 22.70] vs. 19.34 [15.17 / 23.51]), meaning those who 
have better quality of life (in the highest quartile of VAS scores) would place less emphasis 
upon prioritizing those with moderate rather than severe diseases affecting life expectancy in 
the altruistic sample, which is compatible with them being altruistic. In contrast in the pooled 
sample (model 5), MRS is statistically significantly higher (MRS =18.74 [13.98 / 23.51] vs. 
16.30 [13.54 / 19.07]), amongst those with better quality of life (in the highest quartile for VAS 
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scores) for dis2. This is compatible with some self-interested behaviour within the pooled 
sample (model 5), because those with higher quality of life in this sample are placing more 
emphasis upon prioritizing people with moderate rather than severe diseases affecting quality 
of life. 
 
6. Conclusions. 
 
The picture presented above is quite complex. At a methodological level, the main limitation 
of the analysis presented here is that, ideally, I would have liked to have made a comparison 
in relation to patient preferences for DCE attributes between respondents who answered in 
each of the following 3 ways:  
 
1) Answering the questions in terms of what would be best for me. 
2) Answering the questions in terms of what would be best for me and others. 
3) Disregarding what is best for me and only considering what is best for others. 
 
However, regrettably there were insufficient numbers of respondents (n= 30) in group 1 to 
enable me to conduct an analysis (using interaction dummy variables) to establish whether 
their preferences for DCE attributes varied from those in the other two groups. This meant 
that, when conducting analyses for model 1 (table 5), the 542 respondents who had chosen 
the third option which could be labelled ‘altruistic’ were compared against patients who had 
not responded in this way. 
 
Consideration of model 2 (table 6), model 3 (table 7), and model 4 (table 8) leads to some 
interesting findings. Model 2 was a pooled model in which all respondents providing Eq-5d 
status information and answering the question about the perspective they adopted were 
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included (n = 892). Model 3 comprised 359 / 892 respondents who did not claim to only 
consider others (i.e. the first and second response options), and model 4 comprised the 533 / 
892 respondents who had ticked the third response option indicating they only considered 
others (labelled as ‘altruistic’). Since only 30 respondents had indicated that they had 
responded in an entirely self-interested manner (first response), most of the group of 
responders who we have described as respondents who ‘did not claim to only consider 
others’, in actual fact had an altruistic dimension to their utility function because most of them 
had considered “what would be best for me and others.”  Indeed such behaviour is equivalent 
to the behaviour of an individual who has a ‘caring externality.’ 
 
The implication of this is that I was unable to compare the preferences of altruistic vs. non-
altruistic responders, but rather instead I had to compare the preferences of a group of 
respondents who claimed to have purely altruistic motives (which I labelled altruistic) with 
respondents who in contrast considered self interest (although most of this group claimed to 
consider others at the same time as themselves). Had we achieved a larger sample of 
respondents who reported they only considered their self-interest then the preferences of 
purely self interested vs. purely altruistic respondents could have been compared also. Links 
between the perspective respondents adopted, and how their preferences were affected by 
their quality of life status, may have been more apparent, if I could have made this more 
useful comparison.   
 
Exactly the same point can be made in relation to the comparisons between models 5 (table 
9), model 6 (table 10), and model 7 (table 11). Model 5 was once again a pooled model, in 
this case all respondents providing VAS status information as well as answering the question 
about the perspective they adopted (n= 895). Model 6 comprised 357 / 892 respondents who 
had not claimed they only consider others (i.e. the first and second response options), and 
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model 7 comprised the 538 / 892 respondents who had ticked the third response option 
indicating they only considered others (labelled ‘altruistic’). So once again, because we had 
not enough respondents who only considered their self interest, I ended up making a 
comparison between those who claimed to consider only others (labelled altruistic) vs. 
another group of respondents who took self interest into account; but most of the latter group 
said they considered others as well as themselves.  
 
Despite the fact that the methodological approach we adopted was compromised because of 
these sampling issues, there is a case for modelling preferences separately for altruistic vs. 
other responders. The evidence presented here suggests that patient respondent quality of 
life as measured by either VAS or Eq-5d influences respondent preferences. However, the 
links appear to be surprisingly quite weak.  When using dummy variables to establish the 
links between Eq-5d and preferences for model 2 (pooled model), model 3 (those who do not 
claim to consider only others), and model 4 (altruistic responders), none of the dummy 
variables proved significant either jointly or individually. However, in terms of the weaker test 
for differences (statistically significant differences in MRS for variables) there was evidence of 
some differences in preferences, and some of these differences in the altruistic sample 
appeared to be compatible with altruistic preferences (model 4). Also, differences in 
preferences in the non-altruistic sample were compatible with respondents behaving non-
altruistically (model 3).  
 
Interestingly, the evidence on links between VAS and preferences is less clear cut. There is 
some evidence of statistically significant differences in variable impacts in models 5, 6, and 7. 
However, although some of the differences in MRS seem to be in line with respondents’ non-
altruistic or altruistic status, others are not. It could be that part of the reason for this is that 
those who take into account the interests of others (not themselves), might still have greater 
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empathy for others who are like themselves. This may explain why the links between quality 
of life and preferences can still apparently be related to respondents’ own quality of life status 
amongst non-altruistic patients.  
 
It is obviously regrettable from a methodological point of view that we did not have a large 
enough sample of respondents who claimed to be purely self-interested. Had more 
respondents indicated they answered the questions in terms of what would be best for 
themselves we could have established their DCE preferences, and then compared these 
preferences with the other two groups. 
 
It is not altogether unsurprising that only a small number (n=30) respondents indicated they 
had answered the DCE questionnaire in terms only of what would be best for them. This is 
because most of the choices they faced for hypothetical kidney transplant recipients (Patient 
A or Patient B) would involve patients whose characteristics differed from their own. In such a 
situation, it is difficult to be purely self-interested when asked to choose which patient should 
be given a transplant. However, in some other contexts (in which personal utility maximising 
behaviour might be expected) it should be possible to derive information from enough DCE 
respondents who take self interest into account.  
 
Despite the limitations arising because we did not have enough purely self interested 
respondents to assess their group’s preferences, there does seem to be some evidence that 
a patient’s own quality of life (as measured by Eq-5d) may influence their DCE preferences, 
and that less altruistic respondents may be more likely to prioritize respondents with similar 
characteristics to themselves than altruistic respondents do. However, when undertaking a 
similar analysis using respondents’ VAS scores we found that sometimes the results were 
counter-intuitive, and not always supportive of the view that altruistic patients are less inclined 
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to prioritize potential recipients with similar characteristics to themselves, than those with 
more self-interested motivations. 
 
In conclusion, I think that the hypothesis we are trying to test ideally needs to be tested using 
a DCE which can obtain sufficient respondents who fall into all 3 categories of behaviour. I 
am currently conducting a DCE study (in collaboration with Dr Verity Watson, University of 
Aberdeen) in which I am examining preferences for different modes of renal dialysis. For the 
purposes of this labelled choice DCE, patients have again completed Eq-5d and VAS, and 
have been asked a similar question to ascertain whether self-interested or altruistic 
preferences (or both types of preferences simultaneously) apply. Because we have enough 
respondents falling into each of the 3 categories, I will be able to analyse the preferences 
from respondents in the three groups. This should therefore provide a very promising 
environment in which to examine the issue discussed above in greater detail i.e. the links 
between respondent quality of life, respondent DCE preferences, and how respondent DCE 
preferences might be affected by how altruistic a respondent is. 
 
The issue of the extent to which DCE respondents are motivated by self-interest or altruism, 
and how this might affect respondent preferences, has been given little attention to date in 
the DCE literature. The analysis presented in this chapter represents the first serious attempt 
to address this issue. As indicated, I am also now following up this work in a further, separate 
DCE study. I am confident that publishable findings should emerge from this work.  
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Chapter 9: Discussion, and Conclusions. 
 
1. Introduction. 
 
This thesis has presented some of the research I have conducted over a number of years, 
specifically focused on the use of Discrete Choice Experiments (DCEs). Earlier chapters have 
described different studies and how my approach towards the use of DCEs has developed, 
as well as setting this research in the context of the developing literature for use of DCEs in 
health. In this chapter, I first briefly recap on the previous chapters and the conclusions 
drawn. This is followed by pulling the themes together and discussion of the key 
methodological issues emerging.  The use of DCE to inform policy making is still in its 
infancy. At the same time, the popularity of this powerful technique is increasing. Now is a 
good time to consider its use to date and its future value. 
 
2. A developing evidence base. 
 
In Chapter 1, I provided a definition of DCEs and explained key steps involved in undertaking 
a DCE (section A); and demonstrated that DCEs have theoretical foundations within the 
characteristics theory of demand (section B) and Random Utility Theory (section C). I then 
completed a systematic review of the DCE literature relating to health and presented my 
findings (section D). This review encompassed evidence from earlier systematic reviews for 
the periods 1990 – 2000 (Ryan and Gerard 2003) 2001 – 2008 (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 
2012) plus 96 more recent studies which were reviewed and analyzed by me for 2009-2011.  
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The review began by considering which categories DCE studies fall into, and then provided 
an overview of trends in the number of studies published per year. This number has 
increased exponentially from 3 per year during 1990 – 2000, to 14 per year during 2001 – 
2008, and then 32 per year during 2009 - 2011. Information was also presented relating to 
the country of origin for DCE studies.  A key finding here was that the UK’s previous 
dominance (48% of DCE studies in 2001 – 2008) as the major source of published DCE 
studies appears to be threatened. The UK now accounts for just 21% of studies. This is 
primarily due to increasing numbers of studies emanating from countries such as the USA, 
Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, and other countries. On a positive note, this 
means that DCE are increasingly being applied internationally, while the actual annual 
number of DCEs in the UK (55 / 114 from 2001 – 2008; and 20 / 96 from 2009 – 2011) has 
not changed much in the last decade (e.g. around 8 a year from 2001 – 2008, and 7 a year 
from 2009 – 2011). Moreover, DCEs have the advantage over Cost-Utility Analysis that they 
can value both health outcomes and experience factors (and hence value process utility). In 
the UK, whilst many health economists regard DCEs as a useful tool for economic evaluation, 
Cost-Utility Analysis still seems to be used more often alongside randomized controlled trials. 
This partly reflects the fact that policy makers were already familiar with the use of Cost-per-
QALYs to help inform decision making, before DCEs had become established. Before this 
technique is used to underpin more decision making in healthcare, I think more DCE studies 
using WTP to underpin Cost-Benefit Analysis will need to be undertaken. In this way policy 
makers might begin to think in terms of what constitutes an acceptable Cost-Benefit ratio, not 
acceptable just an acceptable Cost per QALY. 
 
However, this thesis points to wide ranging methodological issues surrounding the current 
use of DCEs to elicit WTP (Chapter 1, 3, and 4). In particular the need to ensure that DCE 
questionnaires are designed to be incentive compatible. Moreover, the range set for DCE 
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monetary attributes should be appropriate and informed by suitable pilot DCE research. 
Finally, DCE attributes and levels need to be carefully selected (a process informed by 
thorough qualitative research), so that benefits can be calculated for all the important 
characteristics that patients value. 
 
Trends are also observable in the number of attributes in DCE studies. A key finding here is 
that during 2009 – 2011 there were fewer studies with low numbers of attributes (i.e. either 2 
– 3, or 4 – 5, and an increased number of studies with a large number of attributes (i.e. 6 – 9 
attributes). Interestingly, when I examined the domains of DCE attributes, it was evident that 
the number of studies with a monetary measure has remained reasonably constant, although 
increasing numbers of studies appear to have attributes relating to risk, health status, and 
other domains. There also seems to be an increasing trend towards presenting respondents 
with more DCE questions; in 2009 – 2011 only 23% of studies had 8 or less choices, and 
increasing numbers of studies (55% had 9 – 16 choices, with 22% presenting more than 16 
choices. Some evidence suggests (Bech, Kjaer et al. 2011) that later DCE responses might 
be more thought through, so this may be a welcome development. There has also been a 
shift away from self-administered DCE questionnaires towards more interviewer administered 
ones and, particularly, computer administered questionnaires. The fact that DCEs are 
increasingly computer administered is inevitable given technological developments. It may 
also help DCE researchers more easily access respondents. However, care must be taken to 
ensure that this does not exclude certain potential respondent groups (in the interests of 
ensuring sample representativeness) just because they are less computer literate or do not 
have access to a computer e.g. older people. 
 
Obviously, having an appropriate DCE experimental design is extremely important. In section 
D.4 I outlined a range of designs that can be used. Main effects designs (which do not cater 
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for interactions) still accounted for the bulk of designs in 2009 – 2011. However, reassuringly, 
an increasing proportion of studies are now catering for interaction effects (11% in 2009 – 
2011, up from 5% in 2001 – 2008).  
 
The use of software packages to design DCEs had fallen to 46% of studies by 2009-2011. 
Use of Sawtooth and SPSS has not changed very much. However, there has been a shift 
away from the somewhat dated package (SPEED) which is used to generate orthogonal 
designs, towards the use of SAS which can be used to generate D-optimal designs. D-
optimal designs have the advantage that they are more statistically efficient than many 
orthogonal designs, which means information on preferences can be inferred from a smaller 
sample of respondents. That said, orthogonal designs using suitable software packages or 
design catalogues can still provide competent DCE designs, and may be sufficient if 
researchers already plan to distribute a large number of questionnaires (as was the case for 
all the studies reported in this thesis). Design catalogues are increasingly used, and in 2009 – 
2011 accounted for 16% of designs. In the same period, 4% of DCEs used websites for DCE 
designs, and 6% used expert advice. Worryingly, however, around 27% of studies published 
in 2009-2011 failed to adequately report the source of their design. 
 
In terms of analysis, a variety of different econometric methods can be used to analyse DCE 
data (see section D.5 of Chapter 1). All the DCEs reported in this thesis involved a choice 
between just two options (A or B), and so the data from them could be analyzed using binary 
dependent variable models. I therefore used Random Effects Probit for estimation of most of 
the models (Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 8). When each of the studies in this thesis was piloted 
(i.e. before 2007), the use of Random Effects Probit was very common, and remained 
common until recently. So for example during 1990 – 2000, 53% of studies were Random 
Effects Probit. However, use of such models then started to decline, falling to 41% in 2001 – 
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2008, and down further to 15% in 2009 – 2011. By 2009 – 2011, other binary dependent 
models such as Random effects Logit accounted for 9% of DCEs (in the same period Probit 
accounted for just 2% of studies and Logit 9%). There has been a corresponding increase in 
the use of Multinomial Logit models (18% in 1990 – 2000, 22% in 2001 – 2008, up to 45% in 
2009 – 2011). Part of the reason for this is that DCEs are increasingly designed to allow 
respondents to select between more than 2 options, or between two options plus an opt-out. 
In some situations presenting more than 2 options is essential. An example of this is the new 
labeled choice DCE I am currently conducting which compares 3 models of dialysis provision 
(hospital based haemodialysis, home based haemodialysis, and peritoneal dialysis). If I had 
not allowed for at least 3 response options, I would not have been able to adequately present 
a sufficient range of dialysis options to respondents. 
 
However, the use of a binary dependent model such as Random Effects Probit was adequate 
for the purposes of evaluating 2 competing models of DVT provision (Chapter 2 of this 
thesis); or 2 competing models of gynaecological care provision (Chapters 3 and 4); or for 
evaluating preferences for renal transplantation (Chapters 5, 6, and 8). A limitation of this 
approach is that information on preference heterogeneity is not provided (except if interaction 
dummy variables are used for respondent sub-groups). Of course, I could have given 
respondents the option not to make a choice. However, in some contexts (for example 
preferences for renal transplantation) that might not be appropriate. During piloting I 
discovered that a number of respondents who were not indifferent would have preferred to 
avoid registering a choice, simply because they felt uncomfortable with ‘playing God’. I 
therefore decided that in order to obtain as much information about preferences as possible, I 
ought to force a choice. 
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The use of Nested Logit might be indicated if there is a need to relax the Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption, but even by 2009 – 2011 only 3% of studies used 
this form of analysis. I think researchers do need to be sure that the IIA assumption holds 
before simply using Multinomial Logit (MNL). I am aware that for analysis of my new renal 
dialysis DCE I may have to use Nested Logit because two of my response options are quite 
similar (i.e. hospital based haemodialysis and home based dialysis) whilst the third option 
(home based peritoneal dialysis) is rather different, so the IIA option assumption may not 
hold. Had I not read recent key literature relating to econometric analysis of DCE data (de 
Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012) it would have been easy to make the potential mistake of 
unthinkingly adopting MNL, because it is “what other researchers appear to be doing”. 
 
The findings of my systematic review of the literature show that there has been a big rise in 
the application of Mixed Logit (this accounted for 18% of studies by 2009 – 2011). Mixed 
Logit is relatively easy to undertake and it allows researchers to establish whether 
preferences for particular attributes are subject to preference heterogeneity or not. When 
either Mixed Logit or LCM is applied, my literature review suggests it always seems to 
provide at least some evidence of preference heterogeneity. It could be argued that, since 
both Mixed Logit models and LCM invariably seem to indicate that preferences are 
heterogeneous, there is little point in applying them because they generate a result which can 
be anticipated (i.e. evidence of preference heterogeneity). I think, however, that such an 
argument misses two crucial points. The first is that by applying either Mixed Logit or LCM, it 
is possible to establish which attributes might be valued more differently by respondents, and 
which parameters might be less susceptible to preference heterogeneity. Secondly, if 
information about preference heterogeneity is not obtained, any results may give the 
misguided impression that respondent preferences are similar, when in reality preferences 
are heterogeneous across respondents. For these reasons I think that researchers need to 
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consider using either Mixed Logit or LCM routinely to analyze DCE data (perhaps alongside 
other econometric models).  
 
The use of validity checks when undertaking DCEs has been examined in some detail in 
chapter 1 of this thesis. The ‘Gold standard’ for validity checks requires some assessment of 
external validity. This involves a comparison of stated preferences obtained using DCEs with 
revealed preference data on actual choices. Only one published DCE paper over the period 
1990 – 2011 has been identified using such an approach (Mark and Swait 2004) for a 
healthcare DCE. So, it is apparent that tests of external validity are extremely rare for 
healthcare DCEs. Applying tests for DCE external validity in healthcare, therefore, remains an 
under-researched area. Tests for external validity might be undertaken by applying DCEs in 
some contexts in which people have to pay for health provision, and comparing the DCE 
results with revealed preferences. There is an interesting discussion paper (Watson V and 
Ryan M 2010) which compares the monetary value generated from a DCE model for 
Chlamydia screening with the real price of a Chlamydia screening test introduced at a 
chemist. However, since market prices don’t necessarily equate with someone’s full WTP, 
this still does not provide a full test of external validity (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012).  
 
In contrast with the extreme rarity of tests of external validity, I found evidence that an 
increasing proportion of published studies report tests for internal theoretical validity (72% in 
2009 – 2011). This type of validity test requires that study authors assess whether 
coefficients upon attributes move in line with prior expectations. However, at the same time 
there has been a general decline in the use of a range of other validity tests since 2001-2008. 
These include tests to establish whether preferences are transitive (9% of studies in 1990 – 
2000, 4% in 2001 – 2008, but 0% in 2009 – 2011); non-satiation (44% of studies in 1990 – 
2000, 49% of DCEs in 2001 – 2008, down to 15% in 2009 – 2011); compensating decision 
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making (35% in 1990 – 2000, 32% in 2001 – 2008, down to 15% in 2009 – 2011); and Sen’s 
extraction and contraction properties (0% in 1990, 2% in 2000-2008, and 1% in 2009 – 2011). 
This decline may be related to the observation (Lancsar and Louviere 2006) that some 
behaviour that DCE researchers have identified in rationality tests as apparently irrational, 
may not be out of step with rational decision making.  Moreover, some analyses which have 
used qualitative research techniques (Miguel, Ryan et al. 2005, Ryan, Watson et al. 2009) 
have found that individuals defined as failing non-satiation and Sen’s expansion and 
contraction properties in quantitative tests had ‘rational’ reasons for doing so (de Bekker-
Grob, Ryan et al. 2012). Furthermore, it has been pointed out (Lancsar and Louviere 2006) 
that random utility models are robust to both violations of compensatory decision making and 
errors made by individuals in forming and revealing preferences (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 
2012). This body of evidence suggests that the decline in the use of many validity tests partly 
reflects the fact that researchers increasingly feel they do not yield useful information.  
 
I was however expecting to find increasing evidence that researchers are making use of 
qualitative methods to improve DCE validity. This was because key publications since 2007 
have highlighted the need to deploy qualitative methods to enhance DCE process and design 
(Coast and Horrocks 2007, Ryan, Watson et al. 2009, Coast, Al-Janabi et al. 2012, de 
Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012). However, worryingly the use of qualitative methods appears 
to be declining, after an initial rise. In 1990-2000, 18% of studies used qualitative methods to 
inform attribute selection, rising to 69% in 2001 – 2008 before falling back to 38% in 2009 – 
2011. A similar trend is apparent in relation to attribute level selection. In 1990 – 2000, 18% 
of studies used qualitative methods to inform attribute level selection, rising to 33% in 2001 – 
2008 before falling back to 25 / 96 (26%) in 2009 – 2011. This pattern is particularly worrying 
because unless you obtain information from members of the respondent groups to be 
targeted with DCE questionnaires about attributes and level appropriateness, there is a 
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danger that attributes that ought to be valued as part of a DCE might be omitted, leading to 
omitted variable bias. Also, establishing appropriate levels for attributes is important, and 
especially so if you are using a monetary attribute to try to establish respondents WTP. 
Without good qualitative research to inform the selection of attributes and levels included in a 
DCE, a study can end up framing DCE questions inappropriately, thereby compromising DCE 
validity. 
 
Similarly, use of pre-testing DCE questionnaires has also fallen over the period (pre-testing 
questionnaire used in 47% of studies in 1990 – 2000, 32% in 2001 – 2008, and 24% in 2009 
– 2011). In all the DCE studies I have undertaken, I have always used a pilot pre-testing 
questionnaire. Data from the pilot questionnaires can be analyzed econometrically, and if 
particular attributes or attribute levels are not statistically significant then it is possible to re-
think whether they ought to be included in the DCE design. I think it is worrying that under a 
quarter of DCE studies in the most recent period (2009 – 2011) reported that they used pilot 
pre-testing questionnaires. There also continues to be very little application of measures to 
strengthen face validity through the use of debriefing choices (0% in 1990 – 2000, 4% in 2001 
– 2008, and 2% in 2009 – 2011). 
 
3. Adding to the evidence base. 
 
Considering the work reported in this thesis, Chapter 2 relates to the very first DCE I 
conducted about 10 years ago (with assistance from Dr Emma Mc Intosh, University of 
Oxford). Some of this work has been published (Clark, Moro et al. 2009). Chapter 2 
demonstrates how DCEs can be used to calculate WTP. The primary objective was to 
evaluate whether healthcare services for patients with suspected DVT ought to be provided in 
the community or a hospital outpatient setting. The DCE valued attributes that differed across 
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the two modes of provision in terms of WTP. A key finding of this chapter is that how DVT 
provision performs in terms of certain attributes (i.e. speed of diagnosis) might be more 
important than the location of service provision (i.e. community versus hospital). This finding 
holds regardless of whether MWTP, uptake rates, or Compensating Variation are used to 
inform decision making.  
 
Chapter 2 illustrates a major advantage of DCEs, the possibility of calculating WTP for 
different models of service provision and using MWTP figures to value different models of 
provision (if a ‘state of the world’ model is appropriate). Alternatively, it is possible to establish 
the popularity of different hypothetical service models using uptake rates; or to calculate 
welfare changes using the compensating variation formula. Clearly therefore, if DCEs can be 
used to accurately calculate WTP, they may be very useful. Information on WTP for benefits 
can also inform the benefits side of a Cost-Benefit Analysis. 
 
Having indicated the usefulness of estimates of WTP obtained using DCEs in Chapter 2, in 
Chapters 3 and 4 I considered whether estimates of WTP obtained using DCEs when 
healthcare is free at the point of use are likely to be subject to hypothetical bias. Analyses in 
these chapters relate to research that originally began in 2003. Since 2003, a number other 
analyses have been published relating to whether estimates of WTP obtained using DCEs 
might be subject to hypothetical bias. In Chapters 3 and 4 I reported the findings of two 
separate DCE analyses which included a question to establish whether or not people take a 
monetary attribute into account when answering choices. I was concerned that, because my 
respondents received healthcare free at the point of use, a proportion of them might disregard 
the monetary attribute when they made DCE choices because they knew that in reality a cost 
would not apply. If respondents fail to take differences in the levels of the monetary attribute 
into account then this could bias WTP estimates. I therefore tried to establish what proportion 
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of respondents might fail to take differences in the monetary attribute into account. My logic 
was that rational respondents should value money, therefore if their responses were not 
subject to hypothetical bias they should take differences in the levels of the monetary attribute 
into account when choosing. Moreover, if this was not happening it might indicate estimates 
of marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) are subject to hypothetical bias. In two similar 
analyses, using different DCE data (Chapter 3 and Chapter 4), I obtained the result that 
around a third of DCE respondents indicated that they had not taken differences in the 
monetary attribute into account when making DCE choices. In both chapters, I then ran 
econometric models using interaction dummy variables to establish whether estimated WTP 
varied between respondents who indicated that they had not taken differences in the 
monetary attribute into account, versus other respondents. Both analyses found evidence that 
estimated MWTP varied (statistically significant result using Wald tests) for some attributes in 
the group that claimed they had not taken differences in the monetary attribute into account. 
This suggests that having a group of respondents who fail to take differences in the monetary 
attribute into account may bias estimates of MWTP. 
 
One of the problems with this analysis is that a failure to take a monetary attribute into 
account may have arisen because the levels I set for the monetary attribute may have been 
inappropriate. This could well be the case because there is evidence that estimated MWTP 
may be sensitive to the levels assigned to the monetary attribute (Skjoldborg and Gyrd-
Hansen 2003). Therefore, if I were to repeat a similar analysis again I would plan to use 
mainstream WTP analysis during piloting (perhaps using payment cards) to more robustly 
determine the levels for the monetary attribute. Also, it would be worth having different 
versions of the questionnaire with different ranges for the levels for monetary attribute in 
order to establish whether a failure to take differences in the levels of the monetary attribute 
into account, is related to the levels assigned to the monetary attribute. Moreover, the way in 
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which the monetary attribute was framed in the questionnaire was not incentive compatible. 
The questionnaire pre-amble asked respondents to “Please assume that you would lose this 
amount even if you would not.” This request was made because, in the DCE pilot exercise, it 
was clear some respondents ignored the monetary attribute because they considered that 
since healthcare is free at the point of use, a ‘cost to you’ would not apply. However, this 
wording may have only served to make matters worse by reminding respondents that in 
reality such a difference in the monetary attribute would not apply. Thus the analyses in 
Chapters 3 and 4 may have generated an extreme result. Had I framed the monetary attribute 
in a more incentive compatible manner, and taken more care to establish an appropriate 
payment vector, I would have almost certainly discovered that the proportion of respondents 
failing to take the monetary attribute was lower. That said, I was correct to think that there 
may be cause for concern that estimates of WTP obtained using DCEs can be biased. An 
analysis (Skjoldborg and Gyrd-Hansen 2003) had shown that estimates of WTP may be 
sensitive both to the range specified for the monetary attribute and to the presence or 
absence of payment per se. A more recent analysis (Gyrd-Hansen and Skjoldborg 2008) 
reached the conclusion that respondents might be more influenced by the presence or 
absence of a non-zero cost than by the level of cost indicated by the monetary attribute.  
 
There is other evidence to indicate that, unless ‘cheap talk’ is used to ensure respondents 
consider the levels of a monetary attribute when making DCE choices, DCE responses may 
be insensitive to changes in the levels of the monetary attribute (Ozdemir, Johnson et al. 
2009). So ‘cheap-talk’ may be required to more accurately estimate WTP. There is also 
evidence to suggest that DCE cost functions may not be linear, something which tends to be 
assumed when conducting MWTP analysis (Ozdemir, Johnson et al. 2009). However, use of 
‘cheap talk’ can help to ensure that the cost function becomes linear (Ozdemir, Johnson et al. 
2009). Other evidence suggests that respondents might deploy heuristics to recode costs into 
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categories such as low, medium, or high (Johnson, Mohamed et al. 2011), which inevitably 
means that estimates of WTP obtained from respondents who deploy such heuristics are less 
accurate. Also, preferences may be subject to a ‘learning curve’, so later responses in a DCE 
might be a better indicator of preferences than earlier responses (Johnson and Desvousges 
1997, Carlsson and Martinsson 2001). This fits with evidence that estimated WTP might be 
affected by the number of DCE choices that respondents face (Bech, Kjaer et al. 2011). This 
implies that later responses might provide more accurate indications of WTP than earlier 
ones. Finally, there is also evidence that framing effects might affect estimated WTP i.e. a 
question framed in terms of number of polyps found versus number of polyps missed may be 
associated with differences in the absolute levels of MWTP (Howard and Salkeld 2009). 
 
Given the wide ranging concerns surrounding the robustness of eliciting WTP using DCEs, 
researchers could decide to use DCEs but avoid using them to elicit WTP, in favour of 
adopting other summary DCE outcome measures (see Chapter 1, section 7.2). However a 
disadvantage of this approach is that it means estimates of WTP are not generated to inform 
the Benefits side of a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA). An alternative approach would be to use 
DCEs to elicit information on WTP but take measures to minimize bias. For example, by 
defining the monetary attribute in a manner which is as incentive compatible as possible and 
undertaking rigorous qualitative research using mainstream WTP analysis to establish an 
appropriate price vector for the monetary attribute. Different price vectors for the monetary 
attribute can be used within the same DCE to see how estimated WTP is affected. This 
information could inform sensitivity analysis around WTP values (Ryan and Wordsworth 
2000). Also, to ensure that respondents take the monetary attribute into account when 
making choices, researchers could use ‘cheap talk’ or graphic representations of attribute 
cost in questionnaire preambles to improve validity (Johnson, Mohamed et al. 2011). Another 
possibility is the use of a variant of the question I posed about whether respondents take 
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differences in the monetary attribute into account, after each DCE choice. This would be to 
ensure respondents take differences in the monetary attribute into account when making 
DCE choices. My thinking is that it may not possible to ensure questionnaires are completed 
in interviews using ‘cheap talk’. So, as an alternative, a DCE questionnaire pre-amble could 
say something to the effect that “It is important when making choices that you consider 
differences in the levels of price. Therefore we are going to ask you to tick a box after each 
choice scenario to indicate whether you have done this or not.” After each DCE question 
respondents could be then asked “Did you look to see whether price differed between options 
when making choices” and they could answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. This approach may concentrate 
respondents mind (like ‘cheap talk’), so they consider differences in the monetary attribute 
when choosing.  
 
Chapter 4 also addressed another WTP methodological issue. During DCE piloting 
consideration was given to how the monetary attribute ought to be described to respondents. 
The 3 most highly ranked options were ‘Cost to you’, ‘Amount Lost’ and ‘Willingness to Pay.’ 
As ‘Cost to you’ was the highest ranking descriptor we used that descriptor for the ‘Period 
Problem’ questionnaires (Appendix C). All the questionnaires used for the DCE analysis 
contained in Chapter 3 had a ‘Cost to you’ monetary attribute. However, in Chapter 4 I 
wanted to establish whether adopting different descriptors for the monetary attribute might 
affect estimated MWTP. I distributed equal proportions of questionnaires with DCE choices 
which were otherwise the same except for the fact that the descriptor for the monetary 
attribute varied. It was either ‘Cost to you’, ‘Amount Lost’ or ‘Willingness to Pay’. I was 
concerned that a descriptor which referred to cost (like ‘Cost to you’) might be more likely to 
induce cost based responses (Ratcliffe 2000) e.g. respondents would value differences in 
other attributes in terms of how much they think they might cost, rather than how much they 
value them. This would be of concern, because cost-based valuations might exclude 
  394 
‘consumer surplus.’ I reasoned that a descriptor such as ‘Willingness to Pay’ uses wording 
which makes people think in terms of their maximum valuation of something. Therefore, if the 
‘Cost to you’ descriptor encouraged cost based prices, I would expect to find that estimates of 
MWTP obtained using a ‘Willingness to Pay’ descriptor would be higher than those obtained 
using a ‘Cost to you.’ In fact, Wald tests suggested that estimated MWTP for all attributes 
was never statistically significantly different, irrespective of which monetary descriptor was 
used. This was reassuring and would appear to indicate that, so long as the choice of 
monetary descriptor does not affect who pays, it can be described in different ways without 
necessarily affecting estimated MWTP.   
 
A separate series of chapters (Chapters 5 – 8) of the thesis were related to the renal 
transplant DCE study. In Chapter 5 the preferences of renal patients for kidney allocation 
criteria were ascertained using a DCE. The econometric model used interaction dummy 
variables to establish whether the preferences of other stakeholder groups (including 
healthcare professionals, live kidney donors / relatives of deceased donors, and carers) 
differed from those of patients. The attribute relating to valuing how long people waited for a 
transplant was used as the denominator for marginal rates of substitution (MRS). Differences 
in preferences between stakeholder groups were assessed in two ways. The first involved 
assessing whether there were statistically significant differences in the value of particular 
attributes, comparing one of the other stakeholder groups (healthcare professionals, live 
kidney donors / relatives of deceased donors, or carers) with the patient group using 
interaction dummy variables. The second way of establishing whether preferences differ was 
to look for statistically significant differences in MRS for attributes, comparing patients with 
other stakeholder groups using Wald tests (a method not generally used in DCE research). 
Key findings were that patients appeared to value a range of transplant allocation criteria in a 
manner compatible with theoretical validity. Moreover, there was evidence of statistically 
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significant differences in preferences across different stakeholder groups. Of particular 
importance was the finding that healthcare professionals had preferences which sometimes 
differed from those of patients. Some of our findings were consistent with changes to kidney 
transplant allocation policy made in 2006 which placed more emphasis on prioritizing long 
waiters and young adults. However, based on the DCE findings prioritizing recipients with 
dependent children or adults might also be considered when UK transplant policy is next re-
evaluated. 
 
Chapter 5 also compared the preferences of ethnic minority patients with non-ethnic minority 
patients. Ethnic minority patients are likely to be doubly disadvantaged if transplants are 
allocated according to the closeness of donor recipient tissue match. This is because not only 
are they more likely to require a transplant but there is also a paucity of matched organs for 
ethnic minority groups. So another key finding (Chapter 5) was that whilst non-ethnic minority 
groups would prioritize transplanting to patients with a good donor-recipient tissue match, 
ethnic minority patients would not. This analysis has been submitted to ‘BMC Nephrology’, 
who invited us to re-submit it with minor amendments (to tailor it to a clinical audience). Once 
published, it will form part of the body of evidence used when UK renal transplant policy is re-
appraised. 
 
Chapter 6 examines diversity issues in greater depth. The finding reported in Chapter 5 that 
preferences differ between ‘ethnic minority’ patients and ‘non-ethnic minority’ patients is very 
important. However, the ‘ethnic minority’ category used in Chapter 5 was broad and included 
white ethnic minority patients. At the same time, the ethnic minority groups most 
disadvantaged if kidneys are allocated to closely matching recipients are non-white ethnic 
minority groups, especially South Asians, because of the high prevalence of diabetes which 
causes renal disease, and a shortage of kidney donors from these communities. Chapter 6 
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sets out these diversity issues in some detail, shows how preferences vary between non-
white ethnic minority patients vs. other patients; and also Asian patients vs. other patients. 
Data analysis demonstrated that preferences differed for a number of attributes between 
groups. The most important finding was that, like ethnic minority respondents overall (Chapter 
5), findings for non-white ethnic minorities vs. Asian ethnic minorities (Chapter 6) also 
indicated that these ethnic minority patient groups did not value prioritizing kidney transplants 
on the basis of tissue match. In Chapter 6 the issue of gender differences in preferences was 
also addressed, finding only very limited evidence that patient preferences vary by gender. 
The chapter concluded that catering for diversity in terms of gender is not necessary, but that 
substantive differences in preferences exist between non-white ethnic minority patients and 
other patients and Asian and non-Asian patients. It is concluded that these will need to be 
considered when transplant policy is next re-appraised. Much of the analysis contained in this 
chapter has been published (Clark, Gumber et al. 2009), so it can inform kidney transplant 
policy when it is next re-appraised. 
 
Following on from this work in Chapter 7 Mixed Logit and Latent Class Models (LCM) were 
used to analyze the renal transplant patient DCE data. Recently a number of discrete choice 
experiment analyses have been conducted which also assess preference heterogeneity using 
either Mixed Logit or Latent Class Models. During 2001 – 2008 there were 6 such studies  
(Mark and Swait 2004, Hall, Fiebig et al. 2006, Lancsar and Louviere 2006, Goto, Nishimura 
et al. 2007, Lancsar, Hall et al. 2007, Bellary, O'Hare et al. 2008) which used Mixed Logit (de 
Bekker-Grob, Ryan et al. 2012). One of these studies (Lancsar and Louviere 2006) also 
conducted LCM alongside Mixed Logit (the only paper using LCM analysis during 2001 – 
2008). 
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During 2009 – 2011 there have been far more published analyses using Mixed Logit (Eberth, 
Watson et al. 2009, Hauber, Mohamed et al. 2009, Howard and Salkeld 2009, Ozdemir, 
Johnson et al. 2009, Regier, Friedman et al. 2009, van Helvoort-Postulart, Dellaert et al. 
2009, van Helvoort-Postulart, van der Weijden et al. 2009, Blaauw, Erasmus et al. 2010, de 
Bekker-Grob, Hofman et al. 2010, Johnson, Ozdemir et al. 2010, Scuffham, Whitty et al. 
2010, Wittink, Cary et al. 2010, Goto, Takahashi et al. 2011, Mohamed, Epstein et al. 2011, 
Oteng, Marra et al. 2011, Potoglou, Burge et al. 2011, Scalone, Watson et al. 2011, 
Sweeting, Whitty et al. 2011, Whitty, Scuffham et al. 2011)  Also, during this period 3 
analyses used LCM (Miguel, Ryan et al. 2005, Grindrod, Marra et al. 2010, Mentzakis, 
Stefanowska et al. 2011)  
 
In Chapter 7 I applied two econometric methods (Random Effects Logit and Conditional Logit) 
which do not cater for preference heterogeneity before Mixed Logit and LCM results were 
presented. The chapter considered whether Mixed Logit or LCM provides useful information 
over and above models which do not cater for preference heterogeneity (Random Effects 
Logit and Conditional Logit).  
 
A very large patient sample was available with enough responses completed for data analysis 
using all 5 econometric models (n= 863). So, I expected to be able to identify considerable 
preference heterogeneity. Mixed Logit found evidence of preference heterogeneity for 4 / 8 
variables (wait, dep, age, and dis2), but not with respect to ‘tiss’ (closeness of tissue match). 
The LCM technique generated information about how coefficients vary across latent classes. 
We increased the number of latent classes until both the Bayesian Information Criterion and 
Akaike Information Criterion suggested the number of classes was optimal (i.e. when we had 
4 latent classes). This indicated considerable preference heterogeneity. However, I also used 
Wald tests to establish whether the value of MRS for attributes varied in a statistically 
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significant way across the 4 classes. Results suggested MRS differed significantly for 6 / 7 
attributes. However, MRS for tiss was not statistically significantly different across the 4 
classes, an unexpected result. The comparison of ethnic minority vs. non-ethnic minority 
patient DCE preferences presented in Chapter 5 found that ethnic minority patients had 
statistically significantly different preferences for ‘tiss’, whereas non-ethnic minorities had not. 
So in Chapter 7 (after using Mixed Logit and LCM) I also applied Conditional Logit with 
dummy variables for ethnic minorities. Not unsurprisingly, this model found that preferences 
with respect to ‘tiss; differed for ethnic minorities (MRS for ‘tiss’ was insignificant amongst 
ethnic minority patients, but highly significant for non-ethnic minority patients). This analysis 
demonstrates the danger of simply undertaking unthinking Mixed Logit or LCM and assuming 
that the information it provides on preference heterogeneity will be comprehensive. From a 
policy making perspective, I would argue that the most useful information about preference 
heterogeneity related to how preferences varied between ethnic minority and other patients. 
So the Conditional Logit model with interaction dummy variables for ethnic minority groups 
out-performed both Mixed Logit and LCM by uncovering this information about preference 
heterogeneity. However, this does not necessarily demonstrate that Conditional Logit with 
dummy variables should be used in preference to Mixed Logit or LCM. Instead, it means that 
researchers should probably take the analysis one step further, and use interaction dummy 
variables within Mixed Logit or LCM models to establish whether preferences vary for key 
defined sub-groups of respondents. In short, researchers still need to use their heads and 
develop prior hypotheses about how preferences might differ between respondent groups, 
because they cannot just assume that a blanket application of Mixed Logit or LCM will 
pinpoint key policy relevant dimensions of preference heterogeneity. This is an important 
message, so I am planning to submit material from this chapter for publication. 
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Finally, Chapter 8 of the thesis considered an issue which has not really been studied to date 
in DCE research (i.e. whether preferences in a DCE might be altruistically motivated and, if 
so, how this affects DCE results). In relation to organ donation there is a great deal of 
evidence that altruistic motivations are predominant (Siminoff, Mercer et al. 2007, Gill and 
Lowes 2008, Patel, Chadha et al. 2011). Moreover, because the issue we addressed was a 
priority setting one, many respondents might base their responses upon some social 
judgement about what might be appropriate (encompassing altruistic considerations) rather 
than what might be best for them. If altruistic motivations enter into respondents utility 
functions this is compatible with the theory of the ‘caring externality’ (Culyer 1976, Culyer 
1980) The analysis presented in Chapter 8 utilised information obtained from a question in 
the patient questionnaire which asked respondents whether they had answered the 
questionnaire in terms of what would be best for them, what would be best for them and 
others, or what was best for others. Regrettably, it was not possible to obtain a sufficiently 
large sample of respondents who replied that they only considered what was best for them to 
conduct sub-group analysis for this group. So, in the end, I could only compare respondents 
who claimed to only consider what was best for others (pure altruists) with other patients who 
claimed they had preferences which were at least partly self-motivated. The renal patient 
questionnaire contained both VAS and Eq-5d quality of life measures to ascertain 
respondents’ quality of life. In a series of analyses in Chapter 8, I assessed whether patients 
who are altruistic might register preferences which involve prioritizing people for renal 
transplant whose quality of life may differ considerably from their own (as measured using 
Eq-5d and VAS); whereas more self-interested respondents would tend to prioritize potential 
recipients with quality of life or length of life attributes more similar to themselves. 
 
The analysis contained in Chapter 8 reveals a complex picture. It examines possible links 
between the following three aspects:  
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(i) Respondents’ quality of life as measured using Eq-5d or VAS.  
(ii) Whether respondents claimed to only consider others, or whether they admitted to being 
at least partly self-interested (i.e. considered themselves and others, or just considered 
themselves).  
(iii) Respondents’ preferences for the attributes relating to prioritizing recipients with diseases 
affecting life expectancy or diseases affecting quality of life. 
 
Consideration of the links between i, ii and iii above for Eq-5d suggests there is some limited 
evidence that i above affects iii above in line with what we would expected given respondents’ 
categories in terms of ii above. However, there is little evidence of such links between i, ii, 
and iii above for VAS, and findings for VAS are sometimes counter-intuitive. I am inclined to 
think a paper using this analysis which looks at the links between i, ii, and iii, for Eq-5d might 
usefully add to the literature. Moreover, as I have reflected in Chapter 8, a major limitation of 
the analysis was that a large enough sample of respondents who admitted to being entirely 
self-interested could not be identified. Therefore, for my new renal dialysis DCE I have posed 
a similar altruism question, and there are enough respondents in each of the three groups to 
enable comparison of completely self-interested patients with those claiming they are purely 
altruistically motivated. I am hopeful that this new DCE dataset will provide more useful data 
to allow consideration of how altruistic vs. self-interested motivations might affect preferences 
given respondents’ Eq-5d and VAS status. 
 
4. Conclusions. 
 
This thesis has updated earlier systematic reviews relating to the use of DCEs in health. 
Material from Chapter 1 of the thesis could therefore underpin a future submission for 
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publication. Material from chapter 2 of the thesis has been published in Health Policy (Clark, 
Moro et al. 2009). The analysis contained in chapters 3 and 4 relating to whether respondents 
take differences in the monetary attribute into account, addressed an interesting question. 
However, to reach robust conclusions, the analysis should ideally be re-worked using a DCE 
with an incentive compatible monetary attribute; well informed payment vector(s); and a 
strong qualitative agenda using interviews and ‘think aloud’ exercises to establish what 
meaning respondents attach to the monetary attribute. The other finding of Chapter 4, that 
estimates of MWTP did not differ according to the monetary descriptor, is reassuring and 
suggests that descriptors which refer to cost might not necessarily induce ‘cost-based’ 
responses which fail to take ‘consumer surplus’ into account. 
 
The analyses in chapters 7 – 8, relating to the renal transplant DCE, have produced 
interesting findings. Material in chapters 5, and 6, is likely to inform UK renal transplant policy 
when this is next re-appraised (the analysis in Chapter 5 will be published by BMC 
Nephrology, and much of the analysis in Chapter 6 was published in 2009 (Clark, Gumber et 
al. 2009). The analysis in Chapter 7 has produced an unexpected methodological result i.e. 
that a Conditional Logit model with dummy variables for ethnic minorities can expose 
differences in preferences with respect to the tissue match attribute for ethnic minority 
patients, when both Mixed Logit and LCM (without dummy variables) failed to highlight a 
difference. This highlights the need for researchers to think through how preferences might 
vary between respondent groups, and to consider using appropriately specified interaction 
dummy variables within Mixed Logit or LCM to test for hypothesized differences. This is a 
useful finding which I now aim to submit for publication (probably to Value in Health). Finally, 
Chapter 8 presents an exploration of a new issue i.e. the possible impact of altruistic 
preferences upon DCE responses. The analysis here, linking patient Eq-5d status to 
preferences under a veil of altruism, may be publishable as it demonstrates some links. 
  402 
Moreover, I will continue to address issues relating to altruistic preferences, when analyzing 
data from my new renal dialysis DCE. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Who should be prioritized for renal transplantation? Assessment of how renal patient 
preferences are influenced by patient characteristics. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In chapter 5 I assessed the preferences of key stakeholder groups (patients, carers, live 
donors / relatives of deceased donors, and healthcare professionals) as well as ethnic 
minorities (a category including white ethnic minorities) vs. non-ethnic minority patients. 
Chapter 6 then addressed diversity issues within the patient group comparing preferences 
between non-white ethnic minority patients vs. other patients; South Asian vs. other patients; 
and male vs. female patients. However, in addition to the analysis in those chapters I also 
conducted a wealth of sub-group analysis within the patient group using Random Effects 
Probit with interaction dummy variables.  Unlike most of the material in the main body of the 
PhD, this is not of particularly great methodological interest. Rather instead, it might be of 
interest to readers who are interested in the preferences of particular sub-groups of renal 
transplant patients. Therefore this material is placed in this appendix for reference purposes, 
rather than in the main body of the thesis. 
 
Sub-groups relate to transplant status (whether respondents have had a successful 
transplant, failed transplant, or are awaiting a transplant); age; and whether respondents 
have dependent children or dependent adults. The issue of links between quality of life 
(measured both using Eq-5d, and the Visual Analogue scale [VAS]) and preferences is not 
explored in this appendix, because these issues are explored in detail in chapter 8 of the 
thesis. 
 
 
  
  
2. Background. 
 
The ‘Background’ to this research is already discussed in detail in chapter 5, section 2, so the 
reader is referred to that text. The other background information that readers might like to be 
aware of is because we had a large sample of patient responses it afforded the opportunity to 
conduct in-depth analysis to determine how patient preferences are affected by respondent 
characteristics within the patient group. We can establish how preferences vary in relation to 
a range of patient characteristics. This is useful because patient valuation of some attributes, 
may be affected by their own characteristics. The material in this appendix therefore reports 
upon this analysis. 
 
3. Materials and methods. 
 
3.1. Pilot exercise. 
 
I refer the reader to section 3.1 of Chapter 5, which provides information about piloting of the 
DCE.   
 
3.2. Selection of attributes and levels for the final DCE. 
 
I refer the reader to section 3.2 of Chapter 5, which provides information about selection of 
attributes and levels for the DCE.  Details of the attributes and levels used for the final 
analysis are presented in table 1. 
 
 
  
Table 1: Final attributes and levels. 
Attribute Variable name Levels Interpretation of 
coefficients.  
Time spent 
awaiting 
transplantion 
wait 1 month, 2 years, and 10 
years. 
Indirect utility of each 1 
year reduction in transplant 
recipient waiting time. 
Tissue type 
matching 
tiss Non-favourable match: 
86% average kidney 
survival rate post-
transplant. 
 
Favourable match: 89% 
average kidney survival 
rate post-transplant. 
 
Perfect match: 90% 
average kidney survival 
rate post-transplant. 
Indirect utility of prioritizing 
people for each 1% 
improvement in kidney 
survival. 
How many child 
or adult  
dependents 
recipients have 
dep None, 1, or 4 
dependents. 
Indirect utility of each 
additional dependent. 
Recipient age age 20 years, 45 years, and 
65 years 
Indirect utility for each 1 
year reduction in recipient 
age. 
Diseases 
predominantly 
affecting life 
expectancy 
dis1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
dis2 
No disease affecting life 
expectancy (other than 
Kidney disease) vs. 
moderate disease 
(uncontrolled 
hypertension or obesity) 
& Kidney disease. 
Moderate disease 
(uncontrolled 
hypertension or obesity) 
affecting life expectancy 
vs. severe disease (heart 
attack, stroke, or diabetes 
with complications). 
Indirect utility of having no 
rather than moderate 
disease predominantly 
affecting life expectancy. 
 
 
 
 
Indirect utility of having 
moderate disease rather 
than severe disease 
predominantly affecting life 
expectancy. 
Diseases 
predominantly 
affecting quality 
of life 
ill1 
 
 
 
 
 
ill2 
No disease affecting 
quality of life (other than 
Kidney disease) vs. 
moderate disease (mild 
asthma).  
 
Moderate disease (mild 
asthma) affecting quality 
of life vs. severe disease 
(severe arthritis). 
Indirect utility of having no 
disease rather than a 
moderate disease 
predominantly affecting 
quality of life.  
 
Indirect utility of having a 
moderate disease rather 
than a severe disease 
predominantly affecting 
quality of life. 
 
 
  
3.3. Development of final DCE.  
 
I refer the reader to section 3.3 of chapter 5, which explains how the final DCE questionnaire 
was developed. 
 
3.4. Questionnaire distribution.  
 
We included 20,000 flyers and freepost reply envelopes in Kidney Life inviting patients, 
carers, donors, or healthcare workers to request a questionnaire. Patient questionnaires were 
mainly obtained as a result of obtaining responses to that mailout. However, because we had 
a lack of responses from ethnic minority patients we obtained 5 additional patient responses 
from patients at the University Hospitals of Coventry and Warwickshire NHS Trust, and 18 via 
Ealing hospitals NHS Trust. 
 
3.5. Data analysis. 
 
We used model type A, to establish preferences for the patient group overall. 
 
Yij = β0+ β1waitij +β2tissij +β3depij +β4ageij +β5dis1ij +β6dis2ij +β7ill1ij +β8ill2ij + µi +εij  
 
(Model type A: model 1) 
 
Here Yij is the binary dependent variable, from individuals i = 1…m, for observations j = 1…ni. 
The number of observations ni varies because the i individuals do not all complete every 
pairwise choice (a minority of respondents don’t answer all choices). Whilst μi is the random 
effects error term (which allows for multiple responses from i respondents) and εij is the 
  
standard Probit error term for individuals i for j observations, and the other variables are as 
defined in table 1. 
 
We also use model type B, to compare preferences patient preferences for subgroups of 
patients to other patients. Here Yij , μi, and εij are as previously defined, whilst the Ds prefix 
indicates a dummy variable, for the sub-group in question (see table 2). 
 
 
Yij= β0+ β1waitij+β2tissij+β3depij+β4ageij+β5dis1ij +β6dis2ij+β7ill1ij+β8ill2ij 
 
+ β9Ds+ β10Dsijwaitij +β11Dsijtissij+β12Dsijdepij+β13Dsijageij+β14Dsijdis1ij 
 
+β15dis2ij+β16Dsijill1ij+β17Dsijill2ij+ µi +εij        
 
(Model type B: models 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8) 
 
Model type C, can be used when you want to compare  the upper and lower quartiles of a 
continuously distributed patient attribute, such as age, with the inter-quartile range grouping. 
Here Yij , μi, and εij are as previously defined, whilst the DLQ and DHQ prefixes are defined in 
table 2. 
 
Yij=β0+β1waitij+β2tissij+β3depij+β4ageij+β5dis1ij+β6dis2ij+β7ill1ij+β8ill2ij 
 
+β9DLQ+β10DLQijwaitij+β11DLQijtissij+β12DLQijdepij+β13DLQijageij+β14DLQijdis1ij 
 
+β15DLQijdis2ij+β16DLQijill1ij +β17DLQijill2ij +β18DHQ+ β19DHQijwaitij+β20DHQijtissij 
 
+β21DHQijdepij+β22DHQijageij+β23DHQijdis1ij+β24DHQijdis2ij+β25DHQijill1ij +β26DHQijill2ij+µ +ε 
   
 
      (Model type C: Model 5) 
 
  
Table 2: Dummy variables. 
Model type B  (Models 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, & 8).  
Respondent grouping Dummy variable (prefix 
upon variable name) 
Coding for dummy 
variable 
Base group (preferences 
for patients not in the 
defined sub-group) 
Not / Applicable Not required: Preferences 
of those not in the sub-
group correspond to the 
base group coefficients. 
Patient sub-group 
preferences 
Ds Ds = 1 for the subgroup 
 
Ds = 0 otherwise 
Model type C  (Model 5).  
Respondent grouping Dummy variable (prefix 
upon variable name) 
Coding for dummy 
variable 
Base group (preferences 
for patients not in the 
defined sub-group) 
Not / Applicable Not required: Preferences 
of those not in the sub-
groups correspond to the 
base group coefficients. 
Those in the lowest quartile 
of the continuously 
distributed variable 
DLQ DLQ = 1 for respondents in 
the lowest quartile 
 
DLQ = 0 otherwise 
Those in the highest 
quartile of the continuously 
distributed variable 
DHQ DHQ = 1 for respondents in 
the highest quartile 
 
DHQ = 0 otherwise 
 
3.6. Establishing Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS). 
 
To express the value of changes in attributes with respect to changes in another we calculate 
MRS (see table 3). MRS values changes in the other variables compared with a 1 year 
change in waiting time. To establish whether MRS is significant we used the Delta method 
(Wooldridge 2002) which was executed using the ‘nlcom’ command in STATA v. 9.2, to 
derive 95% confidence intervals. We use Wald tests (executed using ‘testnl in STATA) to 
establish whether there is a statistically significant difference in MRS between the base group 
and dummy variables group(s). Difference in MRS is indicated by a Wald test p-value ≤ 0.05.
  
Table 3: Calculating MRS. 
Model type A 
 
Variable 
MRS all respondents Model type A. 
 
Variable 
 MRS all  
respondents 
wait N / A dis1 β5 / β1  
tiss β2 / β1  dis2 β6 / β1  
dep β3 / β1  ill1 β7 / β1  
age β4 / β1  ill2 β8 / β1  
Model type B 
 
Variable 
 
 
Base group MRS 
Model type B 
 
Variable 
 
Defined sub-group  
MRS 
wait N / A wait N / A 
tiss β2 / β1  tiss (β2 + β11) / (β1 + β10) 
dep β3 / β1  dep (β3 + β12) / (β1 + β10) 
age β4 / β1  age (β4 + β13) / (β1 + β10) 
dis1 β5 / β1  dis1 (β5 + β14) / (β1 + β10) 
dis2 β6 / β1  dis2 (β6 + β15) / (β1 + β10) 
ill1 β7 / β1  ill1 (β7 + β16) / (β1 + β10) 
ill2 β8 / β1  ill2 (β8 + β17) / (β1 + β10) 
Model type C 
 
Variable 
 
 
Base group MRS 
Model type C 
 
Variable 
 
 
Lower quartile MRS 
wait N / A wait N / A 
tiss β2 / β1  tiss (β2 + β11) / (β1 + β10) 
dep β3 / β1  dep (β3 + β12) / (β1 + β10) 
age β4 / β1  age (β4 + β13) / (β1 + β10) 
dis1 β5 / β1  dis1 (β5 + β14) / (β1 + β10) 
dis2 β6 / β1  dis2 (β6 + β15) / (β1 + β10) 
ill1 β7 / β1  ill1 (β7 + β16) / (β1 + β10) 
ill2 β8 / β1  ill2 (β8 + β17) / (β1 + β10) 
Model type C 
 
Variable 
 
 
Higher quartile MRS 
  
wait    
tiss (β2 + β20) / (β1 + β19)   
dep (β3 + β21) / (β1 + β19)   
age (β4 + β22) / (β1 + β19)   
dis1 (β5 + β23) / (β1 + β19)   
dis2 (β6 + β24) / (β1 + β19)   
ill1 (β7 + β25) / (β1 + β19)   
ill2 (β8 + β26) / (β1 + β19)   
 
 
  
4. Results.  
4.1. Results - Sample characteristics.   
 
Table 4: Patient sample characteristics. 
 Patients 
(n = 908) 
AGE  
Mean age 54.88 years 
  
GENDER  
Male 508 (55.9%) 
Female 397 (43.7%) 
Not indicated 3 (0.3%) 
  
ETHNICITY  
White (British) 799 (88%) 
White ethnic minorities 27 (2.9%) 
Non-white ethnic minorities 69 (7.6%) 
Asian groups (also included in non-Asian 
ethnic minority category) 
50 (5.5%) 
Not indicated 13 (1.4%) 
  
DEPENDENT CHILDREN  
0 755 (83.1%) 
1  72 (7.9%) 
2  49 (5.4%) 
3  12 (1.3%) 
> 3  7 (0.8%) 
Not indicated 13 (1.4%) 
  
DEPENDENT ADULTS  
0 750 (82.6%) 
1  121 (13.3%) 
2  17 (1.9%) 
> 2 8 (0.9%) 
Not indicated 12 (1.3%) 
 
Table 4 indicates respondent characteristics.  UK Renal Registry data (Byrne, Ford et al. 
2008; Byrne, Steenkamp et al. 2008) was used to assess patient sample representativeness. 
Of the 895/ 908 patients indicating ethnicity, 799 / 895 patients (89.3%) were white (British), 
and 27 / 895 (3%) were white ethnic minorities, so 92.3% are white. UK incidence data 
(Byrne, Ford et al. 2008) suggested 79.7% of renal patients are white, so whites are over-
  
represented in our survey.  Overall, 69 / 895 (7.7%) patients indicating ethnicity were non-
white, compared with a 20.3% incidence rate (Byrne, Ford et al. 2008), 50 / 69 non-white 
patients were South Asians (5.6% of those indicating ethnicity) compared to a 10.5% 
incidence (Byrne, Ford et al. 2008).  508 /908 patients (55.9%) were male, 397 / 908 (43.7%) 
were female, 3 / 908 (0.3%) did not say. Graphically presented Renal Registry data (Byrne, 
Ford et al. 2008) reassuringly indicated slightly higher proportions of male than female 
patients across age groups. Average sample patient age was 54.88 years (median 57 years), 
and Renal Registry data median age (57.3 years) was virtually identical (Byrne, Steenkamp 
et al. 2008).  
 
The patient sample comprised: 468 / 908 (51.5%) with successful transplants; 118 / 908 
(13%) whose transplant failed; 279 / 908 (30.7%) awaiting transplants (average wait 22.6 
months). Some patients whose transplant failed also appeared as awaiting transplantation; 
237 / 908 (26.3%) had dialysis without transplantation; and 57 / 908 (6.3%) had kidney 
disease, not requiring dialysis. Renal Registry prevalence data (Byrne, Steenkamp et al. 
2008) suggests 46.9% of patients have successful transplants (close to our figure). There is 
no incidence / prevalence data for other patient categories. Amongst non-whites (including 
Asians) figures are 18 / 69 patients (26%) with successful transplants; 10 / 69 (14.5%) whose 
transplant failed; 35 / 69 patients (50.7%) awaiting a transplant on dialysis (average wait: 
21.45 months); and 3 / 69 (4.3%) with kidney disease, not requiring dialysis. Unfortunately 
renal registry data (Byrne, Steenkamp et al. 2008) does not indicate ethnicity. However, lower 
percentage figures for successes, and higher transplant failures figures are expected (ethnic 
minorities are less likely to be closely matched).      
 
 
  
4. Results – Econometric analysis. 
 
4.2. Econometric analysis of patient preferences overall. 
 
Table 5 - Model 1: Patient preferences. 
Attribute Coefficient Implied MRS  
– relative to  
waiting time 
Attribute Coefficient Implied MRS  
– relative to  
waiting time 
wait 0.444** 1 dis1 -.0005 -0.01 
(-1.03 / 1.01) 
tiss .0626** 1.41** 
(1.08 / 1.74) 
dis2 .6812** 15.33** 
(13.46 / 17.20) 
dep .0636** 1.43** 
(1.17 / 1.69) 
ill1 -.1213** -2.73** 
(-1.45 / -4.00) 
age .0069** 0.16** 
(0.12 / 0.19) 
ill2 .1857** 4.18** 
(3.12 / 5.24) 
Constant .1225**  Log-likelihood: -5609.41  
Number of 
respondents: 
908 % of actual  
values  
predicted: 
62.82% Mc  
Faddens  
R
2
: 
0.110 
*: Denotes significant at 5% level; **: Denotes significant at 1% level 
 
Results for patients overall (model 1 – table 5) are reassuring. The model accurately predicts 
62.82% of responses and McFaddens R2 = 0.110. Overall 7 / 8 variables are significant at the 
1% level, but one (dis1) is insignificant.  
 
The variable tiss has MRS = 1.41 [CI: 1.08 / 1.74]. Implying that the MRS of transplanting to 
someone with a favourable rather than non-favourable match is equivalent to 4.23 because 
there is a 3% difference in graft survival. Therefore if you had 2 patients competing for 
transplantation of one kidney (one with a non-favourable match, and the other a favourable 
match), then all other things being equal, you would expect the patient with the less 
favourable match to have waited 4.23 years longer than the other patient to be of equal 
priority, and more than 4.23 years to be a greater priority. If the comparison is between 2 
patients but one had a non-favourable match, and the other a perfect match, it would require 
  
the non-favourable match to have waited 5.84 years to be of equal priority (assuming other 
characteristics are identical), because there is a 4% difference in the likelihood of kidney 
survival. Likewise, if the difference between them was a favourable vs. a perfect match, it 
would require the non-favourable match to wait 1.41 years longer, to be of equal priority 
(because there is a 1% difference in transplant survival). 
 
The variable dep has MRS = 1.43 [CI: 1.17 / 1.69]. Someone with no dependents (all other 
things being equal) would be expected to wait an extra 1.43 years for a transplant, to be 
considered an equal priority to someone with 1 dependent. 
 
MRS for age, indicates patient valuation of prioritising younger rather than older patients (for 
each year younger). At 0.16 [0.12 / 0.19], it suggests that if you had two patients in 
competition for one organ, and the older one had waited 1 year longer than the younger one, 
all other things being equal the younger one would have to have be 6.25 years younger (i.e. 1 
/ 0.16 = 6.25) to be of equal priority, and wait more than 6.25 years to be a greater priority.  
 
Patients don’t prioritize people without a disease affecting life expectancy more than those 
with a moderate disease affecting (dis1). They would prioritize those with a moderate disease 
affecting life expectancy, rather than a severe disease, and MRS = 15.33 [CI: 13.46 / 17.20]. 
This implies all other things being equal, a person with a severe disease affecting life 
expectancy not a moderate one, would have to wait 15.33 years longer to be of equal priority 
to a person with a moderate disease affecting life expectancy.  
 
The coefficient on ill1 is negative, suggesting patients would prioritize someone with a 
moderate disease affecting quality of life, to a person with no disease (other than kidney 
disease), and MRS is -2.73 [-1.45 / -4.00]. Thus all other things being equal, a person without 
  
a disease affecting quality of life would be expected to wait 2.73 years longer, to be of equal 
priority. This result, is probably because many patient respondents have moderate diseases 
affecting quality of life. 
 
The coefficient on ill2 is positive, people would prioritize a person with a moderate disease 
affecting quality of life more than someone with severe disease. With MRS = 4.18 [3.12 / 
5.24], it implies that if there are 2 patients competing for transplantation of one kidney 
(differing only in terms of how long they had waited, and diseases affecting quality of life) then 
a person with a severe disease affecting quality of life, would have to have waited 4.18 years 
longer to be of equal priority, and more than 4.18 years to be a greater priority, than someone 
with moderate disease. 
 
  
4.3. Econometric analysis - Patient sample, with interaction dummy variables for those 
who are successfully transplanted. 
Table 6 - Model 2: Patients values with interaction dummy variables for those who are 
successfully transplanted.  
Attribute Coefficient 
for  
patients  
in general 
Implied  
MRS for  
patients  
in  
general 
Coefficient for 
dummy  
variable for 
successfully 
transplated  
patients.  
Implied MRS  
for the  
successfully 
transplanted  
group  
Wald  
test 
 
p-values 
wait .0400** 1 .0092* 1  
tiss .0574** 1.43** 
(0.91 / 1.96) 
.0089 1.35** 
(0.92 / 1.77) 
p=0.0310 
dep .0640** 1.60** 
(1.18 / 2.02) 
.0002 1.31** 
(0.98 / 1.63) 
p=0.0004 
age .0061** 0.15** 
(0.10 / 0.21) 
.0011 0.15** 
(0.10 / 0.19) 
p=0.0583 
dis1 .0110 0.28 
(-1.34 / 1.89) 
-.0314 -0.41 
(-1.73 / 0.90) 
p=0.5664 
dis2 .5921** 14.80** 
(11.86 / 17.73) 
.1767** 15.62** 
(13.21 / 18.03) 
p=0.0000 
ill1 -.0673 -1.68 
(-3.73 / 0.37) 
-.1149 -3.70** 
(-2.07 / -5.33) 
p=0.6032 
ill2 .1134** 2.83** 
(1.14 / 4.53) 
.1466** 5.28** 
(3.92 / 6.64) 
p=0.6373 
Intercepts .0905**  .0649*   
% of actual 
values predicted: 
63.12% Sample:  896 patients  
(468 had been 
successfully 
transplanted). 
McFaddens  
R
2
: 
0.113 
LR test (λ): 21.64 Jointly 
significant?: 
Yes: CV for 9  
df = 16.92 
Log-
likelihood: 
-4919.38 
 
 
Model 2 (table 6) establishes whether preferences differ amongst patients who report they 
have been successfully transplanted (compared to patients overall). The model accurately 
predicts 63.12% of values and McFaddens R2 = 0.113. The likelihood ratio (LR) test suggests 
that the dummy variables are jointly significant (λ = 21.64, and the critical value (CV) for 9 
degrees of freedom [df] is 16.92). There is evidence of a statistically significant difference in 
‘impacts’ with respect to 3 variables (wait, dis2, and ill2). Clearly because wait is used to 
derive MRS, there is not a figure for MRS for wait, however the dummy variable is positive 
  
suggesting that those who are successfully transplanted prioritize those who have been 
waiting by more than those patients who have not. 
 
For dis2 there is a statistically significant difference in MRS, according to the Wald test 
(p=0.0000). MRS for dis2 (MRS = 15.62 [CI: 13.21 / 18.03] vs. 14.80 [CI: 11.86 / 17.73]), 
suggesting those who have been successfully transplanted place higher upon transplanting to 
those with moderate rather than severe disease affecting life expectancy. This makes sense, 
those who have been successfully transplanted are unlikely to have severe diseases affecting 
life expectancy (as if they had, they are not likely to have been offered a transplant). The 
dummy variable dis2 is significant and positive, suggesting that the attribute impact is higher 
for those who are successfully transplanted. However, surprisingly the Wald test does not 
suggest MRS differs between the groups.  
 
Wald tests also suggest that MRS varies in relation to tiss (p= 0.0310) and dep (p=0.0004). 
For tiss (MRS = 1.35 [CI: 0.92 / 1.77] vs. 1.43 [CI: 0.91 / 1.96]), MRS point estimates suggest 
that those who have been successfully transplanted place a marginally lower valuation upon 
having a good HLA tissue match than the sample overall. For dep (MRS = 1.31 [CI: 0.98 / 
1.63] vs. 1.60 [CI: 1.18 / 2.02]), MRS suggests those who are successfully transplanted, do 
not value prioritising those with child or adult dependents quite as much as those who are 
not.  
 
  
4.4. Econometric analysis - Patient sample, with interaction dummy variables for those 
who had failed transplants. 
 
Table 7 - Model 3: Patients values with interaction dummy variables for those who had a failed 
transplant.  
Attribute Coefficient 
for patients 
in general 
Implied  
MRS for  
patients  
in general 
Coefficient  
for dummy 
variable 
for the 
patients 
who are 
currently 
waiting for  
a  
transplant  
Implied MRS  
for the  
waiting for a  
transplant  
group 
Wald test 
 
p-values 
wait .0440** 1 .0054 1  
tiss .0599** 1.36** 
(1.00 / 1.72) 
.0177 1.57** 
(0.72 / 2.43) 
p = 0.0920 
dep .0651** 1.48** 
(1.19 / 1.76) 
-.0089 1.14** 
(0.50 / 1.78) 
p = 0.0003 
age .0066** 0.15** 
(0.11 / 0.19) 
.0012 0.16** 
(0.06 / 0.25) 
p = 0.0627 
dis1 -.0137 -0.31 
(-1.43 / 0.80) 
.0788 1.32 
(-1.24 / 3.88) 
p = 0.2596 
dis2 .6781** 15.41** 
(13.36 / 17.45) 
.0572 14.88** 
(10.26 / 19.51) 
p = 0.0000 
ill1 -.1239** -2.81** 
(-1.42 / -4.20) 
-.0010 -2.53 
(-5.75 / 0.69) 
p= 0.2622 
ill2 .1970** 4.48** 
(3.32 / 5.63) 
-.0648 2.68* 
(0.01 / 5.35) 
p = 0.0036 
Intercepts .1244  -.0027   
% of actual 
values predicted: 
63.66% Sample:  897 (118 
transplants 
failed 
McFaddens  
R
2
: 
0.107 
LR test (λ): 7.21 Jointly  
significant?: 
No: CV for 
9 df = 16.92 
Log-likelihood: -4930.97 
 
 
Model 3 (table 7), considers whether those who have had a failed transplant have different 
preferences to other patients. The model accurately predicts 63.66% of values and 
McFaddens R2 = 0.107. The LR test suggests that the dummy variables are not jointly 
significant (λ = 7.21, and the CV for 9 df is 16.92). Moreover, there is no evidence that any of 
the interaction dummy variables are significant at the 5% level, so variable ‘impacts’ do not 
differ significantly between the groups. However, 3 / 7 of the Wald tests do suggest that MRS 
  
might differ. These differences apply in relation to dep (p=0.0003); dis2 (p=0.0000); and ill2 
(p=0.0036).  
 
For dep (MRS = 1.14 [CI: 0.50 / 1.78] vs. 1.48 [CI: 1.19 / 1.76]), and there a difference in 
MRS according to the Wald test (p=0.0003) suggesting those with a failed transplant patient 
value prioritizing those with child or adult dependents less. In relation to dis2 (MRS = 14.88 
[CI: 10.26 / 19.51] vs. 15.41 [CI: 13.36 / 17.45]). Although the Wald test (p=0.0000) suggests 
a difference, the difference is very small. With respect to ill2 (MRS = 2.68 [CI: 0.01 / 5.35] vs. 
4.48 [CI: 3.32 / 5.63]), suggesting those with failed transplants would not prioritize those with 
moderate rather than severe diseases affecting quality of life as much, which may be due to 
self-interest as those with failed transplants may be more susceptible to severe diseases 
affecting quality of life. MRS does not vary significantly for other variables. 
 
 
  
4.5. Econometric analysis - Patient sample, with interaction dummy variables for those 
who are waiting for a transplant. 
 
Table 8 - Model 4: Patients values with interaction dummy variables for those who are waiting 
for a transplant.  
Attribute Coefficient 
for patients 
in general 
Implied MRS 
for patients in 
general 
Coefficient 
for dummy 
variable for 
the patients 
who are 
currently 
waiting for a 
transplant  
Implied  
MRS for  
the waiting  
for a 
transplant 
group 
Wald  
test 
 
p-values 
wait .0451** 1 -.0003 1  
tiss .0610** 1.35** 
(0.89 / 1.81) 
.0007 1.38** 
(0.78 / 1.97) 
p=0.0100 
dep .0570** 1.26** 
(0.91 / 1.61) 
.0035 1.35** 
(0.89 / 1.81) 
p=0.0048 
age .0073** 0.16** 
(0.11 / 0.21) 
-.0001 0.16** 
(0.09 / 0.23) 
p=0.0046 
dis1 -.0265 -0.59 
(-2.01 / 0.83) 
.0466 0.45 
(-1.37 / 2.27) 
p=0.3481 
dis2 .7081** 15.68** 
(13.06 / 18.31) 
-.0535 14.59** 
(11.33 / 17.85) 
p=0.0000 
ill1 -.1074* -2.38** 
(-0.59 / -4.17) 
.0147 -2.07 
(-4.36 / 0.23) 
p=0.2315 
ill2 .1717** 3.80** 
(2.33 / 5.28) 
-.0115 3.57** 
(1.69 / 5.46) 
p=0.0308 
Intercepts .1206**  -.0094   
% of actual 
values predicted: 
62.93% Sample:  732 (279 
currently 
waiting for a 
transplant) 
McFaddens 
R
2
: 
0.111 
LR test (λ): 1.84 Jointly 
significant?: 
No: CV for 9 
df = 16.92 
Log-
likelihood: 
-4029.28 
 
 
Model 4 (table 8), considers whether those currently waiting for a transplant have different 
preferences to other patients who addressed the question about whether they are currently 
waiting for a transplant (n=732). The model accurately predicts 62.93% of values, and 
McFaddens R2 = 0.111. The LR test suggests that the dummy variables for those currently 
waiting for a transplant are not jointly significant (λ = 1.84, and the CV for 9 df is 16.92). 
Moreover, there is no evidence any of the interaction dummy variables are significant (5% 
  
level), so variable ‘impacts’ do not differ significantly between groups. However, surprisingly 5 
/ 7 of the Wald tests do suggest that MRS might differ. These differences apply in relation to 
tiss (p=0.0100); dep (p=0.0048); age (p=0.0046); dis2 (p=0.0000); and ill2 (p=0.0308).  
 
With respect to tiss (MRS = 1.38 [CI: 0.78 / 1.97] vs. 1.35 [CI: 0.89 / 1.81]), so although Wald 
tests suggest MRS differs (p=0.0100), there is little difference in MRS between the groups for 
this variable.  For dep (MRS = 1.35 [CI: 0.89 / 1.81] vs. 1.26 [CI: 0.91 / 1.61]), there is again a 
difference in MRS according to the Wald test (p=0.0048) but it is very marginal. In relation to 
age (MRS = 0.16 [CI: 0.09 / 0.23] vs. 0.16 [CI: 0.11 / 0.21]), despite the fact point estimates 
are equal, the Wald test suggests MRS may vary between the groups (p=0.0046), this result 
may have arisen because 95% confidence intervals around MRS are wider amongst those 
waiting for a transplant.  
 
With respect to dis2 (MRS = 14.59 [CI: 11.33 / 17.85] vs. 15.68 [CI: 13.06 / 18.31]), so those 
currently awaiting a transplant may value prioritizing those with moderate rather than severe 
diseases affecting life expectancy very marginally less than those who are not currently 
waiting according to the Wald test (p=0.0000). Finally, the for the variable ill2 (MRS = 3.57 
[CI: 1.69 / 5.46] vs. 3.80 [CI: 2.33 / 5.28]), the Wald test again suggests that MRS may differ 
between the groups (p=0.0308). However, the point estimates for MRS do not differ much. 
MRS for other variables does not vary significantly. 
  
 4.6. Econometric analysis - Age and patient response 
 
Table 9 – model 5: Patients with dummy variables for those in 1
st
 & 4
th
 age quartiles.   
Attribute Coefficient 
for inter-
quartile 
range 
Implied MRS 
for inter-
quartile range 
Coefficient  
on dummy   
for patients  
in the lowest 
quartile 
Implied MRS  
for lowest 
quartile 
Wald  
test 
 
p-values 
wait .0477** 1 .0038 1  
tiss .0608** 1.27** 
(0.84 / 1.71) 
.0098 1.37** 
(0.78 / 1.96) 
p=0.0392 
dep .0692** 1.45** 
(1.11 / 1.79) 
-.0061 1.22** 
(0.77 / 1.67) 
p=0.0002 
age .0071** 0.15** 
(0.10 / 0.20) 
.0003 0.14** 
(0.08 / 0.21) 
p=0.0160 
dis1 -.0100 -0.21 
(-1.57 / 1.15) 
.1334* 2.39** 
(0.56 / 4.22) 
p=0.0800 
dis2 .6989** 14.64** 
(12.22 / 17.06) 
-.0047 13.46** 
(10.37 / 16.55) 
p=0.0000 
ill1 -.1675** -3.51** 
(-1.82 / -5.20) 
-.0076 -3.40** 
(-1.15 / -5.64) 
p=0.1393 
ill2 .2405** 5.04** 
(3.62 / 6.46) 
.0258 5.16** 
(3.28 / 7.04) 
p=0.0174 
Intercepts .1488**  .0007   
Attribute Coefficient 
for inter-
quartile 
range 
Implied MRS 
for inter-
quartile range 
Coefficient  
on dummy  
for patients  
in the 
highest 
quartile 
Implied MRS  
for highest 
quartile 
Wald  
test 
 
p-values 
wait .0477** 1 -.0154** 1  
tiss .0608** 1.27** 
(0.84 / 1.71) 
-.0014 1.84** 
(0.86 / 2.81) 
p=0.0095 
dep .0692** 1.45** 
(1.11 / 1.79) 
-.0120 1.77** 
(1.02 / 2.52) 
p=0.0000 
age .0071** 0.15** 
(0.10 / 0.20) 
-.0011 0.19** 
(0.08 / 0.29) 
p=0.0008 
dis1 -.0100 -0.21 
(-1.57 / 1.15) 
-.0890 -3.06* 
(-0.08 /- 6.05) 
p=0.3100 
dis2 .6989** 14.64** 
(12.22 / 17.06) 
-.0594 19.80** 
(13.69 / 25.90) 
p=0.0000 
ill1 -.1675** -3.51** 
(-1.82 / -5.20) 
.1694* 0.06 
(-3.63 / 3.75) 
p=0.0011 
ill2 .2405** 5.04** 
(3.62 / 6.46) 
-.2220** 0.57 
(-2.46 / 3.60) 
p=0.0000 
Intercepts .1488**  -.107**   
% of actual 
values predicted: 
62.61% Sample:  889 patients:   
222 in first  
quartile and  
222 in top  
quartile.  
McFaddens  
R
2
: 
0.114 
LR test (λ): 36.56 Jointly 
significant?: 
Yes : CV for 
18  
df = 28.87 
Log- 
likelihood: 
-4877.33 
 
  
Model 5 (table 9), compares preferences for those in the lower and upper quartiles of the age 
distribution with those in the inter-quartile range. The model accurately predicts 62.61% of 
values, and McFaddens R2 = 0.114. The LR test (λ = 36.56, compares with the CV of 18 df of 
28.87), suggesting that the dummy variables are jointly significant. There is evidence that 
only dis1 is statistically significantly different at the 5% level for those in the lowest quartile of 
the age distribution compared with the inter-quartile range. However the Wald test (p=0.0800) 
suggests that MRS does not differ with respect to this variable at the 5% level. The attribute 
impact for the lowest quartile age grouping is positive and significant however, which 
contrasts with a negative and insignificant coefficient for the inter-quartile range. 
 
The Wald tests do suggest however, that MRS for the lowest quartile group differs with 
respect to tiss (p=0.0392); dep (p=0.0002); age (p=0.0160) dis2 (p=0.0000), and ill2 
(p=0.0174). 
 
For tiss MRS (MRS = 1.37 [CI: 0.78 / 1.96] vs. 1.27 [CI: 0.84 / 1.71]) is significantly different 
between the groups (p=0.0392), and higher for those in the lowest quartile of the age 
distribution, implying they would prioritize those with a good tissue match more. With respect 
to dep, the Wald test (p=0.0002) suggests that MRS differs, and MRS (MRS = 1.22 [CI: 0.77 / 
1.67] vs. 1.45 [CI: 1.11 / 1.79]) for those in the lowest quartile of the age distribution is lower, 
implying this group does not value prioritizing those with dependents as much as those in the 
inter-quartile range of the age distribution. For the attribute age the Wald test (p=0.0160) 
again suggests that MRS (MRS = 0.14 [CI: 0.08 / 0.21] vs. 0.15 [CI: 0.10 / 0.20]) differs. This 
suggests those in the lowest quartile of the age distribution might value prioritizing younger 
potential recipients marginally less than those in the inter-quartile range.  
The Wald test on dis2 (p=0.0000) suggests that MRS (MRS = 13.46 [CI: 10.37 / 16.55] vs. 
14.64 [CI: 12.22 / 17.06]) does differ, those in the lowest quartile of the age distribution 
  
prioritize those with moderate rather than severe diseases affecting life expectancy by less 
than those in the inter-quartile range. Also the Wald test (p=0.0174) suggests that MRS may 
differ with respect to ill2 (MRS = 5.16 [CI: 3.28 / 7.04] vs. 5.04 [CI: 3.62 / 6.46]), with those in 
the lowest quartile of the age distribution valuing prioritizing those with moderate rather than 
severe diseases affecting life expectancy slightly more than those in the inter-quartile range. 
 
Overall, 3 / 8 of the interaction dummy variables are significant at the 5% significance level for 
dummy variables for those in the highest quartile of the age distribution including wait, ill1 and 
ill2. Of course wait is the variable used to calculate MRS, so tests for differences in MRS 
cannot apply to it.  However, it would appear that the significant and negative dummy variable 
on wait suggests that those in the highest quartile of the age distribution do not value 
prioritizing people based upon time spent on the transplant list as much.   
 
Wald tests also suggest that ill1 (p=0.0011) and  ill2 (p=0.0000) do differ between the groups 
for those in the highest quartile of the age distribution. For ill1 MRS (MRS = 0.006 [CI: -3.63 / 
3.75] vs. -3.51 [CI: -1.82 / -5.20]) may differ, it is actually significant and negative for patients 
in the inter-quartile range of the age distribution, but could be positive for those in the highest 
quartile of the age distribution (although this is unclear because the positive point estimate is 
not significantly different from zero). The negative point estimate for those within the inter-
quartile range of the age distribution implies respondents would prioritize those with moderate 
as opposed to no diseases affecting quality of life, perhaps because many respondents 
themselves have such diseases.   
 
With respect to ill2, the Wald test (p=0.0000) suggests that MRS (MRS = 0.57 [CI: -2.46 / 
3.60] vs. 5.04 [CI: 3.62 / 6.46]) differs between those in the upper quartile of the age 
distribution, and the inter-quartile range. Those in the inter-quartile range of the age 
  
distribution would prioritize those with moderate rather than severe diseases affecting quality 
of life, whereas for those in the highest quartile of the age distribution, it is unclear whether 
they would or not. 
 
The Wald tests also suggest that MRS varies with respect to tiss (p=0.0095); dep (p=0.0000); 
age (p=0.0008); and dis2 (p=0.0000), ill1 (p=0.0011) and ill2 (p=0.0000) when comparing the 
highest quartile of the age distribution with the inter-quartile range. For tiss, the Wald test 
(p=0.0095) suggests there is a difference in MRS (MRS = 1.84 [CI: 0.86 / 2.81] vs. 1.27 [CI: 
0.84 / 1.71. This suggests that those in the upper quartile of the age distribution value 
allocating kidneys to people with a better tissue match more highly that those in the inter-
quartile range. With respect to dep, the Wald test (p=0.0000) suggests that MRS (MRS = 
1.77 [CI: 1.02 / 2.52] vs. 1.45 [CI: 1.11 / 1.79]) differs between the groups, with those in the 
highest quartile of the age distribution, placing more priority upon those with child or adult 
dependents. Also MRS for age (MRS = 0.19 [CI: 0.08 / 0.29] vs. 0.15 [CI: 0.10 / 0.20]) may 
differ between the groups (p=0.0008), with older respondents in the highest quartile of the 
age distribution paradoxically valuing prioritizing the young, more than the younger 
respondents within the inter-quartile range (so perhaps some altruism is underpinning these 
responses). The Wald test for dis2 (p=0.0000), suggests that MRS differs (MRS = 19.80 [CI: 
13.69 / 25.90] vs. 14.64 [CI: 12.22 / 17.06]). Note Wald tests do not suggest MRS is 
significantly different for dis1 (p=0.3100). However, Wald tests do suggest differences for ill1 
(MRS = 0.06 [CI:-3.63 / 3.75] vs. -3.51 [CI: -1.82/-5.20]) suggesting the old may value 
prioritizing those with no rather than moderate diseases affecting life expectancy, when the 
inter-quartile range does not. Also Wald tests suggest a difference in ill2 (MRS = 0.57 [CI: -
2.46 / 3.60] vs. 5.04 [3.62 / 6.46]) suggesting the old would not prioritize those with moderate 
rather than severe diseases affecting life expectancy as much. 
 
  
4.7. Econometric analysis - Comparing those with above and below average age. 
Table 10 – Model 6: All patients providing details of their age, interaction dummies for above 
average age.  
Attribute Coefficient 
for patients 
in general 
Implied MRS 
for patients in 
general 
Coefficient 
for dummy 
variable for 
the patients 
with above 
average age 
Implied MRS 
for those with 
above average 
age 
Wald 
test 
 
p-values 
wait .0487**  -.0070   
tiss .0657** 1.35** 
(0.89 / 1.81) 
-.0055 1.45** 
(0.97 / 1.92) 
p=0.0024 
dep .0637** 1.31** 
(0.95 / 1.67) 
.0020 1.58** 
(1.20 / 1.96) 
p=0.0011 
age .0074** 0.15** 
(0.10 / 0.20) 
-.0009 0.16** 
(0.10 / 0.21) 
p=0.0010 
dis1 .0740* 1.52* 
(0.08 / 2.96) 
-.1311** -1.37 
(-2.86 / 0.11) 
p=0.0082 
dis2 .7216** 14.83** 
(12.25 / 17.40) 
-.0730 15.58** 
(12.87 / 18.30) 
p=0.0000 
ill1 -.1636** -3.36** 
(-1.58 / -5.14) 
.0668 -2.33* 
(-0.48 / -4.17) 
p=0.0209 
ill2 .2595** 5.33** 
(3.84 / 6.82) 
-.1245* 3.24** 
(1.72 / 4.77) 
p=0.0000 
Intercepts .1534**  -.0573   
% of actual 
values predicted: 
62.49% Sample:  889 patients 
of which 492 
form the 
above 
average age 
group 
McFaddens 
R
2
: 
0.113 
LR test (λ): 22.47 Jointly 
significant?: 
Yes: CV for 9 
df = 16.92 
Log-
likelihood: 
-4884.38 
 
 
Model 6 (table 10) looks at whether being above or below average age affects your 
preferences for renal transplantation. The model accurately predicts 62.49% of responses. 
McFaddens R2 = 0.113. The LR tests suggest that the dummy variables for above average 
age are jointly significant (λ = 22.47, when the CV for 9 df is 16.92). Overall 2 / 8 of the 
interaction dummy variables (for dis1; and ill2) are significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level, for the above average age group. The Wald test (p=0.0082) also suggests that MRS 
(MRS = -1.37 [-2.86 / 0.11] vs. 1.52 [0.08 / 2.96]) differs between the 2 groups for dis1. MRS 
is positive and clearly significant for the below average age base group, who would prioritize 
  
those with no rather than moderate diseases affecting life expectancy. However, it is 
insignificant for those with an above average age. For ill2, the Wald test (p=0.0000) suggests 
that MRS differs. The MRS (MRS = 3.24 [1.72 / 4.77] vs. 5.33 [3.84 / 6.82]) is lower for those 
with above average age, implying a lower priority for prioritizing those with moderate rather 
than severe diseases affecting quality of life. 
 
For this analysis all the Wald statistics for every variable have a p-value < 0.05 suggesting 
that MRS differs at the 5% level. With respect to tiss, the Wald test (p=0.0024) suggests that 
MRS (MRS = 1.45 [CI: 0.97 / 1.92] vs. 1.35 [CI: 0.89 / 1.81]) suggesting that those with above 
average age afford a marginally greater priority to prioritizing those with better tissue 
matches. For dep, the Wald test (p=0.0011) suggests that MRS varies between the 2 groups 
(MRS = 1.58 [CI: 1.20 / 1.96] vs. 1.31 [CI: 0.95 / 1.67]), with those with above average age 
prioritizing those with dependents more than those who have a below average age. In relation 
to age, the Wald test (p=0.0010) suggests that MRS may vary. However the point estimate 
for MRS is only slightly different (MRS = 0.16 [CI: 0.10 / 0.21] vs. 0.15 [CI: 0.10 / 0.20]), 
suggesting a slightly increased preference for prioritizing younger recipients, amongst those 
with an above average age. 
 
With respect to dis1, the Wald test (p=0.0082) again suggests that MRS differs (MRS = -1.37 
[CI: -2.86 / 0.11] vs. 1.52 [CI: 0.08 / 2.96]), with those with above average age perhaps 
prioritizing those with no rather than moderate diseases affecting life expectancy whilst those 
with below average age may have a preference in the other direction. 
 
With respect to dis2, the Wald test (p=0.0000) again suggests that MRS differs (MRS = 15.58 
[CI: 12.87 / 18.30] vs. 14.83 [CI: 12.25 / 17.40]), with those with above average age 
prioritizing those with moderate rather than severe diseases affecting life expectancy by 
  
slightly more than below average age patients. There is also evidence from the Wald test 
(p=0.0209) that ill1 varies, and the MRS (MRS = -2.33 [CI: -0.48 / -4.17] vs. -3.36 [CI: -1.58 / -
5.14]) implies that those with above average age, prioritize those with moderate rather than 
no diseases affecting quality of life by less than those with below average age. Also ill2 may 
vary and MRS (MRS = 3.24 [CI: 1.72 / 4.77] vs. 5.33 [CI: 3.84 / 6.82]) suggesting those with 
moderate rather than no diseases affecting quality of life are prioritized less by the old. 
 
4.8. Econometric analysis – Comparing those with and without dependent children. 
Table 11 – Model 7: Patients with interaction dummy variables for sub-group with dependent 
children.  
Attribute Coefficient 
for patients 
in general 
Implied MRS 
for patients in 
general 
Coefficient 
for dummy 
variable for 
the patients 
who have 
dependent 
children 
Implied MRS 
for  the 
patients who 
have 
dependent 
children 
Wald 
test 
 
p-values 
wait .0430** 1 .0117* 1  
tiss .0655** 1.52** 
(1.14 / 1.90) 
-.0158 0.91** 
(0.25 / 1.57) 
p=0.0005 
dep .0666** 1.55** 
(1.25 / 1.85) 
-.0196 0.86** 
(0.35 / 1.37) 
p=0.0000 
age .0073** 0.17** 
(0.13 / 0.21) 
-.0019 0.10** 
(0.02 / 0.17) 
p=0.0009 
dis1 -.0066 -0.15 
(-1.30 / 0.99) 
.0289 0.41 
(-1.75 / 2.57) 
p=0.6477 
dis2 .6767** 15.74** 
(13.60 / 17.88) 
.0440 13.18** 
(9.56 / 16.81) 
p=0.0000 
ill1 -.1198** -2.79** 
(-1.35 / -4.22) 
-.0117 -2.40 
(-5.10 / 0.29) 
p=0.3035 
ill2 .1838** 4.28** 
(3.08 / 5.47) 
.0105 3.55* 
(1.36 / 5.75) 
p=0.0461 
Intercepts .1248**  -.0159   
% of actual 
values predicted: 
61.28% Sample:  901 patients - 
142 of which 
have 
dependent 
children 
Mc Faddens 
R
2
: 
0.112 
LR test (λ): 13.35 Jointly 
significant?: 
Yes: CV for 9 
df = 16.92 
Log-
likelihood: 
-4956.20 
 
 
  
Model 7 (table 11) looks at whether those with dependent children differ in their preferences. 
The model accurately predicts 61.28% of responses, and McFaddens R2 = 0.112. According 
to the LR test the dummy variables are not jointly significant (λ = 13.35, the CV for 9 df is 
16.92). We thought it was possible that those with dependents (either children or adults) 
might value attributes differently compared to those without dependents. The only interaction 
dummy variable which is significant is wait (for which MRS is not derived). The dummy 
variable is positive, implying that those with dependent children prioritize those who have 
waited longer by more than patient respondents without dependent children. 
 
However Wald tests suggest that MRS differs with respect to tiss (p=0.0005); dep (p=0.0000); 
age (p=0.0009); dis2 (p=0.0000); and ill2 (p=0.0461).For tiss the Wald test (p=0.0005) 
suggests that MRS differs (MRS = 0.91 [CI: 0.25 / 1.57] vs. 1.52 [CI: 1.14 / 1.90]), and that 
those with dependent children would not prioritize those with better tissue matches as much 
as other patients.The Wald test (p=0.0009) suggests that those with dependent children have 
a different MRS for age (MRS = 0.10 [CI: 0.02 / 0.17] vs. 0.17 [CI: 0.13 / 0.21]) and  
surprisingly those with dependent children would prioritize transplants for younger recipients 
less than those without.. The Wald test for dis2 (p=0.0000) suggests MRS (MRS = 13.18 [CI: 
9.56 / 16.81] vs. 15.74 [CI: 13.60 / 17.88]) differs and those with dependent children would 
not prioritize those with moderate rather than severe diseases affecting life expectancy as 
much as other patients. A Wald test (p=0.0461) also indicates that MRS may differ for ill2 
(MRS = 3.55 [CI: 1.36 / 5.75] vs. 4.28 [CI: 3.08 / 5.47]), and respondents with dependent 
children would not prioritize those with moderate rather than severe diseases affecting quality 
of life as much as other patients. Wald tests for other variables are insignificant. 
 
  
4.9. Econometric analysis – Comparing those with and without dependent adults. 
 
Table 12 – model 8: Patients with interaction dummy variables for sub-group with dependent 
adults.  
Attribute Coefficient 
for patients in 
general 
Implied MRS 
for patients in 
general 
Coefficient  
for dummy 
variable for  
the patients 
who have 
dependent 
adults 
Implied MRS 
for  the 
patients who 
have 
dependent 
adults 
Wald test 
 
p-values 
wait .0459** 1 -.0052 1  
tiss .0624** 1.36** 
(1.01 / 1.71) 
-.0053 1.40** 
(0.50 / 2.30) 
p=0.0031 
dep .0642** 1.40** 
(1.12 / 1.67) 
.0002 1.58** 
(0.86 / 2.30) 
p=0.0007 
age .0067** 0.15** 
(0.11 / 0.18) 
.0012 0.19** 
(0.09 / 0.30)  
p=0.0277 
dis1 .0037 0.08 
(-1.00 / 1.17) 
-.0393 -0.87 
(-3.68 / 1.93) 
p=05706 
dis2 .6777** 14.77** 
(12.82 / 16.71) 
.0287 17.34** 
(11.86 / 22.8) 
p=0.0000 
ill1 -.1300** -2.83** 
(-1.48 / -4.19) 
.0252 -2.57 
(-6.05 / 0.90) 
p=0.1289 
ill2 .1860** 4.05** 
(2.93 / 5.18) 
.0255 5.19** 
(2.30 / 8.09) 
p=0.0636 
Intercepts .1306**  -.0437   
% of actual values 
predicted: 
63.15% Sample:  898 patients - 
146 of which 
have  
dependent 
adults 
Mc Faddens 
R
2
: 
0.112 
LR test (λ): 3.97 Jointly 
significant?: 
No : CV for 9 
df = 16.92 
Log-
likelihood: 
-4940.23 
 
Model 8 (table 12) looks at whether those with dependent adults exhibit differences in 
preferences to those who say they do not. The model accurately predicts 63.15% of 
responses, and McFaddens R2 = 0.112. The LR test (λ=3.97, compares with a CV for 9 df of 
16.92) does not suggest that the dummy variables are jointly significant. None of the 
interaction dummy variables for the model which compares those with dependent adults to 
other patients, are statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% level. However, the 
Wald tests suggest that MRS may vary in relation to tiss (p=0.0031); dep (p=0.0007); age 
(p=0.0277); and dis2 (p=0.0000). 
  
 
The Wald test for tiss (p=0.0031) suggests MRS may differ (MRS = 1.40 [CI: 0.50 / 2.30] vs. 
1.36 [CI: 1.01 / 1.71]) with those with adult dependents putting marginally more emphasis 
upon prioritizing those with better tissue matches. For  dep the Wald test (p=0.0007) suggests 
that MRS (MRS = 1.58 [CI: 0.86 / 2.30] vs. 1.40 [CI: 1.12 / 1.67]) may differ, with those with 
adult dependents wanting to prioritize those with dependents marginally more (which makes 
intuitive sense). The Wald test for age (p=0.0277) suggests MRS (MRS = 0.19 [CI: 0.09 / 
0.30] vs. 0.15 [CI: 0.11 / 0.18) differs. Those with dependent adults would prioritize younger 
recipients more. The Wald test for dis2 (p=0.0000) suggests that MRS (MRS = 17.34 [CI: 
11.86 / 22.83] vs. 14.77 [CI: 12.82 / 16.71]) may differ. This implies that those with moderate 
rather than severe disease affecting life expectancy are considered more of a priority by 
those with dependent adults. 
 
5. Discussion. 
 
Results from the baseline model (model 1) are broadly reassuring. They affirm the case for 
the revisions to UK transplant policy in 2006, which placed more emphasis upon factors such 
as prioritizing long waiters, and younger adults, which this analysis shows are priority criteria 
which patients value. Closeness of HLA tissue matching however remains an important 
consideration because the attribute is highly significant. It is somewhat surprising that 
patients do not value prioritizing those with no rather than moderate diseases affecting life 
expectancy significantly, but this could be due to the fact that many respondents may 
themselves have moderate diseases affecting life expectancy (so this finding ought to be 
treated with caution). The fact that respondents do value prioritizing those with moderate 
rather than severe diseases affecting life expectancy, makes sense, and is in line with UK 
transplant policy. It is somewhat surprising that respondents would prioritize those with 
  
moderate illnesses affecting quality of life rather than no disease (other then kidney disease) 
affecting quality of life. However this may be because many respondents themselves have 
impaired quality of life and don’t want to discriminate against people like themselves. 
Moreover, some respondents may believe that there is a case for helping those with 
moderate diseases affecting quality of life, in preference to those with no disease other than 
kidney disease. This is because dialysis itself adversely affects quality of life, and therefore a 
case could be made for reducing the suffering of those with other illnesses affecting their 
quality of life as a first priority, so their quality of life is not doubly impaired (by having to have 
ongoing dialysis). The clear preference for prioritizing those with moderate rather than severe 
diseases affecting quality of life makes sense, and is in line with UK transplant policy. It is 
interesting that patients seem to value prioritizing those with child or adult dependents quite a 
lot, and that this is not a criterion which currently explicitly figures in UK transplant policy, but 
perhaps ought to do. 
 
There is some evidence that those who are successfully transplanted have different priorities 
(model 2). This is apparent because dummy variables are jointly significant according to the 
likelihood ratio test, and 3 / 8 dummy variables are significant. Moreover, Wald tests suggest 
that MRS differs for 3 variables. However none of the differences in MRS are dramatic. There 
is limited evidence that those with a failed transplant (model 3) have preferences which differ 
as the dummy variables are jointly insignificant. MRS though differs for 3 variables and quite 
markedly with respect to valuing a differences between having moderate rather than severe 
diseases affecting quality of life, which is valued less by the failed transplant group. 
 
There is little evidence that those awaiting a transplant have different preferences (model 4), 
because the dummy variables are not jointly significant according to the LR test, and none of 
the dummy variables are significant (so variable impacts do not differ significantly). The Wald 
  
tests however suggest that MRS may differ significantly for 5 variables, but MRS does not 
differ very much for any of them. 
 
There is evidence that age affects preferences (model 5). The dummy variables for those in 
the lowest and highest quartiles are jointly significant according to a likelihood ratio test. Also 
4 / 16 interaction dummy variables are significant, and MRS varies from the quartile range for 
11 / 16 of the dummy variables. The most noteworthy finding is that those in the lowest 
quartile of the age distribution may value prioritizing younger respondents less than those in 
the inter-quartile range, whilst those in the highest quartile of the age distribution, value 
prioritizing the young more. This is a surprising result which we would not expect if 
respondents operated out of enlightened self-interest. The importance of respondent age as a 
determinant of preferences is confirmed by model 6 which compares preferences for those 
with above and below average age. The dummy variables are jointly significant according to 
the likelihood ratio test, and 2 / 8 interaction dummy variables proved significant, and MRS 
was always significantly different for every variable. Most worthy of note is the fact that 
respondents with above average age place a slightly higher valuation upon prioritizing 
transplants to younger recipients. 
 
The evidence suggests (model 7) that the dummy variables for respondents with dependent 
children are not jointly significant according to a likelihood ratio test, and only the waiting time 
dummy variable is individually significant, although MRS differs significantly for 5 / 7 
variables. The finding most worthy of note is that the MRS figures suggest that respondents 
with dependent children value those with dependents (either adults or children) less than 
those who don’t have dependent children, a finding which is difficult to understand. Finally 
there is evidence (model 8) that the dummy variables for respondents with dependent adults 
are not jointly significant according to the likelihood ratio test. Moreover, none of the individual 
  
dummy variables are significant, although 4 / 7 MRS scores are different comparing the 2 
groups. The most important issue to address is whether those with dependent adults, value 
prioritizing those with either dependent adults or children more. The evidence suggests they 
do.    
 
6. Conclusions. 
 
The results remain broadly supportive of the reforms made in 2006 to UK renal 
transplantation policy, towards affording greater priority to those who had been on the 
transplant list longer, and to the young. However we have argued (chapter 5), that another 
consideration (whether recipients have child or adult dependents) ought to be given more 
explicit consideration when prioritizing people for kidney transplants.  
 
Our findings do not seem to suggest that transplant status (whether you have had a 
successful transplant, failed transplant, or waiting a transplant) affects preferences in a 
manner that would make much of a difference to the general thrust of our conclusions. 
Therefore our findings would not be very sensitive to any imbalance in the number of 
successfully transplanted, failed transplant patients, or those awaiting a transplant, that might 
be present in our sample. 
 
There is evidence that the age of patients affects their preferences. However, the fact that 
older respondents would prioritize younger recipients runs counter to theories of enlightened 
self-interested behaviour. Similarly patients with dependent children value prioritizing those 
with dependents less. However, in keeping with theories of enlightened self-interest, those 
patients with dependent adults value prioritizing those with dependents more highly. 
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HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN WITH   
 
PERIOD PROBLEMS 
 
A SURVEY OF WHAT YOU  
 
PREFER 
 
 
REF: 
This is a questionnaire to find out what women would like when 
they get help for their period problems. 
 
We hope you will help us with this important research by filling in this survey and returning 
it in the FREEPOST envelope provided. 
 
Instructions: 
 
 We want you to choose between different types of health care. The questions are made 
up examples of different types of health care we could offer to women. This means that 
we will be asking you to think about things that might not have happened to you. 
 
 We are asking you how you would have like to get health care for a period problem not 
what health care you have had in the past.  
 
 There are no right or wrong answers, we just want to know what you prefer.  
 
 Your choices are important to us. We can only make things better if we find out what 
people want. Filling in this survey will not affect your health care, but you will be helping 
us to help other women in the future. 
 
 This survey is confidential. None of the doctors or nurses who have treated you will find 
out your answers. 
 
What you need to do: 
 
 In section A there are 8 parts. Each part has two different examples of the kind of option 
which women with period problems could be offered.  
 
 For each part we want you to tell us the option you would prefer. Put a tick underneath 
the list for the option you would prefer i.e. put a tick either under option A or B.  
 
 In section B we ask a few brief questions. 
 
 The questionnaire usually takes about 20 minutes to fill in. 
 
 Many people find filling in forms difficult. If you would like some help filling in this survey 
please phone me. I will be very happy to phone you back and go through it with you, or 
answer any questions you might have. 
 
 Thank you in advance for your help. 
 
 
 
Dr. Sophia Julian 
 
Department of Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology 
 
Tel (0116) 252 5883       Email 
slj2@le.ac.uk 
 
 
 Section A 
 
In Section A, these are the things that we want you to think 
about. 
 
 
The thing that may vary: Could be: 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 
2 days 
2 weeks 
4 weeks 
 
Cost to you (i.e. perhaps because of 
absence from work or travel costs - 
Please assume you would loose this 
amount of money even if you would not). 
None (no money lost) 
£25 
£75 
£125 
 
The type of doctor you see GP or Consultant 
The sex of the doctor you see Male or Female 
Time waiting for an appointment to see 
the doctor (either the GP or the 
consultant) 
1 day 
4 days 
6 weeks 
12 weeks 
 
How often you get to see the same 
doctor 
 
None of the time 
Half of the time 
All of the time 
 
 Note there is no question of you being charged for health 
care, but we want you to pretend that you would lose the 
amount of money shown even if you would not. 
 
 Just a few of the possible combinations are included, 
these are chosen by a computer programme. 
 
 Remember, everything else apart from the things on the 
list, like the receptionists, nurses and waiting area etc, is 
the same for option A and B. 
 
 Remember there are no right or wrong answers. 
Please read the whole descriptions of option A and B below 
and for each of the parts choose A or B. 
 
Part 1 Option A Option B 
 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 2 weeks 
Cost to you None None 
The type of doctor you see Consultant GP 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Male 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the 
doctor 
12 weeks 6 weeks 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time All of the time 
 
Which option would you choose?                    Choose A            Choose B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
Part 2 Option A Option B 
 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 1 day 
Cost to you None £25 
The type of doctor you see Consultant GP 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Female 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the 
doctor 
12 weeks 1 day 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time All of the time 
 
Which option would you choose?                    Choose A            Choose B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
Part 3 Option A Option B 
 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 4 weeks 
Cost to you None £125 
The type of doctor you see Consultant Consultant 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Female 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the 
doctor 
12 weeks 12 weeks 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time All of the time 
 
Which option would you choose?                    Choose A            Choose B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
Part 4 Option A Option B 
 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 1 day 
Cost to you None None 
The type of doctor you see Consultant Consultant 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Male 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the 
doctor 
12 weeks 6 weeks 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time Half of the time 
 
Which option would you choose?                    Choose A            Choose B  
(tick 1 box only) 
  
Part 5 Option A Option B 
 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day  2 weeks 
Cost to you None £25 
The type of doctor you see Consultant Consultant 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Female 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the 
doctor 
12 weeks 4 days 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time Half of the time 
 
Which option would you choose?                    Choose A            Choose B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
Part 6 Option A Option B 
 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 4 weeks 
Cost to you None £25 
The type of doctor you see Consultant Consultant 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Male 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the 
doctor 
12 weeks 6 weeks 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time None of the 
time 
 
Which option would you choose?                    Choose A            Choose B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
Part 7 Option A Option B 
 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 4 weeks 
Cost to you None None 
The type of doctor you see Consultant GP 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Female 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the 
doctor 
12 weeks 4 days 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time Half of the time 
 
Which option would you choose?                    Choose A            Choose B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
Part 8 Option A Option B 
 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 2 days 
Cost to you None None 
The type of doctor you see Consultant Consultant 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Female 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the 
doctor 
12 weeks 1 day 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time None of the 
time 
 
Which option would you choose?                    Choose A            Choose B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
 
Section B 
 
 
About Filling in the Questionnaire 
 
 
When you answered this questionnaire did one thing matter to you more than anything else? 
 
Yes  
No  
 
If Yes, which one mattered most? If No, go to next box. 
 Tick one box only 
Differences in the type of doctor you see (GP or Consultant)   
Differences in the sex of the doctor you see (Male or Female)  
Differences in time spent waiting for an appointment to see the doctor  
Differences in how often I would get to see the same doctor   
Differences in how long I have to wait for results  
Differences in ‘cost to you’  
  
 Tick one box only 
  
If Yes, did you ignore the other things on the list? Yes  
 No   
 Sometimes  
 
 
 
Did differences in the amount of ‘cost to you’ for options A and B, influence your choices? 
 
Yes  
No   
Sometimes  
 
 
 
Do you have a preference for either having a male or female doctor about a period problem? 
 
Strong preference 
for 
Male 
Some 
preference for 
male 
 
No preference 
Some 
preference for 
female 
Strong preference 
for female 
                    
 
If you have a preference, can your GP surgery meet this preference? 
  
Yes  
No  
Sometimes  
Don’t know  
  
 
 
How easy is it for you to get to:  
 
Your GP’s surgery? Leicester Royal Infirmary? 
 
Easy access  Easy access  
Reasonable access         Reasonable access  
Difficult access  Difficult access  
 
 
About You and Your Circumstances:  To make sure we have women 
from all different backgrounds in the study. 
 
 
Which ethnic group do you consider you belong to? 
 
 Tick one box only 
 
White  
Includes British, Irish, and any other white background 
 
 
 
Mixed  
Includes white and black Caribbean, white and black African, white and 
Asian; any mixed background 
 
 
Asian or Asian British 
Includes Indian; Pakistani; Bangladeshi; any other Asian background 
 
 
 
Black or Black British 
Includes Caribbean; African; or other black background 
 
 
 
Other ethnic group 
 Includes Chinese or any other ethnic group – please describe below 
 
…………………………………………………..  
 
 
 
How old are you?                                                                           …… Years 
 
  
 
Overall, what has happened to your household income (after deducting income tax and national 
insurance) in the last year?  
  
                         Tick one box only 
  
Stayed about the same   
Gone down  
Gone up  
 
 
 
The average annual household income before tax in Leicestershire is about £25,000. Is your 
household income: 
 
                           Tick one box only 
 
Above average   
About average  
Below average  
 
 
 About Your Health Care 
 
 
When you have been seen by a doctor in relation to a period problem has it tended to be: 
  
Mainly a GP  
About the same likelihood of seeing a GP or Consultant  
Mainly a Consultant  
 
 
 
How long on average do you have to wait to see a GP about a period problem? 
   
…… Days 
 
  
 
How long on average do you have to wait to see a hospital doctor about a period problem? 
  
…… Days 
…… Weeks 
 
  
 
How long on average have you had to wait for results of tests relating to period problems? 
  
…… Days 
…… Weeks 
 
 
 
How often do you usually see the same doctor in relation to period problems? 
 
None of the time  
Between none and half of the time  
Half of the time  
Between half and all of the time  
All of the time  
 
 
 
Would you normally see a male or a female GP about your period problems? 
 
Always male    
Usually male   
About the same likelihood of seeing a male or female  
Usually female  
Always female  
 
 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. 
 
Please post it in the FREEPOST envelope provided. 
 
 
 
  
 
By: 
 
 
 
Dr Sophia Julian,     Mr Michael Clark 
Department of Obstetrics and    Senior Research Fellow, 
Gynaecology, and the University   Centre for Health Services Studies, 
of Leicester Medical School,       Warwick Business School, 
Robert Kilpatrick Building,   University of Warwick, 
Leicester Royal Infirmary,   Coventry, 
Leicester, LE2 7LX.    CV4 7AL.   
          
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
  
 
 
HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN WITH   
 
PERIOD PROBLEMS 
 
A SURVEY OF WHAT YOU  
 
PREFER 
 
 
REF: 
This is a questionnaire to find out what women would like when 
they get help for their period problems. 
 
We hope you will help us with this important research by filling in this survey and returning 
it in the FREEPOST envelope provided. 
 
Instructions: 
 
 We want you to choose between different types of health care. The questions are made 
up examples of different types of health care we could offer to women. This means that 
we will be asking you to think about things that might not have happened to you. 
 
 We are asking you how you would have like to get health care for a period problem not 
what health care you have had in the past.  
 
 There are no right or wrong answers, we just want to know what you prefer.  
 
 Your choices are important to us. We can only make things better if we find out what 
people want. Filling in this survey will not affect your health care, but you will be helping 
us to help other women in the future. 
 
 This survey is confidential. None of the doctors or nurses who have treated you will find 
out your answers. 
 
What you need to do: 
 
 In section A there are 8 parts. Each part has two different examples of the kind of option 
which women with period problems could be offered.  
 
 For each part we want you to tell us the option you would prefer. Put a tick underneath 
the list for the option you would prefer i.e. put a tick either under option A or B.  
 
 In section B we ask a few brief questions. 
 
 The questionnaire usually takes about 20 minutes to fill in. 
 
 Many people find filling in forms difficult. If you would like some help filling in this survey 
please phone me. I will be very happy to phone you back and go through it with you, or 
answer any questions you might have. 
 
 Thank you in advance for your help. 
 
 
 
Dr. Sophia Julian 
 
Department of Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology 
 
Tel (0116) 252 5883       Email 
slj2@le.ac.uk 
 
 
 Section A 
 
In Section A, these are the things that we want you to think 
about. 
 
 
The thing that may vary: Could be: 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 
2 days 
2 weeks 
4 weeks 
 
Cost to you (i.e. perhaps because of 
absence from work or travel costs - 
Please assume you would loose this 
amount of money even if you would not). 
None (no money lost) 
£25 
£75 
£125 
 
The type of doctor you see GP or Consultant 
The sex of the doctor you see Male or Female 
Time waiting for an appointment to see 
the doctor (either the GP or the 
consultant) 
1 day 
4 days 
6 weeks 
12 weeks 
 
How often you get to see the same 
doctor 
 
None of the time 
Half of the time 
All of the time 
 
 Note there is no question of you being charged for health 
care, but we want you to pretend that you would lose the 
amount of money shown even if you would not. 
 
 Just a few of the possible combinations are included, 
these are chosen by a computer programme. 
 
 Remember, everything else apart from the things on the 
list, like the receptionists, nurses and waiting area etc, is 
the same for option A and B. 
 
 Remember there are no right or wrong answers. 
Please read the whole descriptions of option A and B below 
and for each of the parts choose A or B. 
 
Part 1 Option A Option B 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 2 weeks 
Cost to you None None 
The type of doctor you see Consultant Consultant 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Male 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the 
doctor 
12 weeks 12 weeks 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time Half of the time 
 
Which option would you choose?                    Choose A            Choose B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
Part 2 Option A Option B 
 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 1 day 
Cost to you None £75 
The type of doctor you see Consultant Consultant 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Female 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the 
doctor 
12 weeks 6 weeks 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time Half of the time 
 
Which option would you choose?                    Choose A            Choose B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
Part 3 Option A Option B 
 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 1 day 
Cost to you None £125 
The type of doctor you see Consultant GP 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Male 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the 
doctor 
12 weeks 4 days 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time None of the 
time 
 
Which option would you choose?                    Choose A            Choose B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
Part 4 Option A Option B 
 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 2 days 
Cost to you None £75 
The type of doctor you see Consultant Consultant 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Male 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the 
doctor 
12 weeks 4 days 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time All of the time 
 
Which option would you choose?                    Choose A            Choose B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 Part 5 Option A Option B 
 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 2 days 
Cost to you None £125 
The type of doctor you see Consultant GP 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Female 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the 
doctor 
12 weeks 6 weeks 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time Half of the time 
 
Which option would you choose?                    Choose A            Choose B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
Part 6 Option A Option B 
 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 2 weeks 
Cost to you None £75 
The type of doctor you see Consultant GP 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Female 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the 
doctor 
12 weeks 12 weeks 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time None of the 
time 
 
Which option would you choose?                    Choose A            Choose B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
Part 7 Option A Option B 
 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 4 weeks 
Cost to you None £75 
The type of doctor you see Consultant GP 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Male 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the 
doctor 
12 weeks 1 day 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time Half of the time 
 
Which option would you choose?                    Choose A            Choose B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
Part 8 Option A Option B 
 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 2 days 
Cost to you None £25 
The type of doctor you see Consultant GP 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Male 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the 
doctor 
12 weeks 12 weeks 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time Half of the time 
 
Which option would you choose?                    Choose A            Choose B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
 Section B 
 
 
About Filling in the Questionnaire 
 
 
When you answered this questionnaire did one thing matter to you more than anything else? 
 
Yes  
No  
 
If Yes, which one mattered most? If No, go to next box. 
 Tick one box only 
Differences in the type of doctor you see (GP or Consultant)   
Differences in the sex of the doctor you see (Male or Female)  
Differences in time spent waiting for an appointment to see the doctor  
Differences in how often I would get to see the same doctor   
Differences in how long I have to wait for results  
Differences in ‘cost to you’  
  
 Tick one box only 
  
If Yes, did you ignore the other things on the list? Yes  
 No   
 Sometimes  
 
 
 
Did differences in the amount of ‘cost to you’ for options A and B, influence your choices? 
 
Yes  
No   
Sometimes  
 
 
 
Do you have a preference for either having a male or female doctor about a period problem? 
 
Strong preference 
for 
Male 
Some 
preference for 
male 
 
No preference 
Some 
preference for 
female 
Strong preference 
for female 
                    
 
If you have a preference, can your GP surgery meet this preference? 
  
Yes  
No  
Sometimes  
Don’t know  
  
 
 
How easy is it for you to get to:  
 
Your GP’s surgery? Leicester Royal Infirmary? 
 
Easy access  Easy access  
Reasonable access         Reasonable access  
Difficult access  Difficult access  
 
 
About You and Your Circumstances:  To make sure we have women 
from all different backgrounds in the study. 
 
 
Which ethnic group do you consider you belong to? 
 
 Tick one box only 
 
White  
Includes British, Irish, and any other white background 
 
 
 
Mixed  
Includes white and black Caribbean, white and black African, white and 
Asian; any mixed background 
 
 
Asian or Asian British 
Includes Indian; Pakistani; Bangladeshi; any other Asian background 
 
 
 
Black or Black British 
Includes Caribbean; African; or other black background 
 
 
 
Other ethnic group 
 Includes Chinese or any other ethnic group – please describe below 
 
…………………………………………………..  
 
 
 
How old are you?                                                                           …… Years 
 
  
 
Overall, what has happened to your household income (after deducting income tax and national 
insurance) in the last year?  
  
                         Tick one box only 
  
Stayed about the same   
Gone down  
Gone up  
 
 
 
The average annual household income before tax in Leicestershire is about £25,000. Is your 
household income: 
 
                           Tick one box only 
 
Above average   
About average  
Below average  
 
 
 About Your Health Care 
 
 
When you have been seen by a doctor in relation to a period problem has it tended to be: 
  
Mainly a GP  
About the same likelihood of seeing a GP or Consultant  
Mainly a Consultant  
 
 
 
How long on average do you have to wait to see a GP about a period problem? 
   
…… Days 
 
  
 
How long on average do you have to wait to see a hospital doctor about a period problem? 
  
…… Days 
…… Weeks 
 
  
 
How long on average have you had to wait for results of tests relating to period problems? 
  
…… Days 
…… Weeks 
 
 
 
How often do you usually see the same doctor in relation to period problems? 
 
None of the time  
Between none and half of the time  
Half of the time  
Between half and all of the time  
All of the time  
 
 
 
Would you normally see a male or a female GP about your period problems? 
 
Always male    
Usually male   
About the same likelihood of seeing a male or female  
Usually female  
Always female  
 
 
 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. 
 
Please post it in the FREEPOST envelope provided. 
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GYNAECOLOGY HEALTH CARE 
 
A SURVEY OF WHAT YOU  
 
PREFER 
 
 
 
 
 
By: 
 
Dr Sophia Julian Mr Michael Clark 
Department of Obs & Gynae Senior Research Fellow 
Leicester-Warwick Medical School Centre for Health Services Studies, 
Robert Kilpatrick Building Warwick Business School 
Leicester Royal Infirmary University of Warwick 
Leicester Coventry, 
LE2 7LX CV4 7AL 
   
 
      
 
 
      
 
 
  
 
 
REF: 
This is a questionnaire to find out what women would like when 
they need gynaecological healthcare. 
 
We hope you will help us with this important research by filling in this survey. 
 
 
Instructions: 
 
 We want you to choose between different types of health care. The questions are made 
up examples of different types of health care we could offer to women. This means that 
we will be asking you to think about things that might not have happened to you. 
 
 We are asking you how you would have like to get gynaecological care not what health 
care you have had in the past.  
 
 There are no right or wrong answers, we just want to know what you prefer.  
 
 Your choices are important to us. We can only make things better if we find out what 
people want. Filling in this survey will not affect your health care, but you will be helping 
us to help other women in the future. 
 
 This survey is confidential. Do not put your name on it. None of the doctors or nurses 
who have treated you will find out your answers. 
 
 
What you need to do: 
 
 In section A there are 8 parts. Each part has two different examples of the kind of option 
which women requiring gynaecological care could be offered. The options might look 
the same at a glance, but they are all different. 
 
 For each part we want you to tell us the option you would prefer. Put a tick underneath 
the list for the option you would prefer i.e. put a tick either under option A or B.  
 
 In section B there are questions about you and your health care. 
 
 The questionnaire usually takes about 20 minutes to fill in. 
 
 If you have any questions, please see the receptionist. 
 
 
 
 
Thank you in advance for your help 
 
 Section A 
 
In Section A, these are the things that we want you to think about. 
 
 
The thing that may vary 
 
 
Could be 
 
Amount lost (i.e. perhaps because of absence from 
work or travel costs - Please assume you would loose 
this amount of money even if you would not). 
 
None (no money lost) 
£25 
£75 
£125 
 
 
The type of doctor you see 
 
 
GP or Consultant 
 
The sex of the doctor you see 
 
 
Male or Female 
 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the doctor 
(either the GP or the consultant) 
 
1 day 
4 days 
6 weeks 
12 weeks 
 
 
How often you get to see the same doctor 
 
 
None of the time 
Half of the time 
All of the time 
 
How long you have to wait for test results 
 
1 day 
2 days 
2 weeks 
4 weeks 
 
 
 
 Note there is no question of you being charged for health care, but we want you to 
pretend that you would lose the amount of money shown even if you would not. 
 
 Just a few of the possible combinations are included, these are chosen by a 
computer programme. 
 
 Remember, everything else apart from the things on the list, like the receptionists, 
nurses and waiting area etc, is the same for option A and B. 
 
 Remember there are no right or wrong answers. 
Please read the whole descriptions of option A and B below and 
for each of the parts choose A or B. 
 
Part 1 Option A Option B 
Amount lost None None 
The type of doctor you see Consultant GP 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Male 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the doctor 12 weeks 6 weeks 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time All of the time 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 2 weeks 
Which option would you choose? (tick 1 box only) Choose A  Choose B  
   
Part 2 Option A Option B 
Amount lost None £25 
The type of doctor you see Consultant GP 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Female 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the doctor 12 weeks 1 day 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time All of the time 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 1 day 
Which option would you choose? (tick 1 box only) Choose A  Choose B  
   
Part 3 Option A Option B 
Amount lost None £125 
The type of doctor you see Consultant Consultant 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Female 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the doctor 12 weeks 12 weeks 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time All of the time 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 4 weeks 
Which option would you choose? (tick 1 box only) Choose A  Choose B  
   
Part 4 Option A Option B 
Amount lost None None 
The type of doctor you see Consultant Consultant 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Male 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the doctor 12 weeks 6 weeks 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time Half of the time 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 1 day 
Which option would you choose? (tick 1 box only)          Choose A  Choose B  
Part 5 Option A Option B 
Amount lost None £25 
The type of doctor you see Consultant Consultant 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Female 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the doctor 12 weeks 4 days 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time Half of the time 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 2 weeks 
Which option would you choose? (tick 1 box only) Choose A  Choose B  
   
Part 6 Option A Option B 
Amount lost None £25 
The type of doctor you see Consultant Consultant 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Male 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the doctor 12 weeks 6 weeks 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time None of the time 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 4 weeks 
Which option would you choose? (tick 1 box only) Choose A  Choose B  
   
Part 7 Option A Option B 
Amount lost None None 
The type of doctor you see Consultant GP 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Female 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the doctor 12 weeks 4 days 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time Half of the time 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 4 weeks 
Which option would you choose? (tick 1 box only) Choose A  Choose B  
   
Part 8 Option A Option B 
Amount lost None None 
The type of doctor you see Consultant Consultant 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Female 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the doctor 12 weeks 1 day 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time None of the time 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 2 days 
Which option would you choose? (tick 1 box only) Choose A  Choose B  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Section B 
 
 
About Filling in the Questionnaire 
 
 
When you answered this questionnaire did one thing matter to you more than anything else? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
  
 
 
If Yes, which one mattered most? If No, go to the next box. 
 
 Differences in the type of doctor you see (GP or Consultant)  
 Differences in how long I have to wait for results 
 Differences in the sex of the doctor you see (Male or Female) 
 Differences in how often I would get to see the same doctor 
 Differences in time spent waiting for an appointment to see the doctor 
 Differences in ‘amount lost’ 
 
If Yes, did you ignore the other things on the list? 
  
 Yes 
 No  
 Sometimes 
  
 
 
Did differences in the amount of ‘amount lost’ for options A and B influence your choices? 
 
 Yes 
 No  
 Sometimes 
  
 
 
Do you have a preference for either seeing a male or female doctor about a gynaecological 
problem 
 
 Strong preference for male 
 Some preference for male 
 No preference 
 Some preference for female 
 Strong preference for female 
  
If you have a preference, can your GP surgery meet this preference? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 Sometimes 
 Don’t know 
  
About You and Your Circumstances: To make sure we have women 
from all different backgrounds in the study. 
 
 
How easy is it for you to get to: 
 
Your GP’s surgery? Leicester Royal Infirmary? 
 
 Easy access  Easy access 
 Reasonable access  Reasonable access 
 Difficult access  Difficult access 
 
 
 
Which ethnic group do you consider you belong to? 
 
 White  
Includes British, Irish, and any other white background 
 
 Mixed  
Includes white and black Caribbean, white and black African, white and Asian; any 
mixed background 
 
 Asian or Asian British 
Includes Indian; Pakistani; Bangladeshi; any other Asian background 
 
 Black or Black British 
Includes Caribbean; African; or other black background 
 
 Other ethnic group 
Includes Chinese or any other ethnic group – please describe below 
………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
How old are you?                                                                              
 
…… Years 
   
 
 
Overall, what has happened to your household income (after deducting income tax and 
national insurance) in the last year?  
 
 Stayed about the same  
 Gone down 
 Gone up 
 
 
 
The average annual household income before tax in Leicestershire is about £25,000. 
Is your household income: 
 
 Above average 
 About average 
 Below average 
 
About Your Health Care 
 
 
When you have been seen by a doctor in relation to a gynaecological problem to be: 
  
 Mainly a GP 
 About the same likelihood of seeing a GP or Consultant 
 Mainly a Consultant 
 
 
 
How long on average do you have to wait to see a GP about a gynaecological problem? 
   
…… Days 
 
 
 
How long on average do you have to wait to see a hospital doctor about a gynaecological 
problem? 
  
…… Days 
…… Weeks 
 
 
 
How long on average have you had to wait for results of tests relating to gynaecological 
problem? 
  
…… Days 
…… Weeks 
  
 
 
How often do you usually see the same doctor in relation to gynaecological problem? 
 
 None of the time 
 Between none and half of the time 
 Half of the time 
 Between half and all of the time 
 All of the time 
  
 
 
Would you normally see a male or a female GP about your gynaecological problem? 
 
 Always male   
 Usually male  
 About the same likelihood of seeing a male or female 
 Usually female 
 Always female 
 
 
 
Thank you 
 
Please put it in the envelope and then in the box at reception 
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A SURVEY OF WHAT YOU  
 
PREFER 
 
 
 
 
 
By: 
 
Dr Sophia Julian Mr Michael Clark 
Department of Obs & Gynae Senior Research Fellow 
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REF: 
This is a questionnaire to find out what women would like when 
they need gynaecological healthcare. 
 
We hope you will help us with this important research by filling in this survey. 
 
 
Instructions: 
 
 We want you to choose between different types of health care. The questions are made 
up examples of different types of health care we could offer to women. This means that 
we will be asking you to think about things that might not have happened to you. 
 
 We are asking you how you would have like to get gynaecological care not what health 
care you have had in the past.  
 
 There are no right or wrong answers, we just want to know what you prefer.  
 
 Your choices are important to us. We can only make things better if we find out what 
people want. Filling in this survey will not affect your health care, but you will be helping 
us to help other women in the future. 
 
 This survey is confidential. Do not put your name on it. None of the doctors or nurses 
who have treated you will find out your answers. 
 
 
What you need to do: 
 
 In section A there are 8 parts. Each part has different examples of the kind of option 
which women requiring gynaecological care could be offered. The options might look 
the same at a glance, but they are all different. 
 
 For each part we want you to tell us the option you would prefer. Put a tick underneath 
the list for the option you would prefer i.e. put a tick either under option A or B.  
 
 In section B there are questions about you and your health care. 
 
 The questionnaire usually takes about 20 minutes to fill in. 
 
 If you have any questions, please see the receptionist. 
 
 
 
 
Thank you in advance for your help 
 
 Section A 
 
In Section A, these are the things that we want you to think about. 
 
 
The thing that may vary 
 
 
Could be 
 
Willingness to pay (i.e. perhaps because of absence 
from work or travel costs - Please assume you would 
loose this amount of money even if you would not). 
 
None (no money lost) 
£25 
£75 
£125 
 
 
The type of doctor you see 
 
 
GP or Consultant 
 
The sex of the doctor you see 
 
 
Male or Female 
 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the doctor 
(either the GP or the consultant) 
 
1 day 
4 days 
6 weeks 
12 weeks 
 
 
How often you get to see the same doctor 
 
 
None of the time 
Half of the time 
All of the time 
 
How long you have to wait for test results 
 
1 day 
2 days 
2 weeks 
4 weeks 
 
 
 
 Note there is no question of you being charged for health care, but we want you to 
pretend that you would lose the amount of money shown even if you would not. 
 
 Just a few of the possible combinations are included, these are chosen by a 
computer programme. 
 
 Remember, everything else apart from the things on the list, like the receptionists, 
nurses and waiting area etc, is the same for option A and B. 
 
 Remember there are no right or wrong answers. 
Please read the whole descriptions of option A and B below and 
for each of the parts choose A or B. 
 
Part 1 Option A Option B 
Willingness to pay None None 
The type of doctor you see Consultant Consultant 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Male 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the doctor 12 weeks 12 weeks 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time Half of the time 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 2 weeks 
Which option would you choose? (tick 1 box only) Choose A  Choose B  
   
Part 2 Option A Option B 
Willingness to pay None £75 
The type of doctor you see Consultant Consultant 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Female 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the doctor 12 weeks 6 weeks 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time Half of the time 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 1 day 
Which option would you choose? (tick 1 box only) Choose A  Choose B  
   
Part 3 Option A Option B 
Willingness to pay None £125 
The type of doctor you see Consultant GP 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Male 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the doctor 12 weeks 4 days 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time None of the time 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 1 day 
Which option would you choose? (tick 1 box only) Choose A  Choose B  
   
Part 4 Option A Option B 
Willingness to pay None £75 
The type of doctor you see Consultant Consultant 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Male 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the doctor 12 weeks 4 days 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time All of the time 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day  2 days 
Which option would you choose? (tick 1 box only)          Choose A  Choose B  
Part 5 Option A Option B 
Willingness to pay None  £125 
The type of doctor you see Consultant GP 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Female 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the doctor 12 weeks 6 weeks 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time Half of the time 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 2 days 
Which option would you choose? (tick 1 box only) Choose A  Choose B  
   
Part 6 Option A Option B 
Willingness to pay None £75 
The type of doctor you see Consultant GP 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Female 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the doctor 12 weeks 12 weeks 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time None of the time 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day  2 weeks 
Which option would you choose? (tick 1 box only) Choose A  Choose B  
   
Part 7 Option A Option B 
Willingness to pay None  £75 
The type of doctor you see Consultant GP 
The sex of the doctor you see Male  Male 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the doctor 12 weeks 1 day 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time Half of the time 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day  4 weeks 
Which option would you choose? (tick 1 box only) Choose A  Choose B  
   
Part 8 Option A Option B 
Willingness to pay None £25 
The type of doctor you see Consultant GP 
The sex of the doctor you see Male Male 
Time waiting for an appointment to see the doctor 12 weeks 12 weeks 
How often you get to see the same doctor Half of the time Half of the time 
How long you have to wait for test results 1 day 2 days 
Which option would you choose? (tick 1 box only) Choose A  Choose B  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section B 
 
About Filling in the Questionnaire 
 
 
When you answered this questionnaire did one thing matter to you more than anything else? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
  
 
 
If Yes, which one mattered most? If No, go to the next box. 
 
 Differences in the type of doctor you see (GP or Consultant)  
 Differences in how long I have to wait for results 
 Differences in the sex of the doctor you see (Male or Female) 
 Differences in how often I would get to see the same doctor 
 Differences in time spent waiting for an appointment to see the doctor 
 Differences in ‘Willingness to pay’ 
 
If Yes, did you ignore the other things on the list? 
  
 Yes 
 No  
 Sometimes 
  
 
 
Did differences in the amount of ‘Willingness to pay’ for options A and B influence your 
choices? 
 
 Yes 
 No  
 Sometimes 
  
 
 
Do you have a preference for either seeing a male or female doctor about a gynaecological 
problem 
 
 Strong preference for male 
 Some preference for male 
 No preference 
 Some preference for female 
 Strong preference for female 
  
If you have a preference, can your GP surgery meet this preference? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 Sometimes 
 Don’t know 
  
About You and Your Circumstances: To make sure we have women 
from all different backgrounds in the study. 
 
 
How easy is it for you to get to: 
 
Your GP’s surgery? Leicester Royal Infirmary? 
 
 Easy access  Easy access 
 Reasonable access  Reasonable access 
 Difficult access  Difficult access 
 
 
 
Which ethnic group do you consider you belong to? 
 
 White  
Includes British, Irish, and any other white background 
 
 Mixed  
Includes white and black Caribbean, white and black African, white and Asian; any 
mixed background 
 
 Asian or Asian British 
Includes Indian; Pakistani; Bangladeshi; any other Asian background 
 
 Black or Black British 
Includes Caribbean; African; or other black background 
 
 Other ethnic group 
Includes Chinese or any other ethnic group – please describe below 
………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
How old are you?                                                                              
 
…… Years 
   
 
 
Overall, what has happened to your household income (after deducting income tax and 
national insurance) in the last year?  
 
 Stayed about the same  
 Gone down 
 Gone up 
 
 
 
The average annual household income before tax in Leicestershire is about £25,000. 
Is your household income: 
 
 Above average 
 About average 
 Below average 
 
About Your Health Care 
 
 
When you have been seen by a doctor in relation to a gynaecological problem to be: 
  
 Mainly a GP 
 About the same likelihood of seeing a GP or Consultant 
 Mainly a Consultant 
 
 
 
How long on average do you have to wait to see a GP about a gynaecological problem? 
   
…… Days 
 
 
 
How long on average do you have to wait to see a hospital doctor about a gynaecological 
problem? 
  
…… Days 
…… Weeks 
 
 
 
How long on average have you had to wait for results of tests relating to gynaecological 
problem? 
  
…… Days 
…… Weeks 
  
 
 
How often do you usually see the same doctor in relation to gynaecological problem? 
 
 None of the time 
 Between none and half of the time 
 Half of the time 
 Between half and all of the time 
 All of the time 
  
 
 
Would you normally see a male or a female GP about your gynaecological problem? 
 
 Always male   
 Usually male  
 About the same likelihood of seeing a male or female 
 Usually female 
 Always female 
 
 
 
Thank you 
 
Please put it in the envelope and then in the box at reception 
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Who should be prioritized for 
Kidney Transplants in the UK? 
 
 
A SURVEY OF YOUR PREFERENCES. 
 
 
 
 
REF: 
 
What is this questionnaire about?:  
 
In this questionnaire we are trying to establish how to prioritize patients for a renal 
transplant. It is important for us to ensure that the systems for kidney allocation take 
account of the views of patients, health professionals and others involved in the transplant 
process. This questionnaire is being distributed as part of a research project aimed to 
provide increased information about what criteria should be used in order to allocate kidney 
transplants, and what weight should be attached to different criteria. This is independent 
research, which may in time have an impact upon kidney allocation policy. It will take into 
account the views of key stakeholders who may have an interest in the criteria to be used 
to prioritize transplants. Stakeholders will include renal patients; healthcare workers 
routinely working with renal patients; those caring for renal patients; kidney donors and 
relatives of deceased donors.  
 
In order to do this we have developed this questionnaire. The questionnaire is trying to find 
out your preferences for a number of different hypothetical (illustrative) health care 
scenarios for treatment of patients who need a renal transplantation. Please begin by 
familiarising yourself with the various possible alternatives by reading the box below.  
Please assume that all other factors other than those which we indicate may differ, are 
equal. 
 
Background information that we can provide you with which may inform your choices is as 
follows: 
 
 This questionnaire relates only to allocation from deceased (dead) donors, currently 
there are over 5,000 people awaiting a transplant in the UK, and this year about 
1,300 will get a deceased donor transplant. 
 
 Under the matching system currently used in the UK, it is possible to get a kidney 
transplant at any time after going on the list, but someone may wait for many years 
and occasionally someone gets a transplant after being on the list for only a few 
weeks. 
 
 The main factors used to allocate kidneys are waiting time and tissue matching. This 
means that people with rare or unusual tissue types have reduced chance of getting 
a cadaveric transplant. This applies to many people from ethnic minorities. 
 
 A difference in tissue type between the donor and recipient was the main cause of 
transplant rejection in the past. However, with better anti-rejection drugs, rejection is 
not now the main cause of transplant loss, though a kidney transplant with an 
excellent tissue type now has a slightly better chance of survival than one with a 
reasonable match (Figures from UK Transplant: 1 year survival for perfect match it is 
90%; for favourable match it is 89%; and for a non-favourable match it is 86%). 
 
Different criteria for prioritizing transplants  
 
Description of alternatives. 
 
A) Amount of time a person has waited. 
 
Timescales for people receiving a transplant after being placed on a waiting list are 
likely to differ. The waiting time could be: 
 
1) 1 month. 
2) 2 years. 
3) 10 years. 
 
B) Tissue type matching  – and likelihood of transplant success. 
 
This affects the likelihood of a transplant proving to be successful. Below are the up to 
date figures from UK Transplant for the survival of all transplants in the UK. There are 
6 main tissue types used in matching. A perfect tissue type match is all 6 types 
matching; favourable is 4-5 out of 6 matching, non-favourable is less than 4 matching. 
If a transplant fails the patient 
will return to renal dialysis. 
 
1) Non-favourable tissue match (86% average survival rate of the kidney 1 year after 
the transplant). 
2) Favourable tissue match (89% average survival rate of the kidney 1 year after the 
transplant). 
3) Perfect tissue type match (90% average survival rate of the kidney 1 year after the 
transplant). 
 
C) How many dependents (either children or adults) recipients have. 
 
Some respondents might consider that those who have dependent children, or others 
who are dependent either because of their age or a physical or mental handicap, 
ought to be prioritized for kidney transplant. So we assume that respondents might 
have: 
 
1) No dependents. 
2) 1 dependent. 
3) 4 dependents. 
 
D) Recipient age. 
 
The recipient could be aged either: 
 
1) 20 years. 
2) 45 years. 
3) 65 years 
 
E) Diseases affecting life expectancy. 
 
As well as having kidney failure, someone may have other conditions prior to kidney 
transplantation which affect their life expectancy. Some of the conditions which reduce 
life expectancy may occur in young people, and some older people may be entirely 
healthy apart from kidney disease. We assume these could be either: 
 
1) None. 
2) Moderate diseases (uncontrolled hypertension or obesity). 
3) Severe diseases (heart attack, or stroke, or diabetes with complications). 
 
F) Other recipient illnesses. 
 
Someone with kidney failure may have conditions other than kidney failure which are 
not life-threatening but do affect their quality of life. Respondents might or might not 
wish to allocate kidneys according to such conditions. Examples would be:- 
 
1) Healthy except for kidney disease. 
2) Kidney disease with a condition that sometimes affects their activities, such as mild 
asthma. 
3) Kidney disease with a condition that affects their activities on a daily basis, such as 
severe arthritis. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 We now want you to choose between different options. Please remember that the 
questions are hypothetical, but we want you to assume that what the questions tells 
you is what is actually happening. 
 
 Everything else about the pattern of who receives what care apart from the stated 
differences is identical. 
 
 Please answer every question remembering that there are no right or wrong 
answers, it is finding out what your personal preferences are that matters.  
 
 Assume there is 1 kidney that could be transplanted to either patient A or patient B. 
 
NOW PLEASE READ DESCRIPTIONS OF OPTION A AND B AND INDICATE WHO YOU 
THINK SHOULD BE PRIORITISED FOR A KIDNEY TRANSPLANT – PATIENT A OR 
PATIENT B?: 
 
1 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
1 month 2 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
89% average 1 
year chance of 
transplant success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
No dependents 1 dependent 
Recipient age 20 years 45 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy None Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
None Mild asthma 
 
Which patient would you choose?     Patient A       Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
2 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
2 years 10 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
89% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
        1 dependents 4 dependents 
Recipient age 45 years 65 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Severe: Heart 
attack, or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications. 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Mild asthma Severe arthritis 
  
Which patient would you choose?  Patient  A   Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
10 years 1 month 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
4 dependents No dependents 
Recipient age 65 years 20 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Severe: Heart 
attack, or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications 
None 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Severe arthritis None 
 
Which patient would you choose?    Patient A        Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
4 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
1 month 2 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
89% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
1 dependents 4 dependents 
Recipient age 45 years 20 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Severe: Heart attack 
or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications. 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Severe arthritis None 
 
Which patient would you choose?     Patient A       Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 5 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
2 years 10 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
89% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
4 dependents No dependents 
Recipient age 20 years 45 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Severe: Heart attack 
or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications 
None 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
None Mild asthma 
 
Which patient would you choose?              Patient A        Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
6 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
10 years 1 month 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
No dependents 1 dependent 
Recipient age 45 years 65 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy               None 
 
Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Mild asthma Severe arthritis 
 
Which patient would you choose?     Patient A       Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 7 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
1 month 2 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
89% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
No dependents 1 dependent 
Recipient age 65 years 20 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Severe: Heart attack 
or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications 
None 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Mild asthma Severe arthritis 
 
Which patient would you choose?    Patient A         Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
8 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
2 years 10 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
 1 dependent 4 dependents 
Recipient age 20 years 45 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy               None Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Severe arthritis None 
 
Which patient would you choose?    Patient A         Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 9 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
 10 years 1 month 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
89% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
4 dependents No dependents 
Recipient age 45 years 65 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Severe: Heart attack 
or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
None Mild asthma 
 
Which patient would you choose?     Patient A       Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
 
About you and your circumstances. 
 
 
Gender:  
 
(Please tick 1 box only):   Male   Female  
 
Age:                 ____ years 
 
 
Do you have any children under 18 years?     
 
(Please tick 1 box only): 
 
Yes   No  
 
If ‘Yes’ how many of these live in your household? 
 
1 child               2 children      3 children      More than 3 children    
 
 
Do you have to care for any dependent adults (Please tick 1 box only): 
 
Yes       No  
 
If ‘Yes’ how many? 
 
1 dependent adult   2 dependent adults   More than 2 dependent adults  
  
 
Which of the following ethnic groups do you consider that you belong to?  (Please 
tick 1 box only): 
 
White – British       
 
White – Irish       
 
White – Any other white background    
- please describe__________________________ 
 
Mixed – White / Black Caribbean    
 
Mixed – White / Black African     
 
Mixed – White / Asian      
 
Any other mixed background     
- please describe__________________________ 
 
Black or black British (Caribbean)    
 
Black or black British (African)     
 
Black or black British (Any other background  
 
Asian or Asian British (Indian)     
 
Asian or Asian British (Pakistani)    
 
Asian or Asian British (Bangladeshi)    
 
Asian or Asian British (Any other background)  
 
Chinese         
 
Any other ethnic group      
- please describe__________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Work: 
 
Are you currently in paid employment? (Please tick all that apply): 
 
Yes (Working full-time).     Yes (Working part-time)  
     
Unemployed (Not working,    Not working due to long-   
but available for work).     Term sickness or disability. 
 
Retired from paid work.     Full time student   
  
 
Engagement in household    Others (please specify:)   
Duties.       _____________________________ 
 
 
Qualifications: 
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed (Please tick 1 box only): 
 
Secondary School       
 
Vocational / Trade / College Qualification   
 
‘A’ level / ‘AS’ levels      
 
Degree level qualification(s)     
 
Other (please describe_____________________).  
 
 
What perspective did you adopt when answering this questionnaire?: (Please tick 1 
box only): 
 
Answering the questions in terms of what  
would be best for me      
 
Answering the questions in terms of what  
would be best for me and others     
 
Disregarding what is best for me and only 
considering what is best for others    
 
  
Are you a Transplanted patient? (please tick all that apply): 
 
 Currently successful. 
 
 Now failed – If failed how long has it been since kidney failure treatment with your first dialysis / 
transplant:______years______months. 
 
Or: 
 
 On dialysis (not transplanted) – Since being on dialysis how long have you been on the transplant 
list?:______years______months. 
 
 Kidney disease but not on dialysis. 
 
Waiting list for transplantation (if you are on a waiting list, or have been please 
complete the following as applicable): 
 
Are you on the waiting list for a kidney transplant? 
 
Yes  
 
No  
 
If you answered ‘yes’ how long did you wait on the list for your most recent 
transplant?(if applicable): _______years and:_______months. 
 
Are you currently on kidney dialysis? If so how long have you been on kidney 
dialysis?(if applicable):_______years and ________months. 
 
If you are no longer on kidney dialysis but have been in the past, please indicate the 
total amount of time you have spent on dialysis? (if applicable):______years and 
________months. 
 
The following questions are to ask about your general health state at the moment. By placing a tick in one box 
in each group below, please indicate which statement best describes your own health state today. 
 
Do not tick more than one box per question. 
 
1.  Mobility: 
 I have no problems in walking about  
 
I have some problems in walking about 
       
I am confined to bed     
  
  
2.  Self-Care: 
I have no problems with self-care 
 
 I have some problems washing or dressing myself 
 
 I am unable to wash or dress myself       
 
 
3.  Usual Activities (e.g. work, study, housework, family or leisure activities): 
 I have no problems with performing my usual activities 
 
I have some problems with performing my usual activities 
 
 I am unable to perform my usual activities      
 
 
4.  Pain / Discomfort: 
I have no pain or discomfort 
        
I have moderate pain or discomfort  
 
I have extreme pain or discomfort       
 
 
5.  Anxiety / Depression: 
I am not anxious or depressed  
       
I am moderately anxious or depressed 
      
I am extremely anxious or depressed 
  
 Your own health state today 
 
 
 
 
 
Your own health state 
TODAY 
 
      To help people say how good or           
       bad a health state is, we have drawn     
       a scale (rather like a thermometer)  
       on which the best state you can  
       imagine is marked by 100 and the   
       worst state you can imagine is  
       marked by 0. 
 
We would like you to indicate on this 
scale how good or bad is your own 
health today, in your opinion. 
 
Please do this by drawing a line from 
the box below, to whichever point on 
the scale indicates how good or bad 
your current health state is today. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Undertaken by:      
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University of Warwick, 
Coventry, 
UK, 
CV4 7AL.   
  
 
 
Undertaken for: 
 
University Hospitals of Coventry 
and Warwickshire NHS Trust, 
Walsgrave Hospital, 
Clifford Bridge Road, 
Coventry, 
CV2 2DX 
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Who should be prioritized for 
Kidney Transplants in the UK? 
 
 
A SURVEY OF YOUR PREFERENCES. 
 
 
 
 
REF: 
  
What is this questionnaire about?:  
 
In this questionnaire we are trying to establish how to prioritize patients for a renal 
transplant. It is important for us to ensure that the systems for kidney allocation take 
account of the views of patients, health professionals and others involved in the transplant 
process. This questionnaire is being distributed as part of a research project aimed to 
provide increased information about what criteria should be used in order to allocate kidney 
transplants, and what weight should be attached to different criteria. This is independent 
research, which may in time have an impact upon kidney allocation policy. It will take into 
account the views of key stakeholders who may have an interest in the criteria to be used 
to prioritize transplants. Stakeholders will include renal patients; healthcare workers 
routinely working with renal patients; those caring for renal patients; kidney donors and 
relatives of deceased donors.  
 
In order to do this we have developed this questionnaire. The questionnaire is trying to find 
out your preferences for a number of different hypothetical (illustrative) health care 
scenarios for treatment of patients who need a renal transplantation. Please begin by 
familiarising yourself with the various possible alternatives by reading the box below.  
Please assume that all other factors other than those which we indicate may differ, are 
equal. 
 
Background information that we can provide you with which may inform your choices is as 
follows: 
 
 This questionnaire relates only to allocation from deceased (dead) donors, currently 
there are over 5,000 people awaiting a transplant in the UK, and this year about 
1,300 will get a deceased donor transplant. 
 
 Under the matching system currently used in the UK, it is possible to get a kidney 
transplant at any time after going on the list, but someone may wait for many years 
and occasionally someone gets a transplant after being on the list for only a few 
weeks. 
 
 The main factors used to allocate kidneys are waiting time and tissue matching. This 
means that people with rare or unusual tissue types have reduced chance of getting 
a cadaveric transplant. This applies to many people from ethnic minorities. 
 
 A difference in tissue type between the donor and recipient was the main cause of 
transplant rejection in the past. However, with better anti-rejection drugs, rejection is 
not now the main cause of transplant loss, though a kidney transplant with an 
excellent tissue type now has a slightly better chance of survival than one with a 
reasonable match (Figures from UK Transplant: 1 year survival for perfect match it is 
90%; for favourable match it is 89%; and for a non-favourable match it is 86%). 
 
  
Different criteria for prioritizing transplants  
 
Description of alternatives. 
 
A) Amount of time a person has waited. 
 
Timescales for people receiving a transplant after being placed on a waiting list are 
likely to differ. The waiting time could be: 
 
1) 1 month. 
2) 2 years. 
3) 10 years. 
 
B) Tissue type matching  – and likelihood of transplant success. 
 
This affects the likelihood of a transplant proving to be successful. Below are the up to 
date figures from UK Transplant for the survival of all transplants in the UK. There are 
6 main tissue types used in matching. A perfect tissue type match is all 6 types 
matching; favourable is 4-5 out of 6 matching, non-favourable is less than 4 matching. 
If a transplant fails the patient 
will return to renal dialysis. 
 
1) Non-favourable tissue match (86% average survival rate of the kidney 1 year after 
the transplant). 
2) Favourable tissue match (89% average survival rate of the kidney 1 year after the 
transplant). 
3) Perfect tissue type match (90% average survival rate of the kidney 1 year after the 
transplant). 
 
C) How many dependents (either children or adults) recipients have. 
 
Some respondents might consider that those who have dependent children, or others 
who are dependent either because of their age or a physical or mental handicap, 
ought to be prioritized for kidney transplant. So we assume that respondents might 
have: 
 
1) No dependents. 
2) 1 dependent. 
3) 4 dependents. 
 
D) Recipient age. 
 
The recipient could be aged either: 
 
1) 20 years. 
2) 45 years. 
3) 65 years 
 
E) Diseases affecting life expectancy. 
 
As well as having kidney failure, someone may have other conditions prior to kidney 
transplantation which affect their life expectancy. Some of the conditions which reduce 
life expectancy may occur in young people, and some older people may be entirely 
  
healthy apart from kidney disease. We assume these could be either: 
 
1) None. 
2) Moderate diseases (uncontrolled hypertension or obesity). 
3) Severe diseases (heart attack, or stroke, or diabetes with complications). 
 
F) Other recipient illnesses. 
 
Someone with kidney failure may have conditions other than kidney failure which are 
not life-threatening but do affect their quality of life. Respondents might or might not 
wish to allocate kidneys according to such conditions. Examples would be:- 
 
1) Healthy except for kidney disease. 
2) Kidney disease with a condition that sometimes affects their activities, such as mild 
asthma. 
3) Kidney disease with a condition that affects their activities on a daily basis, such as 
severe arthritis. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 We now want you to choose between different options. Please remember that the 
questions are hypothetical, but we want you to assume that what the questions tells 
you is what is actually happening. 
 
 Everything else about the pattern of who receives what care apart from the stated 
differences is identical. 
 
 Please answer every question remembering that there are no right or wrong 
answers, it is finding out what your personal preferences are that matters.  
 
 Assume there is 1 kidney that could be transplanted to either patient A or patient B. 
 
  
NOW PLEASE READ DESCRIPTIONS OF OPTION A AND B AND INDICATE WHO YOU 
THINK SHOULD BE PRIORITISED FOR A KIDNEY TRANSPLANT – PATIENT A OR 
PATIENT B?: 
 
1 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
1 month 2 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
86% average 1 
year chance of 
transplant success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
4 dependents No dependents 
Recipient age 20 years 45 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Severe: Heart 
attack, or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications. 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Mild asthma Severe arthritis 
 
Which patient would you choose?    Patient A                  Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
2 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
2 years 10 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
89% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
        No dependents 1 dependent 
Recipient age 45 years 65 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Severe: Heart 
attack, or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications 
None 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Severe arthritis None 
 
Which patient would you choose?   Patient  A                    Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
3 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
10 years 1 month 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
89% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
1 dependent 4 dependents 
Recipient age 65 years 20 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy None Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
None Mild asthma 
 
Which patient would you choose?    Patient A                  Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
4 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
1 month 2 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
89% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
4 dependents No dependents 
Recipient age 45 years 65 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy None Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Severe arthritis None 
 
Which patient would you choose?      Patient A        Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
  
 
5 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
2 years 10 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
No dependents 1 dependent 
Recipient age 65 years 20 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Severe: Heart 
attack, or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications. 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
None Mild asthma 
 
Which patient would you choose?              Patient A        Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
6 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
10 years 1 month 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
1 dependent 4 dependents 
Recipient age 20 years 45 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Severe: Heart 
attack, or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications. 
 
None 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Mild asthma Severe arthritis 
 
Which patient would you choose?   Patient A                    Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
  
 
7 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
1 month 2 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
1 dependent 4 dependents 
Recipient age 45 years 65 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Severe: Heart attack 
or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications 
None 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
None Mild asthma 
 
Which patient would you choose?    Patient A                  Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
8 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
2 years 10 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
89% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
 4 dependents No dependents 
Recipient age 65 years 20 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy               None Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Mild asthma Severe arthritis 
 
Which patient would you choose?     Patient A             Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
  
 
9 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
 10 years 1 month 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
89% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
No dependents 1 dependent 
Recipient age 20 years 45 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Severe: Heart attack 
or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Severe arthritis. None 
 
Which patient would you choose?    Patient A                    Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
  
About you and your circumstances. 
 
 
Gender:  
 
(Please tick 1 box only):   Male   Female  
 
Age:                 ____ years 
 
Do you have any children under 18 years?     
 
(Please tick 1 box only): 
 
Yes   No  
 
If ‘Yes’ how many of these live in your household? 
 
1 child               2 children      3 children      More than 3 children    
 
 
  
Do you have to care for any dependent adults (Please tick 1 box only): 
 
Yes       No  
 
If ‘Yes’ how many? 
 
1 dependent adult   2 dependent adults   More than 2 dependent adults  
  
 
Which of the following ethnic groups do you consider that you belong to?  (Please 
tick 1 box only): 
 
White – British       
 
White – Irish       
 
White – Any other white background    
- please describe__________________________ 
 
Mixed – White / Black Caribbean    
 
Mixed – White / Black African     
 
Mixed – White / Asian      
 
Any other mixed background     
- please describe__________________________ 
 
Black or black British (Caribbean)    
 
Black or black British (African)     
 
Black or black British (Any other background  
 
Asian or Asian British (Indian)     
 
Asian or Asian British (Pakistani)    
 
Asian or Asian British (Bangladeshi)    
 
Asian or Asian British (Any other background)  
 
Chinese         
 
Any other ethnic group      
- please describe__________________________ 
 
  
Work: 
 
Are you currently in paid employment? (Please tick all that apply): 
 
Yes (Working full-time).     Yes (Working part-time)  
     
Unemployed (Not working,    Not working due to long-   
but available for work).     Term sickness or disability. 
 
Retired from paid work.     Full time student   
  
 
Engagement in household    Others (please specify:)   
Duties.       _____________________________ 
 
 
Qualifications: 
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed (Please tick 1 box only): 
 
Secondary School       
 
Vocational / Trade / College Qualification   
 
‘A’ level / ‘AS’ levels      
 
Degree level qualification(s)     
 
Other (please describe_____________________).  
 
 
What perspective did you adopt when answering this questionnaire?: (Please tick 1 
box only): 
 
Answering the questions in terms of what  
would be best for me      
 
Answering the questions in terms of what  
would be best for me and others     
 
Disregarding what is best for me and only 
considering what is best for others    
 
  
 
  
 
Which of the following categories does the person you are caring for fall into:  
 
The person I am caring for is a transplanted patient (please tick all that apply): 
 
 Currently successful. 
 
 Now failed – If failed how long has it been since kidney failure treatment with your first dialysis / 
transplant:______years______months. 
 
Or: 
 
 On dialysis – Since being on dialysis how long have they been on the transplant 
list?:______years______months. 
 
 Kidney disease but not on dialysis. 
 
Is the person you are caring for on the waiting list for transplantation? 
 
Yes  
 
No  
 
If you answered ‘yes’ how long did she / he wait on the list for their most recent 
transplant?(if applicable): _______years and:_______months. 
 
Are they currently on kidney dialysis? If so how long have they been on kidney 
dialysis?(if applicable):_______years and ________months. 
 
If they are no longer on kidney dialysis but have been in the past, please indicate the 
total amount of time they have spent on dialysis? (if applicable):______years and 
________months. 
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Who should be prioritized for 
Kidney Transplants in the UK? 
 
 
A SURVEY OF YOUR PREFERENCES. 
 
 
 
 
REF: 
  
What is this questionnaire about?:  
 
In this questionnaire we are trying to establish how to prioritize patients for a renal 
transplant. It is important for us to ensure that the systems for kidney allocation take 
account of the views of patients, health professionals and others involved in the transplant 
process. This questionnaire is being distributed as part of a research project aimed to 
provide increased information about what criteria should be used in order to allocate kidney 
transplants, and what weight should be attached to different criteria. This is independent 
research, which may in time have an impact upon kidney allocation policy. It will take into 
account the views of key stakeholders who may have an interest in the criteria to be used 
to prioritize transplants. Stakeholders will include renal patients; healthcare workers 
routinely working with renal patients; those caring for renal patients; kidney donors and 
relatives of deceased donors.  
 
In order to do this we have developed this questionnaire. The questionnaire is trying to find 
out your preferences for a number of different hypothetical (illustrative) health care 
scenarios for treatment of patients who need a renal transplantation. Please begin by 
familiarising yourself with the various possible alternatives by reading the box below.  
Please assume that all other factors other than those which we indicate may differ, are 
equal. 
 
Background information that we can provide you with which may inform your choices is as 
follows: 
 
 This questionnaire relates only to allocation from deceased (dead) donors, currently 
there are over 5,000 people awaiting a transplant in the UK, and this year about 
1,300 will get a deceased donor transplant. 
 
 Under the matching system currently used in the UK, it is possible to get a kidney 
transplant at any time after going on the list, but someone may wait for many years 
and occasionally someone gets a transplant after being on the list for only a few 
weeks. 
 
 The main factors used to allocate kidneys are waiting time and tissue matching. This 
means that people with rare or unusual tissue types have reduced chance of getting 
a cadaveric transplant. This applies to many people from ethnic minorities. 
 
 A difference in tissue type between the donor and recipient was the main cause of 
transplant rejection in the past. However, with better anti-rejection drugs, rejection is 
not now the main cause of transplant loss, though a kidney transplant with an 
excellent tissue type now has a slightly better chance of survival than one with a 
reasonable match (Figures from UK Transplant: 1 year survival for perfect match it is 
90%; for favourable match it is 89%; and for a non-favourable match it is 86%). 
 
  
Different criteria for prioritizing transplants  
 
Description of alternatives. 
 
A) Amount of time a person has waited. 
 
Timescales for people receiving a transplant after being placed on a waiting list are 
likely to differ. The waiting time could be: 
 
1) 1 month. 
2) 2 years. 
3) 10 years. 
 
B) Tissue type matching  – and likelihood of transplant success. 
 
This affects the likelihood of a transplant proving to be successful. Below are the up to 
date figures from UK Transplant for the survival of all transplants in the UK. There are 
6 main tissue types used in matching. A perfect tissue type match is all 6 types 
matching; favourable is 4-5 out of 6 matching, non-favourable is less than 4 matching. 
If a transplant fails the patient 
will return to renal dialysis. 
 
1) Non-favourable tissue match (86% average survival rate of the kidney 1 year after 
the transplant). 
2) Favourable tissue match (89% average survival rate of the kidney 1 year after the 
transplant). 
3) Perfect tissue type match (90% average survival rate of the kidney 1 year after the 
transplant). 
 
C) How many dependents (either children or adults) recipients have. 
 
Some respondents might consider that those who have dependent children, or others 
who are dependent either because of their age or a physical or mental handicap, 
ought to be prioritized for kidney transplant. So we assume that respondents might 
have: 
 
1) No dependents. 
2) 1 dependent. 
3) 4 dependents. 
 
D) Recipient age. 
 
The recipient could be aged either: 
 
1) 20 years. 
2) 45 years. 
3) 65 years 
 
E) Diseases affecting life expectancy. 
 
As well as having kidney failure, someone may have other conditions prior to kidney 
transplantation which affect their life expectancy. Some of the conditions which reduce 
life expectancy may occur in young people, and some older people may be entirely 
  
healthy apart from kidney disease. We assume these could be either: 
 
1) None. 
2) Moderate diseases (uncontrolled hypertension or obesity). 
3) Severe diseases (heart attack, or stroke, or diabetes with complications). 
 
F) Other recipient illnesses. 
 
Someone with kidney failure may have conditions other than kidney failure which are 
not life-threatening but do affect their quality of life. Respondents might or might not 
wish to allocate kidneys according to such conditions. Examples would be:- 
 
1) Healthy except for kidney disease. 
2) Kidney disease with a condition that sometimes affects their activities, such as mild 
asthma. 
3) Kidney disease with a condition that affects their activities on a daily basis, such as 
severe arthritis. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 We now want you to choose between different options. Please remember that the 
questions are hypothetical, but we want you to assume that what the questions tells 
you is what is actually happening. 
 
 Everything else about the pattern of who receives what care apart from the stated 
differences is identical. 
 
 Please answer every question remembering that there are no right or wrong 
answers, it is finding out what your personal preferences are that matters.  
 
 Assume there is 1 kidney that could be transplanted to either patient A or patient B. 
 
  
NOW PLEASE READ DESCRIPTIONS OF OPTION A AND B AND INDICATE WHO YOU 
THINK SHOULD BE PRIORITISED FOR A KIDNEY TRANSPLANT – PATIENT A OR 
PATIENT B?: 
 
1 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
1 month 2 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
89% average 1 
year chance of 
transplant success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
No dependents 1 dependent 
Recipient age 20 years 45 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy None Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
None Mild asthma 
 
Which patient would you choose?        Patient A        Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
2 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
2 years 10 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
89% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
        1 dependents 4 dependents 
Recipient age 45 years 65 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Severe: Heart 
attack, or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications. 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Mild asthma Severe arthritis 
  
Which patient would you choose?        Patient  A             Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
  
 
3 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
10 years 1 month 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
4 dependents No dependents 
Recipient age 65 years 20 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Severe: Heart 
attack, or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications 
None 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Severe arthritis None 
 
Which patient would you choose?    Patient A                   Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
4 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
1 month 2 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
89% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
1 dependents 4 dependents 
Recipient age 45 years 20 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Severe: Heart attack 
or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications. 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Severe arthritis None 
 
Which patient would you choose?        Patient A        Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
  
 
5 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
2 years 10 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
89% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
4 dependents No dependents 
Recipient age 20 years 45 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Severe: Heart attack 
or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications 
None 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
None Mild asthma 
 
Which patient would you choose?     Patient A         Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
6 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
10 years 1 month 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
No dependents 1 dependent 
Recipient age 45 years 65 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy               None 
 
Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Mild asthma Severe arthritis 
 
Which patient would you choose?     Patient A        Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
  
 
7 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
1 month 2 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
89% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
No dependents 1 dependent 
Recipient age 65 years 20 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Severe: Heart attack 
or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications 
None 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Mild asthma Severe arthritis 
 
Which patient would you choose?    Patient A                  Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
8 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
2 years 10 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
 1 dependent 4 dependents 
Recipient age 20 years 45 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy               None Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Severe arthritis None 
 
Which patient would you choose?    Patient A                  Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
  
 
9 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
 10 years 1 month 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
89% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
4 dependents No dependents 
Recipient age 45 years 65 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Severe: Heart attack 
or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
None Mild asthma 
 
Which patient would you choose?    Patient A                    Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
  
About you and your circumstances. 
 
 
Gender:  
 
(Please tick 1 box only):   Male   Female  
 
Age:                 ____ years 
 
Do you have any children under 18 years?     
 
(Please tick 1 box only): 
 
Yes   No  
 
If ‘Yes’ how many of these live in your household? 
 
1 child               2 children      3 children      More than 3 children    
 
 
  
Do you have to care for any dependent adults (Please tick 1 box only): 
 
Yes       No  
 
If ‘Yes’ how many? 
 
1 dependent adult   2 dependent adults       More than 2 dependent adults  
  
 
Which of the following ethnic groups do you consider that you belong to?  (Please 
tick 1 box only): 
 
White – British       
 
White – Irish       
 
White – Any other white background    
- please describe__________________________ 
 
Mixed – White / Black Caribbean    
 
Mixed – White / Black African     
 
Mixed – White / Asian      
 
Any other mixed background     
- please describe__________________________ 
 
Black or black British (Caribbean)    
 
Black or black British (African)     
 
Black or black British (Any other background  
 
Asian or Asian British (Indian)     
 
Asian or Asian British (Pakistani)    
 
Asian or Asian British (Bangladeshi)    
 
Asian or Asian British (Any other background)  
 
Chinese         
 
Any other ethnic group      
- please describe__________________________ 
 
 
  
Work: 
 
Are you currently in paid employment? (Please tick all that apply): 
 
Yes (Working full-time).     Yes (Working part-time)  
     
Unemployed (Not working,    Not working due to long-   
but available for work).     Term sickness or disability. 
 
Retired from paid work.     Full time student    
 
Engagement in household    Others (please specify:)   
Duties.       _____________________________ 
 
 
Qualifications: 
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed (Please tick 1 box only): 
 
Secondary School       
 
Vocational / Trade / College Qualification   
 
‘A’ level / ‘AS’ levels      
 
Degree level qualification(s)     
 
Other (please describe_____________________).  
 
 
What perspective did you adopt when answering this questionnaire?: (Please tick 1 
box only): 
 
Answering the questions in terms of what  
would be best for me      
 
Answering the questions in terms of what  
would be best for me and others     
 
Disregarding what is best for me and only 
considering what is best for others    
 
  
  
 
Which of the following categories do you fall into:  
 
 Surgeon. 
  
 Renal Physician. 
  
 Transplant co-ordinator. 
  
 Nurse. 
  
 Pharmacist. 
 
        Other (please describe)_________________________________________. 
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Who should be prioritized for 
Kidney Transplants in the UK? 
 
 
A SURVEY OF YOUR PREFERENCES. 
 
 
 
 
REF: 
  
What is this questionnaire about?:  
 
In this questionnaire we are trying to establish how to prioritize patients for a renal 
transplant. It is important for us to ensure that the systems for kidney allocation take 
account of the views of patients, health professionals and others involved in the transplant 
process. This questionnaire is being distributed as part of a research project aimed to 
provide increased information about what criteria should be used in order to allocate kidney 
transplants, and what weight should be attached to different criteria. This is independent 
research, which may in time have an impact upon kidney allocation policy. It will take into 
account the views of key stakeholders who may have an interest in the criteria to be used 
to prioritize transplants. Stakeholders will include renal patients; healthcare workers 
routinely working with renal patients; those caring for renal patients; kidney donors and 
relatives of deceased donors.  
 
In order to do this we have developed this questionnaire. The questionnaire is trying to find 
out your preferences for a number of different hypothetical (illustrative) health care 
scenarios for treatment of patients who need a renal transplantation. Please begin by 
familiarising yourself with the various possible alternatives by reading the box below.  
Please assume that all other factors other than those which we indicate may differ, are 
equal. 
 
Background information that we can provide you with which may inform your choices is as 
follows: 
 
 This questionnaire relates only to allocation from deceased (dead) donors, currently 
there are over 5,000 people awaiting a transplant in the UK, and this year about 
1,300 will get a deceased donor transplant. 
 
 Under the matching system currently used in the UK, it is possible to get a kidney 
transplant at any time after going on the list, but someone may wait for many years 
and occasionally someone gets a transplant after being on the list for only a few 
weeks. 
 
 The main factors used to allocate kidneys are waiting time and tissue matching. This 
means that people with rare or unusual tissue types have reduced chance of getting 
a cadaveric transplant. This applies to many people from ethnic minorities. 
 
 A difference in tissue type between the donor and recipient was the main cause of 
transplant rejection in the past. However, with better anti-rejection drugs, rejection is 
not now the main cause of transplant loss, though a kidney transplant with an 
excellent tissue type now has a slightly better chance of survival than one with a 
reasonable match (Figures from UK Transplant: 1 year survival for perfect match it is 
90%; for favourable match it is 89%; and for a non-favourable match it is 86%). 
 
  
Different criteria for prioritizing transplants  
 
Description of alternatives. 
 
A) Amount of time a person has waited. 
 
Timescales for people receiving a transplant after being placed on a waiting list are 
likely to differ. The waiting time could be: 
 
1) 1 month. 
2) 2 years. 
3) 10 years. 
 
B) Tissue type matching  – and likelihood of transplant success. 
 
This affects the likelihood of a transplant proving to be successful. Below are the up to 
date figures from UK Transplant for the survival of all transplants in the UK. There are 
6 main tissue types used in matching. A perfect tissue type match is all 6 types 
matching; favourable is 4-5 out of 6 matching, non-favourable is less than 4 matching. 
If a transplant fails the patient 
will return to renal dialysis. 
 
1) Non-favourable tissue match (86% average survival rate of the kidney 1 year after 
the transplant). 
2) Favourable tissue match (89% average survival rate of the kidney 1 year after the 
transplant). 
3) Perfect tissue type match (90% average survival rate of the kidney 1 year after the 
transplant). 
 
C) How many dependents (either children or adults) recipients have. 
 
Some respondents might consider that those who have dependent children, or others 
who are dependent either because of their age or a physical or mental handicap, 
ought to be prioritized for kidney transplant. So we assume that respondents might 
have: 
 
1) No dependents. 
2) 1 dependent. 
3) 4 dependents. 
 
D) Recipient age. 
 
The recipient could be aged either: 
 
1) 20 years. 
2) 45 years. 
3) 65 years 
 
E) Diseases affecting life expectancy. 
 
As well as having kidney failure, someone may have other conditions prior to kidney 
transplantation which affect their life expectancy. Some of the conditions which reduce 
life expectancy may occur in young people, and some older people may be entirely 
  
healthy apart from kidney disease. We assume these could be either: 
 
1) None. 
2) Moderate diseases (uncontrolled hypertension or obesity). 
3) Severe diseases (heart attack, or stroke, or diabetes with complications). 
 
F) Other recipient illnesses. 
 
Someone with kidney failure may have conditions other than kidney failure which are 
not life-threatening but do affect their quality of life. Respondents might or might not 
wish to allocate kidneys according to such conditions. Examples would be:- 
 
1) Healthy except for kidney disease. 
2) Kidney disease with a condition that sometimes affects their activities, such as mild 
asthma. 
3) Kidney disease with a condition that affects their activities on a daily basis, such as 
severe arthritis. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 We now want you to choose between different options. Please remember that the 
questions are hypothetical, but we want you to assume that what the questions tells 
you is what is actually happening. 
 
 Everything else about the pattern of who receives what care apart from the stated 
differences is identical. 
 
 Please answer every question remembering that there are no right or wrong 
answers, it is finding out what your personal preferences are that matters.  
 
 Assume there is 1 kidney that could be transplanted to either patient A or patient B. 
 
  
NOW PLEASE READ DESCRIPTIONS OF OPTION A AND B AND INDICATE WHO YOU 
THINK SHOULD BE PRIORITISED FOR A KIDNEY TRANSPLANT – PATIENT A OR 
PATIENT B?: 
 
1 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
1 month 2 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
86% average 1 
year chance of 
transplant success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
4 dependents No dependents 
Recipient age 20 years 45 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Severe: Heart 
attack, or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications. 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Mild asthma Severe arthritis 
 
Which patient would you choose?     Patient A        Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
2 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
2 years 10 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
89% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
        No dependents 1 dependent 
Recipient age 45 years 65 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Severe: Heart 
attack, or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications 
None 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Severe arthritis None 
 
Which patient would you choose?     Patient  A         Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
3 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
10 years 1 month 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
89% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
1 dependent 4 dependents 
Recipient age 65 years 20 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy None Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
None Mild asthma 
 
Which patient would you choose?     Patient A        Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
4 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
1 month 2 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
89% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
4 dependents No dependents 
Recipient age 45 years 65 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy None Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Severe arthritis None 
 
Which patient would you choose?    Patient A                  Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
  
 
5 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
2 years 10 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
No dependents 1 dependent 
Recipient age 65 years 20 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Severe: Heart 
attack, or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications. 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
None Mild asthma 
 
Which patient would you choose?     Patient A         Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
6 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
10 years 1 month 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
1 dependent 4 dependents 
Recipient age 20 years 45 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Severe: Heart 
attack, or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications. 
 
None 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Mild asthma Severe arthritis 
 
Which patient would you choose?     Patient A         Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
  
 
7 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
1 month 2 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
1 dependent 4 dependents 
Recipient age 45 years 65 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Severe: Heart attack 
or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications 
None 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
None Mild asthma 
 
Which patient would you choose?     Patient A        Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
8 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
2 years 10 years 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
86% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
89% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
 4 dependents No dependents 
Recipient age 65 years 20 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy               None Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Mild asthma Severe arthritis 
 
Which patient would you choose?   Patient A                   Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
  
 
9 Patient A Patient B 
Amount of time a person has waited 
for a transplant 
 10 years 1 month 
Tissue type match – and likelihood of 
transplant success. 
89% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
90% average 1 year 
chance of transplant 
success 
How many dependents (children or 
adults) recipients have. 
No dependents 1 dependent 
Recipient age 20 years 45 years 
Diseases affecting life expectancy Moderate: 
Uncontrolled 
hypertension or 
obesity 
Severe: Heart attack 
or stroke, or 
diabetes with 
complications 
Other recipient illnesses (other than 
Kidney disease) 
Severe arthritis. None 
 
Which patient would you choose?    Patient A                    Patient B  
(tick 1 box only) 
 
  
About you and your circumstances. 
 
 
Gender:  
 
(Please tick 1 box only):   Male   Female  
 
Age:                 ____ years 
 
Do you have any children under 18 years?     
 
(Please tick 1 box only): 
 
Yes   No  
 
If ‘Yes’ how many of these live in your household? 
 
1 child               2 children      3 children      More than 3 children    
 
 
  
Do you have to care for any dependent adults (Please tick 1 box only): 
 
Yes       No  
 
If ‘Yes’ how many? 
 
1 dependent adult   2 dependent adults   More than 2 dependent adults  
  
 
Which of the following ethnic groups do you consider that you belong to?  (Please 
tick 1 box only): 
 
White – British       
 
White – Irish       
 
White – Any other white background    
- please describe__________________________ 
 
Mixed – White / Black Caribbean    
 
Mixed – White / Black African     
 
Mixed – White / Asian      
 
Any other mixed background     
- please describe__________________________ 
 
Black or black British (Caribbean)    
 
Black or black British (African)     
 
Black or black British (Any other background  
 
Asian or Asian British (Indian)     
 
Asian or Asian British (Pakistani)    
 
Asian or Asian British (Bangladeshi)    
 
Asian or Asian British (Any other background)  
 
Chinese         
 
Any other ethnic group      
- please describe__________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Work: 
 
Are you currently in paid employment? (Please tick all that apply): 
 
Yes (Working full-time).     Yes (Working part-time)  
     
Unemployed (Not working,    Not working due to long-   
but available for work).     Term sickness or disability. 
 
Retired from paid work.     Full time student    
 
Engagement in household    Others (please specify:)   
Duties.       _____________________________ 
 
 
Qualifications: 
 
What is the highest level of education you have completed (Please tick 1 box only): 
 
Secondary School       
 
Vocational / Trade / College Qualification   
 
‘A’ level / ‘AS’ levels      
 
Degree level qualification(s)     
 
Other (please describe_____________________).  
 
 
What perspective did you adopt when answering this questionnaire?: (Please tick 1 
box only): 
 
Answering the questions in terms of what  
would be best for me      
 
Answering the questions in terms of what  
would be best for me and others     
 
Disregarding what is best for me and only 
considering what is best for others    
 
  
  
  
  
Are you a donor or relative of a deceased donor?: 
 
 A living donor. 
 
 A relative of a deceased donor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
